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This thesis explores institutions under which venture capital investment 
operates in China and whether and how these institutions affect venture capitalists’ 
(VCs) investment preferences, ex-ante project screening strategies, and ex-post 
monitoring activities in China. Based on an analysis of about 50 unstructured and 
semi-structured interviews and an examination of more than 800 venture capital 
backed deals, this study finds that regulations on corporate governance impact 
VCs’ investment activities in China. Due to regulatory restrictions, most foreign 
venture capital firms are structured under limited partnerships, whereas all 
domestic venture capital firms (VCFs) are structured as limited companies in 
China. The difference in corporate governance of VCFs heavily affects VCs’ 
investment strategies in China. VCFs under limited partnerships show more risk-
taking capability than those structured as limited companies by investing more in 
younger projects with higher R&D intensity. Associated with the difference in 
investment preferences, VCFs under limited partnerships employ stage financing 
more frequently than those structured as limited companies do. At the same time, 
the stage financing strategies deployed by VCFs under limited partnerships are 
closely related to agency problems and transaction uncertainties. The more serious 
agency problems are the more intensive stage financing will be. However, VCFs 
structured as limited companies rarely employ stage financing and there is no 
visible pattern shown in their stage financing arrangements. Finally, similar to the 
practices in developed countries, VCs in China also take human capital factors as 
the utmost important criteria. However, they are more demanding in project 
screening by imposing additional criteria. Further, VCFs under limited 
partnerships are more demanding and more sensitive to market growth rate and 
financial returns, and more concerned about public policies. These results may be 
explained by the weak regulatory institutions in China and the incentives provided 
by different governance structures. VCFs structured as limited companies are 
organized hierarchically. Their incentive structure is designed to discourage risk 
taking and responsibilities. VCFs under limited partnership are more independent 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
‘If  I am not able to catch up with a VC folk in Menlo Park, then I may expect to meet 
him up either on the board flying to China or at a dinner table there…’ 
                                                                          (Partner of VCF13, interview, 2005)  
 
1.1 Research Objectives 
This study explores institutions of venture capital investment and the impacts 
of these institutions on venture capitalists’ (VCs) investment strategies in China. The 
overall institutional environments and institutional arrangements related to venture 
capital investment are first discussed. This study then examines whether these 
institutions affect VCs’ investment strategies in China; and, if the answer is yes, how 
these institutions impact VCs’ investment in China. The impacts of institutions on 
VCs’ investment activities are examined through three aspects: i.e. VCs’ investment 
preferences in terms of the technology and development stage of their portfolio 
companies, VCs’ ex-ante project screening criteria and VCs’ stage financing 
strategies. 
The general institutional environments and arrangements related to venture 
capital investment in China are first explored based on secondary document analysis 
and interviews with practitioners and governmental officials. It explores the overall 
legal and financial systems, public policies and social norms under which venture 
capital investment operates on the one hand, and, the governance structures of the 
individual venture capital funds on the other hand. A detailed introduction on the 
trajectory of China’s venture capital industry in the past twenty years is then 
followed to present how institutions interact with the development of venture capital 
investment in China. Based on these discussions, the specific research questions on 
VCs’ investment strategies are clarified.  
The impacts of institutions on VCs’ investment preferences in terms of 
technological intensity and development stage of their portfolio companies are 
examined from interviews with practitioners and investment data of the venture 
capital firms (VCFs). This analysis reveals to what extent VCs support young R&D 
entrepreneurship activities under the unique institutions in China. Although 
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researchers have claimed that venture capital investment indeed supports young 
R&D-oriented companies in the US (Elango et al., 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 
1999a), some empirical studies show that venture capitalists tend to invest in later-
staged companies in other countries (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Mayer et al., 2005). This 
analysis thus extends the literature by examining the impact of whether and how 
institutions affect VCs’ capability in supporting young and R&D intensive activities 
in China.  
The impacts of institutions on VCs’ ex-ante project screening criteria in 
China are also evaluated. Newly-established high-technology companies are 
associated with serious agency problems and uncertainties due to information 
asymmetries and high rate of failure (Hall, 2002). As a result, it is difficult for 
external investors to determine the potential and likelihood of success. The existing 
literature suggests that VCs employ sophisticated screening criteria as a major 
mechanism to avoid investing in bad projects. Empirical studies have found that the 
screening criteria used by venture capitalists across countries do not vary much. The 
personality and experience of the entrepreneur and management team are the utmost 
important concerns of VCs in most countries (MacMillan et al., 1985; Knight, 1994). 
Interviews with venture capitalists are conducted to determine whether and how 
institutions impact VCs’ screening criteria in China. By comparing VCs’ ex-ante 
project screening criteria in China to those in the US and other western countries, it 
examines whether VCs are more demanding in project screening under the weaker 
institutions in China. In addition, it also compares the screening criteria employed by 
VCFs under different governance structures within China to examine the impacts of 
institutional arrangements on VCs’ project screening activities.   
Finally, the impacts of institutions on VCs’ stage financing strategies in 
China are investigated.  Stage financing is considered as the most effective way to 
reduce agency costs and uncertainties in venture financing (Sahlman, 1990). 
Empirical studies show that VCs’ stage financing arrangements are indeed associated 
with the severity of agency problems and uncertainties of the investment; they are 
also correlated with the investment performance in the US (Gompers, 1995; Kaplan 
and Per Stromberg, 2004). Based on interviews with venture capitalists and 
systematic analysis on investment data of venture capital backed companies, the 
- 3 -  
pattern of stage financing arrangements in China are identified and compared to 
those in the US to analyze whether and how institutions affect VCs’ stage financing 
strategies in China.   
By addressing the above questions, this study provides an empirical 
exploration and analysis on institutions of venture capital investment and VCs’ 
investment strategies in China, examining the impacts of institutions on VCs’ 
investment preferences, ex-ante project screening and stage financing strategies. It is 
among the first empirical studies exploring venture capital investment in China based 
on first-hand collected data. It is also among the first attempts examining the 
interaction between institutions and investment activities in developing countries.  
1.2 Research Motivations 
Venture capital has been recognized as a powerful financial instrument to fill 
the funding gaps faced by young R&D-oriented companies and consequently 
accelerate national innovation. As an innovative financing means it has been 
duplicated around the world in recent years. However, despite the intense interest, 
little research has been conducted on venture capital outside the United States.  Many 
areas remain unexplored, such as how venture capital operates in other countries, 
whether the American model works in other countries, and what the determinants for 
venture capital development are. This lack of knowledge not only limits our 
understanding in the mechanisms of venture capital from the scholarly strand but 
also constrains the decision-making of policymakers and practitioners. This study 
tries to bridge up the knowledge gap with an insightful examination on venture 
capital investment in China.  
China’s venture capital industry is of special interest for the following 
reasons. China is one of the largest and most vibrant venture capital markets in the 
world. Since 2001, China (including Hong Kong) has ranked as the second largest 
venture capital market next to the United States in terms of annual disbursement (see 
Table 1.1). Even though the size of venture capital investment is still small relative to 
the GDP, it has been a major source of funding for new technology-based firms. 
Many of the most successful new technological companies in China, such as SOHU, 
SINA, BAIDU, SHANGDE and SHENGDA, have been backed by venture capital 
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funds. At the same time, China has become one of the most favourite destinations of 
international venture capital funds.  

















Australia 1,273 0.36 Korea 1695  0.40 
Austria  47 0.02 Malaysia  80 0.09 
Belgium  112 0.05 Netherlands 208 0.05 
Canada 3172 0.45 New Zealand 46 0.09 
China  1590 0.14 Norway 74 0.05 
Czech Republic 8 0.01 Philippines 24 0.03 
Denmark 172 0.11 Poland 28 0.02 
Finland 159 0.13 Portugal  18 0.02 
France  635 0.05 Singapore 1052 1.19 
Germany  1306 0.07 Slovakia 3 0.02 
Greece 36 0.03 Spain 125 0.02 
Hong Kong 1864 1.15 Sweden 270 0.13 
Hungary 18 0.04 Switzerland 85 0.03 
Iceland 7 0.09 Taiwan 393 0.14 
India 1133 0.24 Thailand 22 0.02 
Indonesia  9 0.01 United Kingdom  1051 0.07 
Ireland 43 0.04 United States  41005 0.40 
Italy 330 0.03 Vietnam 3 0.01 
Japan 2148 0.05    
 
                                                 
1 The data on venture capital investment in this table is from Gompers & Lerner (2004, P.18). According to them, they utilized 
the Asian Venture Capital Journal’s 2003 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia, 14th edition (2003) for statistics on the Asian 
region, Venture Economics’ National Venture Capital Association Yearbook (2000) for U.S. information, and the European 
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association’s Annual Survey of Pan-European Private Equity and Activity (2002) for 
European data.  European statistics include seed and start-up investments and exclude expansion, replacement capital and 
buyout investments. However, Asian statistics may include expansion and buyout investments.  All Dollar figures are in 
millions of 2002 Dollars. The figures on venture capital investment as a percentage of GDP is based on GDP figures in ‘The 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2002’ published by IMF, 2002. These values are based upon GDP in national 
currency and the exchange rate projections provided by the country desk economists for developing and transition countries. 
Exchanges rates for advanced economies are set as one part of the WEO assumptions during the WEO exercise. 
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According to a Zero2IPO survey, 2  venture capital investments made by 
foreign and joint venture capital investment firms consisted of over 75 per cent of the 
total investment in the country in 2004. In 2005, over US $4 billion new funds were 
raised from all over the world with the focus on China’s market. The rapid growth of 
China’s venture capital industry has attracted little scrutiny.  
China is the largest developing economy, sustaining an annual growth rate of 
over 9.5 per cent since the late 1970s, when the country started economic reform. 
Among the achievements of the economic reform, the development of high-
technology industries and non-state owned small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) is most remarkable. After twenty years of implementing market-driven 
reforms to modernize the science and technology system, China’s gross expenditure 
on research and development (GERD) rose from RMB 34.9 billion in 1995 to RMB 
236.7 billion in 2005 with an average annual growth rate at about 21 per cent. 
Currently, China’s GERD ranks the third in the world behind the United States and 
Japan. The output of R&D activities has also significantly improved over the years. 
The production of the high-technology industry accounted for about 18 per cent of 
the total GDP in 2004. Furthermore, the exports of high-technology products reached 
to US $218.25 billion in 2005, from US $2.87 billion in 1991. 
At the same time, non-state owned enterprises show increasing contribution 
to R&D and high-technology industry development. Foreign and joint ventures in 53 
high technology development zones (HTDZs) contributed to nearly half of the total 
production and 85 per cent of the total exports in 2005.  Private firms, among which 
99 per cent are SMEs, create 65 per cent of patents and 80 per cent of new products 
in China. In 2005, more than 30,000 of 41,990 companies in HTDZs were private 
companies that created about 3 million jobs. Although the development of China’s 
economy and high-technology industry have attracted enormous attention from 
policy makers and practitioners, academic investigations remain scarce, especially 
studies concerning China’s entrepreneurship and R&D financing.  
China is one of the most active nations in initiating venture capital investment 
programs and attracting venture capital inflows. Over the past two decades, various 
                                                 
2 Zero2IPO is the largest venture capital and private equity survey company in China. They have produced annual reports on 
venture capital investment in China every year since 2001 based on survey data. The data from the report has been quoted in 
many media and academic work. It is regarded as one of the most reliable data sources in venture capital investment in China.  
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initiatives have been carried out in order to encourage R&D activities in general and 
corporate R&D-oriented projects in newly established high-technology companies in 
particular. Venture capital investment was introduced by the government as a part of 
science and technology reform. China’s venture capital industry echoes the dramatic 
institutional dynamics of the country during the transition from central planning to a 
more market-based business system. A thorough investigation may therefore not only 
contribute to understanding in venture capital investment in China as well as 
institutional reform. Additionally, a systematic examination of the market will also 
help to assess how the government initiatives work.  
The rapid development of venture capital in China, like many other 
phenomena in the country, contradicts some theoretical predictions and empirical 
evidence from other countries. Researchers suggest that the differences in institutions, 
especially the divergence in financial and legal systems, are the major factors that 
impact corporate performance and business behaviours across countries (La Porta, et 
al., 1997, 1998; Allen and Gale, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Cross-country 
studies indeed show that venture capitalists’ investment activities depend on the 
institutions of the countries where they operate. Stronger institutions lead to more 
active venture capitalists’ involvement in the management of their portfolio 
companies, greater use of innovative governance mechanisms, and more developed 
venture capital markets (Kaplan et al., 2003; Cummings et al., 2003; Jeng and Wells, 
2000). As the largest transitional economy, China is unique in its political, economic, 
technological and social institutions. In particular, it is well documented that Chinese 
financial and legal institutions are weak (Allen et al., 2005). Thus, it is puzzling that 
the venture capital market in China has experienced surprisingly rapid development 
in the past decade. An insightful examination of the market is thus needed as the first 
step to uncover the puzzle.   
As one of the first studies on venture capital investment in China, this study 
empirically explores and examines venture capital investment in China under an 
institutional framework. It contributes to the existing literature by providing both 
insights and systematic analysis on China’s venture capital investment. It also 
contributes to the existing literature on venture capital investment by examining the 
impacts of both the agency relationship between VCs and entrepreneurs and the 
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agency relationship between VCs and the venture fund investors on VCs’ investment 
activities. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature on institutions with the attempt 
to identify the specific institutions that might affect VCs’ investment activities. By 
providing the stylized facts and a thorough analysis on VCs’ investing behaviours, 
this study also has important implications to policy- making and decision-making of 
practitioners.  
1.3 Methodology and Data  
This study is an empirical exploration on venture capital investment in China 
that combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The choice of 
methodology is mainly determined by the nature of this research and the pragmatic 
considerations. A multi-phased research design which covers different data 
collecting and analyzing methods was constructed. In the initial stage, unstructured 
interviews, semi-structured interviews, and archive analysis were used to document 
and document the relevant institutions and explore the activities of venture capitalists 
in China. The specific research questions for quantitative examinations were then 
derived from the understandings in the existing literature and the interview findings. 
In the second stage, quantitative analyses were conducted based on the detailed 
investment data that were hand-collected from various sources, and, data from 
commercial databases. In the last stage, unstructured interviews were conducted 
again to reinforce the primary findings and enrich the interpretation of the findings.  
The qualitative data were gathered from unstructured interviews with seven 
venture capitalists, four entrepreneurs, two government officials, and four 
researchers; the semi-structured interviews were conducted with 37 venture 
capitalists from 34 venture capital firms. The major quantitative data were composed 
of two sub-datasets: the ‘Venture Economics’ database and a hand collected database 
gathered from secondary document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The data 
cover detailed investment information for 1030 venture capital backed deals, which 
represent over one third of the venture capital backed projects in China.  
This is among the first studies that combine both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses on venture capital investment. Limitations of the research methodology, 
such as sampling bias and the weakness of research skills, are hardly avoided. 
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However, it is hoped that the multi-phased research design and the employment of 
various research approaches may essentially improve the robustness of this study.   
1.4 Summary of Findings  
The findings of this study are summarized as follows. Overall, the institutions 
in China are different from those in the US and other western countries. And, 
institutions indeed impact venture capitalists’ investment activities in China. This 
study shows that VCs’ investment strategies share both commonalities and 
differences with the practices in the United States. Similar to their US peers, venture 
capitalists in China also take agency problems and uncertainties as important 
concerns in their investment. However, the unique institutions in China, especially 
regulatory institutions, affect venture capitalists’ investment strategies. Moreover, the 
major institutions that affect investment activities are not along the lines of financial 
systems or the protection for property rights; rather, this study shows that institutions 
affect investment strategies mainly through the channel of corporate governance.  
Primarily, this study reveals that the general institutional environments, 
especially legal and financial institutions under which venture capital investment 
operates in China are relatively weaker than those in the US.  Associated with these 
regulatory constraints, venture capital firms in China are divided into two major 
groups. That is, the organizational structures of most venture capital firms in China 
are either limited partnerships or limited companies. The Chinese law prohibited 
limited partnership as a form of organizations until June 2007. Currently, nearly all 
foreign venture capital firms (FVCFs) are incorporated offshore under the limited 
partnership structure, whereas all domestic venture capital firms (DVCFs) are 
structured as limited companies. This difference in the corporate governance of 
VCFs significantly affects VCs’ investment strategies in China. 
First, similar to their counterparts in the US, venture capitalists in China 
support young R&D-oriented companies. Over 70 per cent of venture capital backed 
deals in the sample are in high-technology industry; about 35 per cent were in early 
development stages at the time of venture financing. However, VCFs under different 
governance structures show different risk-taking capabilities in their investments in 
China. Compared with the VCFs structured as limited companies (LCVCFs), VCFs 
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under limited partnership (LPVCFs) take higher level of risks by investing more in 
younger projects and projects with higher R&D intensity.   
Second, venture capitalists in China also share many commonalities with 
their peers in developed countries in terms of the ex-ante project screening criteria. 
Similar to the US practice, venture capitalists in China consider the characteristics of 
the entrepreneur as the utmost important factor in their project screening. In addition, 
the market and financial considerations are also emphasized by venture capitalists in 
China, as that in the US. However, venture capitalists in China are more demanding 
than their peers in developed countries, imposing more screening criteria as 
additional conditions to reduce the problems raised from the weak regulatory 
institutions. For example, besides the commonly recognized screening factors, 
venture capitalists in China emphasize the integrity and social network of the 
entrepreneur. Additionally, venture capitalists in China consider the public policies 
of local governments as major concerns. Moreover, again, the screening criteria are 
also associated with the corporate governance structure: VCFs under limited 
partnership are more demanding than VCFs structured as limited companies, paying 
more attention to the market growth rate and the financial returns of the potential 
portfolio companies, and are more concerned about regulatory institutions. 
Thirdly, similar to practice in the United States, for sectors where agency 
problems are more severe, stage financing is used more frequently in China. 
However, this pattern is not shown with all VCFs in China. VCFs under the different 
governance structures behave differently in stage financing. VCFs under limited 
partnership employ stage financing much more frequently and show clear regularities 
in their stage financing arrangements. The stage financing strategy deployed by 
VCFs under limited partnership in China is closely related to agency problems and 
transaction uncertainties. The more serious the agency problems one expects, the 
more intensive stage financing is used. Financing durations between stages are 
negatively and significantly correlated with the R&D intensity but positively and 
significantly correlated with the age of the company. At the same time, the 
investment performance of VCFs under limited partnership is positively and 
significantly correlated to stage financing arrangements. All the discovered stage 
financing strategies of VCFs under limited partnership are similar to the US practice 
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documented in the literature. However, VCFs under the limited company structure 
rarely employ stage financing. Moreover, they do not show visible patterns in the 
choice and structure of stage financing in their investment.  
These findings suggest that institutions indeed matter in venture capital 
investment in China. On the one hand, the regulatory institutions impact on the 
corporate governance structure of VCFs in China that in turn affects the operation of 
the venture capital firms and incentives provided to the investment professionals. 
The different incentive schemes then determine the investment strategies carried by 
the investment professionals. VCFs structured as limited companies are organized 
hierarchically that provide lower-powered incentives to venture capitalists to take 
more risks and responsibilities in their investment. VCFs under limited partnership 
are more decentralized in governance that provide higher-powered incentives to 
investment professionals to pursue higher risks and responsibilities for more 
opportunities and higher return.  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the 
background for this study and the motivations for the research questions.  It analyzes 
the difficulties in R&D financing followed by a discussion on why venture capital 
investment, as a solution for financing R&D projects, is significant to innovation and 
economic growth. The major characteristics and the history of venture capital 
investment are then introduced. Based on the discussion on venture capital 
investment and the evolution of venture capital industry in the United States, this 
chapter justifies why agency problems and institutions are the key issues in this 
study. 
Chapter 3 reviews relevant studies with the focus on agency problems and 
institutional issues in venture capital investment. Studies on how the business actors 
resolve the agency problems and uncertainty involved in the double-sided agency 
relationships (i.e. the agency relationship between venture capitalists and the ultimate 
investors of venture funds, and, the agency relationship between venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs) in venture capital investment is discussed. It also reviews the 
previous studies that address the interactions between venture capital investment and 
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institutions. This chapter concludes with a summary of the limitations with the 
existing literature and what knowledge gaps this study may fill up in particular.  
Chapter 4 justifies the methodology and research design of this study. It first 
analyzes the features of different research approaches and then presents a detailed 
design that covers the research process, methods of data collection, the choice and 
access of research subjects, and data analysis methods. In the last section, the major 
limitations of the methods used are addressed and the methodological findings are 
analyzed.  
Chapter 5 introduces the institutional environments and arrangements of 
venture capital investment in China. With an introduction on the major arguments in 
new institutional economics, it suggests that new institutional economics provides an 
appropriate platform to understand and explain venture capital investment in China. 
It then introduces the development of venture capital industry and the institutional 
settings and arrangements under which the industry has been developed. Finally, it 
discusses how the framework of new institutional economics may be applied to help 
in achieving the research objectives of this study. 
Chapters 6 through 8 present the major findings of this empirically study. 
Chapter 6 examines venture capitalists’ investment preferences in the development 
stage and technological intensity of their portfolio companies. By answering this 
question, it reveals whether venture capitalists indeed support young high-technology 
companies in China; whether venture capital firms are different in their capabilities 
to finance young R&D-oriented companies; and, what the major factors are that 
impact on venture capitalists’ investment preferences. Chapter 7 explores how 
venture capitalists make ex-ante investment decisions in China with the focus on 
venture capitalists’ project screening criteria. With this analysis, it finds out what the 
major risks and opportunities are considered as the most important by venture 
capitalists in their investment in China. Chapter 8 explores and examines venture 
capitalists’ ex-post monitoring activities in China with a focus on stage financing. 
The relationship between venture capitalists’ stage financing arrangements and the 
agency problems and uncertainties associated with the investment is investigated. In 
addition, the impact of the agency relationship between venture capitalists and the 
ultimate fund investors on VCs’ stage financing strategies is also examined. 
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Furthermore, the impact of stage financing on the performance of venture capitalists’ 
portfolio companies is tested. By comparing venture capitalists’ investing activities 
in China and their counterparts in the US, where venture capital investment 
originated, these chapters discuss how institutions impact on venture capital 
investment in China.  
Chapter 9 draws together the key findings of this empirical analysis and 
assesses the limitations with this study, followed by a discussion on the potential 
further research directions and the implications of this study.  
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background of Venture Capital Investment 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the institutional background and conceptual 
framework of venture capital investment. Questions like what venture capital is, how 
venture capital is different from other financial means and what makes venture 
capital investment significant for economy are discussed. At the same time, the 
interaction between venture capital investment and institutional environments is 
analyzed based on the introduction of the history of venture capital investment in the 
United States.  
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section introduces the nature of 
venture capital investment; Section 3 describes the history of venture capital industry 
in the US; Section 4 discusses the economic and social impacts on venture capital 
investment with the focus on its effects on innovation; The last section summarizes 
the chapter by addressing the importance of agency problems and institutions for 
understanding venture capital investment.   
2.2 The Nature of Venture Capital Investment  
2.2.1 What is Venture Capital Investment?  
Venture capital was first used as a term by Jean Witter in his presidential 
address to the 1939 Investment Bankers Association of American Convention. 
However, for Witter, venture capital was not a specialized area of finance like 
modern concept that focuses on early-staged technological enterprises; rather, it was 
a traditional component of some wealthy individual’s portfolios, i.e. investment in 
businesses in experimental stages (Reiner, 1991). In the past sixty years, venture 
capital industry has experienced dramatic dynamics and it has been well established 
and professionalized. The definition for this special investment form is more 
standardized.  
According to the definition of the US National Venture Capital Association 
(NVCA), venture capital is ‘money provided by professionals who invest alongside 
management in young, rapidly growing companies that have the potential to develop 
into significant economic contributors. Venture capital is an important source of 
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equity for start-up companies’3.  Although private equity and venture capital are 
combined both statistically and in the mind of policy-makers for much of the world, 
the definitions for venture capital investment share many commonalities with the 
‘American model’(Kenney et al., 2004),. For example, according to the European 
Venture Capital Association (EVCA), venture capital is ‘Professional equity co-
invested with the entrepreneur to fund an early stage (seed and start-up) or expansion 
venture. Offsetting the high risk the investor takes is the expectation of higher than 
average return on the investment’4.  
Normally, three major groups of stakeholders are involved in venture capital 
investment, i.e. the ultimate investors of venture capital funds, venture capitalists and 
the entrepreneurs. The ultimate investors of venture capital funds are normally 
private or public pension funds, endowment funds, foundations, corporations, 
wealthy individuals and foreign investors etc. (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). In the 
context of venture capital investment, an entrepreneur is normally a person who 
operates a venture, which is normally with limited operating history and cannot raise 
funds from a bank or public capital market. In this case, the entrepreneur normally 
gives up certain portion of equity and control rights to gain the capital from venture 
capitalists to support the growth of the venture (Gompers. 1995).  
A venture capitalist is a professional who channels the ultimate investors of 
venture funds and entrepreneurs with their expertise. They raise funds from those 
ultimate investors and then invest the capital on behalf of the investors in newly 
established ventures. According to NVCA, VCs not only make many efforts to seek 
and evaluate the projects and provide capital to the ventures; but also very actively 
participate in the management of their portfolio companies. It is suggested that as 
shareholders, VCs normally take part in all the important decision-makings in the 
ventures including the recruitment of major executive managers, the development of 
new products and services, large investment, M&A or IPO schedule etc.  
2.2.2 The Process of Venture Capital Investment 
The process of venture capital investment includes fund raising, capital 
investing, and, investment exit (see Figure 2.1). Fundraising is the first step for 
                                                 
3 See www.nvca.org  
4 See www.evca.com  
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venture capital investment. VCs normally raise funds from institutional investors, 
large corporations, wealthy individuals and foreign investors who look for investing 
part of their portfolios in opportunities with higher risks and commensurate 
opportunities for higher returns. Since the 1980s, over 80 per cent venture capital 
firms are structured as limited partnerships in the United Sates with the venture 
capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. In a 
limited partnership, investors are limited partners who contribute the majority of the 
capital (normally 97-99%) and venture capitalists are general partners who contribute 
the minority of capital. The life span of the partnership is normally between seven to 
ten years. Most venture capital firms are responsible for managing several pools of 
capital, each representing a legally separate limited partnership. The relationship 
between fund investors and VCs is governed by a partnership agreement that spells 
out the rights and obligations of each group (Sahlman, 1990). 
After fundraising, venture capitalists concentrate on investing the capital in 
growing ventures. Normally, the capital is invested in new ventures during the first 
three to five years of the fund. Deal sourcing, ex-ante project screening, due 
diligence, contract design and ex-post monitoring are the major activities of venture 
capitalists in venture financing (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). Studies show that venture 
capitalists not only provide the needed capital to entrepreneurs but also very actively 
participate in the management and governance of the ventures they invested 
(Salhman, 1990; Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003). 
Researchers suggest that venture capitalists differentiate themselves from other 
institutional financiers by exerting intensive monitoring efforts and providing value-
added supports to their portfolio companies (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  
The goal for venture capitalists is to begin divesting after the investments are 
made, i.e. converting the existing investments to cash. According to NVCA, VCs 
eventually seek to exit the investment in three to seven years. The major exit 
methods are IPO, M&A, share sale and clearance. IPO is considered as the most 
favourite type of exit by both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. There have been 
over 3000 venture capital backed companies issued IPO at the US stock markets in 
the past twenty years that has brought great profits to entrepreneurs, venture 
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capitalists and their investors (NVCA). Normally, the distributions are made to the 
partners rather than reinvested in new ventures.  
Typically, well before all of the capital from a venture-capital pool is 
distributed to the partners, a new fund is raised and invested in new ventures 
(Sahlman, 1990). The value of a venture capital fund is measured by the valuation of 
the portfolio companies in which the fund invests. Generally, by the end of the 
fund’s life, the average internal return rate is calculated subject to a liquidity discount 
in the portfolio valuation. Consequently, the performance of a venture capital 
institution is guided by the valuation of funds it manages. Normally, the size of 
further fundraising and the terms of the covenant are dependent on the performance 
of the venture capital firm (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). 
Figure 2.1 Venture Capital Operation Model in the US  
 
Source: www.evca.com  
2.2.3 Agency Problems in Venture Capital Investment 
From the foregoing introduction on venture capital investment, it can be seen 
that venture capital investment is associated with serious agency problems due to the 
severe information asymmetry problems and high level of uncertainty.  
Principal-agent problems normally arise when one person (an agent) acts on 
behalf of another (the principal). Specifically, the delegation of authority to the agent 
may result in the agent taking actions that are not in the principal’s best interests 
which are unknown to the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The fundamental 
assumption of agency problem is that individuals are self-interested and will act 
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opportunistically. When there is conflict between the interests of the agent and the 
principal, the agent might act in his/her own self-interest.  
In the context of venture capital investment, there are two sets of agency 
relationships involved, i.e. the relationship between the venture capitalist and the 
ultimate investors of venture capital funds and, the relationship between the venture 
capitalist and the entrepreneur. In the ‘venture capitalist-fund investor’ relationship, 
VCs act as agents who invest the capital on behalf of the ultimate investors whereas 
the ultimate investors of venture funds act principals who delegate their authority to 
VCs. In the ‘venture capitalist-entrepreneur’ relationship, however, VCs act as 
principals who provide capital to entrepreneurs whereas entrepreneurs act as agents 
who are involved in daily management of the ventures on behalf of VCs.  
Agency problems can be more serious when the contracts are written in a 
world with more severe information asymmetry and higher level of uncertainty. 
Information asymmetry occurs when one party to a transaction has more or better 
information than the other party (Akerlof, 1976). When the agent has better 
information on his/her own skill and on how well the investment is made than the 
principal, it is hard for the principal to monitor and assess the performance of the 
agent that the agent may have an to act inappropriately (from the view of the 
principal) if the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned (Spence and 
Zeckhauser, 1974; Stiglitz, 1971). In addition, higher level of uncertainty may also 
lead to more serious agency problems. Researchers suggest that even when the 
information is symmetric to the two parties, contracts are not complete in reality 
because human beings’ rationality is bounded (Simon, 1979). The contract 
difficulties are more serious when the transaction is associated with more uncertainty 
that may lead to (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Hart, 1988). In this case, the more 
uncertainty the investment encounters, the more serious the agency problems emerge.  
Venture capital investment encounters severe information asymmetric 
problems and high level of uncertainty that determine the agency problems are more 
serious. Primarily, as stated, venture capital investment is highly specialised that the 
ultimate investors of the venture capital funds are not able to fully observe how many 
efforts the venture capitalist exerts and how well the funds are managed whilst the 
venture capitalist has much more and better information. At the same time, there are 
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also severe information asymmetries between venture capitalists and the 
entrepreneurs they back. That is, it is very hard for venture capitalists to fully 
observe and verify the efforts made by the entrepreneurs and the performance of the 
projects. First, the information disclosure rule for privately held companies is not as 
rigorous as those for public companies. Second, it is normally more difficult to verify 
the quality of information since the young companies are lack of historical records. 
Finally, the uncertainty associated with venture capital investment is very high since 
the targeted young companies normally face more uncertainty with the technology, 
product and service, market acceptance and management capability etc. than the 
mature ventures.    
In summary, the severe information problems and high level of uncertainty 
involved in venture capital investment induce serious agency problems in both fund 
raising and capital investing processes. Almost all the widely used mechanisms in 
venture capital investment are therefore focused on how to provide appropriate 
incentives to the parties and control and reduce these agency costs.  
2.2.4 How Venture Capital is Distinguished from Other Financial Forms? 
According to the above introduction, venture capital investment is 
distinguished from other financial instruments. Primarily, it is different from bank 
loans. Venture capital investment is not in the form of debt; rather, it is in the form of 
equity investment. Made as cash in exchange for shares of the portfolio companies, 
venture capital investment normally takes higher degree of uncertainties than bank 
loans since the investment thus might be fully sunk if the project fails.  At the same 
time, as shareholders, VCs are much more heavily involved in the management of 
their portfolio companies than banks (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  
Moreover, venture capital is also different from public equity investment. 
Venture capital investment targets young companies with growing potentials, which 
are normally not able to issue public offerings. By investing in privately held 
ventures, venture capital investment encounters poorer liquidity than those 
investments in public capital markets. At the same time, venture capitalists as 
investors face much more severe information asymmetric problems than investors in 
public capital markets where the listed companies have to face very rigorous 
information disclosure rules.  
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Furthermore, venture capital is also different from non-venture private equity 
investments, e.g. buy-outs, restructure and mezzanine funds etc. Even though both as 
in the form of equity investment, normally, the targets of venture capital investment 
are companies at earlier or expansion stages of development whereas the targets of 
non-venture private equity investments are those at later stages of development. In 
addition, most of non-venture private equity investments are associated with debts. 
Thus, targeting immature ventures, venture capital investment bares more 
uncertainties than non-venture private equity investments.  
Finally, venture capital investment is also different from angel capital. 
Normally, angel investors are affluent individuals who provide capital for a business 
start-up, usually in exchange for convertible debt or ownership equity. Similar to 
venture capital investment, angel capital is also a form of private equity investment. 
However, unlike venture capitalists, who manage the pooled money of others in a 
professionally managed fund, angel investors typically invest their own funds. In this 
case, venture capital investment is more complex than angel capital in terms of the 
stakeholder composition and the layers of agency issues. In addition, the size of 
capital and the portfolio for venture capital funds are normally larger than those of 
angel capital are.  
In summary, venture capital investment is different from many other forms of 
investment by funding younger ventures in the form of private equity. It encounters 
more severe information asymmetries that might lead to more serious agency 
problems. In addition, the poorer liquidity and the lack of collateral requirements 
may also reduce the downside protection for the investment. Therefore, VCs 
normally carry a higher risk-return profile than other institutional investors to 
compensate the higher rate of failure.  
Since the great success of ‘Silicon Valley’, venture capital investment has 
been recognized as one of the most important factors that impact on the rapid 
development of high-technology companies in the US. In the past twenty years, 
many nations began to initiate venture capital programs with the expectation to 
stimulate entrepreneurial R&D activities by duplicating the ‘American model’. 
However, it should be noted that even in the United States, modern venture capital 
industry is still young and the development of this industry has been closely 
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associated with the special institutional changes in this country. In the next text, the 
evolution of venture capital industry in the US is introduced. 
2.3 The History of Venture Capital Industry in the US 
2.3.1 The Emergence of Venture Capital Investment 
Venture capital investment emerged as an innovative financing instrument 
under a special political and economic context in the US in the 1940s. Historical 
events such as The Great Depression in 1929, the First New Deal in the 1930s and, 
the World War II in the 1940s all had impacts on the appearance of venture capital 
investment5. The emergence of venture capital investment as a financial means was 
not only a result of market and technological development of industries and the 
practical choice of businessmen and investment bankers, but also an ideological ideal 
of government officers and scholars.  
First of all, the decline of venture investing from both wealthy individuals 
and investment banks after The Great Depression made it very difficult for new 
businesses to gain start-up capital from private markets. In addition, the regulations 
on IPO issued during the First New Deal (e.g. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933; competitive bidding requirements for underwriting etc.) 
further reduced the opportunities for young companies’ financing from the public 
stock markets. 
At the same time, investment bankers were under heavy pressures due to the 
increase of internalized investment of large corporations and government funding 
during the World War II when more funds and decision-making power shifted from 
individuals to institutional financiers like investment banks. They were eager to find 
out some new ways to invest the funds.  
During the World War II some technologically intensive enterprises 
generated great amount of profits with the supports of the US government. The 
successes based on the collaboration of funds, R&D activities and management 
expertise attracted institutional financiers. Therefore, they called for a new way of 
venture financing to overcome the potential post-war depression and take good use 
of the technologies developed during the war. An important part of this approach was 
                                                 
5 See Reiner (1991) for more detailed analysis of the emergence of venture capital investment in the US.  
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to develop distinctive networks of information about human resources, technologies 
and markets.  
The first venture capital institution, the American Research & Development 
Corporation (AR&D) was established in 1946 in Boston by General George Doriot 
with a group of businessmen, scientists and university administrators6. Raising funds 
from both institutions and individuals and investing the capital in new technological 
businesses, the venture capitalists assessed and managed the projects in more 
professional ways. The greatest success of AR&D was the $ 70,000 investment in 
Digital Equipment Company in 1957 which issued IPO in 1968 with the market 
value of $355 Mil.  
2.3.2 The Professionalization of Venture Capital Investment  
Venture capital sector did not attract much attention in the early years of its 
emergence. The industry has been modest in terms of the size of capital pool and 
disbursements of capital for about 30 years. Even though the Small Business 
Investment Act of 1958 authorized the US Small Business Administration (SBA) to 
license private ‘Small Business Investment Companies’ (SBICs) to provide financing 
and management assistance to small entrepreneurial businesses in the United States, 
the industry developed very slowly due to the lack of institutional investors (see 
Figure 2.1). Because institutional investors are reluctant to invest, most venture 
capital funds were closed-end fund and marketed to individuals or SBICs before the 
1970s (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  
The growth of venture capital industry accelerated in the 1970s associated 
with legislative, regulatory, market, and technological dynamics in the United States. 
The industry experienced significant changes in terms of fundraising, disbursement, 
sources of capital and the organizational structure of the venture capital institutions 
in the 1970s. Primarily, the stock market went into slump after the IPO wave in 1968. 
Then, after the Congress legislated against the abuse of pension fund money in 1974, 
                                                 
6 The major founders of AR&D were as follows: General Georges Doriot, a French-born military man who is considered as 
‘the father of venture capital’. He has been a professor at Harvard Business School after the World War II until 1966. Ralph 
Flanders, an American mechanical engineer and industrialist who has been the president of the Federal Reserve Board in 
Boston, Massachusetts from 1944 to 1946.  Karl Compton, a prominent American physicist who has been the president of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) from 1930 to 1948. Merrill Griswold, an American investment banker who was 
the Chairman of Massachusetts Investors Trust in 1946.  
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all high-risk investment in these funds was halted. However, when the NYSE 
tightened up the regulations on IPO, NASDAQ was established in 1971. It is an 
electronic stock market targeting young companies without sufficient profit records 
but have promising potentials. It provided an alternative exit channel for venture 
capital investment.  
In addition, there were regulations on investment of pension funds and 
taxation in the late 1970s that allowed the inflow of funds into the venture capital 
industry. First, the capital gains tax rate was reduced from 49.5 per cent to 28 per 
cent in 1978. Then the amendment to the ‘Prudent Man’ rule in 1979 confirmed that 
pension fund managers are allowed to invest part of the funds in high-risk assets. The 
relaxation of regulation on pension fund investment led a great increase of fund 
inflow into the venture capital market (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  
Moreover, the technological improvement also accelerated the development 
of the venture capital industry. The increasing use of personal computers in research 
and business and the development of biotechnology attracted much attention from 
investors. There were a number of venture capital-backed innovative companies 
issued IPO with great success. These included Fed-Ex in 1978, Apple Computer and 
Genetech in 1981. This phenomenon attracted further interests from individual and 
institutional financiers. A great amount of capital flowed into the venture capital 
industry from public and pension funds, endowments, foundations, insurance 
companies, banks, individuals and other entities. The industry experienced its first 
sharp increase in the 1980s. In 1978, the new fund raised per year was less than $ 
500 million. The amount rose to more than $ 6.2 billion in 1987.  
Associated with the increase of fundraising and the expansion of capital 
sources, the composition of venture capitalists and the structure of venture capital 
institutions also experienced changes. First, increasing number of investment 
advisors began to enter into the market since the 1980s. They mainly advise large 
public or pension funds in project selecting and monitoring based on their 
professional knowledge and pooled resources. At the same time, limited partnership 
as an organizational structure gained more popularity among venture capital 
institutions in the 1980s. The percentage of limited partnership rose from 40 per cent 
in 1980 to 80 per cent in 1988.  
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Venture capital industry has achieved a steady growth during most of the 
1980s and then a reverse in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Researchers suggest 
that the decrease was due to the disappointing performance of inexperienced venture 
capitalists who stepped into the industry in the early 1980s (Gompers, 1994). In 
addition, the crash of the stock markets in 1987 obviously influenced the industry 
negatively. In 1991, the size of new raised funds dropped to less than $ 1.8 billion 
from $ 6.2 billion in 1987.  
2.3.3 The Boom and Fluctuation of Venture Capital Investment  
The boom of venture capital investment arrived in the second half of the 
1990s with the economic recovery and the rapid development of the internet 
industry.  
After the crash of stock market in 1987, venture capital industry has 
experienced a long-term downturn. According to the statistics of National Venture 
Capital Association, the average of internal rate of return (IRR) of the venture capital 
firms dropped to 8 per cent by 1990 from 25 per cent in the 1980s. Disappointed 
fund investors withdrew from venture investing. At the same time, many 
inexperienced venture capitalists that entered into the industry in the 1980s left due 
to the unsatisfactory performance.  
However, the economic recovery and the IPO booms in the first half of the 
1990s established a friendlier macroeconomic environment for venture capital 
investment. The annual GDP growth rate increased from -0.2 per cent in 1990 to 4 
per cent in 1994 in the United States. At the same time, the total number of IPO cases 
in NYSE and NASDAQ sharply rose from 89 in the year of 1990 to 424 in 1995. 
With the economic growth in the early 1990s, high-technology industry also 
experienced rapid development. The most striking phenomenon is the emergence and 
rapid rise of the internet industry. It was estimated that the internet industry grew by 
100 per cent per year, with a brief period of explosive growth in 1996 and 1997 
(Coffman and Odlyzko, 1998).  
Realizing the remarkable rise in the market value of the internet sectors and 
related fields, venture capitalists moved fast into the industry. At the same time, the 
low interest rates in the late 1990s further helped to increase the venture capital 
investment. According to the data of VentureEconomics, the amount invested by 
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venture capitalists in the United States increased from $7 billion in 1995 to $ 11.5 
billion in 1997 and further rose to $103 billion in 2000.  
However, the increase did not sustain for long. The crash of the ‘Dot Com 
Bubble’ in 2000 and then the collapse of NASDAQ led to a sharp drop of the 
industry. In 2001, the annual fundraising size reduced to $41 billion and further 
dropped to $8 billion in 2002 which was lower than that in 1996. The depression was 
not overcome till the end of 2003. From 2004, with another wave of investment in 
the internet industry and the increasing globalization of venture capital investment, 
the industry began to steadily recover. In the United States, the new funds raised in 
2005 were $25.6 billion which was still much lower than $32.9 billion in 1998.  
In general, the venture capital industry experienced the most dramatic rise 
and fall from 1996 to 2003 and then got back to a steady recovery track by 2004 in 
the United States. If the dynamics of the sector in the 1980s were mainly due to 
institutional changes, then the significant fluctuation during the late 1990s was 
mainly credited to the changes of market speculations on the internet industry. 
To summarize, the development of the venture capital industry in the United 
States shows that the development of venture capital market is path-dependent. It is a 
result of complicated interaction of different institutions including legal, political, 
economic and technological elements. In particular, the government has played an 
important role in the development of venture capital industry. For example, the 
government initiatives such as the Small Business Investment Corporations program, 
the changes of capital gain tax policy and the relaxation of investment regulation for 
pension funds etc. have helped accelerating the capital accumulation and 
professionalizing VCs’ investment activities (Kenney et al., 2004; Gompers, 1994). 
Besides, the individuals have also tried to adjust the ways on how they govern the 
relationship between each other with the overall institutional dynamics. For example, 
with more interests from institutional investors since 1980s, venture capital funds are 
mainly organized as limited partnerships currently instead of being structured as 
close-ended public traded funds. All these phenomena suggest that institutions have 
strong impact on the development of venture capital industry as a whole on the one 
hand, and on how the individuals structure their business organizations on the other 
hand. This is consistent with new institutional economics that believes economic 
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growth and business activities result from institutions and institutional changes both 
at a given time and over time (North, 1990; Williamson, 1991).   
2.4 The Significance of Venture Capital Investment 
2.4.1 The Globalization of Venture Capital Investment  
Venture capital investment has attracted increasing interests from both 
researchers and policymakers since the 1980s. It is widely believed that venture 
capital investment is a good solution to fill up the funding gaps faced by young R&D 
ventures, and consequently, stimulates national innovation and economic growth 
(Bygrave, 1987; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Since the 1980s, many nations in 
Europe and Asia began to initiate public programs to stimulate venture capital 
activities7 . Most countries try to duplicate the ‘American Model’ to build up a 
friendly environment for the venture capital sector by stimulating both demand and 
supply sides of the investment, i.e. providing subsidies and preferential taxation 
policies to both start-up companies and venture capital institutions, undertaking 
regulatory changes in pension funds and insurance funds management, and building 
up secondary stock markets etc8.  
Currently, there are over 30 national venture capital associations around the 
world. Venture capital has become a central institution in some of the most dynamic, 
innovative firm clusters in the world (Kenney et al., 2000). According to the Global 
Venture Capital Insight Report produced by Earnst & Young, in 2005, venture 
capital investments worldwide reached to $31.3 billion (€25.8 billion). Additionally, 
in 2005, $26.5 billion (€22.3 billion) new venture funds were raised in the United 
States, Europe, and Israel according to Dow Jones VentureOne. 
At the same time, the increasing cross-boarder operations of the United States, 
European and some Asian venture capital and private equity institutions further 
speed up the globalization of the innovative financing means. In particular, 
developing countries have attracted strong interests from the cross-boarder funds. 
According to the 2005 Global Venture Capital Survey conducted jointly by Deloitte 
                                                 
7 For example, Yozma in Israel, SBICs in Japan, SEAVI in Singapore, BTU in Germany, AEFI in Ireland, RVCF in UK, etc.  
8 For example, the capital gains tax rate was reduced from forty-nine point five percent to twenty-eight percent in 1978. 
Additionally, the amendment to the "Prudent Man" rule in 1979 confirmed that pension fund managers are allowed to invest 
part of the funds in high-risk assets. 
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& Touche LLP and NVCA, the countries of greatest investment interest in the next 
five years for the 222 surveyed venture capitalists in the United States, are China 
(20%), India (18%), Canada/Mexico (13%), Continental Europe (13%), Israel (12%) 
and the United Kingdom (11%) Meanwhile, the United States maintains as the most 
favourite destination of venture capital funds in the world. 
Despite the decline after the Dot-com bubble, the venture capital industry 
around the world has been marked by unprecedented transition, growth and optimism 
in the past decade. At the same time, although the development of venture capital 
markets around the world is far from homogeneous (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Allen and 
Song, 2005), studies have shown that the economic and social impacts of venture 
capital investment in many parts of the world are remarkable.   
2.4.2 The Impact of Venture Capital Investment on Innovation  
The significance of venture capital investment is particularly seen in its 
strong positive impacts on innovation. Above all, venture capital investment has 
shown great power in financing young R&D ventures that are normally neglected by 
traditional financiers. Moreover, empirical studies show that venture capital 
investment has significant impacts on innovative capability and knowledge 
absorptive capacity of their portfolio companies (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Romain 
and Pottelsberghe, 2004).  
The perspective that innovation is one of the most critical factors for 
sustainable economic growth and social development has no longer been a new idea 
since Schumpeter9 (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965). Studies further suggest that R&D 
activities, especially entrepreneurial R&D activities are utmost important for 
innovation and consequently economic growth (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Tirole; 
1997). However, traditional financiers are reluctant to invest in R&D activities, 
especially newly established R&D ventures due to the serious agency problems and 
high level of uncertainty associated with R&D investment (Hall, 2002). Studies show 
that the underinvestment problems for R&D activities are rigorous even in the United 
States where financial systems are considered as very advanced (Jones and Williams, 
2001).  
                                                 
9 Schumpeter (1942) discussed the power of technological changes to economic development since industrial revolution.  
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With the great success of ‘Silicon Valley’, venture capital investment is 
recognized as a good solution to fill up the funding gaps faced by young R&D 
ventures. Primarily, although venture capital investment by definition does not target 
at high-technology companies, evidence shows that venture capital investment is 
heavily concentrated on high-technology companies. It is widely accepted that 
venture capital organizations have much to do with the rising leadership of US 
companies in high-technology industries (Lerner, 2001). A group of most prominent 
US high-technology  giants such as DEC, Apple Computer, Intel, Microsoft, Google 
and Yahoo! etc. were backed by venture capital investment in the past three decades. 
Moreover, venture capital investment has shown increasing capability in supporting 
young R&D ventures in other parts of the world.  As seen in Table 2.1, in most 
countries and regions except Japan, the majority of venture capital investment is 
made in high-technology industries though the distribution varies substantially across 
countries. In particular, high-technology companies have attracted overwhelmingly 
intensive interests from venture capitalists in the United States, Israel and Taiwan. In 
addition, more than half of the companies were at early or expansion stages at the 
time of venture financing in all the countries in the table. Again, venture capitalists in 
Taiwan and Israel stand them out from their peers in other countries with their 
capability to fund companies at earlier stages.  
Table 2.1 Distribution of Venture Capital Investment across Countries (1990-2006)10  
  US Israel Taiwan UK France Japan 
Hi-tech (%) 84.19 93.01 87.37 63.10 61.03 25.49 
Early (%) 21.8 31.01 44.69 21.13 17.64 5.63 
Expansion (%) 44.85 59.93 39.85 50.65 38.12 50.19 
Late (%) 33.35 9.06 15.46 28.22 44.24 44.18 
 
More importantly, studies shows that venture capital investment has positive 
impacts on innovative capability of their portfolio companies. According to NVCA, 
venture capital backed ventures invested almost three times as much in R&D as the 
average non-venture capital backed public companies in the US in 2002. At the same 
                                                 
10 For each country, the distribution of venture capital investment by technology and development stage is 
calculated by the author based on the firm level data provided by ‘VentureEconomics’ database.  
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time, Kortum and Lerner (2000) estimate that one dollar of venture capital produces 
three times more patents than one dollar of traditional corporate R&D investment in 
the United States. They show that while from 1983 to 1992, the ratio of venture 
capital investment to R&D was on average smaller than three percent, venture capital 
investment have accounted for eight per cent of industrial innovations during that 
period. In addition, based on a survey of 149 ventures in Silicon Valley, Hellmann 
and Puri (2000) find that venture capital backed firms bring their products to the 
market faster than other non-venture-capital backed firms in the United States. Using 
Multi-Factor Productivity (MFP) growth as a measure of innovation, Ueda and 
Hirukawa (2003) find that MFP growth is significantly and positively associated with 
subsequent VC investments in the US. This effect is especially visible seen in 
computer and communication sectors.  
The impact of venture capital investment on innovation in other parts of the 
world is also documented. According to an EVCA report, venture capital backed 
companies spent on average 50500 Euro per employee per year on R&D activities 
that is six times more than the R&D expenditure per employee of the 500 companies 
in the EU 25. At the same time, every third employee in the venture capital backed 
companies works in R&D with 13 per cent of the employees holding a PhD or 
equivalent degree in 200411. Based on a panel of 16 OECD countries from 1990 to 
2001, Romain and Pottelsberghe (2004) find that accumulation of venture capital 
investment improves the output elasticity of R&D. Increased venture capital intensity 
makes it easier to absorb the knowledge generated by universities and firms. In 
addition, based on aggregate data in Germany, Audretsch and Keilbach (2002) 
provide similar evidence by showing venture capital investment is a significant and 
important factor that shapes output and productivity in a region. Besides, anecdotal 
evidence shows that the rising of electronic and semi-conductor industries in Taiwan 
and the software industry in Israel are also significantly benefited from venture 
capital investment (Kenney et al, 2004).  
                                                 
11 For details, see research report ‘Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe’ 
conducted by Ann-Kristin Achleitner and Oliver Klockner in 2005 on behalf EVCA.  
(http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_129_att_953.pdf) 
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2.4.3 General Social and Economic Impacts of Venture Capital Investment 
Besides the direct impacts of venture capital investment on R&D 
entrepreneurial activities and innovation, the positive economic and social impacts of 
venture capital investment from other stands are also documented and discussed by 
researchers and policymakers.  
Primarily, statistics show that venture capital investment has great capability 
in job creation and revenue generation, and, consequently has positive impacts on 
local economy. According to the ‘Global Insight 2004’ released by NVCA, venture 
capital backed companies accounted for $1.8 trillion in revenue and provided 10.1 
million jobs in the US in 2003. In addition, according to a study carried out by Data 
Resources Inc. and Wharton Econometric Forecasting Association (DRI-WEFA)12 in 
2002, US venture capital backed ventures had approximately twice the sales, paid 
three times the federal taxes and generated almost twice exports than non venture 
capital backed ventures over the period from 1970 to 2000.  
In Europe, according a survey conducted by EVCA13, 420,000 new jobs were 
created by venture capital backed companies between 2000 and 2004. Employment 
in venture capital backed companies grew by an average rate of 30.5 per cent 
annually over the period between 1997 and 2004. This is nearly forty times the 
annual growth rate of total employment in the European Union (EU) member states 
(0.7%) between the 2000 and 2004. Among the surveyed companies, 73 per cent 
increased the number of employees by more than 25 per cent on average per year. In 
the United Kingdom, according to a survey conducted by British Venture capital 
Association (BVCA) in 2006, venture capital backed companies increased their UK 
employment by nine per cent per year, compared to a national fall in employment of 
0.4 per cent per year over the five-year period to 2005/2006. In the year 2006, over 
2.8 million of Britons, or 19 per cent of private workforce in the United Kingdom 
was employed by private equity backed firms in 200614. It also suggests that private 
equity backed firms grow three times faster than firms in Financial Times Stock 
Exchange Index 100 in the United Kingdom. Similarly, with a panel dataset of about 
                                                 
12 DRI-WEFA now called Global Insight, Inc. was formed to bring together the two most respected economic and financial 
information companies in the world, DRI (Data Resources Inc.) and WEFA (Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates). 
13 For details, see http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_129_att_953.pdf. 
14 See http://www.bvca.co.uk.  
- 30 -  
1,000 German start-ups, Engel (2002) shows that the surviving German venture 
capital backed companies seem to achieve significant higher growth rates compared 
to non venture capital backed companies.  
Moreover, studies also provide that venture capital investment plays an 
important role in IPOs. Comparing the IPO price of venture capital backed and non 
venture capital backed companies between 1978 and 1987, Barry et al. (1990) find 
that venture capital backed companies are less underpriced in the US. Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) suggest that venture capital investment may have positive certificating 
effects to investors. Based on the data from the US, the authors provide further 
evidence that the underpricing of venture capital backed companies are far less than 
that of non venture capital backed ventures. At the same time, the author find that the 
underwriters for venture capital backed companies are much more experienced, and, 
the costs for IPOs of venture capital backed companies are much lower, compared 
with those of non venture capital backed companies. Bottazzi und Da Rin (2002) 
support the above findings by providing evidence that European venture capital 
financed firms are able to come up with significantly more capital in the IPO process.  
In summary, although in terms of the capital size, venture capital investment 
is still modest compared with other institutional financiers, the economic and social 
impacts of venture capital are remarkable in many parts of the world.  The impact of 
venture capital investment is particular seen in its capability to fill up the funding 
gaps faced by young R&D ventures, and, consequently stimulate innovation and 
economic growth.  
2.4.4 The Heterogeneity of Venture Capital Markets around the World   
Although venture capital investment has been transferred to many regions of 
the world and both studies and statistics suggest that venture capital investment have 
positive impact on innovation and economic growth, it is noted that the development 
of the market is heterogeneous.  
As it is discussed, the disbursement and the total capital pool across countries 
are not balanced distributed (see Table 1.1 for details). In some countries, the venture 
capital market has developed very fast whereas in some others it grows slowly (Jeng 
and Wells, 2000; Allen and Song, 2005).  
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Moreover, studies show that there are substantial variations in venture 
capitalists’ capability to support R&D entrepreneurial activities. Above all, 
researchers find that the distribution of venture capital investment by technology and 
development stage varies across countries (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Mayer et al., 2005). 
For example, in some European countries, venture capitalists invest more in 
companies at later stages and with less technological intensity compared with those 
in the United States. This heterogeneity is even seen within the United States. For 
example, venture capital institutions and their portfolio companies in the United 
States are clustered in Silicon Valley, Boston and New York City. Additionally, 
researchers find that venture capitalists in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts invest 
more in early-staged projects compared with those in New York City (Saxenian, 
1990). In addition, the mechanisms used in venture capital investment in different 
countries are also different (Cummings et al, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2003). These 
phenomena have attracted increasing interests from researchers to find out what the 
major factors are that affect the transplantation of venture capital investment.  
2.5 Summary  
As an innovative private equity investment instrument, venture capital 
investment stands out from traditional financing means in many ways. By devoting 
both capital and management expertise, venture capitalists finance projects of higher 
level of uncertainties by channelling institutional and individual wealth to a class of 
businesses. It is recognized as a good solution to fill up the funding gaps faced by 
young R&D ventures, which are normally neglected by traditional institutional 
financiers.  
This form of investment, however, is encountered with high level investment 
uncertainties. The severe information asymmetry problems in both fundraising and 
capital investing processes determine that the agency problems in venture capital 
investment are more complex and more serious than those in traditional financial 
means. Moreover, the poor liquidity and the lack of collateral requirements of 
venture capital investment further reduce the downside protection of the investment.  
At the same time, the trajectory of venture capital industry in the US shows 
that that the development of venture capital investment is not isolated from 
institutions. The institutional dynamics have strong impacts on both the supplying 
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and demanding sides of venture capital investment on the one hand; and, on the ways 
of how the individual stakeholders govern the relationship between each other on the 
other hand.  
In summary, the characteristics of venture capital investment and the 
development of venture capital industry suggests that the two major issues are 
important for us to understand venture capital investment: i.e. the agency problems in 
venture capital investment and, the interaction of the players of venture capital 
investment and the related institutional environments and arrangements. In the next 
chapter, the existing literature is therefore introduced with the focus on the 
mechanisms employed in venture capital investment that deal with the agency 
problems and institutional issues.  
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Chapter 3 Agency and Institutional Issues in Venture Capital 
Investment: Literature Review  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews relevant studies on venture capital investment with the 
focuses on how venture capital investment works to deal with the agency and 
institutional issues. The studies on agency issues in venture capital investment are 
reviewed with two strands, i.e. the literature on agency relationship between venture 
capitalists and the ultimate investors of venture funds, and, the studies on agency 
relationship between venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs. The existing studies 
on institutional issues in venture capital investment are discussed with the emphasis 
on the impacts of legal and financial institutions. Based on the critical review of the 
existing literature, the knowledge gaps are discussed, and, the specific research 
questions in this study and how this study may contribute to the existing literature are 
consequently clarified.  
This Chapter is organized as follows: The next section introduces the 
literature on the relationship between venture capitalists and venture fund investors. 
Section 3 discusses the mechanisms employed by venture capitalists in governing 
portfolio companies. Section 4 introduces the literature on institutions and the 
relationship between institutions and venture capital investment. Section 5 addresses 
issues and knowledge gaps in the existing literature. Section 6 clarifies the research 
questions of this study based on the discussion on knowledge gaps in China’s venture 
capital investment. The last section summarizes this chapter.  
3.2 Fundraising: Relationship between VCs and Fund Investors  
As stated in the foregoing section, venture capitalists need to raise funds from 
various sources and conduct venturing investment on behalf of the ultimate fund 
investors. This raises agency problems because monitoring the prospects and 
understanding the business of each individual investment case is extraordinary 
difficult for investors. Venture capitalists have opportunities to behave 
opportunistically and take the advantage of the delegated power (Schmidt, 2003). 
Currently, research on the relationship between venture capitalists and fund investors 
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is mainly based on observations in the United States. Studies suggest that limited 
partnership as an organizational form for venture capital firms and the sophisticated 
covenants of the venture fund contracts are the most powerful solutions in dealing 
with agency problems in venture capital fundraising (Gompers and Lerner, 1996, 
1999; Fenn and Liang, 1995).  
3.2.1 Limited Partnership and Agency Problems  
Limited partnership as an organizational form is widely used in venture 
capital investment in the US since the 1980. In a limited partnership, fund investors, 
who are normally private and public pension funds, endowment funds, corporations, 
wealthy individuals and foreign investors, are limited partners who contribute the 
majority of the capital (normally 99%) (Salhman, 1990).The fund investors are not 
involved in the daily operation of the partnership in order to retain limited liability 
status and to receive favourable tax treatment 15 . Venture capitalists are general 
partners who are responsible for running the partnership. The limited partnership is 
normally designed to be self-liquidating; a lifespan of a fund is around 7-10 years. 
Under the terms of the limited partnership agreement, profits are distributed when 
realized, either in cash or in the form of shares of portfolio companies. Venture 
capitalists typically manage several funds and raise funds sequentially. About 
halfway through the life of one fund, they begin raising the next. In general, no liquid 
market for partnership interests exists, and, limited partners are normally restricted 
from selling the partnership interests (Gompers and Lerner, 1996).  
Based on analysis on 140 private partnership contracts in the US, Gompers 
and Lerner (1996) suggest that the potential agency problems in venture capital fund 
management are serious since fund investors are not allowed to interfere daily 
management of the limited partnership that they may not have enough information 
on how many efforts the venture capitalists exert and how well the investments are 
made. According to the authors, venture capitalists may not exert enough efforts 
since his/her share is small. At the same time, the venture capitalist may be reluctant 
                                                 
15 Venture capital limited partnership can operate tax-free as mutual funds. In addition, the transfer of securities to individual 
limited partners will not have tax consequences until they are sold. These tax advantages can be achieve as long as the limited 
partnership satisfies four conditions: 1) a finite term life; 2) transfer of limited partnership interests is restricted; 3) early 
withdrawal from the partnership is prohibited; 4) and limited partners can not participate the active management of the 
partnerships (Sahlman, 1990). 
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to take risks for higher return since he/she takes unlimited liability of the loss. 
Furthermore, the venture capitalist begins raising a new fund before his current fund 
ends.  It may create the bias toward producing currently visible results at the expense 
of long-term value. It also may create an incentive for the venture capitalist to take 
excessive risks at the late stages of fund’s existence, especially if the fund has done 
poorly. Researchers suggest that there are two primary mechanisms in the limited 
partnership agreement that address the agency problems. The first is a set of 
covenants that restrict the venture capitalist’s activities. The second is a 
compensation structure that aligns the interests of venture capitalists with the 
ultimate investors of the venture funds.   
3.2.2 Covenants in Venture Partnerships  
Gompers and Lerner (1996) find that sophisticated covenants are designed to 
address the agency problems in venture capital partnership agreements. Three major 
groups of covenants are explored in their study.  
According to the authors, the first group of covenants relates to the 
management of the venture fund. These covenants include ‘(a) restrictions on the 
amount invested in a single firm, (b) restrictions on the retention of partnership 
profits, (c) restrictions on the extent to which one fund can invest in the portfolio 
companies of another fund run by the same venture capital firm, and (d) restrictions 
on debt’ ( Gompers and Lerner, 1996). The authors suggest that this set of covenants 
imposes financial discipline on the venture capitalist. ‘They limit the venture 
capitalist’s ability to prop up under-performing firms in his portfolio; they prevent 
him from using a successful fund to salvage an unsuccessful fund; they make the 
performance of each fund more transparent to investors; and they limit the venture 
capitalist’s ability to take risk. In addition, the requirement that the venture capital 
firm distribute profits prevents him from accumulating funds and thereby inflating 
his percentage-of-assets fee’.  
The second group of covenants addresses the opportunities for conflicts. The 
covenants restrict the venture capitalist to invest personal capital in the portfolio 
companies. With these covenants, investors try to prevent the venture capitalist 
taking benefits disproportionate to those of the investors on the one hand, and keep 
the venture capitalist concentrate on the current fund on the other hand.  
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The last group of covenants restricts the investment focus of the fund. These 
covenants again aim to prevent the venture capitalist from using investors’ money to 
create private benefits. In some cases, ‘a venture capitalist might want to experiment 
with certain types of investments, such as leveraged buy-outs, in order to establish a 
reputation in a new field that he plans to target in a future fund’ (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1996).  
In summary, research suggests that the covenants of venture capital fund 
agreements mainly deal with the potential interest conflicts between the two parties 
with the financial restrictions on venture capitalists and the restrictions on the 
investment strategies of the venture funds.  
3.2.3 Compensation Structure of the Venture Partnership 
According to Salhman (1990), venture capitalists usually receive 2.5 per cent 
of total capital per year as annual management fees and, 20 per cent of total profits as 
compensation. This compensation package is highly sensitive to venture capitalists’ 
performance. The shared profit part of the compensation is more than three times 
higher than the base pay part. As long as the compound return rate is positive, shared 
profits always increase faster than the base pay. Researchers suggest that the strong 
performance sensitive compensation for general partners may help align venture 
capitalists’ interests with investors’ interests (Fenn and Liang, 1995).  
Gompers and Lerner (1996) provide empirical evidence for the performance 
sensitivity of the compensation in venture partnership. Based on an analysis of 140 
venture capital partnership agreements in the US, the authors find that more 
experienced venture capitalists take a lower fixed fee. The compensation of these 
venture capitalists is thus more performance-sensitive than that of others. However, 
the compensation of the least-known venture capitalists is less performance-sensitive 
than that of the best-known venture capitalists. The authors suggest that new venture 
capitalists have incentives to perform in order to build up reputations that will yield 
rewards in the future. Consistently, Gompers and Lerner (1999b) find that the 
performance-sensitive pay for venture capitalists does not correlate with better fund 
performance. It confirms that new venture capitalists’ extra-contractual incentives 
are as powerful as the contractual incentives of established venture capitalists.  
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In summary, the existing studies suggest that the limited partnership is an 
appropriate organizational structure to solve the agency problems in venture capital 
fund management. However, almost all the existing studies are based on the US data. 
How limited partnership impacts on venture capital investment in other venture 
capital markets is not well studied.  
3.3 Venture Capital Investing: Relationship between VCs and Entrepreneurs  
As discussed, investment in young companies with high growing potentials is 
associated with serious agency problems due to the severe information asymmetries. 
How venture capitalists control the agency problems and other uncertainties have 
long been the major interests among researchers. Researchers suggest that venture 
capitalists are able to reduce informational asymmetries and control agency costs 
with their special pre-investment decision-making process, unique contract design, 
active post-investment oversights and value added activities (Gorman and Sahlman, 
1989; Gompers, 1994; Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003). This section introduces the 
relevant studies on the mechanisms employed in venture capital investment that deal 
with the agency relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.  
3.3.1 VCs’ Decision-making Process  
Studies on venture capitalist’s decision-making process are among the first 
literature in venture capital research. Most of the existing literature focuses on 
documenting the decision-making process of venture capital investment in details.  
Wells (1974) describes venture capital investment decision-making process 
based on interviews with venture capitalists from eight venture capital firms in the 
United States. According to Wells’ exploratory study, searching for projects, 
screening proposals and evaluating projects are the sequential processes in decision-
making of venture financing. Besides, Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) find that deal 
structuring is also an important step in pre-investment decision making.  Additionally, 
other researchers further reveal that due diligences during which the venture 
capitalist investigates the projects in field is also a common process in ex-ante 
decision-making of venture capital investment (Hall and Hofer, 1989; Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994; Boocock and Woods, 1997; Bliss, 1999).  
The existing literature provides stylized facts on how venture capitalists make 
investment decisions in developed countries with only one exception that is focused 
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on Poland (Bliss, 1999).  There is little known about the decision making process in 
developing countries where have different institutional arrangements from the 
developed economies. 
3.3.2 Ex-ante Project Screening in Venture Capital Investment 
According to the existing literature, venture capitalists employ sophisticated 
project screening strategies to avoid investing in bad projects. The project screening 
criteria have been studied extensively. The literature covers three major topics. Most 
studies in this area explore the criteria used by venture capitalists and ascertaining 
the relative importance of various criteria in the proposal screening (Wells, 1974; 
Tyebjee and Bruno, 1981; Macmillan et al., 1985; Knight, 1994; Maigart et al., 1996; 
Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003). Some other researchers identify the relationship 
between the screening criteria and the performance of the selected projects 
(MacMillan et al., 1987; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984).  Some more recent studies 
analyze the relationship between screening criteria and contracting arrangements of 
venture investment based on financing contracting theories (Kaplan and Per 
Stromberg, 2003, 2004). 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) are those who first identified a set of project 
screening criteria in venture capital investment. Following this work, a number of 
studies were conducted to confirm their findings. Focusing on venture capitalists’ 
screening criteria in the United States, the studies yielded almost the same set of 
investment evaluation criteria. MacMillan et al. (1985), based on interviews with 14 
venture capitalists in the US, came up with a list of 27 criteria. The authors 
categorized them into six sets, namely, (i) the entrepreneur’s personality, (ii) the 
entrepreneur’s experience, (iii) the characteristics of the product or service, (iv) the 
characteristics of the market, (v) financial considerations and, (vi) the characteristics 
of the venture team. It is revealed that ‘human factors’ like the entrepreneurs’ 
personality and experience and, the capability of the management team are utmost 
important for venture capitalists when they screen the venture projects. For instance, 
according to MacMillan et al. (1985), five of the top ten most important criteria had 
to do with the entrepreneur’s experience or personality. At the same time, other 
factors including the attractiveness of products and service, market size and growth, 
business model, the customer adoption, favourable competitive position and cash out 
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potentials are also important concerns of venture capitalists in their proposal 
screening in the United States though the levels of importance of the criteria are 
different by studies. 
Echoing to the criteria that are seen as advantages by venture capitalist in 
project screening, the risks concerned by venture capitalists are also studied. Again, 
based on investigations in the United States, MacMillan et al. (1985) identified six 
categories of risks. Half of the risk factors are related to human aspects that further 
confirms the concerns with human capital from venture capitalists in their project 
screening.  
The second research wave of studies in this area emphasizes venture capital 
industries outside of the United States. Researchers suggest that influenced by legal 
and economic environments, the risks faced by venture capitalists should differ 
across countries. It is thus anticipated that the screening criteria employed by venture 
capitalists across countries should be different. However, studies show that venture 
capitalists around the world employ very similar screening criteria (Knight, 1994; 
Muzyka, et al., 1996; Manigart et al., 1996). Similar to their US peers, venture 
capitalists in most nations see the quality of entrepreneurs and management teams as 
one of the most important factors in their project screening. For instance, based on a 
questionnaire survey with venture capitalists from 10 European countries, Muzyka et 
al., (1996) suggest that five human resource criteria, i.e. the leadership of the 
entrepreneur, the leadership of the management team, the professional expertise and 
track record of the entrepreneur and the management team are ranked in the top 
among the 35 criteria. Moreover, studies on developing countries also show strong 
consensus in screening criteria used by venture capitalists (Ray and Turpin, 1991; 
Zutshi, et al., 1999).  
Nonetheless, heterogeneity indeed exists in screening criteria. Manigart et al. 
(1996) find that in younger venture capital markets such as European countries like 
Belgium and France, financial information is shown as more important for venture 
capitalists than that for their counterparts in the United States. Bruton and Ahlstrom 
(2003) find that networks (i.e. Guanxi) of the entrepreneur and the location of the 
enterprise are the additional concerns of venture capitalists in Asian countries.  
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After the first exploratory studies on documenting venture capitalists’ 
screening criteria, researchers start to question whether there is a relationship 
between the screening scores and the performance of venture capital backed projects 
(i.e. MacMillan, et al., 1987; Khan, 1987; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Bliss, 1999). 
Macmillan et al., (1987) identify two major criteria that are predictors of venture 
success, which are: 1) the extent to which the venture is initially insulated from 
competition and 2) the degree to which there is demonstrated market acceptance of 
the product. With similar research questions, Khan (1987) find that venture 
capitalists consider the entrepreneur’ desires for success and the uniqueness of 
products as essentials for potential success of the projects. However, the study also 
shows that venture capitalists’ judgments are poor in predicting the actual 
performance of the projects.  
Furthermore, some researchers examine the interaction between venture 
capitalists’ screening criteria and their other investment activities. Kaplan and Per 
Stromberg (2003, 2004) look at the relationship between project screening and 
contracting terms of venture investment. Based on interviews and archive analysis on 
venture capitalists’ investment theses in the United States, the authors examine what 
venture capitalists see as risks and advantages from a projects and how they react 
accordingly while constructing the investment contracts. The researchers find that 
venture capitalists’ initial appraisal is important for the contract design including the 
allocation of cash flow right, the stage financing arrangements and CEO’s 
compensation etc. As the first studies in linking venture capitalists’ project selection 
to contract design, this comprehensive work not only provides insights in venture 
capitalists’ ex-ante decision making, but also empirically examines some advanced 
financial theories based on intensive hand-collected materials though the statistical 
analysis is not without biases.  
3.3.3 Venture Capital Contracting  
Most of the existing literature on venture capital investing focuses on contract 
design and ex-post oversights from agency perspectives. Three major agency 
problems may be involved in venture capital investment. First, the efforts exerted by 
the entrepreneur are either unobservable or unverifiable after the capital is infused 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Hart and Moore, 1994).  The entrepreneur may therefore take 
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opportunistic activities at the prices of the shareholder’s interests.  Second, the 
entrepreneur may have more information about their own capability and the projects 
than the investors (Akerlof, 1976). The entrepreneur may have the incentives to 
continue the projects inefficiently even he/she knows the projects may fail. Third, 
entrepreneur may hold up the investors by threatening to leave the company when 
human capital is valuable in the young high-technology companies (Hart and Moore, 
1998). Researchers suggest that venture capitalists design sophisticated financial 
contracts to control the potential agency problems. The allocation of control rights 
and cash flow rights, and CEO’s compensation arrangements are identified as major 
contracting mechanisms used in venture capital investment.   
3.3.3.1 Allocation of Control Rights 
The allocation of direct control rights including voting rights, board seats and 
veto rights is a widely used mechanism in venture capital investment. The control 
right mechanism in venture capital contracts is unique in two ways. First, the 
allocation of control rights is contingent with the potential agency problems in the 
investment and the performance of venture capital-backed companies. Second, the 
allocation of control rights is usually disproportionate to the shareholdings of the 
contracting parties in venture capital investment.  
First, the allocation of control rights between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur is significantly related to the performance of enterprises. Theoretically, 
Chan et al., (1990) argue that venture capitalists need to retain control rights because 
they do not have sufficient information on the capability and the efforts exerted by 
the entrepreneurs. In this model, the entrepreneur’s capability and the chosen actions 
are observed neither ex-ante nor ex-post. Thus, venture capitalists use cash-flow as a 
signal for the abilities of the entrepreneur. If cash-flow falls below a critical value, 
venture capitalists take over control in the second period and pay the entrepreneur a 
fixed salary. If the cash-flow surpasses a critical level, the entrepreneur controls the 
enterprise and is paid on a pay-for-performance package. Some empirical findings 
are consistent with the prediction. Kaplan and Per Stromberg (2003) report that 
control rights such as voting rights and the number of board seats shift gradually 
from venture capitalists to the entrepreneur as the venture performance improves.  
Venture capitalists have 66 per cent the voting majority in the pre-revenue stage 
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compared to 49 per cent in the post-revenue stage under the condition that the 
contractually specified milestones are met. If the enterprise does not meet the 
contractually specified milestones, venture capitalists have 87 per cent the voting 
majority in the pre-revenue stage compared to 59 per cent in the post-revenue stage, 
respectively. Also, the findings prove that venture capitalists take over control of 
enterprises more frequently with low performance. 
Second, the allocation of control rights between venture capitalists and the 
entrepreneur is contingent with the level of agency problems and uncertainties of the 
projects. Deriving from control theory, Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1994) argue that when the risk of the investment is increasing, the more 
control rights should be held by the financier whereas the risk reduces or 
performance improves more control should be transferred to the entrepreneur. In 
accordance with the control theory, Cornelius (1997) finds 62 per cent of the total 77 
venture capital investments in their sample use voting restrictions at seed stage 
investments while only 25 per cent of the venture capital investments employ this 
control mechanism for funding late-staged projects. Lerner (1995) also finds that the 
number of venture capitalists on the board of directors significantly increases in 
situations where monitoring is most important, for example when the CEO of an 
enterprise is replaced. Also, there is a positive relationship between the R&D 
intensity and the number of venture capitalists representing in the board of directors.  
Third, venture capitalists commonly have control rights that are 
disproportionate to their shareholdings. These control rights can be included in 
contracts between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, or they can be attached 
to the class of equity that the venture capitalist holds. Gompers (1998) finds that 
venture capitalists commonly have veto rights over the following decisions: (a) asset 
sales, (b) changes in control, (c) asset purchases, and (d) issuance of securities. The 
presence of these veto rights is unrelated to whether the venture capitalist has board 
control. In addition, Gompers (1998) also finds that veto rights tend to be greater in 
early-staged companies. Black and Gilson (1998) argue that the disproportionate 
allocation of control to the venture capitalist may play an additional role. The authors 
hypothesize that, since the entrepreneur derives private benefits from control, the 
initial transfer of control to venture capitalists is costly to the entrepreneur. Thus, the 
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opportunity to regain control at the time of IPO creates powerful non-monetary 
incentives for the entrepreneur to increase the value of the company. This contracting 
arrangement is analogous to a call option on control, which the entrepreneur can 
exercise when the company is successful enough to go public.  
3.3.3.2 Cash-flow Allocation: the Use of Convertible Security 
As a cash-flow oriented mechanism, the use of convertible security is popular 
in venture capital finance. In the sample of Kaplan and Per Stroِmberg (2003), more 
than 94 per cent of the venture capital-backed enterprises are financed with 
convertible preferred stocks. The systematic preference for convertible preferred 
stock is also noted in Sahlman (1990) and Gompers (1998). Furthermore, Kaplan and 
Per Stromberg (2003) also report that venture capitalists often employ a variant of 
convertible preferred stock called participating preferred. Explanations for the 
overwhelming use of convertible securities mainly focus on its function in allocating 
the cash flow rights between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that addressing the 
entrepreneurs’ compensation and some other incentive problems.  
1.  Entrepreneurs’ compensation  
Studies show that a very popular compensation mechanism utilized by 
venture capitalists is to have the entrepreneur and critical employees receive a 
substantial fraction of compensation in the form of equity or options in addition to 
the fixed salaries.  
Researchers normally attribute the arrangement of entrepreneurs’ 
compensation to moral hazard and adverse selection problems when there is severe 
asymmetric information distributed between the contracting parties. The traditional 
principal-agency theory pioneered by Holmstrom (1979) stresses that providing 
monetary incentives or cash flow rights to the entrepreneur is an optimal option. 
Based on this theory, Lazear (1986) shows that compensation contract also can be 
used as a screening device if the ability of the entrepreneur is uncertain. By setting 
the entrepreneur’s compensation as an increasing function of performance, the 
venture capitalist discourages the entrepreneur of less capability from accepting the 
contract.  
Empirical studies are largely consistent with the above theories. First, Baker 
and Gompers (2000) find that fixed salaries are lower and the size of the equity stake 
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held is higher for venture capital-backed chief executive officers, when compared to 
similar companies not financed by venture capital. Moreover, entrepreneurs of 
venture capital-backed enterprises usually accept smaller basic salaries compared to 
their income as dependent employees (Sahlman 1990), i.e. entrepreneurs give up a 
share of their safe income for their entrepreneurial activities. Furthermore, venture 
capitalists provide cash flow incentives to the entrepreneur depending upon the 
entrepreneur’s performance and investment risks in practice (Kaplan and Per 
Stromberg, 2003).  
2. Convertible security and other incentive problems 
Other studies on the use of convertible securities in venture capital 
investment analyze the type of financing by comparing the pay-off of the enterprises 
under various contracts, such as equity, debt and convertible security contracts. 
Cornelli and Yosha (2003) and Schmidt (1999) suggest that the intensive 
usage of convertible securities can be explained by the property of this financing type 
to endogenously allocate the cash-flow after the contract has been signed. The 
models predict that venture capitalists’ conversion of convertible securities depends 
on the state of the portfolio projects. Combining both debt elements and equity 
elements with convertible security contracts, venture capitalists can claim on the 
enterprises’ assets, as long as the shares are not converted in a bad state of the project. 
Or, they choose equity contracts while the project is in a good state. With this 
property, venture capitalists may enjoy the high level of returns from good projects 
whilst retaining the downside protection if the project does not do well. Empirical 
findings are consistent with the predictions. Gompers (1997) finds that, 92 per cent 
of the contracts specify an automatic conversion that occurs at the time of issuing 
initial offering of the venture capital-backed company. IPO is generally seen as the 
signal of the success of a venture capital-backed company. Moreover, the early-
staged enterprises, in which the risk to lose the investment is highest (Ruhnka and 
Young 1987, 1991), are more often financed with convertible securities than 
enterprises at later stages (Gompers 1997, Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003). 
However, the models do not clearly explain the frequent use of combination of 
straight preferred stock, common equity and participating preferred stock that has 
been found in several empirical studies (Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003, 2004). 
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Furthermore, Cornelli and Yosha (2003) argue that the use of convertibles 
reduces the entrepreneur’s incentive to engage in short-term earnings management.  
For example, when the venture capitalist stages the capital infusion, the entrepreneur 
may have the incentives to conduct ‘window dressing’ in order to assure subsequent 
financing. With convertible securities, this manipulation increases the likelihood that 
the venture capitalist converts the convertible securities into equity, thereby diluting 
the entrepreneur’s claim. However, since venture capital contracts often comprise 
automatic conversion at the time of an initial public offering (Kaplan and Per 
Stromberg, 2003), the modelled uncertainty about the true performance at the time of 
conversion seems not plausible. Nonetheless, Hellmann (2002) gives more 
convincing explanation for the automatic conversion by suggesting that convertibles 
are an optimal solution to the trade-off between the need to allocate cash flow rights 
to venture capitalists and the need to make efficient exit decisions.  
Another explanation of the prevailing usage of convertible preferred stock is 
offered by Gilson and Schizer (2002). The authors argue that firms that issue 
convertible preferred stock may lead more favourable tax treatment to the 
entrepreneur and other employees. Instead of being taxed at ordinary income rates, 
entrepreneurs and employees can defer taxation until the incentive compensation is 
sold, at which time a preferential tax rate is available. Gilson and Schizer (2002) 
suggest that the favourable tax treatment of such compensation is likely to be of first-
order importance in the choice of this security type. Empirical works based on the 
US data prove that tax concerns indeed matter. However, there is no clear evidence 
for the level of importance of the feature (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a).  
Even though researchers have explained many prevalent aspects of the use of 
convertibles, and empirical works show that it is widely employed in venture capital 
contracts in the United States, it is less clear whether it is an optimal arrangement 
under other institutional settings. Employing a novel dataset of venture financing in 
Canada, Cumming et al., (2002) report that the preference for convertible preferred 
does not extend to Canada. The findings suggest the need for further research on the 
choice of the convertible securities in different institutional settings.   
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3.3.4 VCs’ Ex-post Monitoring and Value-added Activities  
Moral hazard is a major concern for investors due to the separation of 
ownership and management in modern industrial firms. Theories of financial 
intermediation tend to focus on the monitoring role of intermediaries (Diamond, 
1984). Researchers argue that venture capitalists are uniquely positioned to undertake 
ex-post monitoring activities because they have access to the detailed knowledge of 
their portfolio companies. The most widely used ex-post monitoring activity in 
venture capital investment is to stage the capital infusion. In addition, several studies 
confirm that venture capitalists serve such a role in their decision to liquidate or sell 
the firm and the decision to replace the CEO. 
3.3.4.1 Stage Financing and Agency Costs  
Empirical studies find that stage financing is extensively used in venture 
capital investment in the United States (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995). Normally, 
venture capitalists do not provide the capital needed by the entrepreneur in full 
upfront. Rather, they infuse the capital by instalments according to the performance 
of their portfolio companies. Usually, the two parties pre-set milestones as the 
performance measurements. As the most potent mechanism used in venture capital 
investment, stage financing needs many extra monitoring efforts and costs from 
venture capitalists. The opportunistic costs of time spending on evaluation, 
renegotiation and preparation for contracts, and the payments for legal and 
accounting fees etc. are considerably high. Salhman’s (1990) comprehensive work 
empirically demonstrates that venture capitalists visit and communicate with 
entrepreneurs more frequently than usual when they need to make the decision for 
the next round of financing.  
Theorists give different interpretations for the intense usage of stage 
financing in venture capital investment. The rationales are mainly focused on the 
benefits of ‘option to exit’ retained by venture capitalists in terminating bad projects 
and mitigating agency problems. The majority of the literature emphasizes the 
relationship between the characteristics of the venture capital backed projects and the 
exertion of efforts on ex-post monitoring.  
Primarily, theoretical studies rationalize stage financing from agency 
perspectives. As discussed, there are various agency problems involved in venture 
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capital investment. Researchers suggest that stage financing can effectively reduce 
agency problems. First, stage financing may serve as a ‘pay-for-performance’ 
mechanism since the next round of financing depends on the performance of the 
venture capital backed companies. Entrepreneurs thus need to exert efforts to achieve 
the pre-set milestones in order to gain the next round of capital (Cornelli and Yosha, 
2003). Furthermore, drawing from ‘Stealing theory’ developed by Townsend (1979) 
and the ‘Hold-up model’ developed by Hart and Moore (1994), Neher’s model (1999) 
suggests that stage financing is helpful to control entrepreneur’s hold-up problems. 
The author attributes stage financing in venture capital investment to the lack of 
collaterals. According to the author, the human capital is embedded in physical assets 
of the venture with the growth of the company. He argues that the growing physical 
assets may serve as collaterals for investors for future investment. In a dynamic 
agency model, Bergemann and Hege (1998) emphasize the information learning 
through stage financing. The authors assume that the value of the venture project is 
initially uncertain to both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalists. More 
information can be revealed with the development of the project that may help the 
venture capitalist make better decisions.  
Furthermore, researchers argue that stage financing may serve as a signalling 
mechanism. Lazear (1986) argues that good entrepreneurs may signal their capability 
by accepting a more performance sensitive compensation arrangement. At the same 
time, Dewatripont and Roland (1999) and Huang and Xu (1998) suggest that the 
option to abandon the venture can ultimately harden the budget constraints that 
investors commit not to provide further funding if the project is not satisfactory. In 
this way, the entrepreneurs with low-quality projects are deterred from seeking 
venture financing and hence screened out. This model is also related to the theories 
developed by Ross (1977) and Diamond (1991) that suggest the ability to liquidate 
can be used to screen for good entrepreneurs. 
In addition, researchers also advise that stage financing may also serve as an 
ex-post screening mechanism and help venture capitalists to reduce transaction costs. 
Even though venture capitalists normally design sophisticated contracts to reduce 
potential agency problems, contracts can never be complete (Hart, 1995). There are 
risks and uncertainties out of control of both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.  
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The ex-ante arrangements alone may not be enough to control the uncertainties. By 
staging the capital infusion, venture capitalists may terminate unsuccessful projects 
on time to minimize the loss (Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). Since venture capital 
investment normally does not require collaterals, timely termination is seen as 
important given the default liquidation value is low.  
Even though stage financing has been rationalized by many theorists, 
empirical investigations are scarce.  Gompers (1995) empirically examines stage 
financing from an agency perspective based on investment information of 794 
venture capital backed companies in the United States. Taking the average industry 
ratio of tangible assets, R&D intensity, age and the development stage of the 
companies at the time of investment as major measurements for agency problems 
and uncertainties, the author shows that the more severe the potential agency 
problems are, the shorter are the staging intervals and the more frequently do venture 
capitalists revaluate the company. In addition, the author also finds that the 
performance of the investment is positively correlated with the use of stage financing. 
It thus provides the evidence for the strength of stage financing in terminating bad 
projects. The other important empirical literature is the comprehensive studies of 
Kaplan and Per Stromberg (2003, 2004). Based on their analysis of the detailed 
investment theses of venture capital investments in the United States, the authors 
reveal that both internal risks (the agency problems) and external risks (risks and 
uncertainties that are not under the control of either the entrepreneur or venture 
capitalist) have relationship with the use of stage financing.  
There are two major limitations with the existing literature on stage financing. 
First of all, the studies overlook the impact of incentive schemes provided by the 
venture capital funds to venture capitalists on stage financing arrangements. The 
existing literature mainly focuses on the relationship between stage financing 
arrangements and the potential agency problems associated with the venture capital 
backed projects. It is mainly based on an assumption that all venture capitalists may 
automatically exert enough efforts to control the agency costs and the uncertainties 
of their investments.  However, as discussed, venture capital investment involves 
two sets of agency relationship, i.e. ultimate investors of venture capital funds-
venture capitalists, and venture capitalists-entrepreneurs (Salhman, 1990, Cassamata, 
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2003). In the relationships, venture capitalists act as ‘principals’ to entrepreneurs on 
the one hand, and ‘agencies’ to the ultimate fund investors on the other hand. 
Alongside with this line, the incentive schemes provided by venture capital funds to 
venture capitalists may have an impact on how venture capitalists exert efforts in ex-
post monitoring. However, to my knowledge, there is no discussion on stage 
financing from this strand yet. Secondly, the existing empirical evidence are based 
on examinations in the US market where the institutional environments for business 
activities are among the best and the governance structures of venture capital 
institutions are more homogeneous (e.g. over 80% of venture capital institutions in 
the United States are structured as limited partnership (NVCA). Stage financing 
outside the United States are not well documented and examined.  
3.3.4.2 Other Ex-post Monitoring and Value-added Activities  
According to the existing literature, venture capitalists also undertake some 
other monitoring and value-added activities in their venture financing. Studies 
mainly focus on the influence of venture capitalists on portfolio companies’ 
recruiting process, employment contracts, the replacement of CEOs and the 
commercialization of products, etc. 
Gorman and Sahlman (1989) confirm that venture capitalists devote 
considerable time to oversee their portfolio companies, e.g. visiting them and 
reviewing their financial performance. Lerner (1995) finds that the probability that a 
firm can obtain venture capital financing is related to the geographic proximity of the 
firm to the venture capitalist. Furthermore, the likelihood that a venture capitalist will 
sit on a portfolio company’s board is closely related to the proximity. Specifically, 
there is a 47 per cent probability that a venture capital firm is located within five 
miles from the portfolio company will serve as a director, as compared to a 22 per 
cent probability for an investor 500 miles away. Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) provide 
evidence that the geographic proximity is also matters in Asia.   
Similarly, Kaplan and Per Stromberg (2003, 2004) find that the venture 
capitalist plays a primary role in shaping the top management team of the companies 
in which they invest. The authors also report that the monitoring activities of venture 
capitalists are closely related to their pre-investment appraisal and the structure of the 
financial contracts. Furthermore, Hellmann (1998) predicts that venture capitalists 
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have stronger incentives to attract professional managers than entrepreneurs do. The 
results of Hellman’s model show that under reasonably common conditions, an 
entrepreneur will agree ex-ante to cede to a venture capitalist control over future 
decisions to hire a new CEO. Empirical evidence on the outcomes of this trade-off is 
mixed. Hellmann and Puri (2002) find that a venture capital backed firm is twice 
likely to replace its CEO with a non-founder than a firm without venture capital. 
However, Baker and Gompers (2000) find no significant relationship between 
venture capital financing and the likelihood of the takeover of CEOs. 
Besides, researchers suggest that venture capitalists also help entrepreneurs to 
raise additional funds by certifying the quality of a start-up company. Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) hypothesize that venture capitalists certify the value of venture capital 
backed companies in an initial public offering. They argue that venture capitalists are 
repeat players in the IPO market, their success allows them to establish profitable 
follow-on funds, and entrepreneurs give up substantial equity stakes to venture 
capitalists in exchange for relatively small capital infusions. Consistent with the 
valuable certification, the authors find that venture capital backed IPOs exhibit lower 
underpricing and lower underwriter spreads than a matched set of non-VC-backed 
IPOs. However, Lee and Wahal (2002), using more sophisticated econometric 
techniques to control for endogeniety, find that venture capital backed IPOs exhibit 
greater underpricing, particularly during the internet boom of the late 1990s. They 
conclude that their findings are inconsistent with the certification hypothesis.  
In addition, studies show that venture capital backed companies perform 
better in R&D activities. Kortum and Lerner (2000) estimate that one dollar of 
venture capital produces three times more patents than one dollar of traditional 
corporate R&D investment in the United States. Moreover, Hellmann and Puri (2000) 
find that innovator (as opposed to imitator) firms are more likely to be financed by 
venture capitalists. At the same time, firms financed by venture capital tend to bring 
their products to market more quickly. These findings are consistent with the view 
that the expertise of venture capitalists gives them a comparative advantage in 
identifying valuable innovations and assisting the companies in bringing their 
product to market. 
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To summarize, the literature shows that venture capitalists provide many 
benefits to entrepreneurial companies that are not normally offered by traditional 
financial intermediaries. Of course, these benefits are not costless to entrepreneurs. 
The close involvement of venture capitalists can be time consuming for both parties. 
More importantly, venture financing is associated with a significant reduction in the 
entrepreneur’s decision-making and control rights. Finally, venture capitalists tend to 
demand higher rates of return for their investments compared with other private 
equity investors (Sahlman, 1990). This makes venture capital a relatively expensive 
source of financing. These costs must be traded off against the benefits of venture 
capital financing.  
3.3.5 Syndication of the Venture Investment 
Syndication of investment is also a popular mechanism used in venture 
capital investment. According to Sorenson and Stuart’s (2001) survey of the US 
venture capital market, over two thirds of 7590 venture capital baked firms in his 
data are financed by more than one venture capital firms. Researchers suggest that 
similar to other mechanisms, syndication also addresses agency problems and 
uncertainties inherent in the relationship between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur. Currently, studies in this area mainly focus on rationales to syndicate 
investments and benefits of syndication. Researchers explain the motives for 
syndication from various aspects including financial concerns, resources sharing 
requirements, and social networking expansions.  
3.3.5.1 Financial Motives for Syndication 
Studies on financial motives for syndication mainly emphasize reducing risks 
by diversifying portfolios. According to the traditional financial theory, rational 
investors diversify their portfolios to reduce idiosyncratic risks and to make their 
portfolios more efficient (Markowitz, 1952; Wilson, 1968). However, venture capital 
investment is private equity investment. It is not easy for venture capitalists to 
diversify portfolios because normally venture capital funds are smaller than mutual 
funds and venture capital investment has poor liquidity since it is private equity 
investment. Researchers suggest that in order to gain an optimal level of portfolio 
diversification with limited amount of funds, venture capitalists choose to syndicate 
with each other. Bygrave (1988) provides evidence for this argument with a survey 
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in the United States. Furthermore, examining five European countries, Manigart et al., 
(2003) show the same results. However, the findings are quite plausible since they 
fail to explain why venture capitalists syndicate frequently even if the financial value 
at risk is low and they do not have visible financial constraints (Bygrave, 1987; 
Brander et al., 1999).  
3.3.5.2 Resource Sharing Perspectives  
The other explanation for syndicated financing focuses on the value of 
resource sharing among different venture capitalists. Researchers suggest that 
venture capitalists may share information and expertise to gain more access to 
potential deals, improve ex-ante decision-making, provide more value-added 
assistance to entrepreneurs and increase capability in monitoring portfolios by 
syndicating.  
Based on resource sharing perspectives, Sah and Stiglitz (1986) suggest that 
the problems of adverse selection during the deal selection will be mitigated by 
syndicating finance. The authors state that if several independent investors first 
check each other’s willingness to invest in a potentially promising firm and then 
jointly invest in it, the selection they make may be superior to a decision based on 
only one decision-maker. Such a hierarchical or at least partly hierarchical decision-
making mechanism reduces the risk of selecting inferior companies in the portfolio. 
Lerner (1994) supports this decision-making improvement opinion with his empirical 
findings that in first round investments established venture capital firms syndicate 
with one another, and in later rounds with less established organizations. Also, 
Bygrave (1987) and Kaplan and Per Stromberg (2003) find that venture capitalists 
tend to syndicate when the investment-related information is highly asymmetric.  
Furthermore, the improvement of adding value may also motivate syndication 
(Bygrave, 1987; Brander et al., 1999). The venture capitalist plays a much more 
active role in managing their investments than public market investors (Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989; Hellman and Puri, 2000; 2002). From the resource-based perspective, 
syndication allows venture capitalists to add more value to the investments without 
the need to accumulate specialized resources for a long time (George et al., 2000). 
Venture capitalists have heterogeneous skills, information and networks. They may 
add value to the target firm in complementary ways. The existing research suggests 
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that this reason dominates others as motives for syndication (Brander et al., 1999; 
Lerner, 1994; Manigart et al., 2003). However, syndication does not ensure superior 
value added. Hold-up and free-rider problems may emerge after the syndicated 
investment has been made (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1990; Bolton and Scharfstein, 
1990). How venture capitalists deal with the problems and balance the benefits and 
the costs of syndicated financing need more investigations. 
3.3.5.3 Window Dressing Perspectives  
Lerner (1994) further discusses the motives of syndication based on financial 
concerns from another aspect: ‘window dressing’. The author suggests that in order 
to raise a new fund after closing the previous one, venture capitalists normally have 
to be able to demonstrate a good track record of the past performance. Hence, 
venture capital firms may be tempted to enter deals that have proved to have a good 
chance of providing a successful exit in the future. As a result, venture capitalists 
may want to invest in later-staged deals which have been invested by other venture 
capitalists. Such investments allow venture capital firms to associate themselves with 
the potential success stories of these investments. Normally venture capitalists have 
to syndicate their investments at relatively high prices. However, even if the 
‘window dressing’ hypothesis may partly explain syndicated investments in late-
staged projects, it fails to explain syndication activities in the case of early-stage 
investments. 
3.3.5.4 The Social Structure Perspectives  
Sociological studies suggest that there are some social reasons for syndication 
in venture capital investment. Sorenson and Stuart (2001) examine syndication and 
the spatial distribution of US venture capital investments. They find that while 
venture capitalists in general are focused geographically and industry-wise, 
syndication networks diffuse information across these boundaries, and expand the 
spatial radius of exchange. Venture capitalists in a syndication network invest more 
frequently in spatially distant companies. The authors suggest that the structure of 
networks affects both the flow of information and the propensity to syndicate 
investments. This opinion is also supported by some other empirical studies which 
show that venture capitalists form tightly coupled syndication networks and that 
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syndication relationships are often repetitive and reciprocal (Bygrave, 1987; 1988; 
Lerner, 1994). 
3.4 Institutions and Venture Capital Investment 
New institutional economics has been widely employed by economists for its 
broadness in understanding and explaining economic phenomena. The central 
argument of new institutional economics is that the institutional framework of a 
society provides formal rules regulating economic activities and hence influencing 
human beings’ beliefs, goals, and behaviours. In this way, institutions produce a 
structure to reduce uncertainties in daily life (North, 1990) and govern the 
relationships between individuals and organizations (Williamson, 1991). Researchers 
suggest that new institutional economics provides an appropriate framework in 
studies on venture capital markets, especially in cross-country comparison (Black 
and Gilson, 1998; Mayer et al., 2005). Primarily, venture capital investment 
encounters more serious agency problems and higher transaction costs, which are the 
central research issues of new institutional economics. Furthermore, the development 
of venture capital investment itself is path-dependent to and embedded in 
institutional environments.  The evolving trajectory of venture capital investment in 
the US shows that venture capital investment emerged from the dynamics of 
institutional changes in the country (Lerner, 2000; Kenney, 1989). The existing 
literature therefore focuses on how institutions interact with the development of 
venture capital industry on a macro level (Black and Gilson, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 
2000) and the business behaviours of the practitioners on a micro level (Kaplan and 
Per Stromberg, 2004; Cummings, 2003; Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Bruton and 
Ahlstrom, 2003). 
3.4.1 New Institutional Economics  
According to new institutional economics, institutions exist due to the 
uncertainties involved in human interactions. Institutional frameworks comprised of 
a set of political, social, cultural and legal ground rules form the basis for production, 
exchange, and distribution in a society, with the aim to establish an optimal system 
and provide incentives to actors in the social economy (North, 1990). Institutional 
development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development (North, 1990). 
Therefore, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance. 
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There are two major perspectives in new institutional economics. The first 
focuses on institutional environments, which refers to the background constraints or 
‘rule of the game’ that guide individual behaviours. These institutions can be formal, 
explicit rules, such as constitutions, laws, and property rights, or informal, implicit 
rules, such as social conventions and norms (Davis and North, 1971; North, 1990). 
Researchers categorize institutions as normative, regulatory, and cognitive 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Zucker, 1991). The most formal ones are regulatory 
institutions, representing standards provided by laws and other sanctions. Normative 
institutions are less formal. They normally define expected roles or actions and are 
often manifested through accepted authority systems. Cognitive institutions represent 
the most informal, taken-for-granted rules and beliefs that are established among 
individuals through social interactions among various participants.  
Among these sets of rules, legal environments have attracted the most 
attention. Particularly, researchers are most interested in the efficiency of common 
law (Priest, 1977), contract law (Macneil, 1974), and property law (Alchian, 1965; 
Demsetz, 1967; Cheung, 1970) to constrain individuals’ behaviours and reduce 
uncertainty. North (1991) argues that economic development is a response to the 
evolution of institutions that support social and commercial relationships. Economic 
growth thus depends on the degree to which the potential hazards of trade can be 
controlled by institutions. Along with this line, researchers suggest that the growth of 
product markets depends on establishing secure protection of property rights and 
strong enforcement of laws (North, 1990).  Empirically, studies provide evidence 
that the divergence in financial and legal systems is the major factor to explain the 
corporate performance and business behaviors across countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998; Allen and Gale, 1999; Rajan and Zingales; 2003). Besides, informal rules 
defined by codes of conduct, norms of behaviours and conventions are also important 
institutional environments. Some researchers argue that social norms and 
conventions can be superior to administrative and judicial disputes resolution among 
people with close social ties and repeated business partners (Scooter, 1981; Ellickson, 
1991).  
The other perspective in new institutional economics emphasizes institutional 
arrangements that are the agreements made by specific individuals to govern their 
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own relationships. Business firms, long-term contracts, public bureaucracies, 
organizational structures, and other contractual agreements are examples of 
institutional arrangements. The boundary of firms is the major concern of the 
institutional arrangement approach. New institutional economics views a firm as a 
set of arrangements. Differing from neoclassical economic theory that suggests a 
firm is a production function or production possibility that transforms inputs into 
outputs, firm theory explains that the boundary of a firm not only depends on the 
productive technology but also on the various costs involved in the business 
exchange (Coase, 1937). It is suggested that the decision to organize transactions 
within the firm or on the open market depends on the relative costs of the internal 
and external exchanges (Williamson, 1979; Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Grossman 
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Therefore, the core issue of firm theory is 
how to reduce costs under different circumstances. 
Firm theory comprises several approaches, among which agency theory, 
transaction cost economics, and the property right approach are the best developed. 
Agency theory emphasizes the moral hazard problems that result from the separation 
of ownership and control in large firms (Berle and Means, 1932). Based on the 
assumption of self-interest, the authors suggest that managers use their discretion to 
shirk or pursue personal objectives at the expense of shareholder value. Agency 
theory thus studies the design of ex-ante incentive-compatible mechanism to reduce 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1986). Agency costs 
refer to the sum of monitoring expenditures of the principal, the bonding 
expenditures of the agent, and the residual loss. According to agency theory, a firm is 
a nexus of contracting relationships; thus, the question of interest is the degree to 
which various contracts mitigate these conflicts. 
Transaction cost and property right approaches criticize agency theory by 
pointing out that contracts are not able to solve all of the problems associated with 
exchanges. Researchers suggest that contracts are not complete in reality, because 
human beings’ rationality is bounded (Simon, 1979); outcomes of contracts are either 
unobservable (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) or unverifiable (Hart, 1988). Contract 
difficulties are even more serious under weak institutional environments. Even when 
the contract is relatively complete, it is difficult to enforce under the weak protection 
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of property rights and law enforcement (Hart and Moore, 1990; Williamson, 1996). 
This incompleteness of contracts leads to various risks among which the hold-up 
problems associated with asset-specific investments is the best-known (Hart, 1995). 
Therefore, transaction cost and property right approaches suggest that appropriate 
governance structures must protect the transacting parties from risks (Williamson, 
1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986).  
Governance structures are normally divided into decentralized market 
structures (buy) and hierarchical structures (make). Researchers argue that under a 
market structure framework, transactions are dealt through the market system. 
Market prices provide strong incentives for exploiting profit opportunities, and actors 
are quick to adapt to changing circumstances as information is revealed through 
prices. However, when relationship-specific assets are at stake, a bilateral 
coordination of investment decisions may be desirable, and a combined ownership of 
these assets may be efficient (Milgrom and Robert, 1992; Holmstrom, 1992; Shleifer, 
1985).  
Hierarchical structures refer to integrated firms, where trading parties are 
under unified ownership and control. Researchers argue that such hierarchies offer 
greater protections for specific investments and provide relatively efficient 
mechanisms for responding to changes where a coordinated adaptation is necessary. 
Compared with decentralized structures, however, hierarchies provide managers with 
weaker incentives to maximize profits and normally incur additional bureaucratic 
costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). The movement from market to hierarchy thus 
entails a trade-off between high-powered incentives with the adaptive properties of 
markets and lower-powered incentives with central coordinating properties of the 
firm.  
Although the organizing scheme of institutions is not without controversy, the 
institutional arrangement approach has been proven helpful for analytical purposes in 
many fields. Studies mainly focus on the relationship between a certain 
organizational form and the transaction costs, including the asset specificity, the 
uncertainty, the complexity and the frequency of the transaction (Monteverde and 
Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1985). Long-term contracts and partial ownership or 
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equity are also examined as alternative integrating arrangements (Goldberg and 
Erickson, 1987; Pisano, 1990).  
3.4.2 Legal Institutions and Venture Capital Investment   
The interaction between legal institutions and individual business 
performance and behaviours has attracted intensive interests from researchers in 
finance. Following La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, and 2000), King and Lavine (1993) 
and Rajan and Zingales (2003) demonstrate that legal systems are important in 
understanding and explaining economic activities and financial systems. In the case 
of venture capital investment, studies examine the impact of legal systems on the 
growth of venture capital markets and venture capitalists’ investment activities from 
both contractual and non-contractual aspects.   
Kaplan et al. (2003) analyze how financial contracts allocate cash flow, board 
seats, liquidation, and other control rights under different legal systems. Examining 
145 venture capital contracts in 23 developed countries and comparing them to those 
in the United States, the authors find that venture capital contracts differ across legal 
regimes. In particular, investments in common law countries are more likely to look 
like the US contracts while investments elsewhere are likely to differ. However, the 
authors also find that legal systems cannot explain all the differences. According to 
their examination, more experienced venture capitalists implement US style contracts 
regardless of the legal regime. Thus, the authors draw the conclusion that the fixed 
costs of learning appear to explain contracts along a wide range of legal regimes.  
Bottazzi et al. (2004) also examine how the contractual relationship between 
a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur depends on the legal system, but from both 
contractual and non-contractual aspects based on a hand-collected dataset consisting 
of 1457 deals made by 121 venture capital firms in 15 European countries for the 
period 1998-2001. The researchers find that better legal systems tend to be associated 
with more venture capitalists’ governance and more downside protection for the 
investors. Additionally, using the information from investments that cross legal 
system boundaries, they find that investors from stronger legal traditions provide 
more support, exercise more governance, and demand more downside protection, 
both within and outside their legal system.   
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While both the above studies are based on developed countries, Cumming et 
al. (2004) examines the impact of legal systems on the governance of venture capital 
investment in both developed countries and developing countries. With a dataset on 
3848 venture capital backed companies in 39 countries from North and South 
America, Europe and Asia spanning 1971-2003, the authors find that better laws 
facilitate faster deal screening and deal origination, a higher probability of 
syndication and a lower probability of potentially harmful co-investment, and 
facilitate board representation of the investor. They also show better laws reduce the 
probability that the investor requires periodic cash flows prior to exit, which is in 
conjunction with an increased probability of investment in high-technology 
companies. All the studies provide evidence that stronger law protection leads to 
more formal and innovative tools for venture capitalist to control and provide 
incentives to entrepreneurs.  
Furthermore, according to theoretical works, countries with inferior investor 
protection will have less developed markets for new venture financing (King and 
Lavine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Therefore, a hypothesis may be made that 
countries with more investor protection might have more developed venture capital 
market that support more innovative hi-tech projects. However, according to 
Obrimah’s (2004) empirical analysis, the property right protection and the 
enforcement of contracts do not always impact on the supply and demand sides of 
venture capital markets. The author finds that that the quality of the contract 
enforcement is a risk factor, while the quality of property rights protection is not. The 
quality of contract enforcement affects the supply of entrepreneurs who are willing to 
invest in the creation of intangible assets. Meanwhile, the poor quality of property 
right protection only affects the demand for growth financing, with supply unaffected.  
3.4.3 Capital Market and Venture Capital Investment 
Black and Gilson (1998) argue that the venture financing market is strongly 
linked with the stock market in a country. The authors suggest that venture capital 
market can flourish only if there is also an active stock market. First, financing 
contracts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists typically allow entrepreneurs 
to reacquire control from venture capitalists at the time of IPO. Second, an IPO 
provides venture capitalists with the opportunity to exit their investment and return 
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capital to the investors of the funds. Therefore, the authors make the prediction that 
countries with well-developed stock markets, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom tend to have venture capital commitments that are higher as a 
percentage of GDP than do countries with less stable stock markets, such as Japan 
and Germany.  
Drawing from Black and Gilson (1998), Jeng and Wells (2000) analyze the 
determinants of venture capital development for a sample of 21 countries and find 
that IPOs are the strongest driver.  In particular, IPOs are a significant determinant of 
late stage investments while have no effect on early stage investments across 
countries.  Similarly, Milhaupt (1997) compares the different institutional 
environments for venture capital in the United States and Japan. He shows that US 
venture capital firms are larger, more independent than Japanese ones do. Moreover, 
they normally take larger equity stakes, invest more in early-staged projects and new 
technologies, and, are more involved in the governance of their portfolio companies 
than their peers in Japan. The author suggests the US market-based system increases 
both the supply of venture funds and the demand for venture financing relative to a 
bank-centred system as found in Japan.  
3.4.4 Taxation and Venture Capital Investment   
Tax policy also has an impact on venture capital activity either by affecting 
the supply of funds or by affecting the incentives of individuals to become 
entrepreneurs. Poterba (1989) analyzes the link between capital gains taxation and 
venture capital activities. He argues that the supply of funds is unlikely to be greatly 
affected by lower taxes because more than half of venture investors are tax-exempt. 
However, he shows that lower capital gains taxes might increase the demand for 
venture capital by increasing the incentive of individuals to pursue entrepreneurial 
ventures. Consistent with Poterba’s (1989) analysis, Gompers and Lerner (1999) 
provide empirical evidence that lower capital gains tax rates are followed by larger 
amounts of venture capital fundraising. Because this increased fundraising comes 
from both taxable and tax-exempt investors, the authors suggest that the effect of 
capital gains taxes stems from its impact on the supply of entrepreneurs.  
Based on an analysis of R&D financing, Hall (2002) generalizes a model, 
which systemically explain how taxation impacts on the development of venture 
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capital investment. Comparing the costs of capital for early stage investment in hi-
technology under different assumptions of taxation systems, this model shows that 
venture financing is relatively more expensive for R&D projects than for ordinary 
investment, and that the consideration such as the lack of collaterals further reduces 
the possibility of debt finance. So, reducing capital gain tax might be a helpful 
solution to encourage venture capital investment in newly established R&D-oriented 
companies.  
3.4.5 Social Norm/Culture and Venture Capital Investment 
Besides legal and financial systems and taxation policies, researchers suggest 
that social norms might also influence venture capital investing (Wright, 1992; 
Bruno and Tyebjee, 1986; Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; Wang, 2002). Bruton and 
Ahlstrom (2003) examine how institutional arrangements impact venture capital 
investment practices in China. Based on 36 interviews within 24 venture capital 
firms that are active in China, the authors find the screening criteria and due 
diligence activities of venture capitalists in China are different from those in the 
United States. Fewer monitoring and value-added activities are provided by venture 
capitalists in China than their peers in the United States. The researchers suggest that 
various institutional elements including regulatory, normative and cognitive 
arrangement may exert influences while the less formal cognitive institutional 
elements such as ‘Guanxi’ (relationship) ‘Mianzi’ (face) etc. may play stronger roles 
in characterizing venture capitalists’ activities in China. Bruton et al. (2003) also 
gain the similar results from their studies on venture capital investment in East Asia. 
In addition, Manigart et al. (2003) and Locket and Wright (2001) examine 
venture capitalists’ investment activities in European countries in terms of their 
project evaluation, syndication, and some other controlling mechanisms. The authors 
find that, venture capitalists in Europe act more like their US counterparts though 
differences indeed exist across countries. For example, venture capitalists in France 
and Belgium emphasize more on informal information for projects than those in the 
United Kingdom. The authors attribute the results with more emphasis on the 
influences of social norms and cultures.  
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3.5 Limitations of the Existing Studies  
Reviewing the existing literature on venture capital investment, it can be seen 
that there are some important unanswered questions left for further studies in risk 
return of venture capital investment, venture capital investment under institutions 
outside the United States, and, also, the essential mechanisms employed in venture 
capital investment.  
3.5.1 Limitations of Studies on Venture Capital Investment Mechanisms  
As shown in previous sections, even though the mechanisms used in venture 
capital investment in the United States have been extensively discussed both 
theoretically and empirically, there are many unresolved questions on the way to 
fully understanding venture capital finance. 
Primarily, empirical examinations on the ‘double-sided’ moral hazard 
problems in venture capital investment are scarce in the existing literature. Previous 
studies are either interested in discussing the incentive mechanisms in the ‘fund 
investor-venture capitalist’ relationship or the ‘venture capitalist-entrepreneur’ 
relationship. How the incentives provided by venture capital funds to investment 
professionals may impact on the venture capitalist’s investment strategies is seldom 
tested. Almost all studies confirm that venture capitalists are the key in venture 
financing that bridge the other two stakeholders, i.e. the investors of venture funds 
and the entrepreneurs. The efforts exerted by venture capitalists in selecting and 
governing their portfolio companies should be critically important for the success of 
venture investment (Cassmata, 2003, Schmidt, 2003). Therefore, the mechanisms to 
solve the incentive problems between venture capitalists and the investors of venture 
funds should have impacts on investing activities and the performance of the 
investment.  
Limited partnership as an organizational structure is widely employed by 
venture capital institutions as a privileged mechanism to deal with the incentive 
problems between fund investors and venture capitalists. However, there is little 
empirical research on the comparison of this arrangement with other organizational 
structures of venture funds and the relationship between this arrangement and the 
performance of the venture funds. Moreover, there is even little study on the 
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interaction of this arrangement of limited partnership with venture capitalists’ 
investing activities. 
Furthermore, there are also limitations in empirical studies on mechanisms 
used by venture capitalists to solve the agency problems in their selecting and 
managing the portfolio companies. Primarily, empirical study on stage financing is 
scarce. As the most potent mechanism used in venture capital investment, stage 
financing has been discussed extensively by theorists. However, empirical 
investigations are rare and, the few studies are all based on the US data. Moreover, 
most existing studies discuss the mechanisms separately rather than considering the 
interactive relationships and interwoven effects of the mechanisms in venture capital 
investment. For example, the use of convertible security, stage financing and 
syndicated financing are all considered as important mechanisms used in venture 
capital investment. The mechanisms are often used simultaneously. Some theorists 
suggest that the use of the various mechanisms may have relationships between each 
other. For example, Conelli and Yosha (2003) argue that the use of convertible 
security in venture capital investment may help to reduce the ‘short-termism’ of 
entrepreneurs in stage financing. At the same time, Huang and Xu (1998) suggest 
that syndication of investment may act as a commitment device for venture 
capitalists to terminate bad projects through stage financing on time. The studies 
remind us of further empirical examinations on the interwoven effects of the various 
mechanisms used in venture capital investment.  
3.5.2 Limitations of Studies on the Effects of Venture Capital Investment  
Although previous studies implicitly suggest that venture capital may be 
especially important for innovative companies, they devote only modest attention, 
however, to concern about the causality: the possibility remains that more innovative 
firms select venture capital for financing, rather than venture capital causing firms to 
be more innovative. As referred to Lerner ( 2001), policymakers have a perception 
that venture capital organizations have much to do with the rising leadership of US 
companies in high-technology industries (which can be measured through patent 
counts or more qualitative measures). But demonstrating a causal relationship 
between the presence of venture capital investment and innovation or job growth is a 
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challenging empirical problem. Most of the existing literature fails to control the 
endogenous alternatives for the effects of venture capital investments on innovation.  
Furthermore, studies on the factors that influence on venture capitalists’ 
capability to support entrepreneurial R&D activities and innovations are also limited. 
As stated, studies show that there are substantial variations in the distribution of 
venture capital investment. However, systematic studies on what affect venture 
capitalists’ investment focuses, especially those outside the US, are scarce.   
Finally, little work has been done on analyzing the risk and return 
characteristics of venture capital investment. Unlike publicly traded companies, 
private firms are not subject to rigorous disclosure requirements. Thus, it is hard to 
gain accurate data concerning the rate of return of venture capital investment before 
the venture capital backed firms go public. The existing literature that estimates the 
risk return of venture capital investment mainly takes IPOs of venture capital backed 
companies as the measurement of success. However, Cochrane (2001) and Gompers 
and Lerner (2001) point out that this might create a sample selection bias in that only 
the better performed companies choose to go public whereas a substantial number of 
companies elect to remain private. So, it is less clear whether the returns of venture 
capital investments are different from those of public equity. If so, an argument may 
be made that whether these differences can compensate the lack of diversification 
and severe informational asymmetries faced by venture capitalists, and the costs of 
value added and monitoring activities venture capitalists provide.  
To summarize, although much efforts have been exerted to measure the 
economic effects of venture capital investment, the knowledge remains incomplete. 
Currently, policymakers around the world make many efforts to promote venture 
capital programs in order to boost R&D financing and national innovation in their 
countries. It is therefore emerged as a very important question to assess the risk 
return of venture capital financing and, to what extent venture capital supports young 
R&D-oriented companies under various institutions in different countries.  
3.5.3 Limitations of Studies on Venture Capital Investment outside the US  
As discussed, there has been a surge in venture capital investment in a wide 
variety of nations across Asia, Europe, and Latin America since the 1980s. However, 
most of the studies mentioned in foregoing sections are based on the US market. Due 
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to the short history and the lack of data, examinations on venture capital industry 
outside the United States are still limited. Research on European venture capital 
markets started in the 1990s whilst studies on Asian venture capital just started in the 
second half of the 1990s. Recently, researchers examine how intuitions influence the 
growth of venture capital markets and shape venture capitalists’ investment and 
governing activities in different countries (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Gilson 
and Black, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2003; Bruton et al., 2003).  However, most of the 
studies are based on theories that are generated from the observations in developed 
countries. It is questionable whether the indicators and measurements derived from 
the existing theories are suitable in understanding and examining venture capital 
investment in developing economies where the institutions are different from those in 
developed countries in many aspects.  
3.5.4 Knowledge Gaps in China’s Venture Capital Investment  
Studies on venture capital investment and entrepreneurship in China did not 
begin until the years 2000 due to the short history and lack of data. There are many 
questions left unanswered.  
White et al. (2002) are among the first researchers discussing venture capital 
investment in China. The authors document the institutional and policy trajectories of 
China’s venture capital industry before the year 2000. Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) 
explore how foreign venture capitalists (FVCs) invest in China under an institutional 
framework. This study is a qualitative research based on interviews with practitioners. 
The authors find that both formal and informal institutional settings affect FVCs’ 
investment behaviours in China. However, the degree of the impacts is not 
homogeneous. For example, the researchers find that regulatory and cognitive 
institutions impact nearly all aspects of foreign venture capitalists’ investing 
activities in China, but normative institutions only matter in the project screening. 
Similarly, Feng (2004) analyzes the impact of institutional dynamics on the evolution 
of China’s venture capital industry with the focus on the changes of FVCs’ 
investment strategies in China. Based on interviews and secondary document 
analysis, Feng finds that the protection of property rights has a dominant impact on 
investing behaviour whereas the agency perspective is not as powerful in explaining 
FVCs’ investment strategies in China.  
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There is no doubt that such studies have improved our understanding of 
venture capital investment in China. However, knowledge gaps remain due to the 
scarcity of the research. Questions like whether venture capital investment indeed 
supports young R&D-oriented companies; how the structure of venture capital 
institutions interacts with venture capitalists’ investing activities in China; and how 
institutions, especially regulatory institutions, impact venture capitalists’ financial 
contracting are left unanswered. Furthermore, the existing studies only look at 
foreign venture capitalists’ investing activities; the sample cannot represent the 
whole group of venture capitalists in China so far. Finally, these studies are mainly 
conducted based on the qualitative approach, which leads to inevitable weaknesses in 
validating the findings.  
To summarize, although venture capital industry in China has remarkably 
developed in the past years, studies on venture capital investment in China remain 
extremely immature. The lack of investigation is shown in both the content of the 
research and the methodology used in the existing literature.  
3.6 Research Question Statement  
From the above survey of the existing literature, it is seen that there are many 
aspects of venture capital investment remain uncovered. The lack of scrutiny is 
especially seen in venture capital investment outside the US. This study therefore 
tries to fill some of the knowledge gaps by exploring and examining venture capital 
investment in China under an institutional framework.  
Primarily, new institutional economics provides an appropriate framework for 
exploring and examining venture capital investment in China. Above all, as stated, 
new institutional economics provides a deeper understanding of the mechanisms 
employed in venture capital investment.  As previously discussed, the central 
concern of new institutional economics is how institutions may control agency 
problems and uncertainties in transactions. While agency problems and uncertainties 
are more severe in venture capital investment, institutions might be more powerful to 
explain how venture capital investment stands out from traditional financial means in 
dealing with the agency problems and uncertainties. For example, researchers argue 
that equity arrangement is more efficient in investment in R&D-oriented projects 
(Armour and Teece, 1980; Joskow, 1985; Pisano, 1990) that is consistent with the 
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practice of venture capital investment. Furthermore, the development of venture 
capital investment itself is path-dependent to and embedded in institutional 
environments.  The evolving trajectory of venture capital investment in the US shows 
that venture capital investment emerged from the dynamics of institutional changes 
in the country (Lerner, 2000; Kenney, 1989).  
Moreover, the new institutional perspective is even more important to 
understand China specifically. As a transitional economy with the largest population 
and longest history, China has a unique economic structure, political system, legal 
system, and diverse culture. Researchers argue that the differences in institutional 
environments may influence the behaviour of actors in China’s economy on the one 
hand, and the reflection of the actors then influences changes in institutional 
environments on the other hand (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Pistor and Xu, 
2005).    
China is different from western countries due to the socialism legacy. In 
particular, the political and legal framework under which the country has created 
significant economic growth differs from many other developed or developing 
countries (Qian and Xu, 1993; Jin et al., 1999). Before the economic reform, China 
was under a central planning system.  Administrative bureaucracy was the only 
regulatory institution to solve business disputes and govern the State-owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) that composed the absolute majority of the country’s economy at 
that time. The legal system that regulates business practices almost did not exist, 
especially during the twenty years following the political turmoil of the 1950s. Even 
though the government has made substantial efforts to improve the legal and 
financial systems to during the transformation from the centrally planned economy to 
a more market-oriented economy since the late 1970s, the institutional environments 
are far from developed due to the short history of the legal system construction and 
the legacy of the political system in the country (Allen et al, 2005). Currently, the 
country is still criticized for its lack of a comprehensive legal system, weak 
protection of property rights, and problematic law enforcement. The governance 
structure and the effectiveness of the government in China are also major concerns.  
Normative institutions are also unique in China. First, due to the legacy of the 
central planning system, the country has long lacked social infrastructure serving the 
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market economy. For example, professional managers are scarce in China; 
intermediary and consultancy are still immature compared to developed countries.  
Cognitive institutions such as social norms, culture, and customs are considered one 
of the most important factors influencing on business behaviours in China. 
Networking (Guanxi), face value (Mianzi), and excessive concern for family (Jiating 
Guannian), which are all rooted in Confucianism, carry much weight in Chinese 
society (Ford, 1997; Graham and Lam, 2003).  
To summarize, the nature of venture capital investment and the uniqueness of 
China in institutions suggest that new institutional economics provides an 
appropriate platform for exploring and understanding venture capital in China. 
However, although scholars have recognized the importance of China in the global 
economy and the impact of institutions on its development, there are few empirical 
studies focusing on the role of different institutional environments in China’s 
economy and how these differences can help create different organizational and 
commercial systems (Allen et al., 2005; Peng, 2001; Pistor and Xu, 2005), especially 
in the R&D financing and entrepreneurial domains. This study therefore tried to fill 
up the knowledge gaps by exploring and examining institutions of venture capital 
investment and the impact of the institutions on venture capitalists’ investment 
strategies.  
The overall institutional environments and institutional arrangements related 
to venture capital investment are first discussed with a detailed introduction on the 
trajectory of China’s venture capital industry in the past twenty years. It explores the 
overall legal and financial systems, public policies and social norms under which 
venture capital investment operates on the one hand, and, the governance structures 
of the individual venture capital funds on the other hand.  
This study then examines whether these institutions affect VCs’ investment 
strategies in China; and, if the answer is yes, how these institutions impact VCs’ 
investment in China. The impacts of institutions on VCs’ investment activities are 
examined through three aspects: i.e. VCs’ investment preferences in terms of the 
technology and development stage of their portfolio companies, VCs’ ex-ante project 
screening criteria and VCs’ stage financing strategies. 
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Examining venture capitalists’ investment preferences in terms of the 
development stage and R&D intensity of the portfolios, this study explores whether 
venture capitalists in China indeed support young high-technology companies as the 
policymakers and researchers asserted; and, how institutions impact VCs’ capability 
to support the young R&D-oriented companies. After that, VCs’ ex-ante screening 
strategies are explored. It discovers what factors are considered as important for 
venture capitalists in their project screening in China. By comparing the screening 
criteria used in China with those of developed countries, this study examines how the 
unique institutions in China impact VCs’ ex-ante screening. Finally, VCs’ ex-post 
monitoring activities are investigated with the focus on stage financing. It explores 
the relationship between agency problems associated with the investment and VCs’ 
stage financing strategies in China. By comparing VCs’ stage financing structure in 
China with those in the US, it tried to explore whether and how institutions impact 
on VCs’ ex-post monitoring activities in China.  
By addressing the above questions, this study provides an empirical 
exploration and analysis on institutions of venture capital investment and VCs’ 
investment strategies in China. It is among the first empirical studies exploring 
venture capital investment in China. It is also among the first attempts examining the 
interaction between institutions and investment activities in developing countries.  
3.7 Summary  
This chapter reviews the existing literature on venture capital investment with 
the focus on agency and institutional issues associated with this innovative financial 
form. The existing studies suggest that the two agency relationships: i.e. the agency 
relationship between the ultimate investors of venture funds and venture capitalists; 
and, the agency relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are the 
major concerns of practitioners in venture financing. Nearly all the mechanisms 
employed in venture capital investment deal with these two sets of agency problems. 
At the same time, studies also show that institutions, especially legal and financial 
institutions are important factors to explain and the development of different venture 
capital markets and individual investment strategies of the practitioners.  
Although the existing literature has substantially improved our 
understandings in venture capital investment, many questions remain unanswered. 
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The lack of scrutiny is especially seen with the systematic analysis on the economic 
effects of venture capital investment, the interaction of mechanism employed in 
venture capital investment and, the venture capital markets in emerging markets etc.  
Based on the review of the existing literature, the research questions for this 
study are further clarified. This study tried to fill the knowledge gaps by exploring 
and examining venture capital investment in China under an institutional framework. 
The institutions under which venture capital investment operates in China, and, the 
interactions between VCs’ investment strategies and these institutions are the focuses 
of the discussion.  
In summary, this study contributes to the existing literature by providing 
empirical evidence on how venture capital funds are governed and how venture 
capitalists manage their investments under the special institutions in China. In the 
next chapter, the methodological issues, which instruct how the research goals of this 
study are achieved, are discussed.  
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Chapter 4 Methodological Justification 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodological issues of this study. The nature of 
this research and the pragmatic considerations of the researcher suggest that a 
‘triangulation’ methodology, which combines both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, is appropriate for this study. Consequently, a multi-phased research 
design that covers various data collection and analysis methods was chosen to fulfil 
the research objectives in this study. Unstructured and semi-structured interviews 
with venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, government official and researchers were 
taken to gain qualitative data. The quantitative data were mainly gained from semi-
structured interviews, secondary document analysis and commercial databases.  
This chapter is organized as follows: The next section analyzes the features of 
different research approaches in social science to build up the rationale for 
methodological justification. Section 3 discusses the methodological choice in this 
study. After that, a detailed research design of the fieldwork, which covers the 
research process, methods of data collection, the choice and access of research 
subjects, and the data analysis methods are discussed. Section 5 analyzes the 
methodological limitations and documents the methodological findings in this study. 
This chapter is summarized in Section 6. 
4.2 Methodologies in Social Science  
There are two major streams of research approaches employed in social 
science: one is often labelled as ‘quantitative’ research or ‘survey’; the other one is 
often termed as ‘qualitative’ research (as opposed to ‘quantitative’)  (e.g. Filstead, 
1970; Schwartz and Jacobs, 197; Tylor and Bogdan, 1984) or ‘field research’ ( as 
opposed to ‘survey’) ( e.g. Burgess, 1982; Singleton and Straits, 1999). The two 
approaches differ from each other in terms of the nature of data that each engenders 
and the level of analysis at which each operates. However, they are not absolutely 
exclusive. More recently, a ‘triangulation’ approach, which combines both the two 
methods, is also employed by researchers in social studies. Researchers suggest that 
the choice of research methods must be made based on understandings of the 
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advantages and limitations of the two approaches and their appropriateness for the 
research questions (Bryman, 1988; Silverman, 2001).  
4.2.1 Quantitative Approach 
Originated from the positivism perspective (Comte, 184216; Durkheim, 1938), 
quantitative approach is typically taken through methods employed in natural science 
such as social survey and experimental investigations. It seeks for the facts and 
causes of social phenomenon apart from the subjective states of individuals, and 
believes that sociology should conceive itself only within what can be observed with 
the senses and that theories of social life should be built in a rigid, linear, and 
methodical way on a base of verifiable facts (Comte, 1842),  
Quantitative approach is often conceptualized by its practitioners as having a 
logical structure in which theories determine the problems to which researchers 
address themselves in the form of hypotheses derived from general theories 
(Bryman, 1988). It is meriting in its logic structure, relative objectivity, causality, 
generalization, replication, and comparability that makes it a major methodological 
approach in many social disciplines such as political science, economics, business 
and psychology.   
However, limiting its conception of valid or warranted knowledge to 
observable data, and possessing characteristics of nature science research, 
quantitative approach is criticised by commentators. Hindess (1977) argues that it is 
hard to judge the warranty of knowledge by comparing the observed phenomena 
with the theories, which are developed by human beings. Furthermore, the 
assumption to what extent a theory-neutral observable language possible is also a 
concern with quantitative approach since observation itself is by no means absolutely 
objective. Finally, to what extent the researcher could extract the ‘real’ law and 
regularity and the causal relationship by reduction the factors from complex social 
phenomena is also questioned by commentators (Spinelli, 1989). It is argued that 
quantitative approach encourages a misleading emphasis on superficial facts without 
enough attention to understand the underlying mechanisms that cannot be observed 
directly.  
                                                 
16 Auguste Comte, 1830-1842, Cours de philosophie positive (Martineau (tr.), 1896, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste 
Comte, Volumes I, II, and III. London:  Bell 
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Although quantitative approach is criticized in its ignoring the meanings of 
human society and the inability in exploratory work, the problems above mentioned 
are by no means merely located in quantitative approach.   
4.2.2 Qualitative Approach  
Following the interpretivism perspective (Deutscher, 1973), which is 
committed to understand social phenomena from the actor’s own eyes and examining 
how the world is experienced, qualitative research tends to be associated with 
participant observations and unstructured, in-depth interviews which are widely 
employed in philosophical and sociological studies. 
Opposing constructing rigid scientific laws, causality and fixed 
determinations about the observations in the society, qualitative approach 
emphasizes that researchers can only gain the knowledge about the reality based on 
understanding and interpreting of human being’s experiences by phenomenology, 
verstehen, ethnomethodology, etc. By emphasizing seeing through the eyes of the 
subjects, narrative descriptions, processes and the contextual analysis, qualitative 
approach entails that researchers study the society as an insider to gain contextual 
and dynamic understanding of its complexity. In addition, the flexibility of 
qualitative approach provides researchers with a relatively open and unstructured 
research strategy (Bryman, 1988). Finally, qualitative approach does not impose a 
potentially alien framework on their subjects. It is thus good at exploring and 
developing theories. In the past twenty years, qualitative approach has gained great 
attention for its capability to explore social issues in-depth (Bryman, 1988; Deniz 
and Lincoln, 2000; Silverman, 2001).  
Although qualitative approach is prevalent in recent years in social research, 
the approach is criticized for its limited capability to objectively represent the 
society. The problem with interpretation is a major concern. To what extent 
researchers understand the research subjects is a challenge because they may have 
different background and hold diverse perceptions about the issues (Cicourel, 1964). 
The respondent validation is also a problem. It is hard for the informants to 
understand the academic descriptive style that makes cross checking difficult. 
Moreover, it is difficult to code and analyse the normally huge amount of data gained 
from the field. The limitation in generalization, replication is also a problem with 
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qualitative research that may attract critiques about the reliability and validity of the 
research.  
4.2.3 ‘Triangulation’: A Combination of two Approaches 
According to the above discussion, quantitative research relies on detached 
and inferential materials which may introduce systematically measurement errors, 
whereas qualitative inquiry involves intensive interactions between the researcher 
and the informant in a limited number of settings and may therefore lead to ‘observer 
biases’. Quantitative approach aims to achieve the breadth and hence may not 
completely understand the context, whereas qualitative inquiry targets gaining the 
depth therefore may lack of the generalisability (Simon, 1963).  
Even though there are obvious differences between the two approaches, the 
distinction is never exclusive (Bryman, 1988; Stinchcombe, 1964). A proper 
combination of the two research methods that is labelled as a ‘triangulation’ 
approach may bring researchers greater confidence in their findings according to the 
need of their research questions. That is, the two approaches may facilitate each other 
with their own strengths and provide mutual confirmations for the findings and hence 
improve the validity of the research.  
There are a number of ways in which qualitative approach may facilitate 
quantitative research. For instance, qualitative research can act as a precursor to the 
formulation of problems and the development of instruments for quantitative 
research.  Moreover, qualitative research can also facilitate the construction of scales 
and indices for quantitative research. Furthermore, qualitative research may facilitate 
the interpretation of relationships between variables in quantitative examinations; the 
richness of qualitative data may greatly assist analysis of quantitative data.  
On the other hand, quantitative research may also facilitate qualitative 
research in many ways. For example, quantitative research may facilitate qualitative 
research is in the judicious selection of cases for further qualitative studies by 
mapping the issues to be addressed. In addition, the quantitative approach may assist 
qualitative research in providing an account of the regularities, and hence patterns of 
the structure. Furthermore, quantitative approach may also help qualitative research 
to improving the reliability and generialisability of the qualitative findings.  
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Researchers suggest that the triangulation approach not only reinforces the 
findings and improves the validity of the research, but also leads discrepancies to the 
findings. The discrepancies may further prompt the researchers to probe certain 
issues in greater depth, which may lead to fruitful areas of inquiries in their own 
right.  
4.3 Methodological Choice  
Methodology refers to the way in which people approach problems. Thus, it 
is suggested that the assumptions, interests and research purposes determine which 
methodology is chosen in a study. However, most of the existing literature on 
venture capital investment is solely based on reduced form analysis, which is 
challenged for not being able to explore and understand the insights of the emerging 
phenomenon. This study therefore tries to achieve the research goal by combining 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches according to the research purposes and 
the pragmatic considerations.  
4.3.1 Methodological Limitations of the Existing Literature 
As stated in the previous section, venture capital investment was studied until 
the 1980s in the US and the 1990s outside the US. Research in venture capital 
investment is far from mature even under the US settings. Currently, the major 
research interest is located in principal agency problems between venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs.  Most of the research questions are derived from the existing 
financial and contract theories that the studies are mainly conducted with theoretical 
deduction. Questionnaire surveys ( Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al, 1987; Hellmann 
and Puri, 2000; Manigart et al., 2003) , structured interviews (Wells, 1974; Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994; Muzyka et al., 1996, Bliss, 1999), archive researches (Lerner, 1995; 
Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003; Riquelme and Rickards, 1992), real-time 
approaches such as verbal protocols (Sanberg, et al., 1987, Hall and Hofer, 1993) and 
experiments ( Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd, 1999) are widely employed. However, 
qualitative approaches such as unstructured interviews (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003) 
and participant observations (Silva, 2004) are not employed as widely.  
There are some methodological limitations located in the existing literature. 
Above all, quantitative approach is not at the advantage in exploring new emerged 
issues and understanding insights of the society due to its reductive features. 
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Researchers might miss some very important aspects and issues by testing models 
derived from the existing theories given venture capital is still a very new growing 
industry even in developed economy, not mentioning that in developing countries.  
In addition, there are also practical issues related to data collection methods 
in the existing studies. For instance, most of the studies are associated with 
retrospective reporting questionnaire responses (e.g. Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; 
MacMillan et al., 1987. Elango, et al., 1995). Some researchers try to solve the 
retrospection biases by applying some real-time data gathering methods. Typing 
verbal protocol, in which the researcher asks the research subjects to ‘think aloud’ 
their thoughts as they perform a particular task, has been used in Hall and Hofer 
(1993). And, as another real-time data gathering method, experiment is used by 
Riquelme and Rickards (1992) and Muzyka et al. (1996) in their conjoint analyses. 
Although these methods might be helpful to avoid the retrospective problems, they 
rely on self-reporting data that may cause other issues. For instance, the research 
subjects in professional business circles may give standard answers to questions in a 
consultancy style. In addition, there is also the possibility that the similar patterns 
arose because the research subjects want the report to be ‘respectable and legal’. 
Another potential problem is that both parties are professional communicators. They 
could have been ‘spin doctoring’ to each other. 
Despite of the significant contributions made by the researchers, there are 
limitations in methodology of venture capital research. As discussed, it is hard for 
researchers to explore the real issues inside the industry and to avoid the 
retrospective/ self-reporting problems without intensive interactions with the 
research subjects and observations on the spot. This issue is more serious in the case 
of studying venture capital investment in emerging markets where the general 
institutions and this specific industry are not well understood by researchers yet.  
4.3.2 Methodological Choice 
 
The nature of this research and the practical considerations determine that a 
‘triangulation’ methodology, which combines both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches appears appropriate for this study. In this research, qualitative approach 
is taken to explore and understand the institutional background, how venture capital 
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funds are structured, how venture capitalists make their investment, and how the 
venture capital investment mechanisms interact with the institutions in China etc. 
Quantitative approach is undertaken to systematically examine the specific questions 
and assumptions raised from the qualitative study and the existing literature. That is, 
qualitative position plays a major role in exploring the undiscovered facts and 
providing insightful understandings and interpretations on the one hand; quantitative 
position generalizes the regularities and consequently provides harder evidence on 
the other hand.  
Primarily, the exploratory feature of this study calls for the inquiry of 
qualitative position. As stated, this study aims at exploring venture capital investment 
under an institutional framework in China. As an expressly exploratory work with 
questions like ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’, this research tries to explore the 
institution of venture capital investment and the interactions between the institutions 
and venture capitalists’ investment strategies in China. Rather than testing 
hypotheses extracted from the existing framework under which the major variables 
and the relationships between variables are precisely clarified at the outset, the 
researcher tries to raise the specific research questions based on the qualitative 
finding and, the understanding in the existing literature together. As stated, it is 
suggested that qualitative approach is privilege in exploring, understanding and 
explaining the undiscovered facts in the field (Bryman, 1998; Silverman, 2001). 
Therefore, the exploratory nature of this research determines that qualitative 
approach is critical in gaining a set of rich and insightful data for this study.  
In addition, the feature of this study in seeking for the cause-and-effect 
relationship between venture capitalists’ investment activities and the institutions in 
China also calls for a qualitative position. According to Singleton and Straits (1999), 
statistics can tell whether there is a relationship between factors while it hardly 
provides information on whether the relationship is causal or not. This problem is 
especially serious when there are more than two independent factors. Scholars 
suggest by deeper involvements with the research subjects in the field and figuring 
out the contextual process, researchers would gain more possibilities in proposing a 
reasonable mechanism to account for the cause-and-effect relationship (Bryman, 
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1998; Yin, 1994; Lee et al., 1999). Therefore, this study asks for the helps of 
qualitative techniques.  
Moreover, the theoretical framework employed in this study also suggests 
qualitative approach is important in this research. This study explores venture capital 
investment in China under a new institutional economics framework. New 
institutional economics, given the broader scope of analysis, relies less heavily on 
econometric techniques but more on comparative method to collect information and 
pursue generalizations about the economic activities of human groups (Polanyi et al., 
1977; Stanfield, 1986). Qualitative methods like interviews and participant 
observations are specified in recording activities, rules, and applicable 
understandings or cultural underpinnings that comprise human behaviours unfolding 
in an institutional context (Stanfield, 1999).  
Furthermore, the emphasis of this research on accurately reflecting the reality 
calls for a qualitative position. It is widely known that venture capitalists are all well-
trained professionals and communicators. As discussed, it may be hard to avoid the 
research subjects repeating standard consultancy line when they face survey 
questionnaires or structured interviews. It is thus suggested that qualitative methods 
that provide on spot observations of the researcher and direct interactions between 
the researcher and the research subject may help to mitigate the retrospective 
reporting problems. In addition, a flexible and rapport atmosphere in relaxed 
conversations may stimulate more opinions emerged simultaneously that is very 
valuable for gaining the insights.   
Finally, practical concerns also suggest deploying qualitative approach. The 
research subjects are mainly financiers or entrepreneurs who are normally too busy 
to respond to a questionnaire survey. The face-to-face interviews may help to 
improve the response rate. People working in financial institutions are sensitive 
about providing information to outsiders. A more relaxed atmosphere in interviews 
can help in building up a more trustable and rapport relationship with the research 
subjects and, consequently to ease the sensitivities. This is even more important 
while doing research in China where ‘Guanxi’ (networks) is a visible part of the 
culture. These networks are critical in the whole process of the fieldwork including 
gaining access to the research subjects and the sensitive information, etc. The 
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connections normally come through a referral from friends rather than formal 
channels in China. Such a requirement encourages qualitative approaches that might 
provide closer and more relaxed interactions with the subjects. 
Even though qualitative techniques are good at social reality exploration, 
understandings and causal relationship analyzing etc., the objectives of this research 
can not be fully achieved with qualitative methods solely. The nature of this research 
also calls for assistance of quantitative approach. Primarily, the validity of the 
research findings needs to be improved with quantitative techniques. Qualitative 
approach has long been challenged for its lack of representativeness and 
objectiveness due to the limitation of the sample size and the deep involvement of 
the researcher with the research subjects. By contrast, quantitative approach is not 
only at the advantage in generalizing the research findings and providing systematic 
evidence, but also privilege in keeping the researcher with a more objective strand as 
an outsider. Thus, in order to reinforce the validity of qualitative findings, this study 
also employs quantitative approach to examine the findings systematically and 
objectively, and consequently generalize the results. Moreover, the research 
questions and theoretical framework also suggest that quantitative techniques are 
important in this study. The discussion in this study is based on initial knowledge and 
understandings of venture capital industry evolution and the institutional 
environments in China. This entails us to ask for assistance from statistical data and 
other secondary documents analysis.  
At the same time, the practical concerns also encourage to employ 
quantitative techniques. Due to the economic and time constraints, it is impossible to 
gain all the needed information with the field observations or interviews. The sample 
size is always limited for qualitative research. Thus, quantitative techniques such as 
secondary documents and commercial database are used in this study to generalize 
the research findings.  
To summarize, the nature of this study and the practical concerns suggest that 
a ‘triangulation’ strategy which combines both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches is proper for this study. Qualitative approaches are taken as the major 
methods to answer the questions with ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ etc., whilst 
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quantitative approaches are taken to test the hypotheses derived from the existing 
literature and the findings from the qualitative analysis. 
4.4 Research Design  
Consistent with the methodological choice, this study consists three different 
phases with various data collection methods. Unstructured in-depth interviews, semi-
structured interviews, secondary document analysis, and commercial database are 
employed to collect data for this study. This multi-method approach helps to 
illuminate different facets of the questions and, thus increase the validity and 
reliability of this study.  
4.4.1 Research Process: A Multi-phased Design 
A three-phased research design was constructed in order to achieve the 
research objectives. The three different stages were composed of the exploration of 
the specific questions, the systematic examination on the questions, and, the 
explanation for the findings from the exploration and systematic analysis (see Table 
4.1).  
At the initial stage, the researcher aimed to clarify the specific research 
questions based on the understanding of the existing literature and the explorations 
from the field. Unstructured in-depth interviews, semi-structured interviews and 
secondary document analysis were major data collection methods at this stage. It was 
divided into three parts. At first, the general research questions were addressed based 
on the understanding in the existing literature (as shown in section 3.6). The 
questions served as a conceptual framework in the researcher’s mind to draft the 
inquiry of the unstructured interviews and direct the secondary document analysis. 
With the guidance of the conceptual framework, unstructured interviews and 
secondary document analysis were then taken to explore the major features of 
venture capital institutions and venture capitalists’ investment strategies in China. 
The unstructured interviewees included venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, researchers 
and government officials. Information on the major mechanisms, especially the 
unique features of venture capital investment in China was collected directly from 
the practitioners including venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. In addition, the 
subjects’ views on institutions related on venture capital investment were gathered 
from the interviews with the practitioners, researchers and government officials, and, 
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the secondary documents analysis. In this way, better understandings in what 
happens in the field, what the major questions are, and, whether there are any factors, 
definitions or measurements unique under this research context were gained. Based 
on these initial findings, an inquiry for semi-structured interviews with venture 
capitalists was drafted to address the questions raised from the field. With the 
analysis of the findings from semi-structured interviews, the specific research 
questions, mostly in the form of hypotheses, were clarified.  
At the second stage, systematic analysis on the hypotheses and questions 
raised from the initial stage was conducted.  Data from semi-structured interviews, 
secondary documents analysis and commercial database were combined for the 
analysis. Primarily, the analysis on venture capitalists’ screening criteria was mainly 
based on the data gained from semi-structured interviews. In addition, the 
information gathered from the semi-structured interviews with venture capitalists 
mainly served for providing indicators and measurements for the econometric 
analysis on venture capitalists’ investment preferences and stage financing strategies. 
Commercial databases and secondary document analysis provided detailed 
investment information of the venture capital firms and their portfolio companies for 
statistical examinations.   
The third stage consisted of unstructured interviews with venture capitalists 
again to reinforce the primary findings and enrich the understandings and 
explanations for the findings. The primary findings from both the qualitative and 
quantitative examinations were discussed with the interviewees to review whether 
the key points were caught by the author. In addition, insightful explanations for the 
puzzles in the analysis from the insiders were gained in this way.  
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Table 4.1 A Multi-phased Research Design  
 Data collection 
methods  
Purposes  Outcomes  





analysis,   
3. Semi-structured 
interviews  
1. exploring  the 
insights  
2. clarifying the 
specific research 
questions  























1. reinforcing the 
findings  
2. explaining the 
results  





4.4.2 Data Collection  
As shown in the foregoing subsection, unstructured interviews, semi-
structured interviews, secondary documents analysis, and commercial survey data 
were the major sources of the data in this study. The choice of data collection 
methods echoes Simon’s (1977) view: ‘ One must avoid limiting oneself to a narrow 
choice of methods… several methods together may provide better and cheaper 
answers than any single method can.’  
4.4.2.1 Unstructured Interviews 
1. Why unstructured interviews?  
An unstructured interview is a spontaneous conversation where questions can 
be changed or adapted to meet the respondent’s intelligence, understanding or belief. 
It does not offer any set format but in which the interviewer may have some key 
questions formulated in advance. The interviewer aims to listen to how each 
individual person responds to the questions. .  Normally, the respondent may have 
more control over the conduct of the interview in that they are often allowed to 
discuss issues as they arise and not necessarily in an order predetermined by the 
interviewer. Unstructured interview is good in delving deep beneath the surface of 
superficial responses to obtain meanings that individuals assign to events, and the 
complexities of their attitudes, behaviours and experiences. The major advantages of 
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unstructured interview are that more complex issues can be probed and answers can 
be clarified. The result of this more open-ended approach is a richness of data which 
is unbiased by any interpretation which the interviewer may have placed on it. 
Unstructured interviews have played an important role in this study. As 
stated, at the initial stage of this research, unstructured interviews provided a general 
understanding of the problems and helped to clarify further research questions and 
construct the inquiry for semi-structured interviews. In addition, unstructured 
interviews also facilitated the author to understand and interpret the findings of the 
quantitative analysis. Finally, cross-checking the research findings with the 
interviewees through unstructured interviews helped to improve the credibility and 
reliability of this research.  
However, there are also inevitable disadvantages of unstructured interview.  
The main difficulty with unstructured interviews is that they are time consuming and 
the data are difficult to sort and analyze. Only small size of samples can be 
interviewed that the representitiveness is not guaranteed. Moreover, the data 
collected from different respondents will obviously be different, and therefore not 
always comparable; this may raise issues of reliability and validity for data collected 
in this way. Furthermore, even though more intensive interactions and involvements 
with research subjects may provide greater depth, the researcher may lose objective 
judgments and understandings. In this study, the weaknesses of this qualitative 
approach were compensated with the helps of quantitative techniques that are being 
discussed in the next sections. 
2. Sampling of unstructured interviews 
To invest in China, venture capitalists not only need to interact with 
entrepreneurs but also have to deal with related governmental agencies or other 
external relations. To explore venture capitalists’ investment in China while ignoring 
the related participants in this market might bias further inquiry. Therefore, the unit 
of analysis was not pre-determined in this study. Rather, it was identified in the field. 
In order to achieve this exploratory goal, a practical non-probability sampling 
strategy was chosen for the unstructured interviews. Convenience sampling and 
snowball sampling approaches were the major methods for accessing the research 
subjects. 
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Both convenience and snowball sampling approaches are widely employed in 
social research. A convenience sampling approach is a sampling strategy where the 
subjects are selected, in part or in whole, at the convenience of the researcher. Since 
the major targeted research subjects are people working in financial sector, who are 
very busy and traveling often, it is very hard for the researcher to reach them. It 
suggests that a convenience sampling might be more practical to gain access to them. 
Similarly, snowball sampling uses recommendations to find research subjects of the 
major interests of the researcher. It allows the researcher to identify the resources and 
determine the stakeholders, and, consequently locate information-rich locating 
information-rich key informants. Using this approach, a few potential respondents 
are contacted and asked whether they know of anybody with the characteristics that 
the researcher is looking for. Normally, snowball sampling is not a stand-alone tool; 
the tool is a way of selecting participants and then using other tools, such as 
interviews or surveys.  
Convenience and snowball sampling are the easiest and potentially most 
dangerous approaches that might lead to sampling biases. However, in this study, the 
researcher makes little attempt to insure that this sample is an accurate representation 
of the larger group or population. The major purpose of conducting the unstructured 
interviews was to exploring the potential questions and explaining the quantitative 
results.  
Friends, former colleagues and classmates who work as venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs were firstly interviewed at convenience. Then, some other 
interviewees were accessed through referrals.  In this way, 17 unstructured 
interviews were taken at the initial stage for exploring the major issues. The sample 
of the unstructured interviews was composed of seven venture capitalists from five 
venture capital firms, four entrepreneurs, two government officials and four 
researchers. Among the seven venture capitalists, four were from three foreign 
venture capital firms, three were from three domestic venture capital firms. All the 
entrepreneurs interviewed were in high-technology industry. Among them, one was 
backed by venture capital investment; one was in the process of negotiating with 
venture capitalists; two were not involved in venture capital investment. One of the 
two government officials was from the Ministry of Science & Technology (MoST) 
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and the other one was from the Administrative Committee of Zhongguancun Science 
Park. Two researchers were from the research division of Zero2IPO, which is the 
largest venture capital investment survey company in China. The other two 
researchers were from universities. 
 The samples of the interviews with entrepreneurs, government officials and 
researchers are summarized in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. The samples of interviews 
with venture capitalists are summarized in Table 4.4.   
Table 4.2 Samples for Interviews with Entrepreneurs  




Entrepreneur 1 Unstructured interview Yes EN1 
Entrepreneur 2 Unstructured interview In process EN2 
Entrepreneur 3 Unstructured interview No EN3 
Entrepreneur 4 Unstructured interview No EN4 
 
Table 4.3 Samples for Interviews with Researchers and Government Officials 




Gov Officer 1  Unstructured interviews  MoST GO1 
Gov Officer 2  Unstructured interviews Zhongguancun 
Science Park  
GO2 
Researcher 1 Unstructured interviews Zero2IPO RE1 
Researcher 2 Unstructured interviews Zero2IPO RE2 
Researcher 3 Unstructured interviews University RE3 
Researcher 4 Unstructured interviews University RE4 
3. Inquiry of the unstructured interviews  
The inquiries of the unstructured interviews with different units of analysis 
varied from each other. The emphasis was the interviews with venture capitalists.  As 
stated, the inquiry framework was guided but not limited by the existing literature. 
The existing studies served as a general framework that led the conversation into 
major questions.  
Two broad topical areas were examined in the unstructured interviews with 
venture capitalists. The issues related to fundraising and governance of venture 
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capital firms were discussed. Questions on venture investing including the ex-ante 
project selection, the management of the portfolios and divestment were also 
investigated.  
The interviews were designed to yield in-depth data. They ranged from one 
hour to three hours in length. The interviews were taken in either Chinese or English 
according to the subjects’ preference. Field notes or audio-records were taken 
according to the consents of the participants. The notes or tape records verbatim were 
then generated and sent back to the informants for their review to ensure the 
accuracy. New issues and elements raised from the interviews were particularly 
concerned and marked. The interviews were loosely structured. The major open-end 
questions for venture capitalists were as follows:  
 
1) How do you find out the potential deals? Who is in charge of finding new 
deals in your firm?  
2) How do you make ex-ante project screening? What do you consider as 
important factors in your project screening? Why?  
3) What kind of project is the most attractive for venture capital investment in 
China? Why? 
4) How do you do due diligence? What is the major information you need? Why?  
5) How do you design the mechanisms to provide incentives to entrepreneurs?  
What kind of mechanisms is most important and valid in China from your 
experience? How does it work? 
6) Would you like to stage the capital infusion? If so, why? What kinds of 
projects are mainly financed by stage? Why? How does stage financing work?  
7) What do you consider as the major risks and what as the major advantages in 
investment in China? 
 
The interviews with entrepreneurs were mainly focused on how they finance 
their start-up companies and how they view the impact of venture capital investment 
on their own entrepreneurial activities. The questions with entrepreneurs were as 
follows:  
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1) How did you gain the initial capital for starting you company?  
2) What kind of difficulties did you face in funding your company?  
3) Why did you choose venture capital investment?    
4) What do you think are the major factors for the venture capitalist to invest 
in your company? Why? 
5) Why didn’t you look for venture capital investment? What are the major 
alternative financing sources?  
6) How did you negotiate with venture capitalists? What are your major 
concerns in negotiations?  
7) How do the stage financing arrangements influence your business strategy 
making? 
8) What kind of supports do venture capitalists provide to you? Do you think 
they are helpful? Why?  
 
Interviews with government officials and researchers were much looser than 
those with venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The focuses were mainly on the 
dynamics of the institutions in China and their opinions on how the institutions 
interact with venture capitalists’ investment in China. The interviews provided 
important background knowledge for further interviews with venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs and secondary documents analysis. 
4.4.2.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
1. Why semi- structured interviews?  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to obtain the both qualitative and 
quantitative data. Based on the findings from the unstructured interviews and the 
understanding in the existing literature, the inquiry of the semi-interviews was 
constructed.  
Initially, the researcher aimed to gain systematic data with structured 
interviews. However, the plan was adjusted in the field after three structured 
interviews with venture capitalists. First, it was found that the interviewees were 
reluctant to answer some close-ended questions due to confidentiality concerns 
whereas very often the answers were emerged under a more relaxed and rapport 
environment when the rigid structured interviews ended. Second, with more 
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interview experience, the researcher found that more insights were needed to 
understand the complexity of the issues. While a structured interview has a 
formalized framework, a semi-structured interview is flexible, allowing new 
questions to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the interviewee 
says. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were chosen to gain more insightful 
understandings from a broader scale of research subjects and, obtain the objective 
information with the close-ended questions at the same time.  
The semi-structured interviews were guided by both open-ended and close-
ended questions. The opened ended questions were the same to those for the 
unstructured interviews in order to gain more insightful qualitative data. The close 
ended questions served for quantitative analysis. Some of the quantitative data from 
the semi-structured interviews were used for direct analysis on venture capital 
institutions and their investment strategies. The other part of data collected from the 
semi-structured interviews was used as pilot tests for further data collection. Since 
part of the firm-level investment data was gained by the researcher with secondary 
document analysis in this study17, the researcher tried to compare the data gained 
from direct interviews with those gained from secondary document search. In this 
way, the researcher tested the credibility of the publicized investment information. 
According to the researcher’s comparison, the data gained from secondary document 
analysis are reliable.  
Similar to the unstructured interview, however, a semi-structured interview is 
also challenged for its weaknesses in lacking capability to generalize the findings. At 
the same time, it is difficult for the researcher to balance the relaxed conversations 
and the pre-set inquiry in semi-structured interviews. However, the fieldwork 
experience shows that guided by both open-ended and close-ended questions, semi-
structured interviews substantially improved the respondent rates and enriched the 
findings in this study.   
2. Sampling of semi-structured interviews 
The unit of research subjects for semi-structured interviews was venture 
capitalists. Both telephone and face-to-face interviews were taken at the convenience 
of the research subjects.  
                                                 
17 Please refer section 4.4.2.3 for details.   
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With the concerns about the difficulties in accessibility to the research 
subjects, convenience sampling and snowballing were again chosen for sampling 
strategy in the semi-structured interviews that was similar to that of the unstructured 
interviews. That is, the convenience and snowball sampling strategies were taken for 
the semi-structured interviews. However, more efforts were made to access venture 
capitalists that are more active in China’s market.  
After hundreds of telephone and email contacts with the potential research 
subjects that were referred by friends or former interviewees, 37 venture capitalists 
from 34 venture capital firms were interviewed. 18 of the 37 venture capitalists are 
from the top 30 venture capital firms in China. The 34 interviewed venture capital 
institutions have invested in over 600 deals in China which consist more than one 
fourth of the total venture capital investment by the number of deals.  
Among the 34 venture capital firms, 22 are foreign venture capital firms 
whereas 12 are domestic ones. The majority of foreign venture capital firms are from 
the US among which 12 are from California or Massachusetts. In addition, 19 out of 
the 22 foreign venture capital firms are structured as limited partnership whereas thee 
are structured as limited companies. As for the domestic venture capital firms, the 
majority are from Beijing. In addition, all of them are structured as limited 
companies. The samples and research methods used in the interviews with venture 
capitalists are summarized in Table 4.4.  
3. Brief inquiry of semi-structured interviews 
Based on the information gathered from initial the documentary analysis and 
unstructured interviews, the inquiry of the semi-structured interviews was designed 
to explore more general patterns of venture capitalists’ investment activities in 
China. The inquiry for the semi-structured interviews was composed with two parts. 
The first part was open-ended questions which were the same to the inquiry of the 
unstructured interviews. The second part was close-ended questions that covered the 
firm-level information of the venture capital firms and their portfolio companies, the 
management of the venture capital firms and the investment strategies of the venture 
capital firms. The close-ended questions are as follows:  
 General information about the venture capital firm: 
1) Year of establishment, place of registration 
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2) Fund volume, fund sources  
3) Organizational structure  
4) Educational background and professional experiences and age of the 
professional staff member  
5) Educational background and professional experiences and age of the senior 
managers  
6) Shareholders information and the ratio of their shares 
7) Industry preference, stage preference and geographical preference 
8) Average investment size for different stage and industry  
9) Screening criteria  
10) Information for due diligence activities  
11) Major evaluation methods  
12) Contracting and negotiation process  
13) Supportive and monitoring activities provided  
14) Syndication motives  
15) Syndication structure 
16) Stage financing motives  
17) Stage financing structure 
18) Others 
 Information on the portfolio companies 
1) Industry, stage, and place of headquarter  
2) Entrepreneur’s characteristics  
3) Product/service characteristics 
4) Market characteristics 
5) Financial characteristics 
6) Performance of the firm 
7) First or repeated investment 
8) Forecast sales in business plan 
9) Capital committed, capital provided 
 Major measurements for screening criteria 
1) Product-market (market size and growth, the attractiveness of products and 
service, technology, etc.) 
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2) Strategic-competitive (business model, the customer adoption, competition and 
barriers to entry, etc.)  
3) Management team (experience, personality, capability, loyalty, networks, etc.)  
4) Financial (other investors, valuation, performance to date)  
5) Cash-out potentials (financial market and exit conditions, etc.)  
6) Regional fit  
7) Others  
 Major measurements of venture capitalists’ monitoring activities: 
1) Venture capitalists are active in replacing management teams;  
2) Venture capitalists are active in regular visits to the portfolio companies 
3) Venture capitalists are active in monitoring the financial statement of portfolio 
firms; 
4) Others. 
 Major measurements of venture capitalists’ supportive actions before 
investment: 
1) Venture capitalists are active in shaping strategy/business model; 
2) Venture capitalists are active in helping entrepreneur in marketing 
3) Venture capitalists are active in recruiting senior managers or experts  
4) Others. 
 Major measurements of deal terms: 
1) Valuation of portfolio company 
2) Allocation of shares, voting rights, seats in board, and veto right 
3) The use of different securities  
4) Entrepreneur’s compensation design 
5) Stage financing arrangement 
6) Syndication investment 
7) Others. 
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VC1 VCF1  UI&SI California  FVCF LPVCF Partner  








VC4 VCF4 2UI&SI Beijing  DVCF    LCVCF General 
Manager 
VC5 VCF5 SI Beijing  DVCF    LCVCF Investment 
Manager  
VC6 VCF6  SI London  FVCF        LPVCF Partner  
VC7 VCF7  SI Washington  
FVCF    
LPVCF Investment 
Manager 
VC8 VCF8 SI Beijing  
DVCF     
LCVCF General 
Manager  
VC9 VCF9 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Partner  
VC10 VCF10 SI Cologne FVCF    LPVCF Investment 
Manager  
VC11 VCF11 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC12 VCF12 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Investment 
Manager 
VC13 VCF13 SI Singapore  FVCF    LCVCF Vice 
President  
VC14 VCF14 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Partner  
VC15 VCF15 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Partner 
VC16 VCF16 2 UI&SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Partner  
VC17 VCF16 UI&SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Investment 
Manager  
VC18 VCF17 SI Massachusetts FVCF    LPVCF Partner 
VC19 VCF18 SI Tokyo  FVCF    LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC20 VCF19 SI New York  FVCF    LPVCF Partner  
VC21 VCF20 UI&SI Beijing  DVCF   LCVCF Vice 
President  
VC22 VCF20 SI Beijing  DVCF   LCVCF Investment 
Manager  
VC23 VCF21 SI  Shanghai  DVCF   LCVCF General 
Manager  
VC24 VCF22 UI&SI Shenzhen  DVCF   LCVCF General 
Manager 
VC25 VCF23 SI  Taipei  
FVCF        
LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC26 VCF24 SI  California  FVCF  LPVCF Partner  
VC27 VCF25 SI  New York FVCF  LPVCF Investment 
Manager 
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VC28 VCF26 SI  Hong Kong FVCF  LPVCF Partner 
VC29 VCF27 SI  Oberhaching FVCF LCVCF Investment 
Manager  
VC30 VCF28 SI  Beijing  DVCF LCVCF Investment 
manager 
VC31 VCF29 SI  Beijing  DVCF LCVCF General 
Manager 
VC32 VCF30 SI  Beijing  DVCF LCVCF Vice 
President  
VC33 VCF31 SI  Shanghai DVCF LCVCF Vice 
President  
VC34 VCF32 SI  California  FVCF        LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC35 VCF33 SI  New York  FVCF        LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC36 VCF34 SI  Beijing  DVCF LCVCF Investment 
manager  
VC37 VCF21 SI  Shanghai  DVCF LCVCF Investment 
manager 
*: UI: unstructured interviews; SI: semi-structured interviews 
4.4.2.3 Secondary Document Analysis 
1. Why secondary document analysis 
Secondary documents analysis was conducted both prior to the filed work, in 
field and afterwards for gaining the background knowledge at initial stage and better 
understandings at later stage. Secondary is at the advantage of richness, accessibility 
and lower cost. In this study, the secondary document analysis not only helped the 
researcher to gain important background information but also served as a very 
important source for gathering quantitative analysis data.  
First, the secondary document analysis helped the researcher to gain 
background knowledge and aggregate data for this study. The websites of the 
government agencies, international organizations like the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and venture capital associations around the world 
provide various reports and statistics concerning entrepreneurship and venture capital 
investment around the world at an aggregate level and information on institutions 
that are critically important for the researcher to understand the major issues before 
the fieldwork. Moreover, published reports, statistics, academic literature, and 
business magazines are also good sources for gaining the overall information and 
individual cases. In addition, the websites of the venture capital firms, venture capital 
backed companies and other company documents were important sources for the 
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researcher to gain more information on the interviewees. The time for interviews was 
limited. Being more familiar with the research subjects helped the researcher to catch 
the key issues before interviews. In addition, the secondary document also helped the 
researcher to clarify some information as cross-check after the interviews since 
sometimes information was not accurately noted in the field.  
Second, the secondary document analysis also helped the researcher to gather 
firm-level data for the econometric analysis in this study. The websites of the venture 
capital firms, the venture capital backed companies and related survey companies 
provide very valuable information on individual investment cases. As stated, data on 
venture capital investment in China is extremely scarce. There is almost no 
commercial database covering the investment details at firm level except the 
‘Venture Economics’ database (see details in the next subsection). However, the 
‘Venture Economics’ database mainly covers the information on investment deals 
made by foreign venture capital firms in China. The coverage on deals made by 
domestic venture capital firms is very limited.  It by no means represents the 
population if a study on China’s venture capital investment misses the analysis on 
investment made by domestic venture capital firms. Therefore, the researcher tried to 
gain more firm-level data on investment details through the secondary document 
analysis to enrich the existing database. More efforts were made to gather the 
investment data of domestic venture capital firms.  In this way, about half of the 
investment data for econometric analysis in this study was hand collected by the 
researcher by this way. That is, information on over 150 venture capital firms and 
over 400 venture capital backed companies were collected from the secondary 
documents analysis.  
As stated, data on venture capital investment in China is extremely scarce. 
Secondary documents analysis not only facilitated this study with background 
knowledge but also enriched the researcher’s understandings and improved the 
accuracy of this study. The major sources of archive research are stated as follows:  
 Documents and information from the Internet  
1. Information about the venture capital firms being interviewed;  
2. Information about portfolio companies of the venture capital firms being 
interviewed;  
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3. Legislation regulating venture capital investment;  
4. Related information of law, regulation, and public policies.  
 Other sources of archive: CVCA reports, Zero2IPO reports, World Bank 
reports, government statistics yearbooks, academic literature, business 
magazines etc. 
1. Aggregate data about venture capital industry in China;  
2. Aggregate data about industrial development in China; 
3. Information about the evolution of venture capital policy in China; 
4. Institutions in China; 
5. Comparison of institutions in China with other countries; 
6. Data on venture capital investment in other countries; 
7. Case analyses of venture capital investment in China. 
4.4.2.4 Secondary Survey Data  
Secondary survey data were used for a more systematic analysis in this study. 
With the information collected from a large number of respondents, secondary 
survey data allowed the author to use more sophisticated statistical techniques to 
determine validity, reliability and statistical significance of the research at a lower 
cost. Two major commercial databases used in this study, i.e. ‘Venture Economics’ 
and ‘The Survey for Large and Medium Sized Industrial Enterprises in China 1998-
2005’.  
The ‘Venture Economics’ database provides information on venture capital 
firms and venture capital backed deals.  It is the most prominent database that covers 
venture capital and private equity investment information around the world. It has 
been used by many studies on venture capital investment. Thus, the definition and 
measurements in this database are comparable across countries. Information on the 
industry, age, location, investment value, investment rounds, investors’ composition, 
public status etc. of the venture capital backed deals and the information on the 
venture capital firms are covered by this database. Overall, this database covers over 
540 venture capital backed deals in China (some of them are paralleled with the ones 
collected from secondary documents analysis and interviews). It is accounted about 
one fifth of the total venture capital backed deals closed in China. However, the 
majority of the deals (i.e. over 75%) were backed by foreign venture capital firms. 
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The coverage of this dataset on domestic venture capital firms and their portfolio 
companies are limited. In this study, the researcher therefore employed secondary 
document analysis to collect more firm level investment data of the domestic venture 
capital firms from various sources to complement the biases of the data (as seen in 
the previous subsection).  In total, over 1000 venture capital backed deals made by 
over 160 venture capital firms were gained from this commercial database and the 
secondary document analysis. These two different data sources cover about firm 
level data on over half of venture capital firms and over two fifths of the venture 
capital backed deals in China.  
The ‘Survey for Large and Medium sized Industrial Enterprises in China 
1998-2005’ was also used in this study to gain the industry level data for some 
variable including the R&D intensity and asset intangibility etc. This dataset covers 
financial information on over 200,000 of China’s industrial enterprises from 1998 to 
2005. It is currently assumed to be one of the most detailed firm level databases on 
industrial enterprises which is publicised to researchers in China. It is suggested that 
it covers the whole population of the enterprises whose annual sales volume is over 
RMB 5 million.  
4.4.3 Data Analysis  
Consistent with the methodological choice which combines both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches, various data analysis methods were employed in this 
study.  
At the initial stage of this study, data collected from secondary documents 
were sorted out and coded for the foundation of the interviews. Furthermore, content 
analysis, a qualitative technique (Berelson, 1952; Simon, 1969) in which the 
responses to the questions are grouped into a logical and orderly set of discrete 
categories, were used to measure the immeasurable data from the qualitative 
fieldwork. Data gathered from the interviews were coded both manually and with the 
assistance of NviVo (a computer based qualitative package). Based on the coding 
work, the author translated them into formulated empirical arguments and refined 
them into systematic analysis models.  
At the later stage, quantitative data from the secondary document analysis, 
interviews and secondary survey database were combined to construct a unique 
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database for this study. Then, statistical techniques were employed for examining the 
hypotheses. Stata 9.0 for Windows is the major econometric program for the 
quantitative analysis. The econometric models and the methods are discussed in 
details in chapter 6, chapter 7 and chapter 8 respectively.  
4.4.4 Validating Procedures 
Validity and reliability of a social research work have been concerns of all 
scholars. The researcher tried to secure the credibility of this study by various ways.  
Primarily, the ‘triangulation’ strategy and the multi-phased research design 
were the most important instrument to improve the validity and reliability of this 
study. As previously discussed, the researcher aimed to accurately explore and 
examine venture capital institutions and venture capital investment strategies in 
China by combining both the qualitative and quantitative approaches.   
First, this methodology and research design helped to improve the face 
validity and content validity. The qualitative approach may help the researcher to 
address the right issues for this study. Venture capital investment in China has not 
been well studied. It is therefore very hard to identify a content area without in-depth 
field investigations (Warwick and Linninger, 1975). In this study, the researcher 
decided to let the specific questions and the categories of the research subjects 
emerged from the field rather than conducting a reduced form examination. The 
interviews allowed the research subjects identify the content of the test to be 
developed. In this way, the researcher tried to gain enough insights and 
understandings in the research subjects and address the right questions for this study.  
Second, the methodology and the research design of this study also helped to 
improve the construct validity. As stated, literature survey was an important part of 
research at the initial stage of this study. Actually, in this whole process of this study, 
the researcher kept the existing literature in mind for comparison with the 
observations in the field. Following Carmines and Zeller (1979), the researchers tried 
to specify the theoretical relationships in the existing literature and, how the 
theoretical issues are related to the empirical observations. Based on the interviews 
and secondary document analysis, the researcher then focused on constructing the 
specific measures for this study based on the empirical findings and the 
understandings in the existing literature. The theory underlying the construct to be 
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measured has been considered all the time in this study. The researcher suggests that 
the validity of operationalization was improved in this way.   
Third, the methodology and the research design of this study helped to 
improve the reliability.  The reliability of qualitative approaches are long been 
challenged due to the small number of samples and the subjective understandings of 
the researcher. This study therefore employed quantitative approach to examine the 
qualitative findings in order to improve the reliability. In addition, the researcher also 
paid much attention to improve the reliability of the quantitative examinations. 
Above all, the researcher tried to operationalize the variables in a precise way that 
the definitions of the variables were easy to understand. In addition, the researcher 
tried to access data on more samples for the quantitative analysis. It is very hard to 
access the firm-level data on private equity investment. The researcher therefore tried 
to combine data gained from different sources to make sure the sample can 
proportionally reflect the population. For example, the researcher on purposely 
gathered more investment data on domestic venture capital firms and their portfolio 
companies to compensate the lack of data with this regards.  
Moreover, the researcher also tried to improve the validity and reliability by 
improving the quality of the data collected. For example, the researcher tried to free 
the informants’ minds of apprehensions with the principles of the anonymity and 
confidentiality. It is guaranteed that the informants and their organizations would not 
be identified by name in this thesis and future publications. Moreover, the author 
accessed the informants through trustable channels and built up a rapport during the 
interviews. In this way, the researcher tried to overcome the ‘cover-up’ obstacles 
(Simon, 1969) and gain a more open atmosphere for interviews so that the 
informants would reduce concerns about confidentiality and expose more accurate 
and insightful information.  
Finally, follow-up reviews and pre-tests were taken to ensure the validity of 
the study. During the whole process of this study, the researcher tried to keep on 
reviewing the inquiries of the interviews with the informants in order to reduce 
misunderstandings or irrelevance problems.  
4.4.5 Structure and Time Scale of the Fieldwork  
The structure and schedule of the fieldwork are summarized in Table 4.5.  
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Table 4.5 Structure and Time Scale of the Fieldwork  
TIME PERIOD  ACTIVITIES  
Jul-Sep, 2004 First field trip to China  
• Preliminary contacts with potential interviewees 
• Gathering secondary documents for the potential samples  
• Two unstructured interviews with researchers were taken  
• Three unstructured interviews with venture capitalists were 
taken 
• One unstructured interview with a Government officer was 
taken 
• Two unstructured interviews with entrepreneurs  
Nov, 2004 –Feb, 
2005  
• Gathering secondary documents  
• Contacting potential interviewees  
• Preparing unstructured interview inquiry  
Mar-May, 2005 Second field trip to China  
• Four unstructured interviews with venture capitalists 
• Two unstructured interviews with researchers  
• One unstructured interviews with a Government officer 
• Two unstructured interviews with entrepreneurs  
• Analyzing and sorting unstructured interviews   
• Consolidating key interview questions 
• Designed semi-structured interview inquiry  
Jun, 2005-Feb, 
2006  
Third field trip to China 
• 37 semi-structured interviews with venture capitalists  
• Gathering secondary documents 
• Gathering and sorting secondary survey data  
• Sorting out data from interviews  
• Combining secondary data and the first hand collected data 
from interviews  
Feb-Jul, 2006  • Analyzing data  
• Confirm specific research questions  
• Preparing empirical report to interviewees for validation  
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4.5 Methodological Limitations and Findings 
4.5.1 Methodological Limitations of this Study 
In the previous sections, the rationale behind the research strategies and the 
methodological procedures undertaken in this study were discussed. Even though the 
researcher has made many efforts to secure and improve the validity and the 
reliability, the methodological limitations are inevitable.   
Above all, the sample biases with the interviews should not be ignored. As 
discussed, the samples for the interviews were selected by convenience and snowball 
sampling strategies. These sampling methods are normally challenged for its lack of 
capability to represent the population. However, in this study, the researcher did not 
attempt to claim representitiveness of the interview findings. As a matter of fact, the 
interview findings mainly served as background knowledge and understandings for 
the researcher to raise specific research questions and hypotheses in the studies on 
venture capitalists’ investment preferences and the stage financing strategies. As for 
the study on venture capitalists’ project screening criteria, the sampling weakness 
was not avoided since the majority data for analysis were from the practitioners 
through the interviews. The researcher tried to send out the survey questionnaires on 
project screening to the research subjects at the initial stage. However, the response 
rate for the questionnaire survey was extremely low18. The way for the researcher to 
limit this weakness was to access more samples and focus more on the exploratory 
aspects of the findings.  
In addition, the sample biases with the quantitative data also exist. There is no 
existing dataset that covers the whole population on venture capital investment in 
China. The researcher chose the samples by accessibility rather than pre-set 
systematic sampling strategies. The samples therefore might be biased. The 
researcher tried to compensate the weakness by accessing more samples and, balance 
the proportion of the samples according to the aggregate statistics. For example, the 
researcher tried to collect more information on domestic venture capital firms and 
their portfolio companies through the secondary document analysis to balance the 
samples of different groups. However, the biases could not be fully avoided. 
                                                 
18 At the initial pre-test stage, the researcher sent out over 100 questionnaires whereas only 17 venture capitalists 
responded to the email. However, among those who responded, only four of them returned back valid 
questionnaires with answers. 
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Normally, more successful investment institutions intended to release more 
information to public whereas the less successful ones are reluctant to publicize the 
information. So, the samples might have overestimated the performance of the 
venture capital firms in China.    
Moreover, there are also potential biases with the data collection methods for 
the quantitative data. As stated, the data on venture capital firms and venture capital 
backed companies were gained from two different sources, i.e. one was from a 
commercial database, and the other one was collected by the researcher with 
secondary document analysis. The researcher then combined the two data sets 
together to conduct the econometric analysis. This raises the challenges on the 
compatibility of the two datasets. The researcher tried to solve this potential problem 
by digging in the methodology used by the’ Venture Economics’. According to the 
description of ‘Venture Economics’ on the data collection methods, for the European 
and Asian components of the database, ‘Venture Economics’ collaborates with local 
consulting and survey companies to solicit the investment information from the 
venture capital firms. As stated, the majority firm-level data collected in this study 
were mainly gained from the secondary document analysis.  Although it seems that 
this data collection method is different from that of the ‘Venture Economics’, the 
researcher actually has pre-test this method by comparing the data from secondary 
document analysis and those solicited from the semi-structured interviews. 
Furthermore, the researcher once worked in Zero2IPO, which is the most leading 
consulting company in venture capital and private equity investment, for more than 
four months in order to learn how they contact and solicit the investment 
information. The researcher suggested that with the cautious research design, the 
compatibility of the data from different sources might be substantially improved.  
Besides, there are potential researcher biases in this study. The researcher 
bias and subjectivity are commonly understood as inevitable and important by most 
qualitative researchers. Primarily, the researcher once worked in a venture capital 
backed company for four years. The familiarity with this field helped the researcher 
to access more samples and gain more in-depth understandings. However, it also 
might lead to more researcher reflexivity due to the personal involvements of the 
researcher with the research subjects (Babcock, 1980). Besides the reflexive issues, 
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other researcher biases remain in this study. The fieldwork of this study was 
conducted by the author alone. Fieldwork with a single interviewer, who interacted 
with a limited number of people under a limited number of settings, is fully 
dependent on the communicating and interpreting skills of the researcher. At the 
same time, since venture capital investment is a new phenomenon in China, it is hard 
to avoid bias-free understandings and observations. The misunderstandings in terms 
of the definitions happened occasionally in the interviews. Finally, given the time 
constraints and the difficulties in accessing to the research subjects, some issues 
could not be discussed thoroughly. Like one of the interviewees said, ‘If you want to 
know what we do in business, you have to give me one month to tell all the stories’.  
The researcher was aware of the potential research biases beforehand and 
made different arrangements to control the problems. Firstly, the researcher made 
many efforts on literature review before the interviews in order to shape the 
interview inquiry with a conceptual framework and reduce the weights of the 
personal judgements and opinions before the fieldwork. Secondly, the researcher 
tried to remind herself being aware of the role of the researcher and personally 
detached from the interviewees to some extent during the interviews. Thirdly, the 
researcher tried to access more public information in venture capital industry in order 
to have more background knowledge on the people and terminologies in this field. In 
this way, the researcher expected to reduce misunderstandings in exchange. 
Although various validating procedures have been carried out to ensure the quality of 
the fieldwork, researcher biases are unavoidable in qualitative studies. The 
systematic examinations based on quantitative data are therefore very valuable to 
improve the quality of this empirical study.  
In summary, due to the knowledge, economic, time and other practical 
constraints, this study has several methodological limitations. It is expected that the 
problems can be solved better in future studies.  
4.5.2 Methodological Findings of this Study 
Methodological findings are summarized in this section. The findings are 
mainly lessons gained from the failures and difficulties in the field.  
Above all, the primary lesson from the fieldwork is that researchers who 
conduct qualitative research should prepare for unexpected changes in the field, 
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particularly when the research subjects are organizations which may have serious 
confidential concerns. Qualitative studies which are based on close interactions with 
research subjects face dynamics in accessibility to the research subjects and research 
settings. In this study, the author adjusted data collection methods in the field. 
Consequently, the specific research questions were adjusted accordingly. According 
to the original research design, the author planned to conduct participant 
observations in a venture capital firm for 3-6 months for its advantages in gaining the 
richest real-time information on spot that is critically important for exploratory work. 
The researcher gained the access initially. However, all the meetings and 
negotiations were not open to the researcher due to the confidential concerns of the 
venture capital firm. It was very hard for the author to participate the research 
subjects as an insider.  Therefore, participant observation plan was cancelled after 
days of trial, instead, interviews were chosen for gathering the qualitative data. The 
other change was about the interview methods. As previously mentioned the author 
originally decided to conduct structured interviews but adjusted to semi-structured 
interviews instead (see section 4).  Meanwhile, the fieldwork schedule, the sampling 
strategies and sample size were also adjusted in the field. 
In addition, difficulties in accessibility are always serious in field research. 
This includes physical and mental access to the research subjects. In this study, the 
major research subjects are venture capitalists who are busy all the time. As one of 
the interviewees said, ‘I may be in Beijing this morning and then have dinner in New 
York at the same day, thank god for the time difference… well, time for me is the 
most luxury thing…’  So, although the researcher tried to access the interviewees 
through some very helpful connections, it was hard to ensure the appointments with 
them. In this study, over 200 phone calls together with over 400 emails were made to 
achieve the interview opportunities with the 37 individual venture capitalists.  
Mental access is also very important. Building up a rapport with research 
subjects is crucial for gathering information under a natural context. Besides the 
widely mentioned mental access techniques, professional, educational and cultural 
background of the research subjects should be taken into considerations to pursue a 
satisfactory interview.  Most of the informants in this study are Chinese overseas 
returnees who have gained higher education and working experience abroad. On the 
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professional side, they look more like ‘American’ than ‘Chinese’. However, under a 
more relaxed context, they are much more ‘Chinese’ in essence. Language, 
expressions and behaviours of the research subjects are influenced by their mixed 
background. Fortunately, the author share the educational and working experiences 
with most of the research subjects that makes it easier to communicate with them and 
interpret the interviews. This fieldwork experience suggests that knowing the 
background of the research subjects is important for deeper understanding and better 
explanations.  
Furthermore, data analysis should be taken in the field rather than afterwards. 
This is especially important for qualitative research. Field research is vast, 
demanding and complicated. It involves literally hundreds of pages of interview 
transcripts, field notes and documents. As for this study, it happened that the author 
lost the thoughts gained from the field because the transcripts were not sorted on 
time. Although most of the interviews were tape-recorded, the author indeed 
encountered some confusion about the notes and the recording transcripts afterwards. 
The author tried to limit the problems with follow-up interviews, but it was very 
time-consuming and the missing was not fully avoided. 
Finally, deciding when to stop data collection is important. There are no 
clear-cut guidelines on when a researcher should stop the data collection. In this 
study, the researcher tried to gain as many secondary documents as possible at first. 
However, at the later stage, there were huge amount of files collected that could 
hardly be sorted out by the researcher alone. Especially, amounts of the files were 
beyond the boundaries of this research that made the analysis much harder. The 
experience of this study suggests that limiting the data collection within the research 
boundary must be taken into account.  
4.6 Summary  
In the foregoing sections, the methodology and research design in this study 
were discussed. Based on the understandings of different research approaches in 
social studies and the nature of this research, the author suggest that a combination of 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches is appropriate methodology for this 
study.  
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The exploratory nature of this study determines that qualitative approaches 
are appropriate. Qualitative approaches are at the advantage of exploring and 
understanding that allows the questions and causality emerged from the field. 
Venture capital investment in China is almost not studied yet. It is a new area that 
needs to understand and analyze based on insightful explorations. At the same time, 
quantitative analysis is also important in this study.  Quantitative approach is 
powerful in its logic structure, relative objectivity, generalization, replication, and 
comparability. The method is therefore employed to examine to what extent the 
qualitative findings represent the population and, how much the findings can be 
generalized. Moreover, based on the hard data, this study is comparable with the 
findings in the existing literature.  
Accordingly, a multi-phased research design was constructed for this study. 
Unstructured and semi-structured interviews, secondary document analysis and 
commercial survey database are employed to collect the data for this study. The 
combination strategy entails the study with insightful understandings without losing 
the generalisability and objectivity.  
Although the researcher tried to secure the validity and reliability of this 
study in various ways, the limitations and potential biases still remain due to the 
difficulties in data accessing. The weaknesses are especially seen in the sampling 
issues of both the qualitative and quantitative data and, the researcher biases in the 
field. While the biases are unavoidable, this study is the first research which provides 
both qualitative and quantitative evidence on China’s venture capital investment with 
such a large number of samples. In the next four chapters, the major findings of this 
study are discussed in details.  
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Chapter 5 Institutions and Development of Venture Capital 
Investment in China  
5.1 Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 3, new institutional economics has great power to 
understanding and explaining the development and mechanisms of venture capital 
investment. In addition, the unique institutions in China further call for attention 
from researchers while discussing China’s venture capital investment. This chapter 
therefore introduces the trajectory of China’s venture capital industry together with 
the economic, institutional and technological dynamisms in this country in the past 
twenty years. In addition, the institutional environments and arrangements under 
which China’s venture capital industry has developed are also discussed. Based on 
the above discussions, the specific questions and hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between the institutions and venture capitalists’ investment strategies are 
further clarified.  
The information on the development of venture capital industry in China and 
the related institutions were obtained from two major sources. One is the secondary 
documents from various sources including the publicised reports and statistics 
released by governments and research institutions, business magazines, academic 
journals and website resources etc. The other one is the interviews with researchers, 
government officials and practitioners including venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.  
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section introduces the 
development trajectory of China’ venture capital industry; section three focuses on 
institutional environments related to venture capital investment in China; section four 
introduces the institutional arrangements related to venture capital in China; the last 
section summarize this chapter with the clarification of the further research questions 
on venture capitalists’ investment strategies.  
5.2 The Development of China’s Venture Capital Industry  
This section documents the evolution of the venture capital industry and its 
interactions with economic, institutional, and technological changes in China. 
Starting from the mid-1980s, China’s venture capital market is becoming one of the 
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most active venture capital markets in the world. By 2005, there were around 250 
domestic and foreign venture capital institutions managing over $16.9 billion funds 
that can be invested in Mainland China. As seen in Figure 5.1, the annual 
disbursements of venture capital investment in the Chinese have increased from 
virtually zero in the 1980s to a high of $1.1 billion in 2005.  
Figure 5.1 Disbursement of Venture Capital Investment in China: 1994-2005 

























Source: 1994-2001: CVCA Yearbook 2002; 2002-2005: Annual Venture Capital Report in China (Zero2IPO) 
The development of China’s venture capital industry, however, is not stand-
alone but is path-dependent. It is a result of complicated interaction of different 
institutions including legal, political, economic and technological elements. Initiated 
by the central government in the mid-1980s, China’s venture capital industry has 
experienced a dramatic transformation during China’s transition from a centrally 
planned system to a more market-oriented economy.  
5.4.1 Emergence of the Venture Capital Industry in China: 1985-1990 
When initiated by the central government in the mid-1980s as part of science 
and technology reform, venture capital investment in China was little more than a 
discussion. It was a top-down initiative from the start. The pace of development in 
the first decade was very slow due to the economic and institutional constraints at 
that time.  
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In 1985, The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council made 
the first effort to create a venture capital industry by releasing ‘The Decision on the 
Reform of the Science and Technology System’. The decision was considered a 
landmark of China’s S&T system reform and focused on linking economic growth 
with the development of S&T activities. Before the 1985 decision, China’s S&T 
system has long followed the Soviet Union’s model, which was centrally planned, 
hierarchical and state-funded. This decision suggested expanding funding channels 
for R&D activities and building up a more competitive funding system. Venture 
capital as a concept was introduced in this decision for the first time.  
In response to this policy, the State Science and Technology Commission 
(SSTC) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) established the China New Technology 
Venture Investment Corp., the first limited corporation in China focusing on venture 
capital investment, in 1986. This wholly government-backed venture capital 
institution was considered the official beginning of China’s venture capital 
industry.19 At the same time, some foreign private equity funds entered into China. In 
1989, China Kezhao High-Tech Ltd., China’s first joint venture capital institution, 
was founded by China Merchants Holding (Hong Kong), the State Science and 
Technology Commission (SSTC) and the Commission of S&T and Industry for 
National Defence (CoSTIND). The venture capital firm was established to support 
the commercialization of S&T activities nominated by national high-technology   
programs (863 Program and Torch Program, etc).20  
However, China’s venture capital industry developed slowly, and its role in 
the S&T development was limited. Venture capital firms as institutional investment 
organizations were not legalized in China at that time; nearly all venture capital 
institutions were established as state-owned subsidiaries or spin-offs of related 
government agencies. Moreover, sources of funds were limited. Any form of private 
fund-raising by individuals and private firms without government approval was 
strictly prohibited. Therefore, the only fund sources for venture capital institutions 
                                                 
19 Formed with central government support, the company provided loans, equity investment, leasing and other assistance to 
technology companies. However, it deviated from its mandate by straying into real property and commodities speculations and 
was closed in 1997, with a loss amounting to 30 million RMB. 
20 863 and Torch programs are two important projects supporting promising new hi-tech enterprises with low-interest rate 
loans.  
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were central or local government bureaus, with the exception of a few joint venture 
capital institutions. The demand side of venture capital investment was also limited 
at that time. China’s economic reform, which began in 1978, was originally targeted 
for agricultural reform. The development of non-agricultural sectors was sluggish; in 
addition, the cut of the state R&D expenditure, the serious ‘brain drain’, and the 
decline of international co-operation after the Tiananmen Square Event in the late 
1980s and early 1990s also contributed to the slow growth of the venture capital 
industry. 
Due to the lack of accurate data, it is hard to estimate the amount of 
investment during that period. Nonetheless, it is believed that there were less than ten 
venture capital institutions operating in China before 1991 (Feng, 2004). The 
majority were subsidiaries of central government agencies with limited funds. 
Venture capital was considered complementary financial resources of the federal 
appreciation for government-backed technological projects in SOEs.  
5.4.2 The First Wave of China’s Venture Capital Industry:1990-1997 
The first wave of China’s venture capital industry came in the early 1990s. 
The number of venture capital institutions, the amount of annual investment, and the 
source of venture capital funds steadily increased from 1990 to 1998. As seen in 
Figure 5.2, the number of venture capital firms increased from 17 in 1994 to 59 in 
1998. The amount of annual investment rose to $128 million in 1998 from $27.2 
million in 1994. In addition, government venture capital firms were not the only 
dominant players in the market. Large SOEs, including some financial institutions 
and foreign venture capital funds, began to set up venture capital investment business 
in China’s market (White et al., 2002).  According to CVCA report, in 1997, 
domestic corporate venture capital firms and foreign venture capital firms 
contributed to 11 per cent and 30 per cent of the total venture capital investment, 
respectively.  
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Figure 5.2 Number of Venture Capital Firms in China: 1994-2005  
 
Source: 1994-2001: CVCA Yearbook 2002; 2002-2005: Annual Venture Capital Report in China (Zero2IPO) 
China’s economy and legal system encountered a dramatic turning point in 
the early 1990s. The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
were officially opened in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Furthermore, Deng 
Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992 made up for the setback of the Tiananmen 
crackdown by further stressing the importance of economic reforms and the opening 
up policy. Alongside these economic and political changes, China’s legal system also 
developed in the 1990s to better serve the socialist market economy. The first 
corporate law, the Company Law of the People's Republic of China was approved in 
1994. It confirmed the legal rights of limited companies for the first time. In addition, 
a series of laws and regulations were issued to regulate S&T transformation and 
foreign investment. For example, the ‘Science and Technology Promotion Law of 
China’ was approved in 1993. These institutional improvements had a positive 
impact on the development of China’s venture capital industry. 
In 1991, the State Council announced the ‘Authorization of National High-
Tech Zones and Related Policies,’ which allowed local governments to set up 
venture capital funds in high-technology zones. After this policy was issued, the 
State Science and Technology Committee, the Ministry of Finance, and the Industrial 
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- 111 -  
and Commercial Bank of China set up the Technology Venture Development Centre. 
In 1992, Technology Venture Development Corporations were sequentially 
established by the local governments of Shenyang, Shanxi, Guangdong, Shanghai, 
and Zhejiang.  
Moreover, CCP and the State Council announced ‘The Decision on 
Accelerating Scientific and Technological Progress’ in 1995, emphasizing the 
development of venture capital and establishing a technology venture capital system. 
In May 1996, the National People’s Congress approved the ‘Law Promoting the 
Industrialization of China’s Technological Achievements,’ which was the first legal 
statement allowing venture capital investment as a commercial activity and 
permitting funds to be raised from national or local governments, enterprises, 
organizations, or individuals to support technology ventures. Since then, more 
venture capital institutions were established by local governments and large SOEs. It 
enriched the source of venture capital investment. The newly established venture 
capital institutions mainly supported state-owned technological projects, making 
them more like government agencies than profit-driven businesses.   
At the same time, more foreign venture capital institutions began to enter into 
China’s venture capital market with the economic and institutional progress. In 1993, 
ChinaVest invested in Zindart Co. Ltd. 21  Additionally, in 1994, The Pacific 
Technology Venture Investment Fund of International Data Group (IDG) established 
three joint venture capital companies together with the Science and Technology 
Commissions of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong.22 
Most foreign venture capital funds worked as joint ventures with local 
governments or government-tied, state-owned venture capital institutions. 
Researchers suggest that the joint venture strategy was made by foreign venture 
capital firms to build relationships with local governments or large SOEs to help with 
deal sourcing, project governing, and administrative protection under weak 
commercial and legal systems in China (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; Feng, 2004). 
However, the structure also had negative impacts on the investment of foreign 
venture capital funds. Taking the size of newly raised funds as a performance proxy, 
                                                 
21 Zindart was traded in the form of American Depositary Shares (ADRs) in NASDAQ in 1997.  
22 Both ChinaVest and IDGVC are venture capital institutions based in the United States. The two venture capital institutions 
are among the first FVCFs entered into China that have made very successful investments.  
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Feng (2004) finds that the performance of most foreign venture capital firms was far 
from satisfactory in the mid-1990s.  
It is clear that, in the first years of development of the venture capital industry, 
central and local governments played a key developmental role, with a succession of 
different policy statements. Besides the policies on venture capital development, 
other important government initiatives on economic reforms, S&T development, and 
regulatory institutional construction also contributed to the development of China’s 
venture capital market. Venture capital did not develop in isolation but resulted from 
institutional dynamics and other aspects of the economy. 
5.4.3 The Breakthrough of Venture Capital in China: 1998-2001  
The breakthrough of China’s venture capital industry did not come until the 
late 1990s. As seen in Figure5.1 and Figure 5.2, both the number of venture capital 
institutions and the amount of investment doubled in 1999. The sharp increase 
continued in the following two years. The annual investment reached a peak of $518 
million in 2001. In addition, a group of successful venture capital backed companies 
issued public offerings in international capital markets.   
China experienced remarkable institutional and technological progress in the 
late 1990s. The constitutional right of the private sector was recognized for the first 
time by the Second Session of the Ninth NPC with a statement that ‘private sectors 
are major components of socialism market economy’ in 1999. This change 
significantly impacted the rapid development of private companies and the 
confidence of investors. Furthermore, the global Internet boom was spreading to 
China at that time. China made an effort to develop information technology and 
developed the infrastructure in the second half of the 1990s. Additionally, an 
increasing number of overseas Chinese students who had working experience in the 
high-technology industry in western countries began returned at that time.  
Policies related to the venture capital industry developed during the same 
time period. In 1998, the ‘Proposal on Developing China’s VC Industry’ was 
presented by the Central Committee of Chinese National Democratic Constructive 
Association at the Ninth Conference of the National People’s Congress. It attracted 
serious attention from policy makers and became the ‘Announcement No.1’ that year. 
A series of policies followed to promote the venture capital industry. In October 
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1998, the State Science and Technology Committee submitted the ‘Proposal for 
encouraging IPO of hi-tech enterprises’ to the China Securities Regulatory 
Committee (CSRC), suggesting the reduction of requirements for issuing hi-
technology enterprises in China’s primary security markets and encouraging venture 
capital backed companies to issue in foreign stock markets. This proposal officially 
raised the question of whether China should set up its own secondary board. In 
December 1999, the State council approved the ‘Proposal on setting up China’s 
venture capital investment mechanism,’ which was jointly submitted by seven 
different governmental bureaus.23  Additionally, the first discussion regarding the 
drafting of the Investment Fund Law was held in the same year. As a result, venture 
capital institutions became officially legitimate in China.  
In 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MoFTEC), together with the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) and the 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) issued the ‘Provisional 
Regulations on the Establishment of Foreign Invested Venture Capital Investment 
Enterprises’ (the ‘VC Regulations’). By clarifying the registration requirements for 
foreign venture capital institutions, the regulation was the first effort from China’s 
government to confirm the legitimacy of foreign venture capital firms in China, 
although most of the requirements in this regulation were not really feasible.24 
With the institutional and technological progress, the sources of venture funds 
have been enriched substantially. Local governments, like the local Science and 
Technology Commissions and the Bureaus of Finance, began to establish venture 
capital institutions and acted as major shareholders. According to CVCA, by the end 
of 2001, over 34 per cent venture capital institutions in China were government-
funded venture capital firms. In addition, a group of university-funded and large 
SOE-funded venture capital firms emerged and developed rapidly. They accounted 
                                                 
23 The seven government bureaus are the State Science and Technology Committee, the State Planning Committee, the State 
Economic and Trading Committee, the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China, the State Administration of Taxation 
of China, and the China Securities Regulatory Committee.  
24 According to the regulation, foreign venture capital firms must pass through a strict, time-consuming approval process at 
various government agencies for registration. In addition, the only legal organizational form for foreign venture capital firms in 
China is the limited company, which is different from the widely-used limited partnership governance structure. Furthermore, 
the rigid requirements for registered capital (at least $20 million; 15 per cent of this amount must be paid within 3 months after 
the issue of the business license; the remainder must be paid in within 3 years whether or not attractive investments are 
available) are also constraints for foreign venture capital firms. 
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for 37 per cent of venture capital institutions in 2001. At the same time, a new wave 
of arrival of foreign venture capital funds occurred. By the end of 2001, one third of 
venture capital institutions in China were foreign venture capital firms. According to 
a report by Zero2IPO, more than 40 foreign venture capital firms invested $258 
million in 45 deals in China in 2001.  
5.4.4 The Second Wave of China’s Venture Capital Industry: 2003-present  
The second significant wave of China’s venture capital industry occurred in 
2003 after a short-term decline in the previous year resulting from the global crash of 
‘Dot Com bubble’ in 2000. However, it did not last long, and the degree of the 
decrease was not serious. On the other hand, the number of venture capital 
institutions continued increasing in 2002. The industry saw even more striking 
development after 2003. The market saw record annual investments of $992 million 
in 2003 and $1269 million in 2004. Even though the market was encountered a 
temporary setback again in 2005, when the annual disbursement decreased to $1.1 
billion as a result of two regulations on exchange currency control promulgated by 
the SAFE earlier that year, the newly raised funds set records to over $4 billion in 
2005. According to the newest released report, the annual disbursement of venture 
capital investment in China raised to $1.7 billion and $2.4 billion in 2006 and 2007 
respectively.  
China experienced even more striking economic growth and institutional 
dynamisms after 2000. The average growth rate of the GDP increased to 9.5 per cent 
during the period of 2001 to 2005 (from 8.25 per cent during 1996 to 2000). At the 
same time, high-technology industries, especially the information, communication, 
and semi-conductor industry have grown significantly. The production of high-
technology industries accounted about 18 per cent of the total GDP in 2004. The 
volume of high-technology products as a percentage of total export in 2005 rose to 
28.6 per cent, which was a significant growth from four per cent in 1991.  
On the policy making side, fundamental progress occurred in the new century. 
Primarily, acknowledging the increasing importance of SMEs to China’s economy, 
the ‘Law for promoting China’s SME’ was approved in June 2002. This law focuses 
on establishing a support system for developing SMEs, including simplifying the 
administrative procedures in registration and providing preferred tax treatment and 
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bank loans to SMEs, especially innovative SMEs, which are the major targets and 
source of demands for venture capital investment.  
More importantly, the constitutional rights of the private sector were fully 
and clearly recognized in 2004. The Tenth National People Congress (NPC) held in 
2004 confirmed that ‘the state encourages, supports and guides the development of 
the private sector’. Private property was also legalized for the first time by a 
statement that ‘any lawful private property should not be encroached upon’. As a 
consequence, the company law was revised in August 2004 and October 2005. In the 
amended version, the incorporation threshold was substantially lowered, and the 
value of non-cash assets, including the value of intellectual property, was further 
recognized. In addition, a variety of changes were made to improve corporate 
governance, including the reorganization of cumulating voting rights of minority 
shareholders and the rights of shareholders to check accounting information.   
Capital markets have also developed since 2000. First, the long-expected 
secondary stock market, the Small and Medium Enterprise Board of Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange opened in June, 2004. Second, the main boards of the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock Exchange fully opened to the private sectors in 2003. 25  The 
development of capital markets shows the government’s determination in 
encouraging SMEs and widens the exit channels for venture capital investment, 
especially investments made by domestic venture capital firms. 
Furthermore, the regulations guiding organizational structures and the 
registration of venture capital institutions have significantly progressed. In January 
2003, the amendment of the ‘Provisional Regulations for Establishment of Foreign-
Invested Venture Capital Investment Enterprise’ was approved. This version further 
clarified registration procedures for foreign venture capital firms and reduced the 
                                                 
25 The quota system was established in the early 1990s. Under the quota system, the IPO quota was allocated to local 
governmental agencies each year. These agencies could use their quota to recommend that a firm be listed to the China’s 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The CSRC usually approved these recommendations. Thus, the most important 
step in gaining approval for an IPO on China’s stock exchanges was to receive a recommendation from a Chinese government 
agency that had an IPO quota. SOEs were heavily favored under the quota system. It was highly unlikely for joint venture firms 
in which international venture capitalists had invested to gain IPO approval. The domestic stock markets were not fully open to 
non state-owned enterprises until 2003, although the quota system was officially abandoned in 2000. Listing in the domestic 
stock market was very difficult for venture capital backed companies, if not impossible, before 2003.  
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requirements for capital utilization.26  Rules regulating domestic and foreign venture 
capital firms are also becoming more uniform. The ‘Interim Administrative Measures 
for the Start-up Investment Enterprises’ was approved by the State Council in 
September 2005 and promulgated by ten different government agencies in November 
2005. The regulations established partially uniform rules for both domestic and 
foreign venture capital firms in terms of preferential treatment and financial support. 
More importantly, the regulations confirmed the legitimacy of using convertible 
security and preferred stock by both domestic and foreign venture capital firms. The 
regulations introduced an autonomous registration mechanism of institutional 
investors.27 The most recent fundamental breakthrough was the confirmation of the 
legitimacy of the limited partnership. The amendment to the ‘Partnership Enterprise 
Law of the People's Republic of China’ was approved at the 23rd session of the 
Standing Committee of the 10th NPC in Aug 2006. The limited partnership as an 
organizational form was officially legalized for the first time in China at that time. 
The regulation was scheduled to take effect in June 2007. 
With the above mentioned institutional and economic development, 
investment confidence in the market recovered in 2003. The market boosted record 
annual investments in 2004. In addition, a new wave of foreign venture capital fund 
inflow occurred after 2003. In particular, a group of mainstream Silicon Valley’s 
venture capital funds entered into the market exactly at the time when venture capital 
around the world was in a recession. The foreign venture capital firms made some 
remarkable investments in 2002.28As seen in Figure 5.3, the annual investment by 
foreign venture capital firms was more than 80 per cent of the total venture 
investment in 2003.  
At the same time, with the accumulated experience and knowledge in China, 
foreign venture capital firms have found some ways to avoid institutional and 
                                                 
26 According to this revised version, the capital from foreign investors should be exploited within 5 years. It is much more 
relaxed than the 2001 version, which required the utilization of capital within 3 years. 
27 The registration of FVCs is still governed by the ‘Provisional Regulations for Establishment of Foreign-Invested Venture 
Capital Investment Enterprise’ approved in 2003 that the establishment of foreign venture capital firms is still subject to 
approval by the Ministry of Commerce, the successor of the MOFTEC. 
28 For example, JAFCO, the largest VC institution in Japan, invested $10 million in 3721.com. in 2002. Other examples 
include the $60 million invested in Harbour Networks by Warburg Pincus and DragonTech Ventures, and, the $58 million 
investment in Beijing United Platform Technologies by National Enterprise Associates and Doll Capital Management etc.   
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economic burdens and to work more efficiently and independently from domestic 
venture capital firms. Since the late 1990s, the joint venture model has been 
gradually abandoned by foreign venture funds. Currently, the majority of foreign 
venture capital firms are incorporated overseas, and the operation of the funds is 
conducted offshore. That is, they invest in China through representative offices in the 
Chinese mainland. At the same time, foreign venture capital firms also register their 
portfolio companies overseas as offshore holding companies, with the decrease of 
investment in state-owned enterprises (Feng, 2004; Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). 
Both domestic and foreign venture capital firms have paid more attention to young 
high-technology companies which were mainly new-established private firms since 
the late 1990s. According to the annual report provided by Zero2IPO, over 70 per 
cent of annual investments have been made in high-technology industry since 2002. 
Figure 5.3 Capital Invested by Different Types of Venture Capital Firms in China: 2001-2005  






























DVCs FVCs Syndication of FVCs and DVCs JVCs  
Source: Annual Venture Capital Report in China: 2002-2006 (Zero2IPO) 
In addition, China’s venture capital market saw more successful exit cases in 
the 2000s. Divestment through the IPO has greatly increased since 2003. Following 
the visible IPOs of AsiaInfo and UTStarcom on NASDAQ in the late 1990s, the 
overseas listing has become the most attractive way for the exit of venture capital 
investment. There were 15, 39, and 26 venture capital backed companies which 
issued public offerings in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively (see Figure 5.4) . More 
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than three fourths of them were backed by foreign venture capital firms and listed on 
overseas stock markets. Additionally, the exit channel was further broadened in 2004 
when the long-expected secondary board, the Small and Medium Enterprise Board of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange opened in June 2004. Five domestic venture capital 
backed companies were listed at that market in that year. By August 2006, there were 
14 venture capital backed companies listed in China’s secondary board that opened a 
door for exit of domestic venture capital investment, although this is a relatively 
small number compared to the number of companies listed in overseas stock markets.  
Figure 5.4 Exit of Venture Capital Investment in China: 2002-2005 
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Source: Annual Venture Capital Report in China (Zero2IPO) 
 
However, these institutional improvements were by no means always smooth. 
It was proved to be a typical ‘trial by error’ process. For instance, SAFE issued a 
circular on certain issues in relation to the Foreign Exchange Registration for 
Outbound Investment by PRC Residents in January 2005 (‘Circular 11’) and anther 
circular on Foreign Exchange Registration for Merger and Acquisition by Offshore 
Entities in April that year (‘Circular 29’). These two circulars tried to develop a more 
clarified framework, which regulates the movement of assets and control of domestic 
assets by foreign investors. By tightening the administrative procedures for 
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registration and approval of cross-border capital investment, the circulars 
significantly constrained the ability of PRC residents and non-Chinese citizens to set 
up and hold shares in the offshore companies.  Although the intent of these 
regulations is to control the fraudulent cross-border capital flows by PRC residents, 
the regulations had a significant impact on foreign venture capital investment, which 
is heavily engaged in offshore investment, cross-border sales and overseas IPO. 
According to the report provided by Zero2IPO, the majority FVCs suggested that 
these two regulations indeed led serious concerns to them. As a result, the venture 
investment in the first three quarters of 2005 dropped substantially. Realizing the 
negative impact of the two circulars, in October 2005, SAFE issued a new circular on 
‘Relevant Issues Concerning Foreign Exchange Control on Domestic Residents’ 
Corporate Financing and Roundtrip Investment through Offshore Special Purpose 
Vehicles’ (‘Circular 75’), effective since November 1, 2005. Circular 75 confirms 
that the use of offshore special purpose vehicles as holding companies for PRC 
investments is permitted as long as proper foreign exchange registrations are made 
with SAFE. It is believed that the sharp increase of  disbursement of venture capital 
investment in the second half of year 2005 and the increase of new fund raised in that 
year are closely related to the institutional dynamics in that year.  
Table 5.1 summarizes the institutional trajectory and the development of 
China’s venture capital investment. In general, China’s venture capital market has 
seen rapid development in the past decade. As shown in Table 5.1, as major 
initiators, central and local governments have played important roles in the 
development of China’s venture capital industry. They act not only as policymakers 
and regulators but also as fund providers and managers. Even though the weight of 
government and domestic venture capital funds has substantially dropped in recent 
years, there are still over 120 domestic venture capital institutions directly or 
indirectly funded by governments or large SOEs operating in the market, making up 
around 20 per cent of the total investment annually. At the same time, foreign 
venture capital funds have shown a great enthusiasm for China’s market in recent 
years, although the institutional environments for them are ambiguous and weak. 
They have contributed to about 80 per cent of annual venture investment in China 
since 2003. 
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 Table 5.1The Development of China’s Venture Capital Industry 
  Government Policy and Regulations Business Events   
1985 1. ‘The Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology System’ was 
released by CCP and the State Council.  
2. China’s first patent law was enacted.  
 
1986  1. 863 High-Tech Program was lunched China New Technology Venture Investment 
Corp., the first limited corporation focusing on 
venture capital investment was funded by SSTC 
and MoF.  
1987  China’s first incubator was established by local 
government in Wuhan city, Hubei Province  
1989  China’s first Sino-foreign joint venture in venture 
capital, Kezhao High-Tech Ltd., was established 
jointly by China Merchants Holding (Hong Kong), 






1990 1. Shanghai Stock Exchange was opened   
1991 1. Shenzhen Stock Exchange was opened.  
2. The ‘Authorization of National High-Tech Zones and Related Policies’ was 
announced. It allows local governments to set up venture capital funds in high-
tech zones.  
The Technology Venture Development Center was 
established by SSTC, MoF and the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China.  
1992 1. Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992 further stressed the importance of 
economic reforms and the opening up policy. 
Technology Venture Development Corporations 
was established by local governments in 
Shenyang, Shanxi, Guangdong, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang. 
 
1993 1. The ‘Science and Technology Promotion Law of China’ was approved.  ChinaVest invested in Zindart, a company that 
listed its ADRs on NASDAQ in 1997. 
1994 The first corporate law, the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 
was approved in 1994.  
 
International Data Group (IDG) established three 
venture capital firms with the local S&T 
commissions of Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangdong.  
1995 CCP and State Council announced ‘The Decision on Accelerating Scientific 
and Technological Progress’.   
 
1991-1997: 




1996 The ‘Law Promoting the Industrialization of China’s Technological At least 20 VCFs were established by S&T 
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Achievements’ was approved. It is the first legal statement allowing venture 
capital as a commercial activity.  
 
commissions and finance departments of local 
governments. 
1997  1. China’s first VCF, founded in 1986, was 
declared bankrupt and closed by the People’s 
Bank of China. 
2. AsiaInfo received US$18 million investment 
from 3 foreign VCFs.  
3. Sohu.com predecessor firm received US$6.5 
million investment from FVCFs.  
1998 1. MoST submitted the ‘Report on Establishing China’s S&T Venture Capital 
System’ to the State Council.  
2. The ‘Proposal on Developing China’s VC Industry’ was presented by at the 
Ninth Conference of the National People’s Congress.  
3. SSTC submitted the ‘Proposal for encouraging IPO of hi-tech enterprises’ 
CSRC, suggesting the reduction of requirements for issuing hi-technology 
enterprises in China’s security markets and encouraging venture capital 
backed companies to issue in foreign stock markets.  
1. A wave of VCFs were established by local 
governments and large corporations.  
2. A group of newly established high-technology 
companies received investments from FVCFs.  
1999 1. The constitutional right of the private sector was recognized for the first 
time by the Second Session of the Ninth NPC.  
2. In December 1999, the State council approved the ‘Proposal on setting up 
China’s venture capital investment mechanism,’ which was jointly submitted 
by seven different governmental bureaus 
3. Additionally, the first discussion regarding the drafting of the Investment 
Fund Law was held in the same year. As a result, venture capital institutions 
became officially legitimate in China. 
1. VCFs became officially legitimate in China.  
2. The number of venture capital institutions and 
the amount of investment doubled in 1999.  
3. Beijing Venture Capital Association was 
established.  
2000 The State Council announced the ‘Policy for Encouraging the Software 
Industry and Promoting the IC Industry’.  








2001 The ‘Provisional Regulations on the Establishment of Foreign Invested 
Venture Capital Investment Enterprises’ (the ‘VC Regulations’), which 
clarifies the registration requirements for foreign institutional investors, was 




1. The annual investment reached a peak of $518 
million.   
2. China’s venture capital market (including Hong 
Kong) ranked as the 2nd largest in the world in 
terms of annual investment.  
3. A new wave of arrival of FVCFs occurred. 
More than 40 foreign venture capital firms 
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. invested $258 million in 45 deals in China in 
2001. 
3. A group of university-funded and large SOE-
funded VCFs emerged and accounted for 37 per 
cent of venture capital institutions in 2001.  
2002 The ‘Law for promoting China’s SME’ was approved in June, simplifying the 
administrative procedures in registration of SMEs and providing preferred tax 
treatment to SMEs.  
 
1. The annual investment dropped a little bit with 
the crash of ‘DOT COM bubble’.  
2. China Venture Capital Association (CVCA) 
was registered in Hong Kong. 
2003 The amendment of the ‘Provisional Regulations for Establishment of Foreign-
Invested Venture Capital Investment Enterprise’ was approved in January. It 
further clarified the registration procedures for foreign venture capital firms 
and reduced the requirements for capital utilization.  
1. The annual investments of venture capital 
reached to $992 million.   
2. A group of mainstream Silicon Valley’s venture 
capital funds entered into China and made some 
remarkable investments.  
3. 15 venture capital backed companies issued 
public offerings.  
2004 1. The constitutional rights of the private sector were fully and clearly 
recognized at The Tenth National People Congress.    
2. The company law was revised in August. In the amended version, the 
incorporation threshold was substantially lowered, and the value of non-cash 
assets, including the value of intellectual property, was further recognized.  
3. The long-expected secondary stock market, the Small and Medium 
Enterprise Board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange opened in June.  
4. The main boards of the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange fully 
opened to private sectors. 
1. The annual investments of venture capital 
reached to $1269 million.  
2. 39 venture capital backed companies issued 
public offerings. Among these companies, five 
domestic venture capital backed companies were 
listed at the Small and Medium Enterprise Board 
of Shenzhen Stock Exchange market.  
 






2005 1. The ‘Interim Administrative Measures for the Start-up Investment 
Enterprises’ was approved by the State Council in September.  It established 
partially uniform rules for both domestic and foreign VCFs in terms of 
preferential treatment and financial support. It also confirmed the legitimacy 
of using convertible security and preferred stock by both domestic and foreign 
VCFs.  
2. SAFE promulgated ‘Circular 11’ and ‘Circular 29’ in January and April 
respectively that tightened the administrative procedures for registration and 
approval of cross-border capital investment.  
3. SAFE issued Circular 75 in October, which confirmed that the use of 
1. The market was encountered a temporary 
setback with the annual disbursement decreased to 
$1.1 billion.  
2. 26 venture capital backed companies issued 
public offerings.  
3. The investment disbursement in the second half 
year was increased, and the newly raised funds set 
records to over $4 billion by the end of 2005.  
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offshore special purpose vehicles as holding companies for PRC investments 
is permitted as long as proper foreign exchange registrations are made with 
SAFE. 
2006 The amendment to the ‘Partnership Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of 
China’ was approved in August. The limited partnership as an organizational 
form was officially legalized for the first time.   
1. The annual investment reached to $1.7 billion.  
 2. By August, there were 14 venture capital 
backed companies listed in the Small and Medium 
Enterprise Board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange.   
 
2007 The regulation on recognizing limited partnership as an organizational 
structure was taken effect in June.  
The annual disbursement of venture capital 
investment rose to $2.49 billion.  
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5.3 Institutional Environments in China 
From the brief introduction on the history of China’s venture capital market, 
it can be seen that the institutional environments under which the venture capital 
industry develops in China are structurally different than those in the United States or 
any other western country. This section summarizes the major characteristics of the 
institutional environments that have shaped the evolving trajectory of China’s 
venture capital industry.   
5.3.1 Regulatory Institutions in China  
The construction of regulatory institutions in China is underdeveloped in 
general; the problem is even worse for related regulations on non-state owned 
organizations and financial institutions. China does not have a comprehensive legal 
system to address the legal issues related to the establishment and operation of 
venture capital funds, due to the legacy of the central planning system.  
5.3.1.1 Weak Protection of Property Rights and Private Sector in China 
The protection of property rights has long been weak in China. The protection 
of property rights is considered critical for finance and entrepreneurship and, 
consequently, for venture capital investment (Hart and Moore, 1990; Johnson et al., 
1999). Even though the private business has played an important role in China’s 
economy since the 1980s, it developed slowly. Private enterprises with more than 
seven employees could not be legally registered until 1988, when the First Session of 
the Seventh NPC recognized the private sector as ‘a complement to the economy’ for 
the first time. However, it also stated that the legal rights of the private sector should 
be ‘controlled by the state’ so that private sectors did not gain a full constitutional 
right.  The constitutional rights of the private sector and the property right were not 
fully recognized until 2004. Feng (2004) suggests that the dynamics of the protection 
for property rights heavily influenced the investment choice of foreign venture 
capitalists in China. In the early 1990s, international venture capitalists invested 
mainly in SOEs, since the interests of private firms were not well protected. With the 
increasing protection of private firms and property rights, international venture 
capitalists gradually turned to private firms after 2000. However, the constitutional 
rights of the property rights were fully recognized only two years ago. However, 
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researchers have documented various distortion cases of property rights in China in 
recent years due to weak law enforcement and other administrative inferences. It is 
therefore questioned whether the lack of protection of property rights may have an 
impact on venture capitalists’ investment strategies in China. 
5.3.1.2 Weak Corporate Governance Rules in China 
Corporate governance rules are also weak in China. Corporate governance is 
a set of internal rules that focus on how to motivate the stakeholders and align their 
actual interests to achieve the overall goals in a corporation. The mechanisms and 
controls of corporate governance are designed to reduce the inefficiencies that arise 
from moral hazard and adverse selection. Researchers suggest that the legal 
framework is an important factor influencing corporate governance (La Porta et al., 
1998). As private equity investors, venture capitalists are active participants in the 
management of their portfolio companies to control agency costs and uncertainties. 
The mechanisms employed in venture capital investment are mainly embedded in 
strong corporate governance.  
Not until the middle of 1990s did China promulgate rules on corporate 
governance that serve the market oriented economy. The most important legal 
sources of corporate governance rules are company law, promulgated in 1994, and 
security law, promulgated in 1998, in China. However, the laws did not take the 
features of venture capital investment into consideration until the latest amendments 
in 2005.  
Convertible security was not legal in China until recently. In western 
countries, convertible security is widely used by venture capitalists to separate 
control rights from cash flow rights. Venture capitalists attain control rights through 
convertible preferred securities, even though, in most cases, they only have the 
minority of ownership. In this way, venture capitalists try to retain the downside 
protection of their investment (Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003; Hellmann, 1998). 
Convertible security was not recognized in China until 2005 when the ‘Interim 
Administrative Measures for the Start-up Investment Enterprises’ was deliberated 
and approved by the State Council. The regulations confirmed the legitimacy of the 
use of convertible security and preferred stock.  
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The other major issue is that limited partnership as an organizational structure 
is currently illegal. As discussed, researchers suggest that a limited partnership 
provides powerful incentives to venture capitalists and thus mitigates potential 
agency problems in fund management. In August 2006, the limited partnership was 
officially and legally recognized in the amendment of ‘Partnership Enterprise Law of 
the People's Republic of China’ that was approved at the 23rd session of the Standing 
Committee of the 10th NPC. The regulation is scheduled to take into effect in June 
2007.  
Before 2005, the recognition of the value of non-cash assets, including 
intellectual property, was limited. Additionally, the cumulating voting rights of 
minority shareholders and the rights of shareholders to check accounting information 
were not legally recognized until 2005. Venture capital investment mainly targets 
human capital. The core value of the investment is therefore embedded in non-cash 
assets. At the same time, they normally syndicate their investment with other venture 
capitalists and do not hold the majority shares. Thus, the need for recognizing the 
non-cash assets and cumulating voting rights of minority shareholders are directly 
related to how venture capitalists protect their own interests.  
Even though many changes have been made to improve the rules of corporate 
governance since 2000, problems remain. For example, China’s laws and regulations 
still forbid the separation of ownership and control that is widely used in venture 
capital contracts in the United States. Shareholders’ veto rights are not legally 
recognized either.  
5.3.1.3 Weak Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights are not well-protected in China. Since young high-
technology companies are more favoured by venture capitalists, researchers suggest 
that the protection of intellectual property rights is important for venture capital 
process (Silverman, 1989). Even though China has enacted legislation on patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, integrated circuit design layout, and computer software since 
the 1980s, theft of intellectual property remains a major problem. According to the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), copyright piracy was 
estimated at between $2.5 billion and $3.8 billion a year, and infringement levels in 
virtually all categories of intellectual property were 90 per cent or higher in 2004. 
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These problems may discourage entrepreneurship and venture capitalists from 
investing in R&D intensive companies.  
5.3.1.4 Restrictions on Foreign Institutional Financiers   
Even though China has made many efforts to attract foreign direct investment 
since the late 1970s, restrictions on foreign institutional financiers are severe due to 
policies on foreign currency control. First, foreign institutional investors are not 
allowed to raise funds in China; they must incorporate and raise money overseas. 
The major fund sources of foreign venture capital funds are pension funds, insurance 
corporations, and university endowments; this is similar to the practice in the United 
States. However, foreign venture capital institutions operating in China may face 
additional constraints, since international investors may be reluctant to invest in 
funds that focus on an emerging market like China due to lack of knowledge and 
confidence in the market. 
Moreover, the requirements for registering as a Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII) are so rigid and complex that most foreign venture 
capital firms cannot satisfy them. For example, according to the ‘Provisional 
Regulations on the Establishment of Foreign Invested Venture Capital Investment 
Enterprises’ issued in 2001, foreign venture capital institutions must undergo a strict 
approval process with various government agencies for registration. In addition, the 
requirements for registered capital are also rigid: at least $20 million and 15 per cent 
of this amount must be paid in within three months after the issue of the business 
license; the remainder must be paid within three years whether or not attractive 
investments are available. A 2003 amendment allowed capital from foreign investors 
being exploited within 5 years that is more relaxed compared with the 2001 version. 
However, the requirements for registering as QFII remain complex and time-
consuming. This restriction leads to the offshore registration of foreign venture 
capital firms that invest in China’s venture capital market.  
5.3.1.5 Weak Law Enforcement in China  
Weak law enforcement in China is also a major concern of financiers. An 
efficient and independent judicial system is considered as critical to protect external 
investors’ interests (La Porta et al., 1998). The judicial system is not independent in 
China, although the situation has improved since the mid-1990s. Law enforcement 
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has long been under the leadership of administrative bureaus in China. Scholars 
suggest that lack of professional judicial expertise, weak enforcement, and serious 
corruption have made the judicial system unreliable for enforcing contracts in China 
(Allen et al., 2005). Feng (2004) finds that foreign venture capital firms frequently 
employed joint venture strategies to reduce transaction costs in China before 1995. 
Foreign investors aimed to economize transaction costs by providing embedded 
interests to their local partners (e.g. large SOEs or local government-tied agencies) to 
encourage their local partners to conduct relation-specific investments. However, 
Feng notes that the performance of these joint funds was not satisfactory, since the 
local partners were not profit-maximizers. Consequently, the governance structure 
was given up lately.  
5.3.1.6 Underdeveloped Capital Market in China 
Capital markets are also underdeveloped in China. A developed capital 
market has been evidenced as one of the most important determinants of an active 
venture capital market (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Black and Gilson, 1998, Lerner, 1994). 
IPO is the most favourable channel of divestment by venture capitalists for its high 
return rate and high liquidity. However, China’s domestic capital markets are not 
friendly to companies backed by venture capital.   
The two main boards of stock markets in China were not fully open to joint 
ventures and private companies until 2003, although the quota system29 was formally 
abandoned in 2000. Although the secondary stock market, i.e. Small and Medium 
Enterprise Board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange opened in June 2004, the listing 
requirements are difficult for young firms to satisfy. The overall design of the SME 
Board may be generalized as ‘two remain’ and ‘four separate’. That is, listing 
standards and laws and regulations governing the main board still apply to the SME 
Board. The board operates under separate trading and regulatory systems, separate 
                                                 
29 The quota system was established in the early 1990s. Under the quota system, an IPO quota was allocated to local 
governmental agencies each year. These agencies could use their quota to recommend to the China’s Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) that a firm be listed. The CSRC usually approved these recommendations. Thus, the most important step 
in gaining approval for an IPO on China’s stock exchanges was to receive a recommendation from a Chinese government 
agency that had IPO quota. SOEs were heavily favored under the quota system. It was highly unlikely for either joint venture 
firms or private firms in which venture capitalists had invested to gain IPO approval. The domestic stock markets were still not 
fully open to non state-owned enterprises until 2003, although the quota system was officially abandoned in 2000. Listing in the 
domestic stock market was very difficult for venture capital backed companies, if not impossible, before 2003.  
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stock coding, and separate stock price indices. Therefore, issuing IPO in domestic 
capital markets is difficult for venture capital backed companies that are mainly 
young enterprises without profit records. The Chinese government has not formally 
allowed foreign-invested enterprises to be listed on China’s stock markets.  
Moreover, the regulatory environments of the markets have long been a concern for 
practitioners and researchers (Allen et al., 2005); this may also discourage venture 
capital firms to list their portfolio companies on China’s domestic capital markets.  
Listing on overseas capital markets is not easy for companies backed by 
domestic venture capital firms. The approval procedures are heavily bureaucratic and 
time-consuming. Even when domestic venture capital backed companies successfully 
pass through the administrative hurdles, the lack of experience in overseas capital 
markets might negatively impact on the performance of the IPO and consequently on 
the return rate of the divestment.  
‘Red chip’ offshore listings have been a unique arrangement for divestment 
of foreign venture capital investment in China. Foreign venture capital firms have 
been relying on the use of offshore holding companies as their China investment 
vehicles since the mid-1990s. 30  Offshore companies are typically located in tax 
efficient jurisdictions such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, or the British Virgin 
Islands. Rather than investing in a Chinese portfolio company directly, foreign 
venture capital and private equity funds commonly make their investments in an 
offshore holding company and then establish a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) in 
China. In this way, they move ownership or control of the PRC-based assets to the 
offshore holding company and then go for an offshore financing transaction. By 
doing this, the company backed by foreign venture capital firms can issue IPO in an 
overseas market or sell shares to any international businesses without approval from 
the Chinese government.  
5.3.1.7 Issues in Public Policies and the Role of Government   
Realizing the problems with the current legal system that regulate business 
exchanges and the financing system, the government has tried to employ public 
                                                 
30 Even though the ‘red chip’ offshore listing encountered setbacks due to the two regulations on exchange currency control 
promulgated by SAFE in 2005 that set forth strict approval-based investment requirements, it was re-commenced with the 
policy shifts in China’s foreign exchange control regime that later took place. 
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policies and administrative measures as complements to the commercial legal system. 
However, the stability, consistency, and transparency of these public policies are 
problematic. For example, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
promulgated three different Circulars with different regulatory details concerning the 
establishment of overseas companies by domestic enterprises and the transfer of 
domestic assets or equity to overseas companies within 10 months in 2005 (e.g. 
Circular No.1 in Jan, Circular No.29 in April and Circular No.75 in Oct.). Besides, 
the manoeuvrability of policies is also problematic. Some policies promote the idea 
of venture capital without further implementation. According to the latest Worldwide 
Governance Survey conducted by World Bank in 2005, China ranked 103rd and 112th 
in the world in terms of the government effectiveness and regulatory quality, 
respectively.  
The role of the government in the venture capital industry is as a policy 
maker, a major capital provider, a practitioner, and a regulator. Local governments 
were a dominant source of venture capital in the first ten years, and government 
backed venture capital institutions were managed by former governmental officials 
without much business experience. The mixed roles of the government in venture 
capital may reduce the incentives of the actors. Since the fund provider and the 
investment decision maker were the same, the budget constraints might be 
comparatively softer. Secondly, mixing the roles of regulator and practitioner might 
reduce the capability of law enforcement and the regulations in most cases. Managers 
who were mainly from government bureaus without specific business experience 
might not be capable in venture financing, which heavily relies on the expertise of 
venture capitalists. It might also induce more corruptions and black-box deals that 
deter good entrepreneurs from the domestic venture capital firms. 
5.3.2 Normative Institutions in China  
Informal institutions are also underdeveloped in China. First, independent 
market intermediaries and consultancies are not developed in China. In the United 
States, venture capital institutions rely on support from various intermediaries such 
as law firms and auditing firms for deal sourcing, due diligence, evaluation, and legal 
documentation preparation. However, intermediaries are much less developed, even 
though the government has made many efforts to keep professional standards in the 
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harmony line with international standards (Xiao et al., 2004). Moreover, the lack of 
accounting practices and underdeveloped accounting system indicates a company's 
accounts may not necessarily truly reflect its financial performance. Furthermore, the 
difference between Chinese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and 
International Accounting Standards requires that the accountants fully understand 
both sets of principles. As such, conducting business due diligence and audits (under 
international standards) is essential before any corporate valuation is undertaken in 
China. 
At the same time, China is impending talent shortage, in particular in high-
end human resource markets. Venture capitalists’ expertise is critical in all 
operational procedures of venture capital investment. In the US, most venture 
capitalists have rich management and investment banking experience and an MBA 
degree. However, these kinds of professionals are scarce in China due to the short 
history of the market economy and professional training. Professional financial 
advisors, managers and accountants that are important for venture capital investment 
are extremely rare (Farrel and Grant, 2005). Even though overseas returnees have 
increased in recent years, few professionals can achieve the standard.31 This shortage 
of talent influences not only the human resource of venture capital institutions but 
also entrepreneurial companies.  
5.3.3 Cognitive Institutions in China  
China’s culture has long been considered one of the most influential 
institutions governing individuals’ behaviours in the country and other countries in 
East Asia. Historically, the core cultural teachings of Confucianism have been 
normative for all Chinese groups. Confucianism places high value on social networks 
(Guanxi), social capital (Face—Mianzi), and trust among friends (Ford, 1997; 
                                                 
31 According to a survey conducted by McKinsey, the Global Institute (MGI), which  was based on interviews with 83 human 
resources (HR) professionals involved with hiring local graduates in low-wage countries in 2005, it was found that fewer than 
10 per cent of Chinese job candidates were suitable to work in a multinational company in finance and accountancy. Effective 
managers are in short supply. According to the MGI's estimate, given the global aspirations of many Chinese companies, over 
the next 10 to 15 years, they will need 75,000 leaders who can work effectively in global environments; today they have only 
3,000 to 5,000. Management talent generally comes from several sources: offshoring enterprises that train lower-level workers, 
industries that produce managers with relevant skills, and expatriates who have worked or studied in countries with developed 
economies. 
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Graham and Lam, 2003). Guanxi and Mianzi are the two major aspects emphasized 
by researchers. 
Chinese society has always relied on a well-functioning social network, or 
Guanxi. Guanxi describes a personal connection between two parties in which one is 
able to prevail upon another to perform a favour or service. Researchers have linked 
Guanxi with the concept of social capital; it has been exhaustively described in 
studies of Chinese economic and political behaviour. Social and cultural practices are 
deeply rooted forces that may take precedence over legitimate decisions based on 
laws or regulations. Business-to-government Guanxi may serve as a kind of a 
surrogate market system due to ill-defined property rights, economic roles, and 
restricted flow of information (Johnston, 1997). According to Park and Luo (2001), 
Guanxi provides a complement to contract law. However, Guanxi is a double-edged 
sword, which can in many cases also be interpreted as corruption. When a Guanxi 
network violates bureaucratic norms, it can lead to corruption and thus fortifies the 
weaknesses of the Chinese corporate governance system, in which the state still plays 
an important role (Braendle et al., 2005). Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) suggest that 
Guanxi heavily impacts foreign venture capitalists’ investment activities in China.  
Another important cognitive institution in China is Mianzi, which represents 
the social perception of a person’s prestige. For a person to maintain face is 
important in Chinese social relations, because face translates into power and 
influence, which affects goodwill. Therefore, in Chinese society, people try to avoid 
direct conflicts or bringing up embarrassing facts in public that may cause other 
people to lose Mianzi (Ho, 1976). Researchers have provided empirical evidence that 
Mianzi impacts people’s business behaviour in China (Buckley et al., 2006; Bruton 
and Ahlstrom, 2003). Therefore, it is suggested that this cognitive aspect should be 
taken into account in studies on venture capital in China.  
In summary, institutional environments related to China’s entrepreneurship 
and venture capital investment are structurally different from those in the United 
States. Regulatory and normative institutions are underdeveloped, although have 
been improved substantially since 2004. In particular, lack of protection of property 
rights, weak rules on corporate governance, underdeveloped capital markets, lack of 
independent judicial system, and restrictions on foreign institutional financiers may 
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lead to problems in investment contracting and corporate governance structures, 
which are the crucial concerns in venture capitalists’ screening and monitoring 
activities. Furthermore, the cognitive institutions in China are also unique and may 
impact business behaviour in venture capital investment. New institutional theorists 
suggest that, in certain cases, cognitive institutions can be superior to administrative 
or judicial dispute resolution among people with close social ties. That is, informal 
norms replace law. Given the weak regulatory and normative institutions and the 
unique cognitive institutions in China, it is questioned whether the institutions affect 
incentive schemes and, if so, to what extent.  
5.4 Institutional Arrangements in China  
According to the interviews and document analysis, VCFs in China are 
divided into two distinct groups in terms of the corporate governance structure, i.e. 
VCFs structured as limited liability companies and VCFs structured as limited 
partnership organizations. This divide is closely associated with the different 
regulatory requirements imposed to foreign venture capital firms and domestic ones.  
Primarily, the two groups differ in organizational structure. Normally, 
venture capital firms are structured as limited partnerships in the US. However, as 
discussed, limited partnership, as an organizational form, was illegal in China until 
June 2007. Therefore, currently, all domestic venture capital firms are structured as 
limited companies (as seen in Table 5.1). They are mainly established as state-owned 
subsidiaries or spin-offs of related government agencies, large corporations, or 
prestigious universities. Although the first venture capital firm was established by the 
central government in 1985, those that followed were all controlled by local 
governments. Most leaders of domestic venture capital firms were former 
governmental officers or appointed by governmental bureaus before 1998. By the 
end of the 1990s, more venture capital firms were funded by large SOEs due to the 
relaxed regulations.  
By contrast, incorporating overseas, most foreign venture capital firms are 
organized under limited partnership structure, except certain strategic venture capital 
firms that are subsidies of large foreign corporations or governments. As shown in 
Table 4.1, 19 out of 22 FVCFs interviewed are structured as limited partnerships in 
China whereas only three of the FVCFs are structured as limited companies. Among 
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these three limited companies, two are corporate venture capital firms and one is a 
government venture capital firm.   
Table 5.2 Organizational Structures of the 34 Interviewed VCFs  
Q1:  WHAT IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF YOUR INSTITUTION?  
 All VCFs (#) FVCFs (#) DVCFs (#) 
Limited partnership 55.89% (19) 86.36% (19) 0 
Limited liability   44.11% (15)  13.64 (3) 100% (12) 
Total  100% (34) 64.71% (22) 35.29% (12) 
 
According to the interviews, the VCFs of different organizational structures 
vary from each other in many aspects. The corporate governance and operation of the 
VCFs under limited partnership in China are similar to those of the VCFs under the 
same corporate structure in the US. However, the VCFs structured as limited 
companies are substantially different from either the limited partnership VCFs in 
China or their peers in the US.  
Above all, the ownership structures and the compensation structures of the 
two types of VCFs are different. As shown in Table 5.2, in a limited partnership, 
VCs, as general partners, normally take unlimited liability for their minority share of 
the funds that is between one and three per cent of the total amount. At the same time, 
they charge 15 to 20 per cent of the total profits as carrier interests and 1.5 to 2.5 per 
cent of the total funds as annual management fees. Therefore, the major investment 
professionals in limited partnership VCFs may claim the residual revenues and, the 
compensation structure is a typical pay-for-performance one. The relationship 
between parties is more market-oriented that is similar to the US practice. 
As in a VCF structured as a limited company, neither the executives nor the 
investment professionals hold the shares of the company. The compensations to 
investment professionals normally consist of fixed salary and bonus. Even though the 
bonus system is considered a pay-for-performance one, the interviews show that, for 
most LCVCFs, the bonus is moderate in size. As a VC from a foreign corporate 
venture capital firm said, ‘No, the bonus is not much even if the performance of our 
firm is great. It’s different from independent venture capital firms. We are a part of 
the huge enterprise, as you know. It is kind of a norm that the earnings of individuals 
of the same administrative level do not different much within the whole enterprise…’ 
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(Info: VCF27). Similar responses were gained from the domestic venture capitalists 
(DVCs).  
Table 5.3 Compensation Structures of the 34 Interviewed VCFs 
Q2:  WHAT IS THE COMPENSATION STRUCTURE TO SENIOR INVESTMENT 
PROFESSIONALS IN YOUR FIRM? 
 All VCFs (#) LPVCFs (#) LCVCFs (#) 
Fixed annual salary  100% (34) 100% (22) 100% (12) 
Bonus by performance    73.53% (25)  68.18% (15) 83.33% (10) 
Carrier interests  55.89 (19) 100% (19) 0 (0) 
Others  20.59 (7)  28.57% (6) 9.10% (1) 
 
Table 5.4 The Ownership and Compensation Scheme of the 19 LPVCFs  
Q3:  WHAT ARE THE OWNERSHIP AND COMPENSATION STRUCTURES IN YOU 
FIRM? 
 Max Min Mean 
Ownership held by general partners  3% 1% 1.49% 
Compensation composition  
Annual management fee    2.5% 1.5% 2.35% 
Carrier interests  20% 15% 18.75% 
 
The interviews also reveal that the performance measurements are more 
ambiguous and complicated in LCVCFs than those in LPVCFs. As a general 
manager of one DVCF illustrated, ‘Well, measurements? That can be a lot. The 
[exertion of] efforts, capability, contributions, motives, attendance, etc. The 
assessments are made by the higher level supervisors’ (Info: VCF4).  As shown in 
Table 5.4, the average number of major performance measurements is 3.89 for 
LPVCFs and 5.87 for LCVCFs respectively.  
Table 5.5  The Number of Performance Measurements in the 34 VCFs  
Q4: THE NUMBER OF MAJOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS IN VCFS 
 Min Max Mean 
All VCFs  1 10 4.76 
LPVCFs    1 6 3.89 
LCVCFs  2 10 5.87 
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Associated with the difference in ownership and compensation structure, the 
governance structure and the decision-making process of the two different types of 
organizations also vary. According to the interviews, the limited partnership VCFs 
are governed under a multi-functional division structure that is more decentralized in 
decision-making. According to the limited partnership covenant, as limited partners, 
the fund investors are not allowed to involve in daily management of the venture 
capital firms. VCs, as general partners are relatively independent in decision-making. 
In a limited partnership, the partners are considerably independent from each other in 
deal sourcing, due diligence, contracting, and management of the portfolio 
companies. Only very important issues, such as investment and refinancing decisions, 
need approvals from the investment committee and the consensus of general partners 
of the fund. The interviews with VCs show that LPVCFs mainly work in a multi-
divisional form that every partner usually has their own team composed few 
investment managers. The compensation and the reputation of partners and 
investment managers are closely related to the performance of the individual team. 
Team numbers are responsible for every aspect of their portfolio companies.  As one 
FVC stated,’ No, we don’t need to report much, everyone is busy anyway… of course, 
we [partners] share [information and opinions]. But, we work by independent teams, 
usually, each one has own team that composed with one or two investment 
managers…The team is responsible for every aspects of the projects, from evaluating 
to managing...’  (Info: VCF16). As shown in Table 5.5, in over 94 per cent LPVCFs, 
the original investment team is in charge of the management of the portfolio 
companies. The LPVCF is therefore a relatively flat organization in decision-making 
and governance.  
By contrast, VCFs structured as limited companies are normally managed 
under a functional structure that is more centralized in decision-making. The 
interviews show that usually the investment decisions are made by executives based 
on the information reported by different levels of managers and through different 
functional divisions. In many cases, the decision-makers do not access to the 
entrepreneurs directly and do not involve in evaluation and due diligence of the 
investments. In addition, under such a unitary structure, the management of the 
portfolio companies is undertaken by a specific division rather than by the original 
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team that took due diligence. As shown in Table 5.5, in 80 per cent LCVCFs, the 
management of portfolio companies is conducted by specific portfolio management 
divisions rather than the original investment team. As a vice general manager in the 
second largest domestic venture capital firm in Beijing illustrated, ‘We have different 
divisions, some mainly deal with deal sourcing and screening, some with due 
diligence, and some are in charge of legal or accounting issues…All of them report 
to their division managers, then the managers report to us…’ (Info: VCF4). The 
limited company is therefore more hierarchical in decision-making and governance.  
Table 5.6 VCs’ Management of the Portfolio Companies 
Q5:  WHO IS IN CHARGE OF MANAGEMENT OF PORTFOLIO COMPANIES?   
 All VCFs (#) LPVCFs (#) LCVCFs (#) 
The original investment team 61.76% (21) 94.74% (18) 20% (3) 
A specific management 
division  
38.24% (13)  5.26 (1) 80% (12) 
 
At the same time, the interviews show that these two types of venture capital 
firms differ in the degree of budget constraints they face. LPVCFs face much tighter 
budget constraints. According to the limited partnership covenants, the life span of 
the funds is limited, and the amount of the funds is normally fixed. However, VCFs 
structured as limited companies face softer budget constraints by working as 
subsidiaries of government agencies or large corporations. Usually, there is no hard 
limit on the length and the size of the funds for LCVCFs. Table 5.5 shows that 6 out 
of 34 venture capital firms were once refinanced by their investors; they are all 
LCVCFs. 
Table 5.7 The Budget Constraints of the 34 Interviewed VCFs 
Q6:  WAS YOUR FIRM REFINANCED BY THE SHAREHOLDERS WHEN YOU FACE 
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES?  
 All VCFs (#) LPVCFs (#) LCVCFs (#) 
Yes   17.65% (6) 0 (0) 50% (6) 
No    82.35% (28)  100% (22) 50% (6) 
 
Furthermore, the two types of venture capital firms also vary in the size and 
sources of their funds. As discussed, according to Chinese law, pension funds, 
insurance corporations, and banks, which are the major sources of venture capital 
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funds in a developed economy, are not allowed in high risk venture capital 
institutions. Therefore, the major source of funds for domestic venture capital firms 
are local governments, large corporations, and universities that reasonably limit the 
fund size of domestic venture capital firms. In contrast, foreign venture capital firms 
raise funds from international markets. Funds of foreign venture capital firms in 
China are mainly raised from pension funds, insurance corporations, university 
endowments, and wealthy individuals, similar to the US practice.  The funding 
sources for foreign venture capital firms are thus much richer than domestic venture 
capital firms. As shown in Figure 5.5, the average amount of capital under 
management by foreign venture capital firms is much larger than that of domestic 
venture capital firms.  
Figure 5.5 Size of Capital Managed by Venture Capital Firms in China  





















DVCFs FVCFs JVCFs  
Source: Annual Venture Capital Report in China (Zero2IPO) 
 
Finally, the two groups of VCFs are also restricted by different laws due to 
the institutional legacy. As discussed in previous sections, foreign venture capital 
funds have explored some special vehicles to accommodate their investment in China 
in recent years to avoid foreign exchange control and other restrictions on operation 
and fundraising of foreign private equity funds. The most popular is to invest in 
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China through offshore holding companies, registering portfolio companies as 
offshore holding companies as well. Under the offshore registration system, the 
business activities of foreign venture capital firms and their portfolio companies are 
regulated by overseas laws. In this way, they avoid the restrictions of Chinese law 
such as weak protection of property rights, the prohibition of convertible security, 
weak law enforcement, and restrictions on IPO in China’s venture capital markets. 
However, domestic venture capital firms are not allowed to employ the ‘round trip’ 
strategy. Therefore, some of the most widely used mechanisms in venture capital 
investment cannot be employed by domestic venture capital firms. Even though the 
restrictions have been gradually relaxed since 2004, problems remain, and it may 
take time to properly implement and enforce new rules. According to commonly 
accepted views, foreign venture capital firms operate business under stronger 
regulatory and normative institutions than domestic firms. 
In summary, the interviews with venture capitalists show that, VCFs are 
divided into two different groups in terms of corporate governance structure due to 
the regulatory restrictions. These two types of VCFs differ from each other in many 
aspects including incentive schemes provided to investment professionals, the 
decision-making process, information flow, and budget constraints. LPVCFs are 
more decentralized and have harder budget constraints. Venture capitalists in 
LPVCFs take unlimited liability with higher-powered incentives. LCVCFs are more 
hierarchical with softer budget constraints. Moreover, venture capitalists in LCVCFs 
take limited liability with lower-powered incentives.  
According to new institutional economics, under a more independent 
governance structure, market prices provide powerful incentives for exploiting profit 
opportunities, and market participants are quick to adapt to changing circumstances 
as information is revealed through prices. Compared with decentralized structures, 
however, hierarchies provide managers with weaker incentives to maximize profits 
and normally incur additional bureaucratic costs. Therefore, the major questions 
raised are whether and how the differences in institutional arrangements of the two 
types of venture capital firms may influence venture capitalists’ investment strategies 
in China.   
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5.5 Summary  
The foregoing sections introduced the history and institutions of China’s 
venture capital investment based on the secondary document analysis and interviews. 
It shows that China’s venture capital industry has experienced dramatic growth in the 
past ten years together with the economic, technological and institutional dynamics 
in this country. This market is currently becoming one of the most active venture 
capital markets in the world.  
However, the institutions under which the venture capital investment operates 
in China are visibly different from those in advanced venture capital markets such as 
the US. Primarily, some institutional elements, which are widely believed as the most 
important factors affecting the development of venture capital markets and the 
mechanisms of venture capital investment, are extremely weak in China compared 
with those in developed economies. For example, the protection of private property 
rights and intellectual property rights is weak; the capital markets are 
underdeveloped; the rules on corporate governance and foreign institutional 
financiers are restrictive, and, the lack of professional financiers and managers etc.  
At the same time, it is found that venture capital firms in China are divided 
into groups in terms of the organizational structures, fund sources, channels for 
divestment, and the legal system and regulations they must obey due to the 
institutional restrictions. In particular, with the offshore registration strategy, the 
majority foreign venture capital firms are structured as limited partnerships and raise 
funds from international markets like their counterparts in the US. However, all the 
domestic venture capital firms are structured as limited companies and can only raise 
funds in domestic markets. Interviews with VCs suggest that these VCFs under 
different organizational structure vary from each other in many aspects including the 
ownership structure, the compensation schemes, the decision-making process, the 
information flow and the budget constraints etc. The governance of VCFs under 
limited partnership is more similar to their peers in the United States, providing 
higher-powered incentives to investment professionals. By contrast, the VCFs 
structured as limited companies are visibly different from those in the United States 
in governance by providing lower-powered incentives to their investment 
professional.  
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As discussed in Chapter 3, the existing literature suggests that institutions, 
especially regulatory institutions, have significant impacts on financial activities and 
performance. It is also suggested that new institutional economics is powerful in 
explaining venture capital investment. The rapid development of China’s venture 
capital industry under the weak regulatory institutions therefore seems to be puzzling. 
The question raised here is whether and how institutions affect venture capitalists’ 
investment strategies and performance in China.  
In particular, the institutional arrangement perspective of new institutional 
economics suggests that the governance structure has strong power to explain 
individual business behaviours and performance because firms under different 
governance structure provide distinctive incentives to business players to exert 
efforts and adapt to uncertainty. As discussed, venture capital investment is 
associated with more serious and complicated ‘double-sided’ agency problems and 
high degree of uncertainty. Moreover, it is well documented that venture capitalists’ 
expertise and efforts are the key value of venture financing to control the higher risks 
encountered. It is therefore interesting to explore whether the differences in 
governance structure of VCFs in China affect VCs’ investment activities; and, if the 
answer is yes, in what way the governance structure matters.  
In the next three chapters, the venture capitalists’ investment strategies 
including the investment preferences, ex-ante project screening and stage financing 
activities in China are investigated. By comparing these investment activities in 
China to those in the United States and other developed economies documented in 
the existing literature, this study pays special attention to the interaction between the 
unique institutions in China and the individual investment activities.  
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Chapter 6 Venture Capitalists’ Investment Preferences in China  
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores venture capitalists’ investment preferences in China 
and how institutions impact on the investment preferences. By exploring venture 
capitalists’ investment focus in terms of the development stage and technological 
intensity of their portfolio companies, whether venture capital supports young R&D-
oriented companies in China and the major factors that impact investment 
preferences of venture capitalist are examined.  
Risk aversion is a fundamental investment principle. Concerns about risks are 
related to a high degree of uncertainty. Risk factors are often related to growth stage 
and technological intensity (Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Ruhnka and Young, 1987). 
Early-staged ventures face considerable management, market, and technological 
uncertainty. Empirical research also shows that venture capitalists believe the risk of 
investment loss is much higher for early stage investments (Elango et al., 1995; 
Ruhnka and Young, 1991). In addition, technological intensity determines 
uncertainty. More intensive technology imposes higher risks due to the more serious 
issues of informational asymmetry, positive externality, lack of liquidation value and 
the higher rate of failures (Riordan and Williamson, 1985; Scherer, 1998; Hall, 2002; 
Hart and Moore, 1994).  
As discussed in previous chapters, the key value of venture capital investment 
is its striking ability to support newly established high-technology companies, 
thereby accelerating national innovation development. However, cross-country 
studies show that there are substantial variations in VCs’ investment preferences. In 
some countries, VCs indeed invest more in younger and R&D oriented companies as 
they are expected whereas in some others, they do not (Jeng and Wells, 2001; Mayer 
et al, 2005). Even within the United States, the venture capital market is segmented 
by VCs’ investment preferences in the development stages and industries of their 
portfolio companies (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Elango et al., 1995; Gupta and 
Sapienza, 1992).  
China has made numerous efforts to promote venture capital programme in 
the past two decades with the expectation to support entrepreneurial R&D activities. 
The Chinese venture capital industry has experienced dramatic development. At the 
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same time, China is becoming one of the most favored investment destinations for 
VCs around the world. However, there is no systematic examination to assess to 
what extend VCs support young and R&D intensive projects in China.  
This research therefore contributes to the existing literature by investigating 
VCs’ investment preferences in China. It explores VCs’ investment focuses in terms 
of the development stage and technological intensity of their portfolio companies as 
a general assess of the impact of venture capital investment on innovation and 
entrepreneurial activities in China. In addition, it also aims to find out the major 
factors affect investment preferences of VCs in China for a better understanding in 
the mechanisms of venture capital investment.  
This study combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches.  Based on 
unstructured interviews with seven venture capitalists and semi-structured interviews 
with 37 venture capitalists from 34 VCFs, the potential factors that might impact on 
VCs’ investment preferences in China are explored at the initial stage. A systemic 
analysis on investment details of 628 venture financing deals made by 86 VCFs is 
then conducted to test the hypotheses raised from the interviews and the 
understandings in the existing literature.   
It is found that, in general, venture capital indeed supports R&D oriented 
companies in China with a higher concentration in the information technology, 
communication, and semi-conductor industries. Most investments are made in the 
early or expansion staged projects; less than 15 per cent of the deals are backed the 
late stages. However, similar to the US practice, there are substantial variations in 
VCs’ capability to finance young and R&D oriented companies in China. The 
organizational structure of the VCFs appears to be an important factor that 
determines VCs’ investment preferences in the development stage and industry of the 
projects. The systematic analysis on the detailed investment information of 86VCFs 
demonstrates that VCFs structured as limited companies (LCVCFs) are more risk 
moderate than VCFs under limited partnership (LPVCFs) by investing more in older 
companies with lower technological intensity. The potential explanation for these 
results is the different incentive schemes and decision-making processes in the two 
different types of organizations. At the same time, similar to the US practice, VCFs 
from California and Massachusetts are more interested in early-staged projects; and, 
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VCFs that invest more in early-staged projects pay more attention to the proprietary 
of the products. However, Industry experience, local knowledge and fund size of the 
VCFs do not seem matter in China.  
The major contribution of this study is to extent the existing literature on 
venture capital investment to understand the factors that may impact innovation 
financing and the relations between business behaviour and organizational structures; 
it also provides a basis for further cross-country comparative research in the venture 
capital industry. This study also has implications for policy makers concerned with 
adjusting legal frameworks and economic strategies and encouraging venture 
capitalists to meet different hi-technology development objectives. The study may 
also be of interest to entrepreneurs who look for venture capital and the initial fund 
investors who seek appropriate structure and management of their funds in 
increasingly competitive private equity markets.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section two introduces the 
segmentation of China’s venture capital market. Section three reviews the factors 
that impact venture capitalists’ investment preferences, as discussed in the existing 
literature. Section four clarifies the research questions based on the findings of 
interviews and the existing literature. Section five introduces the data for quantitative 
analysis. Section six discusses the findings of the quantitative examination. Section 
seven presents the conclusion and implications. 
6.2 Distribution of Venture Capital Investment in China  
Since the mid-1980s, China’s policy makers have made many efforts to 
adjust public policies in order to promote venture capital investment and to relax the 
financial constraints faced by young high-technology companies, thus improving 
national innovation. The industry has been developed rapidly in the past decade (see 
Chapter 5). Anecdotally, many successful newly-established high-technology   
companies (such as Sina, Sohu, Shangde, Shangda, and Infoasia) were backed by 
venture capital investment, which shows the great power of venture capital to support 
young R&D-oriented companies in China. According to statistics, China’s venture 
capital industry shows distinct diversity in terms of capital flow in financing stages, 
industrial sectors, and regional allocations.  
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As seen in Figure 6.1, the venture capital market is segmented by financing 
stages. Venture capital investment in China focuses on early staged projects. 
According to the annual report conducted by Zero2IPO, over 48 per cent of the 884 
deals backed by venture capital investment from 2002 to 2005 were in their early 
stage of development at the time of venture capital investment; 21 per cent in 
expansion stage; and 10 per cent in the late stage.32 The stage focus of VCFs was 
also dynamic during this time. Investment in expansion stage projects has continued 
to increase, while the number of investment deals in early stage projects began to 
drop in 2005 after three years of increase.  
Figure 6.1 Distribution of Venture Capital Investment by Stage in China: 2002-2005 
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Source: Annual Venture Capital Report in China: 2003-2006 (Zero2IPO) 
At the same time, as shown in Figure 6.2, venture capital investments are 
concentrated in high-technology industries. The percentage of venture capital backed 
deals in the high-technology industry has been sustained over 70 per cent from 2001 
to 2005. The average percentage was about 75 per cent.  
However, the investment focuses are dynamic. Table 6.1 shows that IT and 
communication have retained to be the most attractive sectors for venture capitalists 
from 2001 to 2005. Since the year 2003, venture capitalists’ interest in 
                                                 
32 The development stages of the other 21 per cent are unknown.  
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healthcare/bio-tech declined slightly, while interest in semi-conductor projects has 
substantially increased. At the same time, other high-technology sectors like 
environment and new energy and new materials have attracted increasing interests 
from the venture capitalists during the years.  
Figure 6.2 Distribution of Venture Capital Investment by Technology in China 
 
Source: Annual Venture Capital Report in China: 2002-2006 (Zero2IPO) 
 
Table 6.1 Distribution of Venture Capital Investment by Sector in China 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Venture capital investment by sector in China  
Sector No. deals No. deals No. deals No. deals No. deals
IT 46 62 39 53 78 
Communication 28 30 30 38 40 
Med/health-care/bio-tech 24 29 21 19 16 
Semi-conductor 10 16 18 44 33 
Environment  6 6 9 10 1 
New material/energy 0 20 13 13 6 
Other High-technology   6 9 0 4 1 
Service  8 17 7 20 20 
Traditional manufacturing 9 23 24 30 27 
Unknown  22 14 8 26 7 
Total  159 226 169 257 229 
Venture capital investment by technology in China 
Technological Application No. deals No. deals No. deals No. deals No. deals
High-tech Industry 120 172 130 181 175 
Low-tech Industry and service  17 40 31 50 47 
Distribution of Venture Capital Investment by Technological Application in China: 












2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Year 
% 
Higth-tech Traditional Industry and Service Unknown 
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Unknown  22 14 8 26 7 
Total  159 226 169 257 229 
Source: Annual Venture Capital Report in China: 2002-2006 (Zero2IPO) 
In general, the statistics show that venture capital investment is indeed 
concentrated on younger and technology intensive projects in China. At the same 
time, similar to the US practice, the market is also segmented in terms of VCs’ 
focuses on the development stage and technological intensity of the projects. Who 
supports the younger R&D intensive companies? What are the major factors that 
determine VCs’ investment focuses? The answers to the questions are not only 
important for understanding the mechanisms of venture capital investment but also 
for policymaking and business practice.  
6.3 Qualitative Findings: Factors that Impact VCs’ Investment Focuses   
This section reports the interview findings and clarifies the research questions 
raised from the interviews and the understandings in the existing literature. The 
interviews with VCs and document analysis show that VCFs differ from each other 
in many aspects in China including the governance structure, the fund size, industry 
experience and background and the corporate strategy etc. According to the 
interviews and existing literature, some of the elements may have potential impacts 
on VCs’ investment preferences.  
6.3.1 Corporate Governance Structures of the VCFs 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the interviews and secondary document analysis 
show that venture capital firms in China are divided into two major groups in terms 
of governance structure due to the regulatory restrictions. Limited partnership as an 
organizational form was illegal in China until 2007. Currently, all domestic venture 
capital firms are structured as limited companies. By contrast, most foreign venture 
capital firms are under limited partnership structure, except for certain strategic 
venture capital firms that are subsidies of large foreign corporations.  
At the same time, the interviews show that the VCFs under different 
organizational structures vary from each other in many aspects. The VCFs under 
limited partnership are more decentralized in corporate governance than the VCFs 
structured as limited companies. It shows that the decision-making in VCFs under 
limited partnership is highly delegated and the information flow is very flat. 
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However, in VCFs structured as limited companies, the decisions are made by the 
top level executives based on the information passed from different divisions and 
through different level of hierarchies of the company. That is, in a VCF structured as 
limited company, the information flow is complex and hierarchical. In addition, the 
one who makes the decision is not personally involved in the key processes of 
venture capital investment such as project screening, due diligence, contract 
designing and post-investment monitoring etc. Furthermore, the interviews also find 
that the budget constraints faced by a VCF structured as a limited company is much 
harder than that faced by a VCF structured under limited partnership.  
In summary, the interviews with venture capitalists show that, the two types 
of VCFs differ from each other in many aspects including incentive schemes 
provided to investment professionals, the decision-making process, information flow, 
and budget constraints. LPVCFs are more decentralized and face harder budget 
constraints. Venture capitalists in LPVCFs take unlimited liability with higher-
powered incentives. LCVCFs are more hierarchical with softer budget constraints. 
Moreover, venture capitalists in LCVCFs take limited liability with lower-powered 
incentives.  
According to the new institutional economics, differences in governance 
structure and the incentives schemes may lead to different business behaviours. It is 
suggested that hierarchical organizations provide business actors with weaker 
incentives to maximize profits and normally incur additional bureaucratic costs 
(Williamson, 1991). Lacking internal incentives and commitment to harden budget 
constraints, hierarchical organizations normally conduct financing activities on an ad 
hoc basis. Such a governance structure may discourage the investment professionals 
to take risks. In contrary, under a more independent corporate governance structure 
with higher-powered incentive arrangements, decentralized organizations may 
encourage players to take a higher risk-return profile (Salhman, 1990; Huang and Xu, 
1998).  
Empirical evidence shows that risk factors are often related to the growth and 
technological intensity (Elango et al., 1995; Ruhnka and Young, 1987, 1991). 
Ruhnka and Young (1987) present five sequential stages in the development process 
based on the views of venture capitalists. They find a strong census on key 
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development goals in various stages as well as developmental risks associated with 
each stage. The findings from interviews with VCs in China are consistent with the 
findings of Ruhnka and Young (1987). At the same time, more intensive technology 
imposes higher risks due to the more serious issues of informational asymmetry, 
positive externality, lack of liquidation value and the higher rate of failures (Riordan 
and Williamson, 1985; Scherer, 1998; Hart and Moore, 1994). Therefore, if the 
arguments concerning the relationship between the corporate governance and risk-
taking capability indeed reflect the reality in China’s venture capital investment, the 
followings hypotheses are suggested:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: LPVCFs invest more in R&D intensive projects than LCVCFs.  
Hypothesis 1b: LPVCFs invest more in younger projects than LCVCFs.  
Hypothesis 1c: LPVCFs invest more in early-staged projects than LCVCFs.  
6.3.2 Capital Size of the VCFs 
The interviews with VCs also suggest that VCFs are divided into groups by 
the size of funds they manage. As discussed in the foregoing text, foreign VCFs raise 
funds from international markets. The fund sources of FVCFs are much richer than 
that of DVCFs which are mainly backed by the government agents, large 
corporations, and universities.  
According to the interviews, the average capital size managed by the 34 
VCFs is $1406.46 million with high standard deviations. Overall, 17 of 27 VCFs 
manage over $100 million. The amount of capital managed by DVCFs is 
substantially less than that managed by FVCFs. As shown in Table 4.6, the two 
VCFs that manage less than $25 million are domestic; only 4 out of 17 VCFs that 
manage over $100 million are domestic. The differences are not as sharp as in the 
size of funds under management when looking at the size of capital that can be 
invested in China. However, it shows nearly the same pattern. The average amount 
of capital can be invested in China for the VCFs is $486.9 million with a standard 
deviation at 344.76.  11 out of the 13 VCFs that manage over $100 million capital 
that can be invested in China are foreign.  
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Table 6.2 The Size of Capital Managed by the 34 VCFs 
CAPITAL SIZE OF THE VCF 
Panel 1: Capital under management of the VCFs ( the ones known capital) 
 Number of VCFs Size of funds ( $ Million)  
 All FVCFs DVCFs Mean Max Min Std. Div 
< 25  2 0 2 14.5 16 13 2.12 
> = 25& < 100 8 6 2 62.25 75 37.75 11.42 
> = 100 17 13 4 2298.08 29700 100 7076.01 
Total  27  19 8 1406.46 29700 13 5659.84 
Panel 2: Capital can be invested in China ( the ones known capital) 
 Number of VCFs Size of funds ( $ Million)  
 All FVCFs DVCFs Mean Max Min Std. Div 
< 25  2 0 2 14.5 16 13 2.12 
> = 25& < 100 8 6 2 57.23 75 30 15.54 
> = 100 13 11 2 486.9 1086.70 178.00 344.76 
Total  23 17 6 280.66 1086.70 13 328.34 
 
Research suggests that capital size impacts VCs’ investment preferences. 
Some researchers examine venture capitalists’ investment preferences by employing 
Markotwiz’s portfolio methodology. The literature emphasizes risk diversification 
and attributes the different investment preferences of VCs to resource constraints and 
cost considerations (Elango et al., 1995; Lerner, 1995; Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). 
For example, based on a questionnaire of 149 venture capitalists in the US, Elango et 
al. (1995) find that venture capital firms are divided into different groups based on 
investment preferences and ex-post involvement in portfolio companies due to 
resource constraints. According to the survey, the earlier the investment stage, the 
greater the interest of venture capitalists is built upon proprietary products, product 
uniqueness, and high growth markets. Late-stage investors are more interested in 
demonstrated market acceptance. Elango et al. (1995) also find that larger venture 
capital firms invest more in late-stage projects, whereas smaller venture capital firms 
focus on earlier stages. Moreover, larger venture capital firms have more 
professionals and manage more money per professional. Since venture capitalists 
must exert effort to monitor and provide value-added supports to their portfolio 
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companies, venture capitalists who manage more capital must limit the number of 
deals by increasing the size of investment per deal in order to control costs. However, 
early-staged companies normally have less value. Therefore, larger venture capital 
firms invest more in late-staged companies. If the fund size indeed matters on VCs’ 
investment choice in China, the following hypotheses are raised:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Larger VCFs invest more in early-staged projects than smaller VCFs. 
Hypothesis 2b: Larger VCFs invest less in younger projects than smaller VCFs.  
6.3.3 Experience and Background of the VCFs  
The VCFs in China also show great deviations in terms of the history, local 
knowledge, experience in managing certain types of funds, and industrial 
background. First, the venture capital firms substantially differ in industry experience. 
The average age of the 34 interviewed VCFs is 9.68 by the end of 2006. The 
standards deviation is 6.01. About 45 per cent are between six and ten years old; 32 
per cent are less than six years old; and 30 per cent are more than ten years old. 
Moreover, due to the short history of venture capital industry in China, DVCFs have 
less industry experience than FVCFs. As shown in Table 4.7, the average age is 11.5 
for FVCFs and 6.33 for DVCFs. All DVCFs are less than ten years old, while 45 per 
cent of the FVCFs have been operating in this industry for more than ten years.  
Moreover, the VCFs differ in local operating experience in China. The length 
of time that the VCFs undertake venture capital investment in China ranges from two 
years to fourteen years. The average operating time in China for FVCFs is almost the 
same as that for DVCFs. At the same time, 3 out of the 22 FVCFs have operated in 
China for more than ten years.  
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Table 6.3 The Industry and Local Experience of the 34 VCFs 
INDUSTRY EXPEREINCE AND LOCAL KNOWLEDGE  (YEAR)   
Panel 1:  The age of the VCFs by the end of 2006 ( known the time of establishment)  
 Number of VCFs  Average age of the VCFs  
 All  (#) FVCFs DVCFs All  FVCFs DVCFs 
= < 5 32.14% (9) 18.18% (4) 41.67% (5) 4.11 4.2 4 
> 5& =< 10 44.12% 
(15) 
36.36% (8) 58.33% (7) 7.14 6.67 7.5 




0 (0) 17.46 17.46 0  




9.68 11.55 6.63 
Panel 2:  The experience of operation in China by the end of 2006   
 Number of VCFs  Average age of the VCFs  
 All  (#) FVCFs DVCFs All  FVCFs DVCFs 
= < 5 35.29% 
(12)  
36.36% (8) 33.33% (4) 3.83 3.75 4 




66.67% (8) 7.26  7.09 7.5 
> 10 8.82% (3) 8.82% (3) 0 (0) 13 13 0 




6.56 6.68 6.33 
 
The effects of the industry experience and local knowledge on business 
behaviours and performance have long been debated. Some researchers suggest that 
experienced decision-makers make better decisions and perform better (Choo and 
Trotman, 1991; Nosofsky, 1987). However, Shepherd et al. (2003) find no 
relationships between VCs’ industry experiences and their performances. At the 
same time, some scholars argue that the knowledge on local markets may help 
business players to reduce investment risks, improve the efficiency and increase to 
ability to exploit resources (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Luo and Peng, 1999). As 
discussed, venture capital is an innovative financial instrument that heavily relies on 
the expertise of venture capitalists. If industry experience and local knowledge 
indeed impact on business activities and performances, it is expected that older VCFs 
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and those with more local operating experience may take higher risk-return profiles 
by investing more in projects with more uncertainties to exploit more potential 
profits. Thus, the following hypotheses are raised:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: VCFs with more venture financing experience invest more in projects 
with higher R&D intensity than those with less experience. 
Hypothesis 3b: VCFs with more venture financing experience invest more in 
younger projects than those with less experience.  
Hypothesis 3c: VCFs with more venture financing experience invest more in early-
staged projects than those with less experience.  
Hypothesis 3d: VCFs with more local investment experience invest more in projects 
with higher R&D intensity than those with less experience.  
Hypothesis 3e: VCFs with more local investment experience invest more in younger 
projects than those with less experience.  
Hypothesis 3f: VCFs with more local investment experience invest more in early-
staged projects than those with less experience. 
 
Another observation form the interviews is that most of the FVCFs are from 
the United States. As seen in Table 6.4, 16 out of the 22 FVCFs are from the United 
Sates. More interestingly, 12 out of the 16 VCFs from the US are from California or 
Massachusetts where venture capital investment was originated. Empirical studies 
also find that VCFs from California and Massachusetts invest more in early-staged 
projects than those in New York (Elango, et al., 1995; Saxenian, 1989). It is 
suggested that, history, culture and economic environments may have impacts on 
VCs’ investment activities. It is therefore questioned whether the origin of the VCFs 
may have effects on VCs’ investment preferences when they operate across boarders. 
If it does, the hypotheses are raised as follows:   
 
Hypothesis 4a:  VCFs from California or Massachusetts invest more in projects with 
higher R&D intensity than other VCFs.  
Hypothesis 4b: VCFs from California or Massachusetts invest more in younger 
projects than other VCFs. 
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Hypothesis 4c: VCFs from California or Massachusetts invest more in early-staged 
projects than other VCFs.  
Table 6.4 Origin of the FVCFs  
ORIGIN OF THE FVCFS  
 Number of the VCFs  % of the total FVCFs 
US 16 73.73  
California & Massachusetts  12 54.55 
Other Nations 6  27.27 
6.3.4 Product Proprietary and Investment Stage 
My interviews with VCs also demonstrate that they have different views on 
product protection. Some VCs emphasize the proprietary of the products. As one 
DVC said, ‘The product must be innovative in technology. Almost all our companies 
[portfolio companies] have more than one patent.  Our mission is to support 
innovative projects anyway…’ (Info: VCF4). The statement is also echoed by one 
FVC: ‘Unique advantages in products or service is a necessary condition. New firms 
can hardly survive without innovation. No matter it is an innovative business model, 
technology or marketing strategy, it must be innovative and the innovation is must be 
something cannot be easily duplicated...’ (Info: VCF24). Theses statements are 
consistent with what Elango et al. (1995) find in the United States. The authors find 
that VCFs that invest more in early-staged projects pay more attention to the 
proprietary of the products. However, some VCs suggest that the protection of 
products is not really important in China, pointing out that as long as intellectual 
property right laws are not enforced, innovation cannot be protected. The diverse 
statements therefore suggest an examination on whether the product proprietary is 
indeed important for early stage investment in China. The following hypotheses are 
hence raised:  
 
Hypothesis 5: VCFs that invest more in early-staged projects pay more attention to 
the proprietary of products.  
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6.4 Data for Quantitative Analysis  
6.4.1 Data Collection and Sampling 
Firm level data on demographic and investment information of VCFs as well 
as their portfolio companies are drawn from the ‘Venture Economics’ Database33 and 
a hand-collected database built on the interviews and secondary document analysis.34 
The two datasets provide detailed information on over 160 VCFs and over 1020 
venture capital backed deals in China from 1990 to 2006. The sample represents 
about half of the total VCFs and two fifths of the total venture capital backed deals in 
China. 
A two-stage strategic sampling method is employed in this study. First, the 
VCFs that are involved in less than three deals in China are excluded. After the 
screening, 102 VCFs that have invested in over 880 deals are left in the dataset. Then, 
a random sample of 86 VCFs was selected from the screened sample pool for final 
analysis. The VCFs have invested in 628 deals in China, representing over one fourth 
of the total venture capital deals in the country.  
Individual information on R&D intensity and the ratio of intangible assets are 
not available, since all venture capital backed companies are privately held 
companies at the time of venture financing. Therefore, industry average data on 
R&D intensity and intangibility of assets of the venture capital backed companies 
from China’s High-Tech Industry Statistics 35  and ‘Financial Data on China’s 
Industrial Enterprises 36 ’ (1998-2005) are employed in this study. The data are 
matched by date and industry to each company and each round of financing, as in 
Gompers’ (1995) study on the US venture capital market.  
                                                 
33 This database has been extensively used in previous venture capital research (e.g. Bygrave, 1989; Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 
1995; Gompers and Lerner, 1999a; Kortum and Lerner, 2000). Venture Economics has gathered venture capital investment data 
since the 1970s using annual reports of venture capital funds, personal contacts to funds’ personnel, initial public offering 
prospectuses, and deals announced in the media. The database contains information on over 200,000 private equity investments 
(one whole financing round consists of several single investments) and is widely recognized as a leading source of venture 
capital investment data. Currently, it has gathered investment information on over 530 venture capital deals in China.  
34 The hand-collected data were mainly from interviews and websites of the venture capital institutions and their portfolio 
companies.  
35 The data were on a more aggregate level that only IT, Semi-conductor, electronic, medical care and biotech could be 
collected. This might influence the results, although most of our samples are in these industries. 
36 This dataset covers financial data on all registered industrial enterprises whose annual sales are over 5 million RMB in China 
from 1998 to 2005.  
- 156 -  
6.4.2 Variables in Quantitative Analysis 
6.4.2.1 Dependent Variables: VCs’ investment focus in stage and technology 
1. VCs’ investment focus regarding technological intensity: Venture capitalists’ 
investment focus regarding technology is measured by the average R&D intensity of 
the portfolio companies backed by the individual VCF. The industry average ratio of 
R&D spending to value added and the ratio of R&D spending on new products 
development to value added are used as measurements of R&D intensity.  
2. VCs’ investment focuses regarding development stage: Venture capitalists’ 
investment focus regarding the development stage is measured by the ratio of 
distribution of individual VCFs’ portfolio companies in early stage projects, 
expansion stage projects, and late stage projects. The development stage is self-
reported by the VCF at the time of venture financing.37 Normally, the development 
stage is categorized into early (seed/start-up, first stage), expansion (expansion stage, 
second stage) and late stages (third stage, bridge, Buyout/acquisition, other late 
stages). There are no clear divisions between the definitions of each stage; thus,   
divisions should be seen as relative measures rather than absolute measures 
(Gompers, 1995). 
3. VCs’ investment focus regarding the maturity of the companies: Venture 
capitalists’ investment focus regarding the maturity of the companies is measured by 
the percentage of the deals backed by the VCF that were less than two years old at 
the time of financing. A company that has a longer history is able to provide more 
information to investors, so venture capitalists can better judge their prospects. 
According to the interviews, venture capitalists suggest that companies less than two 
years usually have more uncertainties.  Therefore, companies less than two years are 
considered younger companies in this study. This variable is also taken as 
complementary to the development stage variable, since information in the 
development stage is not as accurate. 
6.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
1. Governance structure of the VCF: Since accurate information on governance 
structure of the VCFs is not available, the governance structure is proxied by the 
                                                 
37 There are no clear divisions between the definitions of each stage, so divisions should be seen as relative measures rather 
than absolute measures (Gompers, 1995). 
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origin of the venture capital firm. As the majority of FVCFs are structured as limited 
partnerships and all DVCFs are organized as limited companies due to regulatory 
restrictions, VCFs are divided into two groups. FVCFs are proxied as VCFs under 
limited partnership, whereas DVCFs are proxied as VCFs under the limited company 
structure.  
2. Size of the funds: Fund size is measured as the amount of total funds managed by 
the VCF by the end of 2006.  
3. Experience of the VCF in venture financing: The experience of the VCF in 
venture financing is measured as the age of the VCF at the end of 2006.  
4. Experience of the VCFs in venture financing in China: The experience of the 
VCFs in venture financing in China is measured as the age of the VCF at the end of 
2006 for domestic venture capital firms. For foreign venture capital firms, experience 
is measured by the length of time from the year when the VCF entered the China’s 
market until the end of 2006.  
5. VCFs from California or Massachusetts: Whether the VCF is from California or 
Massachusetts is chosen as a dummy variable. The variable equals one if it is from 
California or Massachusetts; otherwise, it is zero.  
6. Emphasis on product protection of the VCF: The VCF’s emphasis on product 
protection of their portfolio companies is measured as the average ratio of 
intangibility of the companies that it backed by the end of 2006.  The industry 
average ratio of intangible assets to total assets is taken as a proxy of product 
protection of the venture capital backed company.  
6.4.2.3 Controlling Variable  
A dummy variable stating whether the VCF has a pre-set industry preference 
in the high-technology industry is taken as a controlling variable in the analysis. 
According to the interviews and archives analysis, some VCFs have pre-set 
investment strategy in terms of industry preference. For example, 13 of 34 VCFs 
target the information industry or other high-technology industries; 2 of 34 VCFs 
target non-high-technology industries. The rest of the VCFs do not have precise pre-
set investment strategy in terms of industry. Normally, the pre-set investment 
strategy depends on the degree of risk aversion of the ultimate investors of the 
venture capital funds on the one hand; on the other hand, it depends and the expertise 
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of the venture capitalists who will manage the funds. Since this study aims to 
determine the major factors that impact investment preferences, the pre-set strategy 
of the VCFs must be controlled. The pre-set industry strategy of VCFs is normally 
public information that can be searched from their annual reports or websites. The 
variable equals one when the VCF has pre-set high-technology industry preference 
and zero if the VCFs does not have pre-set high-technology industry preference. 
6.4.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Sampled Data  
6.4.3.1 General information  
Overall, 86 VCFs that closed more than four deals in China by the end of 
2006 were selected for this study. Table 6.5 shows that 23 of 86 VCFs are domestic; 
the other 63 are FVCFs.  According to the data, the VCFs invested in 628 deals in 
China by the end of 2006, among which 76.91 per cent were backed by FVCFs and 
only 23.09 per cent were supported by DVCFs. Over 85 per cent of the deals closed 
after 1998. Furthermore, the average size of the funds managed by the VCFs 
substantially differs. The average amount of funds managed by the FVCFs is over 
twenty times larger than those managed by the DVCFs. The operating history in 
venture financing industry of the FVCFs is also much longer. The average age of the 
FVCFs is over 19 years old and over 7 years old for the DVCFs. However, the 
experience of the FVCFs operating in China is less than that of the DVCFs. 
Moreover, about half of the FVCFs are from California or Massachusetts.  
Regarding pre-set investment strategies, the data show that over 62 per cent 
of the VCFs have pre-set investment targets at high-technology companies. Most 
VCFs aim to invest in high-technology companies in China. At the same time, the 
average ratio of funds targeting at early-staged projects managed by the VCFs in the 
sample is 22 per cent. There is no visible difference between the FVCFs and the 
DVCFs in terms of their pre-set investment strategies in the industry and 
development stage of the portfolio companies. 
The basic patterns shown from the sample are consistent with the interview 
findings and the archive analysis. Primarily, FVCFs are more active than DVCFs in 
China’s venture financing market, which is consistent with the secondary document 
analysis and the survey conducted by Zero2IPO (see Chapter 2). At the same time, 
FVCFs control much more capital than DVCFs. Furthermore, FVCFs have more 
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experience than DVCFs in venture financing industry but less experience in China’s 
market. According to the self-reported information, most VCFs target high-
technology companies and their investment preferences in early-staged projects are 
not as strong.  
Table 6.5 Demographic Information of the 86 Sampled VCFs 
 ALL VCFS FVCFS DVCFS 
Number of VCFs 86 (100%) 63 (73.26%) 23 (26.74%) 
The average size of funds under 
management  of the VCFs ($million) 
2467.18 3088.21  138.31 
The average age of the VCFs  (year) 16.34 19.70 7.13 
The investing experience in China  (year) 5.65 5.16 7.13 
The number of deals closed in China  628 (100%) 483 (76.91%) 145 (23.09%) 
The number of VCFs from California or 
Massachusetts 
27 (31.40%) 27 (42.86%)  
The pre-set preference in high-technology  
industry 
54 (62.79%) 38 (60.03%) 16 (69.57%) 
The average ratio of funds targeting at 
early-staged projects VCF (calculated by 
the number of funds)  
22.05% 23.14% 19.17% 
6.4.3.2 Investment distribution of VCFs  
Similar to the US practice, there is a clear market segmentation of the 
investment focus of venture capitalists on stages and technological sectors in China. 
As shown in Table 6.6, among the 628 deals backed by the 86 VCFs in the sample, 
30.74 per cent of projects were invested at the early stages; 56.84 per cent at 
expansion stage; and 12.42 per cent of the total in later stage. The percentage of 
investments focusing on the expansion stage is much larger and the percentage of the 
investment in early-staged projects is much smaller in the sample compared with that 
of the survey data of Zero2IPO. Without access to detailed descriptions of the 
methodology employed by Zero2IPO, this study relies on first-hand collected data 
from the interviews and the Venture Economics dataset, which has been extensively 
used by researchers. However, both the hand-collected data and data from Zero2IPO 
show that the venture financing market is segmented by stage focuses of the venture 
capitalists in China. Moreover, the hand-collected data show that 25.48 per cent of 
the deals were less than two years old at the time of investment.  
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Furthermore, FVCFs invested more in projects at the expansion stage and in 
younger projects. This is consistent with the expectation that LPVCFs (those are 
proxied by FVCFs in this study) are more profit-oriented and thus more sensitive to 
the tradeoffs between risks and returns. Another interesting observation is that the 
age of the venture capital backed companies is not fully correlated with the self-
reported development stage, especially with the deals backed by DVCFs. As seen in 
Table 6.6, only 13.99 per cent of the DVC-backed deals were less than two years of 
old at the time of venture financing, whereas 33.79 per cent of the total were early-
staged projects. According to the data, over half of the early-staged projects backed 
by DVCFs were more than two years old.  
Table 6.6 Distribution of Venture Capital Backed Deals by Development Stage  
 All VC-backed deals Deals backed by FVCFs  Deals backed by DVCFs  
Panel A Distribution of VC-backed deals by development stage at the time of venture financing 
 No. deals % No. deals % No. deals % 
Seed 30 4.78% 16 2.90% 14 11.27% 
Start-up 39 6.21% 13 2.28% 26 19.72% 
Other Early stage 124 19.75% 120 24.74% 4 2.80% 
Expansion 357 56.84% 283 57.97% 74 52.11% 
Later stage 78 12.42% 53 11.99% 25 17.50% 
Total 628 100% 485 77.23% 143 22.77% 
Panel B Distribution of the age of VC-backed deals at the time of venture financing 
 No. deals % No. deals % No. deals % 
> 2 years old 468 74.52% 345 71.13% 123 86.01% 
<= 2 years old 160 25.48% 140 28.87% 20  13.99% 
Total 628 100% 485 77.23% 143 23.77% 
 
Concerning the distribution of the venture capital backed deals by industry, it 
also shows visible diversity, although there is a significant concentration in the 
information technology and electronic sectors. As shown in Table 6.7, 75.8 per cent 
of the total projects are in high-technology industries; only 24.20 per cent are from 
traditional industries. Even though there is no obvious difference in the ratio of the 
investment in high-technology industries between the two types of VCFs, the focus 
of the investment is visibly different. For instance, FVCFs invested more in the 
Internet specific and Semi-conductor industries, while the domestic firms invested 
more in computer software and healthcare industries. According to the data, the 
industry average ratio of R&D spending to total value added across high-technology 
industries substantially differs. On average, it was 5.83 per cent in the 
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communication and IC industries from 2001 to 2005 and only 2.6 per cent for the 
healthcare industry. R&D intensive companies are associated with more server 
information problems and encountered a higher rate of failure. This indicates that the 
two types of VCFs may take different risks by investing in companies with different 
degrees of R&D intensity. 
Table 6.7 Distribution of Venture Capital Backed Deals by Industry & Technology 
 All VC-backed deals Deals backed by FVCFs  Deals backed by DVCFs  
Panel A Distribution of VC-backed deals by industry 
 No. deals % No. deals % No. deals % 
Internet Specific 154 24.52% 151 31.13% 23 16.08% 
Computer Software 68 10.82% 43 8.87% 25 17.48% 
Computer Hardware 19 3.02% 15 3.09% 4 2.80% 
Computer others 7 1.11% 2 0.41% 5 3.50% 
Communication 73 11.62% 66 13.61% 21 14.69% 
IC 93 14.81% 82 16.91% 11 7.69% 
Med/Healthcare 23 3.66% 12 2.47% 11 7.69% 
Biotech 5 0.80% 1 0.21% 4 2.80% 
Business service 30 4.78% 23 4.74% 7 4.90% 
Industry/Energy 23 3.66% 12 2.47% 11 7.69% 
Financial service 22 3.50% 21 4.33% 1 0.70% 
Consumer related 68 10.83% 24 4.95% 10 6.99% 
Arg/Fishery/Forestry 9 1.43% 6 1.24% 3 2.10% 
Others 9 1.43% 8 1.65% 1 0.70% 
Transportation 8 1.27% 8 1.65% 0 0 
Construction 5 0.80% 4 0.82% 1 0.70% 
Manufacturing 10 1.60% 5 1.03% 5 3.50% 
Others 11 1.75% 10 1.09% 1 0.70% 
Panel B Distribution of VC-backed deals by technological application 
High-tech Industry 476 75.80% 372 76.70 104 72.73% 
Traditional Industry 152 24.20% 123 23.30% 39 27.27% 
Total 628 100% 485 77.23% 143 23.77% 
6.5 Findings from Quantitative Analysis  
6.5.1 VCs’ Investment Preferences: Development Stage and Maturity  
Table 6.8 represents the estimates of the relations between the venture 
capitalists’ preferences in the development stage and the characteristics of the VCF. 
The dependent variable in Panel A is the average ratio of the early-staged deals 
supported by the VCF. The dependent variable in Panel B is the average ratio of the 
number of deals invested in younger projects by the VCF. The independent variables 
include the capital size managed by the VCF, the experience of the VCF in the 
venture capital industry, the operating experience of the VCF in China, the ratio of 
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early stage funds managed by the VCF, the average asset intangibility of the 
companies backed by the VCF, a dummy variable that equals one if the VCF is 
governed under limited partnership, and a dummy variable that equals one if the 
VCF is from California or Massachusetts.  
Overall, the regression analysis shows that the proprietary of products, the 
corporate governance structure of the VCF, and whether the VCF is from California 
and Massachusetts are correlated to venture capitalists’ investment preferences in 
terms of development stage and maturity of the portfolio companies. However, the 
capital size and the VCF’s experience in venture financing industry and venture 
financing in China do not matter.  
As shown in Table 6.8, Hypothesis 1b is supported. The dummy variable 
LPVCF is significantly and positively correlated to the ratio of venture investment in 
younger projects made by the VCF. This indicates that venture capital firms under 
limited partnerships invest more in younger companies than venture capital firms 
structured as limited companies. It is well-documented that younger companies are 
associated with more uncertainties and risks. This study thus provides evidence that 
VCFs under a more independent governance structure take more risks than VCFs 
under a more hierarchical governance structure.  
The result is consistent with several arguments in new institutional economics. 
First, it supports transaction cost theory, which argues that decentralized or market-
oriented organizations provide stronger incentives for actors to exploit profit 
opportunities and that actors are quick to adapt to changing circumstances as 
information is revealed through prices. Therefore, decentralized organizations take 
higher risks in investment (Williamson, 1979; 1991). Second, it also provides 
evidence for the soft budget constraints theory that argues the lack of commitment to 
terminate bad investment projects due to the softer budget constraints of the 
hierarchic investment institutions interferes with venture capitalists’ ex-post 
screening capability. This issue may also reduce the risk-taking ability of hierarchical 
investors (Dewartripont and Maskin, 1995; Huang and Xu, 1998).  
Although a significant relationship between the corporate governance 
structure of the VCF and early-stage investments was expected, the analysis does not 
show any correlation; therefore, Hypothesis 1c is rejected. The correlation analysis 
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for the development stage and the age of the venture capital backed deals shows that 
the two variables are not significantly correlated. This confirms my previous 
concerns on the information of development stage. One explanation for this result 
might be different life cycles for companies across industries. For example, in the 
Internet specific industry, companies may grow and expand substantially faster than 
those in Semi-conductor or biotech industries. This also leads to the deviation 
between the development stage variable and the maturity variable of the venture 
capital backed company.  
As predicted in Hypothesis 5, the emphasis on the proprietary of products is 
significantly and positively correlated to the ratio of investment in early-staged 
projects and the ratio of investment in younger companies undertaken by the VCF. 
Table 6.8 shows that the average asset intangibility of the portfolio companies 
backed by the VCF has the strongest power in both regression examinations. VCFs 
that invest more in early-staged projects and younger companies pay more attention 
to the uniqueness and the protection of products or services in China. The result is 
consistent with the existing literature based on US observations. Additionally, the 
result partially confirms the qualitative findings from the fieldwork. The interviews 
suggest that, similar to their US peers, venture capitalists in China take the 
innovative capability as the major power that supports younger companies to achieve 
competitiveness in the market.   
The regression examination shows that the VCFs from California or 
Massachusetts significantly differ from others in their investment choices in terms of 
development stage and maturity of the portfolio companies. As seen in Table 6.8, the 
dummy variable that states whether the VCF is from California or Massachusetts is 
significantly and positively correlated to the ratio of investment in early-staged 
projects and the ratio of the investment in younger companies. This implies that the 
VCFs from California or Massachusetts are more interested in newly-established 
companies in China.  Hypothesis 4b is therefore confirmed. The result is consistent 
with the findings of Elango et al. (1995), who compare venture capitalists’ 
investment preferences in different regions within the United States. The result of 
this study further confirms that venture capitalists from different regions keep their 
business culture and strategies even they go overseas (Saxenian, 1989).  
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However, according to the regression analyses, capital size does not play a 
role in investment preferences in terms of development stage and maturity. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are thus rejected. This indicates that resource constraints and 
cost considerations are not the major factors that determine investment preferences in 
China. The results differ from the existing literature.  Moreover, no experience 
variables matter in determining venture capitalists’ investment preferences, 
suggesting that neither experience in the venture financing industry nor experience in 
local operation of the VCF influence venture capitalists’ investment preferences in 
China. Hypotheses 3b, 3c, 3e, and 5f are therefore rejected.  
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Table 6.8 Regressions for VCs’ Investment Preferences in Development Stage and 
Maturity 
 
The sample is 86 randomly selected VCFs in China that have been invested in more than 3 deals in 
China till the end of 2006. The 86 VCFs have invested in 628 deals in China in total. Estimates are 
from OLS regressions for both Panel A and Panel B (t-statistics for the regression coefficients are in 
parentheses.). The dependent variable for Panel A is the ratio of early-staged deals to total deals 
backed by the VCF. The dependent variable for Panel B is the ratio of deals invested in young 
companies to total investments made by VCF. Independent variables include a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if the VCF is governed under limited partnership and a dummy variable that equals to 1 if 
the VCF is from California or Massachusetts. The emphasis on proprietary of the products is 
measured by the average asset intangibility of the deals backed by the VCF. . Intangibility of assets is 
measured by the average ratio of intangible assets to total assets for the firms in the company’s 
industry. Capital size is measured by the total amount of capital managed by the VCF in million in 
constant 2000 US Dollar. Age of the VCF refers the age of the VCF till the end of 2006 that is 
calculated in year. Experience of the VCF in China is measured by the length of time from the time 
the VCF started business in China to the end of 2006 that is calculated in year. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the 5% ** and 10% * levels. 
 
Panel A Regression on VCs’ Investment Preferences in Development Stage  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: RATIO OF EARLY-STAGED DEALS TO TOTAL DEALS BACKED BY OF 
THE VCF 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




















Age of the VCF -0.001 
(-0.39) 
    
Experience of the VCF in China  0.007 
(0.69) 
   










If the VCF is under limited 
partnership?   




If the VCF is from California or 
Massachusetts? 




R square 0.098 0.102 0.101 0.141 0.141 
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Panel B Regression for VCs’ Investment Preferences in the Maturity of the Portfolio 
Companies  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: RATIO OF THE DEALS INVOLVED IN YOUNG COMPANIES TO TOTAL 
INVESTMENTS MADE BY THE VCF 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




















Age of the VCF 0.001 
(0.432) 
    
Experience of the VCF in China  -0.002 
(-0.13) 
   










If the VCF is under limited 
partnership?   






If the VCF is from California or 
Massachusetts? 




R square 0.056 0.053 0.086 0.105 0.118 
F-statistics  1.411 1.352 2.268 2.810 2.734 
6.5.2 VCs’ Investment Preferences: R&D Intensity  
Table 6.9 reports the estimates of the relations between the R&D intensity of 
the companies backed by the VCFs and the characteristics of the VCFs. The 
dependent variable in Panel A is the average R&D spending to total value added of 
the portfolio companies backed by the VCF. The dependent variable in Panel B is the 
average R&D spending in new product development to the total value added of the 
companies backed by the VCF. The independent variables include the capital size 
managed by the VCF, the experience of the VCF in the venture capital industry, the 
operating experience of the VCF in China, a dummy variable that equals one if the 
VCF is under limited partnership, a dummy variable that equals one if the VCF has a 
pre-set industry preference in the high-technology industry, and a dummy variable 
that equals one if the VCF is from California or Massachusetts.  
In general, the regression analysis confirms that the corporate governance 
structure and the pre-set investment strategy of the VCF are the major factors that 
affect venture capitalists’ investment choices in technology intensity. However, 
neither the resource constraints nor the experience of the VCFs in the industry or in 
the market is correlated with venture capitalists’ investment choice in technology.  
As shown in Table 6.9, Hypothesis 1a is supported. The dummy variable 
LPVCF is significantly and positively correlated to the two R&D intensity variables, 
even while controlling for the VCF’s pre-set investment strategy in industry. The 
significance levels of the coefficients are between 0.07 and 0.10. This suggests that 
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VCFs under limited partnership invest significantly more in companies with higher 
R&D intensity than VCFs structured as limited companies. Since R&D intensive 
companies are normally associated with more agency problems and uncertainties 
(Riordan and Williamson 1985; Shleifer and Vishny 1992), the results suggest that 
VCFs under limited partnership are more risk-taking. The findings empirically 
support the arguments in new institutional economics as previously discussed.  
As expected, the pre-set investment strategy is the strongest factor that 
impacts venture capitalists’ investment choices in technology. Both the average ratio 
of R&D spending to value added and the average ratio of R&D spending in new 
product development to value added of the companies backed by venture capital are 
significantly and positively associated with the dummy variable that states whether 
the VCF has a pre-set investment preference in high-technology  industry. This 
suggests that VCFs that have precise pre-set investment preference in high-
technology industry invest more in companies with higher R&D intensity in China. 
However, none of the variables representing experience in venture financing, local 
operating experience, and investment experience in California and Massachusetts of 
the VCF is correlated to investment choices in technological intensity. The results 
indicate that industry experience and local knowledge do not impact venture 
capitalists’ investment decision on the technology of the portfolio companies in 
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Table 6.9 Regressions for VCs’ Investment Preferences in R&D Intensity  
 
The sample is 86 randomly selected VCFs in China that have been invested in more than 3 deals in 
China till the end of 2006. The 86 VCFs have invested in 628 deals in China in total. Estimates are 
from OLS regressions for both Panel A and Panel B (t-statistics for the regression coefficients are in 
parentheses.). The dependent variable is the average percentage of R&D intensity of the companies 
backed by each VCF in the sample. For Panel A, R&D intensity is proxied by industry level of R&D 
spending to total value added whereas for Panel B, R&D intensity is proxied by industry level of 
R&D spending in new product development to total value added. Independent variables include a 
dummy variable that equals to 1 if the VCF is governed under limited partnership, a dummy variable 
that equals to 1 if the VCF has industry preference in high-technology industry, and a dummy variable 
that equals to 1 if the VCF is from California or Massachusetts. Capital size is measured by the total 
amount of capital managed by the VCF in million in constant 2000 US Dollar. Age of the VCF refers 
the age of the VCF till the end of 2006 that is calculated in year. Experience of the VCF in China is 
measured by the length of time from the time the VCF started business in China to the end of 2006 
that is calculated in year. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 5% ** and 10% * level.  
 
Panel A Regression for Average R&D Spending to Value Added of the VCF’s 
Portfolios  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE AVERAGE R&D SPENDING TO VALUE ADDED OF THE 
VCF’S PORTFOLIO COMPANIES IN CHINA 
Independent 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











































Age of the VCF 0.003 
(0.63) 
   0.001 
(0.20) 
 
Experience of the 
VCF in China 
 -0.16 
(-0.45) 
   -0.02 
(-0.46) 
If the VCF is under 
limited partnership?   






If the VCF is from 
California or 
Massachusetts? 






R square 0.262 0.260 0.288 0.259 0.296 0.298 
F-statistics  8.036 7.947 9.186 7.942 5.546 5.594 
 
- 169 -  
Panel B Regression for Average R&D Spending in New Product Development to Total 
Value Added of the VCF’s Portfolios 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE AVERAGE R&D SPENDING IN NEW PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT TO VALUE ADDED OF THE VCF’S PORTFOLIO COMPANIES IN CHINA 
Independent 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












































Age of the VCF 0.003 
(0.43) 
   0.00 
(-0.75) 
 
Experience of the 
VCF in China 
 -0.29 
(-0.664) 
   -0.03 
(-0.77) 
If the VCF is 
under limited 
partnership?   






If the VCF is from 
California or 
Massachusetts? 






R square 0.072 0.075 0.108 0.072 0.108 0.116 
F-statistics  1.851 1.943 2.907 1.855 1.697 1.83 
 
Generally, the results of the econometric analysis partially support the 
hypotheses.  It is found that VCFs are separated into groups in investment focuses. 
The corporate governance structure of VCFs has significant impacts on VCs’ 
investment preferences. That is, VCFs under limited partnership invest much more in 
younger companies and companies with higher R&D intensity than VCFs structured 
as limited companies. At the same time, VCFs invest more in younger companies or 
companies at earlier stages normally emphasize more on the protection of the 
products and service. Finally, VCFs from California or Massachusetts invest more in 
early-staged projects and younger companies in China. However, some factors which 
are widely believed and evidenced as important to understand and explain individual 
investment activities in the existing literature, such as the capital size of the venture 
capital funds, the industry experience and local knowledge of the investment 
professionals and organizations, do not seem matter in VCs’ investment preferences 
in China.  
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It should be noted that some of the R-square values for the regressions 
analyses are relatively low. For example, the R-square values for regressions on the 
ratio of investment in early-staged companies, the ratio of investment in younger 
companies, and the average ratio of R&D spending in new product development to 
the total value added of the portfolio companies range from 0.05 to 0.141. 
Statistically, low R-square values imply that other factors may better explain the 
dependent variables. However, due to the lack of data in private equity investment, it 
is almost impossible for researchers to test other possibilities. Low R-square values 
are thus commonly seen in studies on venture capital investment. For example, the 
R-square values of the work of Mayer et al. (2005), which examines venture 
capitalists’ investment preferences in four developed countries, range from 0.03 to 
0.13. Due to the data constraints, it is beyond the attempt and capability to identify 
other factors in this study. However, the regressions show that the R-square values 
substantially increase when the variable on corporate governance structure of the 
VCF is included into the examinations. The results indicate that the corporate 
governance of the VCF indeed increases the explaining power of the regressions. 
That is, venture capitalists’ investment preferences in China are indeed associated 
with the corporate governance structure of the VCF. 
6.5.3 Alternative Explanations  
While the results from the above sections are consistent with the predictions 
that institutions have impacts on venture capitalists’ investment preferences in China, 
alternative interpretations may explain the results.  
First, it might be argued that VCs’ different investment preferences are the 
results of distinctions between domestic and foreign VCFs rather than the differences 
in corporate governance of the VCFs. Since the accurate information on the 
organizational structure of VCFs is not available, it is proxied by the origin of the 
VCFs in this study. That is, the foreign VCFs are proxied as VCFs under limited 
partnership whereas the domestic ones are proxied as VCFs structured as limited 
companies. As a result, the challenge is to what extend the corporate governance of 
VCFs may explain VCs’ investment preferences compared with the differences 
between foreign and domestic VCFs.  
- 171 -  
There is indeed amount of literature addressing that the differences in 
business ethics, human resources and business strategies etc. between foreign and 
domestic companies may affect the affect individual’s business behaviours. For 
example, it is suggested that normally firms, which are strong enough within the 
domestic markets, choose to enter overseas markets. That is, compared with Chinese 
domestic VCFs operating within the local markets, the foreign VCFs may be more 
aggressive by nature. They therefore take higher risks by investing more in early-
staged high-technology companies. However, if this is the case, the capital size and 
industry experience should be correlated to VCs’ investment focuses because in 
general the capital size and industry experiences are taken as measures for the 
competitiveness of the VCF. But according to the systematic analysis, the capital size 
and industry experience of the VCF do not matter on VCs’ investment focuses in 
China. Moreover, the interviews show that the compensation schemes and the 
delegation of authority of decision-making are the major concerns of VCs in both 
domestic and foreign VCFs. They suggest that these two factors may further affect 
the business ethics, human resources and business strategies of a VCF, and, 
consequently impact on how they structure their investments. More importantly, as 
stated, there are three foreign VCFs structured as limited companies among the 
interview samples. Although the sample of these three foreign VCFs is small in 
number, it provides an interesting opportunity to address some of these issues. It is 
interesting to notice that the three foreign VCFs, which are structured as limited 
companies, share many commonalities with their domestic counterparts in terms of 
the compensation schemes provided to investment professionals and the degree of 
delegation of authority (see 5.4). Combing the interview findings and the 
econometric examinations, this study therefore shows that the corporate governance 
structure of the VCFs indeed seem to have stronger power in explaining VCs’ 
different investment preferences.  
Another alternative explanation is that the investment distributions of VCFs 
are driven by the choices of the entrepreneurs rather than the preferences of the VCs. 
For example, it might be the case that those entrepreneurs of newly-established high-
technology companies may on purpose choose the VCFs under limited partnership 
for funding rather than other way around. That is, entrepreneurs may select from 
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which VC they ask for investment. In this case, the statistic relationships seen in the 
examinations do not necessarily reflect VCs’ investment preferences. However, the 
interviews with entrepreneurs and VCs suggest that at least currently, the demands 
for venture capital investment are very strong in China. The interviews suggest that, 
entrepreneurs, especially entrepreneurs of newly-established companies with little 
track record, have limited chances to win venture capital investment that the 
probability of entrepreneurs’ self-selection effects may be low. The interviews 
therefore confirm that the segmentation of investment distributions is more likely 
attributable to VCs’ choices rather than entrepreneurs’ decisions.  
In summary, while the alternative explanations might explain some of the 
results, the interviews suggest that the incentives provided to the investment 
professionals by VCFs under different governance structure indeed have impacts on 
VCs’ investment preferences. The results from the econometric analysis in this study 
are therefore consistent with the interviews with VCs and, the predictions derived 
from firm theory. 
6.6 Discussions and Implications 
Risk aversion is a fundamental concern of investors. The key value of venture 
capital investment is in its widely believed capability to fund newly-established 
R&D-oriented companies, which are associated with more uncertainty and risks and 
thus usually neglected by traditional institutional financiers. China has made 
numerous efforts to promote venture capital programs with the expectation to support 
young R&D oriented companies. The venture capital industry in China has been 
greatly developed in terms of the disbursement of the venture investment in the past 
decade. At the same time, anecdotal evidence shows that many the most successful 
new high-technology companies were supported by venture capital investment. 
However, there is no systematic examination on to what extend venture capital 
investment supports R&D entrepreneurial activities in China and what the major 
factors are that affect VCs’ investment preferences.  
Combining field interviews, archive analysis, and systematic econometric 
analysis, this chapter demonstrates that venture capital investment indeed supports 
young R&D-oriented companies under the weak regulatory institutions in China. 
More than 70 per cent of the venture capital deals are in the high-technology industry. 
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About 90 per cent of the deals were at the early stage or the expansion stage when 
they were financed by venture capital investment. The results suggest that the 
capability of venture capital investment to support R&D entrepreneurial activities in 
China is comparable to that of the most advanced venture capital markets such as the 
US, Taiwan and Israel.  
However, similar to the US practice, venture capitalists differ in their abilities 
to support young and R&D-oriented companies within China. It is revealed that 
venture capital firms are divided into different groups by origin; governance structure; 
capital size; history and industry background; emphases on protection of products 
and pre-set business strategy etc. Among all the factors, the corporate governance 
structure of VCFs has significant impacts on VCs’ investment preferences in China. 
VCFs under limited partnership, which is a more decentralized organizational form, 
invest more in younger companies and companies with higher R&D intensity than 
VCFs structured as limited companies, which are more centralized in corporate 
governance. At the same time, the proprietary of products and whether the VCF is 
from California and Massachusetts are correlated to venture capitalists’ investment 
preferences in terms of development stage and maturity of the portfolio companies. 
The evidence indicates that institutional elements, especially regulatory 
institutions, are more powerful than cost considerations and resource constraints of 
VCFs in explaining venture capitalist’s investment preferences in China. However, 
the impacts of institutions on VCs’ investment focuses in China are not made 
through the channel of protection of property rights, which is considered as the most 
important institutional elements that impact on business behaviours. Rather, 
regulatory institutions like the rules of corporate governance and the protection of 
intellectual property rights are the major two institutional factors that affect VCs’ 
investment preferences.  
Through the fieldwork and archive analysis, it appears that the weak and 
restrictive legal and financial systems in China have strong impacts on the corporate 
governance of the VCFs in China. One of the most important consequences of these 
weak systems is that most of foreign VCFs are structured under limited partnership 
whereas all domestic ones are structured as limited companies. The difference in 
corporate governance of the VCFs then influences VCs’ investment preferences in 
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China. The result can be explained by the incentive schemes provided by the two 
different types of VCFs. VCFs under limited partnership are more decentralized in 
organizational governance. The investment professionals are offered higher-powered 
incentives. It encourages VCs to pursue more opportunities by taking a higher risk-
return profile. By contrast, VCFs structured are more centralized in management. 
The investment professionals are provided lower-powered incentives. It may 
discourage VCs to take risks and uncertainty.  
In addition, the protection of intellectual property rights also affects VCs’ 
capability to support entrepreneurial activities in China. Innovative products or 
service are important for newly-established companies to stimulate the chances of 
building a viable business model and safeguard future growth and further 
development. VCs normally emphasize much on the proprietary of products or 
service when they consider investments in younger companies or companies at 
earlier stages. Therefore, a stronger protection of intellectual property rights is more 
important for venture capitalists who invest in early-staged projects to secure the 
investment return.  
As the first exploration and examination on VCs’ investment preferences in 
China, this study contributes to the existing literature on venture capital in China and 
general studies on institutions. This study provides the first systematic assessment on 
the impacts of venture capital investment on R&D entrepreneurial activities in China 
that may contribute to further cross country comparative analysis. It would also 
appear to reveal the relationship between venture capitalists’ investment preferences 
and the mechanisms used in venture capital investment, e.g. ex-ante project 
screening, due diligence, contracting, and ex-post monitoring activities as well as 
other factors. In addition, it also contributes to the literature on institutions. The role 
of institutions playing on investment activities has long been debating.  Cross-
country studies are a major approach used in the literature. However, this approach 
has been challenged due to the endogeneity problems since many cross country 
factors could not be controlled. By investigating investment activities of VCFs of 
different corporate structures within one country and one industry, this study tried to 
identify the specific mechanism through which institutions exert influence. This 
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study thus contributes to the existing literature with a natural experiment approach to 
study the impact of institutions.  
This study also has implications for both policy-making and business practice. 
In recent years, many nations have initiated venture capital program with the 
expectation to accelerate the commercialization of S&T activities and support newly-
established, smaller high-technology firms. However, this research reveals that not 
all VCFs are willing to nurture R&D intensive projects at earlier stages. In the case 
of China, for example, this study implies that policymakers should encourage certain 
types of VCFs under different circumstances by adjusting the regulatory institutions. 
That is, the policymakers may need to consider the legitimacy of the limited 
partnership as an organizational form for venture capital firms if they wish to 
encourage more investments in newly-established companies and companies with 
higher R&D intensity. In addition, it also suggests that the protection of intellectual 
property rights should be greatly improved if the government intends to promote 
investments in entrepreneurial activities.  
This study may also be helpful for practitioners. The insightful examinations 
on venture capitalists’ investment preferences in China can be helpful to 
entrepreneurs who are seeking venture financing. They may obtain some information 
on what kind of VCFs may have interests in their projects. Venture capitalists, which 
have operated in China, can also benefit from the analysis by gaining more 
knowledge concerning the investment choices of other venture capitalists who can 
either be their competitors or collaborators. Finally, this study also has implications 
to venture capital firms which are considering entering China’s venture capital 
market. The assessment may provide them a general picture on the distribution of 
this market and where the potential market niche is for newcomers.  
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Chapter 7 Venture Capitalists’ Project Screening Strategies in China 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates venture capitalists’ ex-ante project screening 
strategies in China. It examines whether institutions indeed affect VCs’ project 
screening strategy in China by comparing the project screening criteria used by VCs 
in China and those employed by VCs in the United States and other developed 
economies. In addition, this study also explores the whether there are differences in 
project screening among different groups of venture capitalists in China.  
As discussed, venture investment encounters serious agency problems and 
other uncertainty. Ex-ante project screening is considered as one of the most 
important mechanisms used by venture capitalists to avoid investing in bad projects 
and consequently mitigate investment risks (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et 
al., 1985). VCs normally screen the business plans they received by analyzing the 
strengths and potential risks associated with the projects. Averagely, over 85 per cent 
of business plans are screened out by VCs before further projects investigations 
(NVCA).  
Venture capitalists’ screening criteria have been studied extensively by 
researchers. Focusing on the United States, some studies yield nearly identical 
investment evaluation criteria (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985, 
1987; Knight, 1994). Overall, the studies reveal that human factors, like 
entrepreneurs’ personality and experience as well as the capability of the 
management team, are most important for venture capitalists in their project 
screening. At the same time, the attractiveness of the product or service, market size 
and growth, business model, customer adoption, favourable competitive position, and 
cash out potential are also important for venture capitalists in their proposal 
screening in the United States.  
Existing literature suggests that institutions are closely related to the 
mechanisms used in venture financing. It is anticipated therefore that the screening 
criteria employed by venture capitalists varies across countries due to different legal 
and economic environments, market structures, and operating financial systems. 
However, empirical studies show that venture capitalists across countries have a 
strong consensus in screening criteria for investment decisions. For instance, similar 
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to the US practice, criteria related to the quality of the entrepreneur and management 
team are normally ranked in the first tier for venture capitalists’ proposal screening in 
European countries (Knight, 1994; Muzyka, et al., 1996; Manigart et al., 1996). The 
consensus is also seen in the screening criteria employed by venture capitalists in 
developing countries (Ray and Turpin, 1991; Zutshi, et al., 1999).    
Nonetheless, there are indeed differences in weighing those factors in venture 
capitalists’ screening criteria across countries. Manigart et al. (1996) find that in 
younger venture capital markets, such as some European countries, financial 
information is more important for venture capitalists compared to their US 
counterparts. Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) find that entrepreneurs’ networks (i.e. 
Guanxi) and the location of the enterprise are important concerns of venture 
capitalists in Asian countries. Researchers normally attribute these differences in 
weighing the screening criteria across countries to the distinctions in institutions.  
As discussed, China represents a unique economic, political, legal, financial, 
and socio-cultural environment. In particular, the legal and financial institutions 
related to venture financing are extremely weak in China (refer Chapter 5 for details). 
Cross-country studies provide empirical evidence that strong regulatory institutions 
are important elements to support the use of major governance mechanisms in 
venture financing (Kaplan et al., 2003; Cummings et al., 2003; Jeng and Wells, 
2000). Whether these institutions may affect how VCs screening the business plans 
in China? What VCs see as strengths and risks from a project in China? The answers 
to these questions may not only contribute to the academic literature by providing the 
stylized facts of venture capital investment in China but also contribute to the 
existing literature on the interaction between institutions and business behaviours. In 
addition, it may also contribute to policymakers and the practitioners. VCs’ screening 
activities in China, however, have attracted little scrutiny. 
Ahlstrom and Bruton (2003) are among the few researchers who have 
empirically analyzed VCs’ investment activities in China. Based on unstructured 
interviews with foreign VCs in China, the authors find that in general, the screening 
criteria employed in China are similar to those in the United Sates. However, the 
researchers find that the FVCs normally limit their investments within a few regions 
that are geographically closer to their offices in China, and where they have better 
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connections with the local governments. The authors attribute these unique findings 
to the decentralization of China’s governance and the large diversity of regulations 
across regions in China. In addition, these FVCs normally screen out enterprises that 
have less than three years of track record in China. The authors suggest that this 
phenomenon is due to the lack of legal protections against outright fraud, the 
imperfect information and rapid chance of the markets in China. Although this study 
has substantially improved our understanding in VCs’ investment activities in China, 
the sample is limited to FVCs in China whereas the investment activities of DVCs 
are not covered. In addition, this study is mainly based on the unstructured interviews 
that it is hard to figure out to what extend the findings with FVCs may be generalized.  
The intent of the present study is to obtain more insights into venture 
capitalists’ ex-ante screening activities in China. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
regulatory institutions related to venture financing are very weak in China. It is 
therefore anticipated that VCs in China may be more cautious than their peers in 
developed economies in ex-ante project screening because they may not be able to 
gain enough supports from legal and financial institutions for the use of other 
governance mechanisms. Besides, it is also found that VCFs are divided into two 
distinctive groups in terms of the governance structure. The examination in the 
previous chapter finds that these two different groups are different in investment 
preferences in China, i.e. LPVCFs take more risks than LCVCFs by investing more 
in younger companies and companies with higher R&D intensity. It is therefore 
expected that these two different groups of VCFs might emphasize different elements 
in project screening given they have distinct investment targets.  
This study combines both qualitative and quantitative analyses. At the initial 
stage, thirty nine screening criteria were identified from the existing literature and the 
unstructured interviews with seven venture capitalists in China. Semi-structured 
interviews with 37 VCs were then conducted to find out how VCs weigh different 
criteria and why they give different weights to these criteria. Additionally, 
unstructured interviews with four entrepreneurs were also conducted to further 
support the evidence.  
In general, this study finds both similarities and differences in venture 
capitalists’ project screening criteria in China compared to those of the US and other 
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western countries. The analysis also suggests that institutions, especially regulatory 
institutions, have important impacts on VCs’ project screening. Similar to their 
counterparts in developed countries, venture capitalists in China consider the 
characteristics of the entrepreneur as the most important factor while screening 
projects. However, VCs in China are more demanding in project screening compared 
to their peers in developed economies. They emphasize additional screening criteria 
like honesty, social networking, and overseas working experience of the entrepreneur 
and the management team. Additionally, they also pay more attention to public 
policies and related institutions while screening projects in China. Finally, VCFs 
under different corporate structures give different weights to certain screening 
criteria. LPVCFs are more profit-oriented, emphasizing market and financial aspects, 
and are more sensitive to regulatory institutions. LCVCFs pay more attention to 
technological aspects of the projects. Besides, it is also found that LPVCFs are more 
demanding than LCVCFs by imposing more essential and important screening 
criteria.  
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the methods and data in 
this study. Section 3 documents the screening criteria used by venture capitalists 
found from the unstructured interviews. Section 4 discusses the findings on the 
screening criteria of venture capitalists in China from the questionnaire survey. 
Section 5 describes the characteristics of the rejected ventures in China. Section 6 
presents a factor analysis to cross-check the criteria classified priori. The study 
concludes in Section 7. 
7.2 Data and Methods 
Different methods including questionnaire surveys, interviews, case studies, 
and secondary documentary analysis have been employed by researchers in the 
existing literature on venture capitalists’ project screening. Considering the short 
history of the venture capital industry in China, the lack of study on this topic, and 
the practical issues concerning empirical studies in China, 38  this study employs 
interviews to explore the screening criteria used by venture capitalists in China.  
Guided but not limited by the existing literature, seven venture capitalists 
were interviewed to determine what criteria they normally use in screening the 
                                                 
38 See Chapter 4 for details.  
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business plans provided by entrepreneurs. The venture capitalists were asked open-
ended questions about what kind of criteria they use in China and whether there are 
any specific criteria they only employ in China. All criteria were noted. Then, criteria 
extracted from MacMillan (1985) that are considered widely used in the United 
States were shown to the interviewees. The venture capitalists were asked to mark 
any criterion from the list that they did not find appreciable in China. After the cross-
check, 38 criteria were identified and classified into seven groups as shown in Table 
7.2. 
The criteria were then assembled into a questionnaire. Similar to the scaling 
methods used in MacMillan et al. (1985), the criteria were scaled on a four point 
scale (Table 7.2). The questionnaire was presented in the semi-structured interviews 
with 37 venture capitalists from 34 venture capital firms in China in order to test the 
reliability of the findings from the unstructured interviews. Among the 34 VCFs, 12 
are domestic limited companies, 19 are foreign limited partnerships, and 3 are 
foreign limited companies. 
The semi-structured interviews are used to uncover how VCs weigh different 
screening criteria. The venture capitalists were asked to answer the questionnaire and 
to specify the ten most important criteria and any additional criteria that they believe 
are important but were not listed on the questionnaire, as well as their reasons for 
choosing these criteria.  
The venture capitalists interviewed were mainly from larger VCFs measured 
by the fund size39 since they were mostly active venture capitalists in China. The 
average amount of funds under management was approximately $280.66 million for 
the VCFs; $344.3 million for the LPVCFs; and $167.52 million for the LCVCFs. 
Consistent with the aggregate data, the size of the funds managed by LPVCFs was 
substantially larger than those managed by LCVCFs. 
Despite the small sample size, it covers venture capitalists from some of the 
most active VCFs in China. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the number of the deals 
backed by the VCFs makes up about one third of the total deals in China, which 
reduces the potential bias to some extent. However, sharing the same concern with 
                                                 
39 According to the Zero2IPO survey, the average size of the funds under management of VCFs operating in China was $78 
million in China in 2005. Among the VCFs, the average size of the funds managed by FVCFs was $255 million, whereas the 
average size of the funds managed by DVCFs was $37 million at that year.  
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MacMillan et al. (1985), this study may inevitably be biased, since it is a self-
reported study.40 However, all interviews were flexible by nature, and the venture 
capitalists were asked to explain the reasons for the criteria that they use. It is hoped 
the self-reported biases may be reduced to some extent.  
7.3 VCs’ Ex-ante Screening Criteria in China: Qualitative Findings  
The unstructured interviews aim at exploring the screening criteria normally 
used by VCs in China.  As discussed, the regulatory institutions related to venture 
financing are very weak in China (see Chapter 5 for details). It is therefore 
questioned whether the regulatory institutions may have impacts on VCs’ project 
screening in China; Whether VCs in China may be more cautious than their peers in 
developed economies in project screening because they may not be able to gain 
enough supports from legal and financial institutions for the use of other governance 
mechanisms. In addition, the social culture in China is unique due to the legacy of 
the long history and complicated social evolution. Whether and how these informal 
institutions affect VCs’ project screening in China also call for insightful 
investigations.  
Guided with the above questions, unstructured interviews with seven VCs 
were conducted. The interviewees were asked to identify any project screening 
criteria they normally use in China and why they impose those criteria. The findings 
of the unstructured interviews are discussed in the following text. 
7.3.1 Personality and Experience of the Entrepreneur 
Primarily, the unstructured interviews show that, similar to the US practice, 
venture capitalists consider the characteristics of entrepreneurs as the most important 
factor when they screen potential projects in China. Both the personality and 
business experience of the entrepreneur are emphasized by the interviewees. Besides 
the criteria used by venture capitalists in developed countries listed in the existing 
literature, the entrepreneur’s honesty, social network, and overseas working and 
educational experience are also seen as very important by venture capitalists in China. 
                                                 
40 As stated by MacMillan (1985), it is possible that the respondents were influenced by their perception of what is a desirable 
response or a response that is seen as appropriate to their positions as financial professionals rather than the criteria they 
actually use in practice.  
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The integrity of the entrepreneur is the primary screening criteria. All of the 
venture capitalists interviewed state that they would not consider a project if they did 
not think that the entrepreneur was honest. As one DVC illustrated, ‘Yes, the first 
thing we need to make sure is he [entrepreneur] is honest. By honest, I mean not only 
to us but to everyone, to their customers, friends, etc. It is the very basic rule one 
should keep. No business can succeed by cheating, right? As for venture capital, we 
invest in human beings. In most cases, neither the product nor the market has been 
tested. It normally takes at least one year before the project breaks even. If the 
entrepreneur is not trustable, nothing is going to work out for sure…’ (Info: VCF4).  
Furthermore, the interviews reveal the extent to which the entrepreneurs exert 
sustainable effort is also a major concern of venture capitalists. Persistence is 
important for an entrepreneur, since there are huge amount of unexpected difficulties 
during the start-up process. One FVC states, ‘Most [entrepreneurs] have worked as 
managers or engineers in large corporations for years before they started a new 
business. They have got used to the system that they gained supports from different 
divisions. But starting up is completely different. Huge amount of problems… they 
need to solve by themselves. They are CEOs, sales, engineers, secretaries at the same 
time. They have to play any roles when needed. It is a real challenge for those once 
worked in large corporations. So, persistence is ultimately important…’ (Info: 
VCF24).   
At the same time, similar to their peers in the United States, venture 
capitalists in China also suggest that they would expect the entrepreneur to have 
good communicating skills, passion for their business ideas, and an ability to react 
and deal with risks.  
Venture capitalists show different perspectives on whether they would expect 
the entrepreneur’s personality to be compatible with their own. Four of the seven 
interviewees said that compatibility is essential. One FVC said, ‘It’s very important. 
We are on the same boat with the entrepreneur. We need to share everything during 
the growth of the business. Mutual understanding and close co-operation is the most 
important while facing difficulties. So, it’s almost impossible if personally we are not 
compatible to each other. As a matter of fact, whenever I make the investment 
decision, I ask myself if I would like to have him/her as a friend first…’ (Info: 
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VCF16). However, not all venture capitalists agree with this view. One DVC stated, 
‘Anyway, making investment is not really like date-matching. As long as the 
entrepreneur is a nice candidate and the project is promising, why I need to bother if 
there is chemistry? Don’t you think sometimes chemistry may mislead? I prefer a 
more objective strand anyway…’ (Info: VCF8). 
Regarding the experience of entrepreneurs, the unstructured interviews show 
that venture capitalists in China share many commonalities with their US 
counterparts. Understandings the targeted markets, demonstrated leadership ability, 
relevant track record of the entrepreneur are emphasized by venture capitalists in 
China. Venture capitalists also pay special attention to whether the entrepreneur is 
recommended by a trustworthy source. Three of the seven interviewees stated that 
they would not consider the deal if the entrepreneur was not introduced through a 
trustable channel. Venture capitalists suggest that a trustworthy channel works as an 
important screening system in China. One FVC states, ‘People in China value their 
reputation and network much. They would not recommend someone they themselves 
don’t trust or a project they themselves don’t feel well. Similarly, if the entrepreneur 
knows we have common friends, he/she would much more behave… it helps to make 
judgement at the initial stage’ (Info: VCF2).  
At the same time, venture capitalists also suggest that the recommendation 
through trustworthy sources may help them in taking due diligence. As another FVC 
addresses, ‘It’s always hard to gain accurate information for due diligence anywhere, 
but it is even harder in China. Some very simple services like credit or business 
record checks don’t exist in China. We have to check the information through very 
personal channels. Besides, tend to avoid saying negative things about others here. 
So, if you do not have someone who is an internal, it is hard to gain real 
information.’ (Info: VCF 16). 
Another interesting observation is that most venture capitalists, especially 
FVCs, suggest that overseas returnees (Haigui) entrepreneurs who have both 
overseas educational and working experience and local knowledge are desirable 
candidates. Some venture capitalists believe that entrepreneurs who have both 
overseas and domestic backgrounds may have better understanding of both markets 
and thus more visionary business strategies. Most venture capitalists, especially 
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FVCs, aim to exit the investment through IPOs of their portfolio companies in 
overseas stock markets. The overseas working background of the entrepreneurs and 
the management teams are seen as an advantage when they go IPOs in international 
markets. As one FVC notes, ‘Although normally the management team is changed 
before IPO, the overseas background of the founders is still helpful. It signals that 
the business is not just a China specific one, it has all connections to the outside 
world…At the same time, it is much easier for US people to understand who a former 
engineer in IBM is and what the guy may work out, isn’t it?’ (Info: VCF 2).  
Another FVC states that they may more easily achieve mutual understanding 
with entrepreneurs who have an overseas background: ‘You need common language 
for communications. Anyway, venture investment is an imported concept in China. 
Some commonly used tools are never heard by people in China. If the entrepreneur 
has never worked outside China, it is hard for him/her to understand why he/she has 
to give up sufficient proportion of the shares to VCs while taking many attached 
conditions and terms. They may hardly understand how options or preferred stocks 
work…Of course, it’s a coaching process, but common language is important. We 
have time and energy constraints anyway’ (Info: VCF 22).  
However, not all venture capitalists consider the entrepreneur’s overseas 
background as an advantage. One participant states, ‘The essence is not whether 
he/she has worked in the US. The essence is whether the project fits this market well 
and if he/she may implement the business strategy locally.’ (Info: VCF4). In addition, 
some venture capitalists are concerned with the overpricing of projects founded by 
‘Haigui’ (overseas returnees) entrepreneurs. One FVC says, ‘I have made some deals 
with ‘haigui’ entrepreneurs. But I did not see real benefits. They hardly adjust their 
expectations in China. They measure everything with Silicon Valley standards, the 
compensation scheme, the working environments, the value of the business, etc. So, 
everything is overpriced. If the price is the same to the US, why I come to China? 
The lower cost is always the most attractive part of China…’ (Info: VCF 16).  
In summary, venture capitalists in China share many commonalities with 
their US peers in terms of their screening criteria on the characteristics of 
entrepreneurs’ personality and working experience. According to the unstructured 
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interviews, the integrity, persistence, and overseas working experience are most often 
noted by venture capitalists in China.  
7.3.2 Management Team  
Associated with the emphasis on the entrepreneur’s characteristics, venture 
capitalists in China are concerned about the quality of the management team of the 
potential projects. Even though for most start-up projects, management teams are not 
yet formed at the time of fundraising, venture capitalists take the quality of the initial 
management team as an important criterion. Similar to the practice in the United 
States, the relevant experience of the management team members and the balance of 
the team composition are the major concerns of venture capitalists in China. Venture 
capitalists in China prefer that the management team have overseas working 
experience for the same reasons that they prefer entrepreneurs to have overseas 
experience.  
Some venture capitalists prefer a management team with good government 
connections. As a FVC addressed, ‘I don’t mean corruption, nothing related to this. 
But good connection with governments is always important. There are some very 
helpful high-technology encouraging programs provided by both local and central 
governments. The managers need to know where and how they may have the 
supports. At least, the managers must have timely information about public policies 
and regulations. Keeping a good connection may help them to have the information 
and better understand the rules. This is extremely important in China since they 
(governments) have so many new rules issued all the time and sometimes the rules 
are not clearly clarified I have to say…’ (Info: VCF11).  
However, not all venture capitalists in China see this connection with the 
government as important. One FVC illustrates: ‘No, it [the connection with 
governments] is not important. You know there is a Chinese saying, i.e. unshakable 
bureaucratic, flowing soldiers. The officials are changing, especially in China when 
the society is so dynamic. You can hardly rely on the connections actually.’ (Info: 
VCF16). Furthermore, there are some venture capitalists, especially FVCs that 
consider close connections with the government as a disadvantage. One FVC states, 
‘As long as the people have got used to relying on the so-called connections, they 
would be corrupted and losing the capability to face real market competitions. This 
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is not for long run success. We have very bad experience. We once invested in a 
project whose CEO had close connections with the officials of the local government. 
We thought it would be beneficial. However, it turned out that all the striking 
performance shown in his earlier years was based on the so-called connections. The 
local government gave him some funds and purchased products from his 
enterprise...But when the government officials changed and the guy need to expand 
the market and raise funds by his own, he was totally lost…’ (Info: VCF2).  
7.3.3 Products and Service 
Similar to the practice in the United States, another important project 
screening criteria for venture capitalists in China are the characteristics of the 
products and services of the projects. The market acceptance and proprietary of the 
products and services are considered most important by venture capitalists in China. 
Some venture capitalists also see the potential for export of the products and service 
as an advantage.  
According to the unstructured interviews, consistent with MacMillan et al. 
(1985), the extent to which the products or services may be accepted by the market 
and whether they may sustain the proprietary advantages are the main concerns of 
venture capitalists during project screening. In particular, demonstrated market 
acceptance of the products or services is considered an important advantage. As one 
DVC addresses, ‘A product without market acceptance is always like a person 
without blood. Market is the source of life for a business. So, no matter how capable 
the entrepreneur looks like and how perfect the products or service are, if they could 
not clarify where the targeted markets are, how the products or service will work on 
the market, I could hardly consider to invest in the project. So, if the products or 
service has shown promising signals about market acceptance, it can be a great 
plus.’(Info: VCF 3).  
Furthermore, many venture capitalists suggest that the potential of the 
products for export is an advantage since the ‘products made in China are superbly 
competitive in price. And, made in China does not necessarily mean the low-end 
labour-intensive products anymore. Many high-end products are exported at much 
lower price. This is the key competitiveness of China’s enterprises. So, as long as the 
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products are feasible to overseas markets, I would be much more confident in the 
projects…’ (Info: VCF22).  
The venture capitalists also claim that whether the product or service is 
proprietary is important given that intellectual property rights are not well-protected 
in China. ‘I would not say that patent is important. After all, the law enforcement for 
copy rights or patents is not really strong. But I would definitely hope the products 
can be protected by some ways, either business secrets or some unique technologies. 
The entrepreneur must keep this in mind. How to sustain the market advantage is the 
hardest thing in China. People learn and copy so fast. You may expect a bulk of same 
products entering into the market at half price right after the first comers…’ (Info: 
VCF 1).  
Moreover, a few venture capitalists suggest that whether the product or 
service of the project is complementary to their other portfolios or business can also 
be a factor. This consideration is not limited to portfolio management of VCs in 
China; some also take worldwide portfolios into account: ‘Different regions have 
their own advantages. Of course the best way is to play to one’s strengths. As we 
focus on IT industry, our portfolios in the US are mainly focused on R&D; the ones 
in Taiwan are mainly on manufacturing; China is the best for assembling. Yes, we 
try to co-ordinate with other offices to see if there can be any linkages between the 
potential portfolios…’ (Info: VCF 22).  
However, even though most venture capital backed companies are in high-
technology sectors, whether the products or service are categorized as ‘high-
technology’ is not considered important by venture capitalists in China. This is 
consistent with the findings of MacMillan et al. (1985). In general, venture capitalists 
emphasize the market feasibility of the products or service when they assess projects 
in China.  
7.3.4 Characteristics of the Market 
According to the unstructured interviews, market factors are strongly 
emphasized by venture capitalists in China. Venture capitalists in China pay more 
attention to the market factors of the potential projects compared to their peers in the 
United States. Almost all venture capitalists interviewed showed great interest when 
they were asked about the market aspects of business in China. As one FVC 
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illustrates, ‘Market, market, and market, it is the most attractive part of China, isn’t 
it? I am sure that everyone who looks at China is excited about the huge market 
potential. You may easily have ten times of consumer population more than that in a 
middle-sized European country, not mention the export potentials. It is amazing… As 
long as the project can catch the market, I would not miss it for sure… ’ (Info: 
VCF16).  
Venture capitalists in China emphasize the growth rate of the targeted market 
of the project, the capability of the project to create new markets and stimulate the 
existing market, and the entry barriers of the targeted market for latecomers. 
Furthermore, the hand-collected data show that the scale of the market is also the 
major concern of venture capitalists in China. As one FVC addresses, ‘The scale of 
the market is critical though sometimes people do not think this is a problem in 
China. Yes, it has great potentials for sure. But, some entrepreneurs do not really 
know the market. They take for granted that China is the largest market. But this is 
not exactly the case. After all, about 80 per cent of the population in China is not 
really ready for quite some consumer markets though the rest 20 per cent is already 
huge. And the competition in China is also very violent. So, the scale and the growth 
rate of the market are very important for newly-established companies. It determines 
how far the sector and the companies may go…’ (Info: VCF 22). 
7.3.5 Geographical Factors  
 Some of the existing literature suggests that venture capitalists also view the 
geographic location of the portfolio companies as another important factor. This 
holds true for VCs in China. First, the supply of human resources and public policies 
are important considerations of venture capitalists in China. One DVC suggests, ‘Yes, 
how much the local governments support entrepreneurship activities and venture 
investment is important. It determines how well the infrastructure can be developed 
and how much potential of the local resources can be extracted. It is not necessary 
that everyone is crowded in the large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
But, a smart business person must know that a friendly government is always 
important for him/her to succeed. This is critical in China.’ (Info: VCF 3). One FVC 
points out that better educational and research environments provides easy access to 
markets.  
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Some researchers also that suggest venture capitalists prefer to invest in 
projects that are located close to their office or home in order to monitor enterprises 
more easily. According to Mason and Harrison (1996), half of venture capitalists like 
to invest within 50 to 100 miles from their offices. Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) show 
that FVCs in China prefer close locations of potential projects in order to have more 
access to information for due diligence and closer relationships with local authorities. 
However, according to the interviews conducted, most venture capitalists in China do 
not consider the distance from the location of the project as a critical factor. As one 
FVC said, ‘I don’t think the distance matters. Given the convenience of 
communication, the physical boundaries are getting to be ambiguous. It only takes 3 
hours to fly from Beijing to Tibet, no mention we all have the internet, mobile phones, 
all kinds of communicating ways. Sometimes driving to Zhongguancun from my 
office in Beijing during rush hours is even more time-consuming than flying to 
Shanghai. So, there is no point that I may monitor the companies better if they are 
my next door neighbours’ (Info: VCF19).  
Furthermore, one FVC suggested that geographical closeness is not really 
helpful for information collection, since people are mobile. ‘It doesn’t make much 
sense to be closer to the companies. People move much, particularly in China at 
current time. How many chances you may meet someone in Beijing who was born or 
educated here? How often you can reach your friend with the same business card 
within five years? If you don’t, how could you imagine that you may have better 
access to information just because the entrepreneur is located close to you? No, I 
don’t see obvious advantage from the so called same-city-model for information 
collection.’ (Info: VCF 16).  
7.3.6 Financial Considerations  
The interviews also show that financial considerations are part of the 
screening criteria of venture capitalists in China. Consistent with the existing 
literature, the major financial concerns of venture capitalists in China are the upside 
potential and liquidity. Similarly, whether the investment is the first round and 
whether the venture capitalists are expected to be involved in the subsequent round 
of financing are not seen as important factors. Concerning the return, according to 
the unstructured interviews, most of the venture capitalists stated that they would 
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expect payout within 5 years, which differs from 10 years expected from capitalists 
in the US (MacMillan, 1985). ‘We expect the return sooner in China. All the China-
focused funds are new. We need beautiful performance to raise further funds. People 
in the West are still lack of knowledge about China. We need to show how attractive 
the market is in short run. And, in fact, there are not many real R&D projects in 
China. The opportunities here are to make good use of the huge market and the low 
cost of skilled labours. These kinds of projects should cash out sooner’ (Info: 
VCF17).  
Overall, a total of 38 screening criteria were identified from the unstructured 
interviews. It shows that venture capitalists in China share many commonalities with 
their peers in the United States in terms of project screening criteria. Almost all the 
criteria mentioned in the existing literature are employed by the venture capitalists in 
China. The unstructured interviews also show that VCs in China indeed seem to be 
more demanding in ex-ante project screening by imposing more criteria. It uncovers 
additional criteria employed by venture capitalists in China including the integrity 
and overseas educational/working background of the entrepreneurs, the scale of the 
targeted market, the export potential of the products, and the public policies of local 
governments. However, questions like to what extent the qualitative findings may 
represent the population, whether venture capitalists from different types of VCFs 
employ the same screening criteria, and the weight of related criteria call for a more 
objective analysis based on a larger sample.  
7.4 The Weight of Screening Criteria: Findings of Semi-structured Interviews  
This section presents the findings from semi-structured interviews with the 37 
VCs. The Semi-interviews focus on exploring how VCs in China weigh different 
project screening criteria and the rationales underlying the rankings. The findings are 
reported together with the discoveries in the United States and some other western 
countries extracted from the existing literature. In addition, the distinctions in 
screening criteria among different groups of VCFs are also reported.  
Semi-interviews are divided into two parts. The first part consists of close-
ended questions asking VCs to weighing the 38 screening criteria identified through 
the unstructured interviews. VCs’ screening criteria are classified into seven groups. 
Group I refers to entrepreneur’s personality; group II, entrepreneur’s experience; 
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group III, the management team; group IV, the characteristics of product/service; 
group V, the characteristics of the market; group VI, geographical aspects; and group 
VII, financial considerations. The criteria are in a four point Likert-like scale, where 
1 is irrelevant; 2 is desirable; 3 is important; and 4 is essential.41 The second part of 
semi-structured interviews is open-ended questions asking VCs to explain the 
rationale for the weighing and add any further information on their project screening 
strategy in China. The findings from the semi-structured interviews are reported in 
the following subsections.  
Table 7.1 presents the means and standard deviations of the responses of 
semi-structured interviews in China along with the responses of questionnaire survey 
in the US undertaken by MacMillan et al. (1985).42 Table 7.2 provides the major 
screening criteria (i.e. the criteria that were rated as important or essential by VCs) 
employed by venture capitalists in the United States, Europe, Canada, Asia-Pacific 
area, and Singapore consolidated by Zutshi et al. (1999) and the findings in China for 
further comparison. Besides, the responses of VCs from LPVCFs and LCVCFs in 
China are presented separately in Table 7.3. The findings are reported in details in 
the following subsections.  
7.4.1 Characteristics of the Entrepreneur and Management Team 
Primarily, similar to the US practice, human capital factors are the most 
important concerns of venture capitalists when they screen projects in China. As 
shown in Table 7.1, sixteen of thirty eight criteria are related to human capital. Table 
7.2 shows that six of twelve factors, which are considered important, are related to 
human capital. In addition, over seventy per cent VCs in China suggest that the 
composition of management team is an essentially important factor they would 
consider in project screening. Furthermore, the standard deviations for the responses 
                                                 
41 The four point weighting system used in this study was borrowed from MacMillan et al. (1985). Each point was defined as 
follows:  
1. Irrelevant-not a factor in the decision-making process. 
2. Desirable-a factor that improves the likelihood of investment. 
3. Important-a factor that must be present in order for an investment to take place, unless other factors specifically compensate 
for this factor’s absence.  
4. Essential-a factor that must be present under any circumstances in order for an investment to take place. 
42 Even though the study of MacMillan et al. (1985) was undertaken more than twenty years ago, it has been extensively 
employed by researchers in either cross-country studies or studies on this topic in the United States. Following studies do not 
show much difference from this research. 
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concerning human aspects are small. This confirms that there is a strong consensus 
on the need of these human capital factors for staying power.  
In terms of the personality of the entrepreneur, venture capitalists in China 
see the capability of the entrepreneur to exert sustainable effort and react to risks as 
the most important factors. Whether the personality of the entrepreneur is compatible 
with the venture capitalists is considered the least important factor. These findings 
are consistent with the practices in most other countries. 
Besides the similarities, venture capitalists in China see the honesty and 
social networks of the entrepreneur as important factors as well. Honesty is the most 
important factor of an entrepreneur’s personality emphasized by the venture 
capitalists in China. According to the semi-structured interviews, the major reason 
for venture capitalists’ emphasis on the above two factors are the weak legal and 
accounting institutions in China. As one FVC illustrated, ‘You can hardly rely on the 
laws and regulations in China. As you know, most of them are changing all the time 
and they don’t really enforce…Anything related to legal procedures may cost a lot, 
not only money, but time, energy and so on. And, you should not expect timely 
enforcement. I had the experience…So, honesty of the founders is extremely 
important in China. If he does not cheat, things can be much smoother in any case’ 
(Info: VCF26). In addition, venture capitalists suggest that the lack of standard 
accounting and auditing systems in China influence them to rely more on the 
entrepreneur’s honesty to reduce information problems.  
The social network of the entrepreneur provides another way to overcome the 
burdens in legal and other regulatory institutions. As one FVC said, ‘There is almost 
no way to run business in China if he [entrepreneur] does not have ‘Guanxi’ (i.e. 
social network). Things are subtle here. Everything depends on if you have an 
acquaintance even for some tiny-tiny problems. The regulations and policies are 
unclear sometimes. People can interpret and implement them in any way. A 
registration procedure may cost five days to three months or even more in the same 
city under the same conditions. The only difference is if you know someone internal. 
No, I’m not talking about something like bribes. Normally, it does not involve 
corruption. Since the rules here are not binding sometimes, people just do things as 
they like. So, a nice network helps a lot’ (Info: VCF19). These explanations indicate 
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that venture capitalists take the honesty and social network of the entrepreneur as 
compensating ways to deal with weaknesses in regulatory and normative institutions 
in China.  
Furthermore, concerning the experience of the entrepreneur, venture 
capitalists in China share many similar views with their peers in other countries. As 
shown in Table 7.1, they consider familiarity with the targeted market and 
demonstrated leadership as the most important requirements on entrepreneur’s 
experience. Of least concern is familiarity with the entrepreneur’s reputation; the 
standard deviation is higher than most of other factors. The findings are similar to 
discoveries of the existing literature.  
However, whether the entrepreneur has a relevant track record is not 
emphasized by venture capitalists in China as much as in the United States, Europe, 
and Singapore. Nonetheless, the mean score for the responses on this factor is 2.91, 
which is reasonably high. It is interesting that the result is similar to the findings in 
Asia-Pacific and Canada. In the case of China, many businesses in China are new, 
especially in the sectors in which venture capitalists show more interest, such as the 
Internet, mobile communication, and Semi-conductor. Many entrepreneurs who have 
innovative ideas and the passions to start companies are very young. This might be a 
plausible explanation for why venture capitalists do not emphasize the entrepreneur’s 
track records that much in China.  
The questionnaire also tests the weight of overseas experience of the 
entrepreneur. The mean of the responses for this question is only 2.09, which is the 
second least concern of venture capitalists in China, but the standard deviation is the 
highest for this response. This indicates that venture capitalists have significantly 
different views on the overseas experience of the entrepreneur. For some VCs, the 
overseas experience of the entrepreneur is utmost important whereas for some others, 
it is not a factor they would consider. This result further confirms the findings from 
the unstructured interviews.  
Finally, concerning the requirements for the management team, similar to the 
US practice again, over 70 per cent of VCs in China consider the composition of the 
management team is an utmost important factor for an investment. Moreover, over 
56 per cent of VCs in China consider a functionally balanced management team is 
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essential for a project that is almost the same to the findings in the United States. The 
results suggest that a balanced management team is a great advantage for the project 
to attract venture financing in both China and the United States.  
However, an interesting observation is that in the United States, 20 per cent 
VCs consider a project initiated by only one person who has relevant experience and 
idea as attractive whereas only 5.8 percent of VCs in China consider that as a plus. It 
suggests that VCs in China normally screen out a project which is initiated by only 
one person even if the entrepreneur has relevant experience and ideas. The interviews 
show that the reason is mainly related to the lack of professional consulting services 
and the complexity of the market and institutions in China. As a FVC said, 
‘Management team is always essential. You can never make a team with one person, 
right? A company, even a very small start-up has to face various problems. And, 
people have different expertise. If it is in the US, you might be able to get some 
assistance from consulting firms or professional services to compensate, but not here 
in China. Besides, China is so dynamic and complicated, it is impossible for an 
entrepreneur to handle everything. It must be a team …’ (Info: VCF23).  
This study also compares the screening criteria employed by VCs from the 
two different groups of VCFs. As discussed in the previous chapter, LPVCFs take 
more risks by investing in younger companies and companies with higher R&D 
intensity. It is therefore predicted that the venture capitalists from LPVCFs may be 
more demanding than those from LCVCFs in ex-ante project screening in order to 
control the higher risks they take. The semi-structured interviews confirm this 
assumption by providing evidence that venture capitalists from LPVCFs are indeed 
more demanding in terms of requirements for the personality and experience of the 
entrepreneur. As shown in Table 7.3, the mean for the responses on the 
entrepreneur’s personality is 3.13 for LPVCFs and 2.82 for LCVCFs. Moreover, the 
mean for the responses on business experience is 2.81 for LPVCFs and 2.52 for 
LCVCFs.  
In addition, the two different types of VCFs give different weights to the 
human capital factors. For example, LPVCFs consider whether the entrepreneur is 
articulate in discussing venture as an important factor, whereas LCVCFs do not. The 
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responses from the venture capitalists in LPVCFs on this factor are similar to those 
of their US peers.  
Furthermore, LPVCFs pay more attention to whether the personality of the 
entrepreneurs is compatible and whether the entrepreneurs have overseas working 
experience. However, it is noted that the standard deviations for these responses are 
high that indicates that there is no strong consensus among LPVCFs concerning the 
two factors. This result confirms the unstructured interviews that some foreign VCs, 
who are mainly from LPVCFs, suggest they prefer the entrepreneur has overseas 
working experience with enough knowledge on legal and financial systems in 
western countries, especially the United States. In addition, some foreign VCs pay 
more attention to whether it is easy to get along with the entrepreneur since they 
suggest venture financing by nature is ‘an investment in people’ ( Info: VCF3). 
However, some other interviewees would suggest that they do not really take these 
two factors as important factors since ‘the key is always the whether they 
(entrepreneurs) may make it, rather than what they had in the past…’ (Info: VCF32).  
Moreover, LPVCFs pay slightly more attention to the composition of the 
management team than LCVCFs do. As seen in Table 7.3, about 74 per cent of 
LPVCFs consider management team composition is an essential factor whereas the 
ratio for LCVCFs is 67 per cent. At the same time, similar to the practice in the 
United States, both LPVCFs and LCVCFs prefer to further investigate the project 
with a functionally balanced management team. However, it is interesting to notice 
that the ten per cent LPVCFs consider a project, which is initiated by only one 
person with relevant experience, is essentially attractive whereas no LCVCF would 
invest in projects like that. At the same time, only five percent LPVCFs consider a 
project, which is initiated by people with similar experience, as an interesting one 
where as over 13 per cent LCVCFs would like to further evaluate that project. In 
general, comparing the findings in China with the observations in the United States, 
it is seen that the views of LPVCFs on the composition of management team is 
similar to those in the United States.  
7.4.2 Characteristics of the Product and Market 
Regarding the requirements on product or service, as seen in Table 7.1, 
whether the product has been developed to the point of a functioning prototype is the 
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least concern of venture capitalists in China. Furthermore, whether the product is 
identified as high-technology is not considered important by venture capitalists in 
China. These two findings are consistent with the practice in the United States. 
However, venture capitalists in China view demonstrated market acceptance 
as the most important product/service related factor that is not considered as 
important by VCs in other countries except Singapore. This result confirms the 
findings from unstructured interviews. It indicates that venture capitalists in 
emerging economies may emphasize more on the present market side of a product or 
service.  
Associated with the above phenomenon, VCs in China do not take whether 
the product is proprietary or can be otherwise protected as an important criterion in 
project screening. As shown in Table 7.2, this observation is similar to the practice in 
almost all the other countries except the United States. This result reflects the 
concerns from venture capitalists on the R&D capability of Chinese ventures. As one 
FVC mentioned, ‘If we talk about the originality of the R&D projects, I should say, 
China is not the place to seek for them yet, at least not now. There are some 
innovative projects here, but mainly in application, business model and marketing… 
not research though. It is improved but we need to wait…So, it is different from real 
R&D projects that you must guarantee it is not stolen. Business model and marketing 
are normally more like arts that cannot be copied directly… ’ (Info: VCF 32).   
Regarding the criteria on the targeted market, similar to the practice in almost 
all the other countries, the growth rate of the targeted market is seen by VCs in China 
as the most important market factor. In addition, VCs in China pay the least attention 
to whether the product or service may create a new market that is again similar to 
their peers in the United States. These phenomena suggest that in most countries, the 
market growth is the utmost important element VCs normally concern.  
A unique observation is that the scale of the potential market, which is not 
identified by VCs in other countries as a project screening criterion, is identified and 
considered as important in China. It confirms the findings of the unstructured 
interviews that suggest VCs view the market size and the potential growth of the 
market as the most visible strengths of China.  
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According to the semi-structured interviews, there are no visible differences 
between LPVCFs and LCVCFs concerning their views on product and market 
potential. Nonetheless, LPVCFs are marginally more demanding in the both factors. 
Additionally, LPVCFs pay more attention to whether the project may be 
complementary to their other portfolio companies. These results suggest that there is 
a high consensus among venture capitalists from different types of VCFs in China 
concerning their requirements in terms of market and product aspects of the project. 
However, LPVCFs take the externality of the individual project to the whole 
portfolio into the consideration in order to reduce risks and gain higher returns.  
 
7.4.3 Characteristics of Geographical Considerations  
It is interesting to note that differing from their peers in other countries, VCs 
in China take the geographical location of the potential portfolio companies as a 
general concern in project screening. As shown in Table 7.1, geographical 
considerations including the supply of human resources, the local policies, the 
geographical distance and whether the company is located in capital or other major 
cities are identified by VCs in China. Among all these factors, the most important 
aspect of geographical concern appears to be whether the needed human resources of 
the location are rich. It further evidences the importance of human factors from the 
venture capitalists’ point of view.  
Another important finding is that the local public policies are heavily 
emphasized by VCs in China. As seen in Table 7.1, the mean for the responses on 
this factor is 2.97 that is very close to 3 which is a measurement for ‘important’. The 
responses suggest that the friendliness of local government to entrepreneurship and 
venture capital investment is important for VCs to determine whether to invest in 
projects in this area. It suggests that public policies are major concerns of financiers 
in China. At the same time, it also indicates that regions in China are diverse not only 
in terms of natural environments but also in terms of institutions. This finding is 
consistent with the explorations of Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003).  
Additionally, some VCs suggest that where the entrepreneur locates his/her 
business may reflect how well the entrepreneur understands the factors that critically 
influence his/own business and how he/she designs the strategy of the business. As 
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one FVC states, ‘It’s a useful way to evaluate the business sense of the entrepreneur. 
For example, I would hardly imagine someone would finance an entrepreneur who 
starts up computer software in Inner Mongolia. No human capital, no treatments of 
public policies, no network of the business... Nothing there is related to software. But, 
we invested in diary manufacturing there. And as you know, it works extremely well. 
So, if the entrepreneur does not have common sense about the local strengths and 
weaknesses, there is no way for the business to win’ (Info: VCF 30).  
The other interesting observation is that the least important factor concerning 
the geographical considerations is the distance from the venture capitalist’s office to 
the location of the potential portfolio company. The low standard deviation of the 
responses for this factor further evidences a high consensus among venture capitalists 
in China that do not consider physical distance as important. The result differs from 
the existing literature, which suggests that venture capitalists normally prefer to 
invest in enterprises within 50 miles from their home or office in order to gain more 
information about the portfolio companies and the entrepreneurs. Furthermore, it is 
also different from the findings of Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003), who provide 
evidence that FVCs in China normally invest in companies closer to their office.  
The potential explanation for the difference is that most of the studies on 
venture capitalists’ screening criteria were made in the 1980s and the early 1990s in 
the United States, when the Internet and mobile tele-communication were not used 
widely and commercially. In the case of China, the Internet industry and tele-
communication were developed with the venture financing industry simultaneously 
that provided venture capitalists easy accesses to entrepreneurs and information; this 
was stated by the interviewees for times. With this improvement, venture capitalists 
in China do not take physical distance as a serious problem that influences on their 
ex-post monitoring activities.  
Regarding the differences between the two types of VCFs in their 
geographical considerations, the analysis shows that LPVCFs are again more 
demanding than LCVCFs. In particular, LPVCFs pay substantially more attention to 
local public policies of the location where the portfolio company operates. As one 
FVC said, ‘The local government is extremely important. As you know, venture 
capital is new in China. There are many issues in venture financing are not 
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understood by people here. So, if the local policies not friendly, we may have lots of 
troubles. Even though local laws are not binding for us, the local officials always 
have ways to set burdens to you and your projects. We are not affordable for the 
waste of time and energy. So, if the local government is not really friendly, we would 
not invest in the project located in that area…’ (Info: VCF16).  
The result indicates that the role of the local government is critically 
important in the view of most foreign venture capitalists, which are mainly structured 
as limited partnership. The potential explanation is that most LCVCFs are domestic 
ones and backed by either government agencies or large corporations; thus, they have 
more ties to local government, making it easier to lobby or solve problems related to 
local policies.  
7.4.4 Financial Considerations  
Similar to their counterparts in the United States and other developed 
countries, VCs in China tale the financial potential of the project as major concern. 
As seen in Table 7.1, the most important financial criterion for VCs in China is the 
project may create ten times of the investment within five to ten years that is similar 
to the practice in the United States. It indicates that the high return potential is what 
VCs look for all over the world including China. In addition, it also provides 
evidence that differing from traditional financiers, VCs normally set up a higher risk-
return profile with a long-term investment strategy in China. This phenomenon is 
again similar to the practice in the United States. 
 The second important criterion is the liquidity of the investment. Similar to 
their peers in the United States and Singapore, VCs in China consider whether the 
investment can be easily made liquid as an important factor in project screening. This 
finding supports the unstructured interviews. As discussed in the previous chapters, 
venture capital investment normally exits within ten years due to the limited life span 
of venture funds. In this study, over half interviewees are from LPVCFs, which have 
almost the same governance scheme of venture funds to those in the United States. 
This may therefore explain why the liquidity of investment is emphasised much by 
VCs in China. 
In addition, also similar to the practice in the United States, the least 
emphasized factors concern subsequent investment. This is the same as most findings 
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in the existing literature. As shown in Table 7.1, VCs in China do not view if they 
would be expected to make subsequent investments or to participate in latter rounds 
of investment as important. This confirms the expected result, which was based on 
the fact that stage financing is widely used by VCs. That is, VCs normally do not 
invest the entire fund needed upfront; rather, they invest by instalments in order to 
reduce the potential loss from bad projects 43 (Gompers, 1995; Salhman, 1990). 
Finally, LPVCFs are again more demanding than LCVCFs regarding the 
concerns on financial aspects of the project. As seen in Table 7.3, the mean of the 
responses for financial considerations is 2.60 for LPVCFs and 2.40 for LCVCFs. 
There are some visible differences between the venture capitalists in the two types of 
VCFs in terms of their financial requirements. First, LPVCFs consider high return 
and high liquidity as important factors, while neither of these factors is seen as 
important by LCVCFs. The responses of LPVCFs are similar to the findings of those 
in the United States. Furthermore, LPVCFs are more likely to consider if the project 
has a chance to attract future investors. A plausible explanation is that LPVCFs are 
more profit-oriented than LCVCFs that they pay more attention to the financial 
return. In addition, LPVCFs face harder budget constraints than LCVCFs that they 
take the liquidity of the investment as an important factor in project screening.  
Overall, the findings from the semi-structured interviews support the major 
findings of the unstructured interviews. Primarily, the major criteria employed by 
venture capitalists in China are similar to those used in the United States. Human 
aspects are the dominant concerns of venture capitalists when they screen projects in 
China, which is the same practice used in developed countries. The growth rate of 
the targeted market and the financial return and liquidity are also major concerns of 
venture capitalists in China.  
However, there are also some unique phenomena in China. In general, 
venture capitalists in China are more demanding than their counterparts in other 
countries by imposing more requirements when they screen projects. The honesty, 
social network and overseas working experience of the entrepreneur are seen as 
important human factors in project screening in China. In addition, the scale of the 
targeted market and the market acceptance of the product or service, which are not 
                                                 
43 For more about stage financing in China, see Chapter 8. 
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considered as screening criteria in other countries, are important concerns for VCs in 
China. Finally, geographical considerations, especially, the local public policies and 
the supply of human resources are emphasized by VCs in China.  
Moreover, different types of VCFs are diverse in project screening in China. 
Overall, LPVCFs are more demanding than those of LCVCFs: fifteen of thirty eight 
screening criteria are considered important by LPVCFs whereas only nine screening 
criteria are important for LCVCFs. Additionally, LPVCFs share more commonalities 
with their peers in the United States and other developed countries in screening 
criteria than LCVCFs, especially in terms of human resources and financial aspects.  
Another interesting observation is that the standard deviations of the 
responses from venture capitalists are notably lower in China compared with those in 
the United States. The finding is consistent for almost all criteria. It suggests that 
there is a stronger consensus among venture capitalists in China in their project 
screening criteria. The potential explanation for this phenomenon is that the venture 
capitalists are either new to China’s market (e.g. FVCs) or new to the venture 
financing industry (e.g. DVCs).  They are still in the process of learning and may 
tend to be more general in ex-ante screening. However, because the venture capital 
industry in the United States is much more developed, practitioners differentiate 
from each other through various special investment preferences and, consequently, 
retain more dispersed screening criteria.  
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Table 7.1 Screening Criteria Employed by VCs in China and the US  
 CHINA  US  
 Mean SD Mean SD 
       Group I: Entrepreneur’s personality---the entrepreneur: 
1. is honest enough.  3.68 0.475   
2. is capable of sustained intense effort.  3.65 0.485 3.60 0.57 
3. is able to evaluate and react to risk well. 3.35 0.544 3.34 0.73 
4. articulates in discussing venture. 2.88 0.409 3.11 0.71 
5. attends to detail. 2.38 0.551 2.82 0.69 
6. has a personality compatible with mine. 1.97 0.870 2.09 0.81 
7. has rich social network. 3.03 0.388   
        Group II: Entrepreneur’s experience---The entrepreneur: 
8. is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by the project. 3.74 0.448 3.58 0.57 
9. has demonstrated leadership ability in past. 3.21 0.410 3.41 0.67 
10. has a track record relevant to venture. 2.91 0.514 3.24 0.69 
11. was referred to me by a trustworthy source. 2.26 0.618 2.03 0.62 
12. I am already familiar with the entrepreneur’s reputation. 2.03 0.627 1.83 0.71 
13. has overseas educational and working experience.  2.09 0.933   
Group III Characteristics of the products or service: 
14. The product is proprietary or can otherwise be protected. 2.94 0.629 3.11 0.71 
15. The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance. 3.26 0.511 2.45 0.74 
16. The product has been developed to the point of a functioning prototype. 2.18 0.576 2.38 0.90 
203  
17. The product may be described as “high tech.” 2.15 0.702 2.03 0.96 
18. The product has great potentials for export.  2.03 0.460   
19. The product or service is complimentary to our other portfolios.  2.09 0.621   
        Group IV Characteristics of the market: 
20. The target market enjoys a significant growth rate. 3.71 0.462 3.34 0.64 
21. The venture will stimulate an existing market. 2.35 0.485 2.43 0.75 
22. The venture is an industry with which I am familiar. 2.06 0.547 2.36 0,78 
23. There is little threat of competition during the first three years. 2.82 0.387 2.33 0.72 
24. The venture will create a new market. 1.94 0.489 1.82 0.83 
25. The market size is scalable.  3.18 0.576   
Group V Geographical considerations: 
26. The project is located in capital city or other major cities in China.  2.26 0.511   
27. The project is located within 50 miles to my office.  1.24 0.431   
28. It is easy to access needed human resources in the location.  3.00 0.492   
29. Local public policy is friendly to SMEs and venture industry.  2.97 0.460   
Group VI Financial considerations: 
30. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within 5-10 years. 3.24 0.606 3.42 0.79 
31. I require an investment that can be easily made liquid (e.g., taken public or acquired). 2.94 0.422 3.17 0.89 
32. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within at least 5 years.  2.76 0.431 2.34 0.81 
33. I will not be expected to make subsequent investments. 1.94 0.600 1.34 0.52 
34. I will not participate in latter rounds of investment.  1.24 0.606 1.20 0.45 
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35. It is easy to find further investors or bank loans for the project.  2.38 0.511   
Group VII Characteristics of management team: 
Please score 1 for the single item below that you suggest the most essential one for the venture to go forward. 
36. The project is initiated by one person and he/she has relevant experience to the idea.  5.9%  20%  
37. The project is initiated by more than one person, each having similar relevant experience.  8.8%  9%  
38. The venture is initiated by more than one person, the individuals constituting a 
functionally balanced management team.  
58.8%  42%  







Table 7.2 Screening Criteria Seen as Important by VCs in China, US, Singapore, Europe and Asia-Pacific Countries 





       Characteristics of the entrepreneur: 
 
1. The entrepreneur is honest enough.  3.68 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2. The entrepreneur is capable of sustained intense effort.  3.65 3.60 3.58 3.74 3.55 3.56 
3. The entrepreneur is able to evaluate and react to risk well. 3.35 3.34 3.52 3.45 3.57 3.31 
4. The entrepreneur articulates in discussing venture. (2.88) 3.11 2.61 2.77 2.77 2.74 
5. The entrepreneur has rich social network. 3.03 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6. The entrepreneur is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by the 
project. 
3.74 3.58 3.61 3.57 3.54 3.68 
7. The entrepreneur has demonstrated leadership ability in past. 3.21 3.41 3.52 
 
2.98 3.18 3.01 
8. The entrepreneur has a track record relevant to venture. 2.91 3.24 3.39 2.92 3.03 2.68 
       Characteristics of the product/service and market: 
 
9. The product is proprietary or can otherwise be protected. 2.94 3.11 2.94 
 
2.64 2.74 2.28 
10. The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance. 3.26 2.45 3.10 2.81 2.85 2.66 
11. The product has been developed to the point of a functioning prototype. 2.18 2.38 2.94 2.92 2.97 3.05 
12. The target market enjoys a significant growth rate. 3.71 3.34 3.35 
 
3.15 3.00 2.86 
13. The market size is scalable.  3.18 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
206  
 Geographic considerations: 
14. It is easy to access needed human resources in the location.  3.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
15. Local public policy is friendly to SMEs and venture industry.  2.97 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 Financial considerations:  
16. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within 5-10 
years. 
3.24 3.42 2.84 2.94 2.86 2.56 
17. I require an investment that can be easily made liquid (e.g., taken public 
or acquired). 
2.94 3.17 3.00 2.67 2.72 2.39 
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 Table 7.3 Project Screening Criteria Used by Different Types of VCFs in China  
 ALL LPVCFS LCVCFS 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Group I: Entrepreneur’s personality---the entrepreneur:  
1. is honest enough.  3.68 0.475 3.79 0.419 3.53 0.516 
2. is capable of sustained intense effort.  3.65 0.485 3.74 0.452 3.53 0.516 
3. is able to evaluate and react to risk well. 3.35 0.544 3.37 0.597 3.33 0.488 
4. articulates in discussing venture. 2.88 0.409 3.00 0.333 2.73 0.458 
5. attends to detail. 2.38 0.551 2.47 0.513 2.27 0.594 
6. has a personality compatible with mine. 1.97 0.870 2.42 0.692 1.40 0.737 
7. has rich social network. 3.03 0.388 3.11 0.315 2.93 0.458 
Group II: Entrepreneur’s experience---The entrepreneur 
8. is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by the project. 3.74 0.448 3.79 0.419 3.67 0.488 
9. has demonstrated leadership ability in past. 3.21 0.410 3.05 0.405 3.07 0.258 
10. has a track record relevant to venture. 2.91 0.514 2.89 0.567 2.93 0.458 
11. was referred to me by a trustworthy source. 2.26 0.618 2.53 0.697 1.93 0.258 
12. I am already familiar with the entrepreneur’s reputation. 2.03 0.627 2.21 0.713 1.80 0.414 
13. has overseas educational and working experience.  2.09 0.933 2.37 0.955 1.73 0.799 
Group III Characteristics of the products or service 
14. The product is proprietary or can otherwise be protected. 2.94 0.629 2.89 0.658 3.00 0.655 
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15. The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance. 3.26 0.511 3.26 0.562 3.27 0.458 
16. The product has been developed to the point of a functioning prototype. 2.18 0.576 2.21 0.535 2.13 0.640 
17. The product may be described as “high tech.” 2.15 0.702 2.11 0.658 2.20 0.775 
18. The product has great potentials for export.  2.03 0.460 1.95 0.524 2.13 0.352 
19. The product or service is complimentary to our other portfolios.  2.09 0.621 2.26 0.653 1.87 0.516 
Group IV Characteristics of the market.  
20. The target market enjoys a significant growth rate. 3.71 0.462 3.84 0.375 3.53 0.516 
21. The venture will stimulate an existing market. 2.35 0.485 2.42 0.507 2.27 0.458 
22. The venture is an industry with which I am familiar. 2.06 0.547 2.16 0.375 1.93 0.704 
23. There is little threat of competition during the first three years. 2.82 0.387 2.95 0.229 2.67 0.488 
24. The venture will create a new market. 1.94 0.489 1.95 0.405 1.93 0.594 
25. The market size is scalable.  3.18 0.576 3.26 0.452 3.07 0.704 
Group V Geographical considerations: 
26. The project is located in capital city or other major cities in China.  2.26 0.511 2.11 0.459 2.47 0.516 
27. The project is located within 50 miles to my office.  1.24 0.431 1.21 0.419 1.27 0.458 
28. It is easy to access needed human resources in the location.  3.00 0.492 3.05 0.315 2.93 0.704 
29. Local public policy is friendly to SMEs and venture industry.  2.97 0.460 3.33 0.594 2.53 0.375 
Group VI Financial considerations: 
30. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within 5-10 years. 3.24 0.460 3.47 0.513 2.93 .594 
31. I require an investment that can be easily made liquid (e.g., taken public or 2.94 0.422 3.05 0.229 2.80 .561 
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acquired). 
32. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within at least 5 years.  2.76 0.431 2.89 0.315 2.60 .507 
33. I will not be expected to make subsequent investments. 1.94 0.6 2 0.667 1.87 0.516 
34. I will not participate in latter rounds of investment.  1.24 0.606 1.1 0.513 1.4  0.704 
35. It is easy to find further investors or bank loans for the project.  2.97 0.511 3.11 0.315 2.8 0.561 
Group VII Characteristics of management team.  
Please score 1 for the single item below that you suggest the most essential one for the venture to go forward. 
36. The project is initiated by one person and he/she has relevant experience to the idea. 5.8%  10.5%  0  
37. The project is initiated by more than one person, each having similar relevant 
experience.  
8.8%  5.3%  13.3%  
38. The venture is initiated by more than one person, the individuals constituting a 
functionally balanced management team.  
58.8%  57.9%  60%  




7.5 Characteristics of Rejected Ventures in China 
 To gain more insights about the key concerns of venture capitalists, the ten 
criteria that were most frequently rated as essential are presented in Table 7.4. The 
interviewees were asked to mark the factors as essential when they would reject 
the project regardless of any other characteristics. This provides an opportunity to 
analyze the characteristics for the projects that are most likely rejected by VCs in 
China.  
As shown in Table 7.4, four of the top ten criteria that were most 
commonly rated as essential have to do with the characteristics of the entrepreneur 
characteristics in China. Moreover, all four criteria related to the entrepreneur rank 
among the top five essential criteria: 73.5 per cent of the venture capitalists would 
reject the project if the entrepreneur were not thoroughly familiar with the targeted 
market, and 67.6 per cent would deny the project if the entrepreneur was not 
capable of sustained intense efforts. Additionally, 64.7 per cent of venture 
capitalists would not invest in the project if the entrepreneur was not honest. The 
importance of human capital aspects is also shown in venture capitalists’ concerns 
about the management team. As shown in Table 7.5, about 60 per cent of the 
venture capitalists suggest that a functionally balanced management team is 
essential. The result is similar to evidence from the United States.  
Four criteria related to the market and products are also listed in the top 
ten. Table 7.4 shows that 58.8 per cent of venture capitalists would reject a project 
if the targeted market did not have a significant growth rate. Other criteria related 
to the market and products included market acceptance of the products, the scale 
of the market, and the proprietary protection of the products. The financial return 
and public policies of the local governments also ranked in the top ten.  
The distribution of the top ten screening criteria identified by the venture 
capitalists in China slightly differs from those in the United States. Criteria that 
rank high in the US, like the liquidity of the investment, the track record of the 
entrepreneur, and if the entrepreneur is capable of articulating the venture well, are 
not as heavily emphasized in China. Instead, the integrity of the entrepreneur, the 
public policies of the project location, and the scale of the market are listed among 
the top ten criteria in China.  
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The result indicates that under weak regulatory institutions, venture 
capitalists in China normally rely on the integrity of the entrepreneur to reduce 
potential agency problems and uncertainties. At the same time, many venture 
capitalists are attracted by the huge size of the market in China. Furthermore, 
public policies of local government may influence some venture capitalists’ 
investment decisions. In general, the result is consistent with the findings from the 
unstructured interviews.  
Table 7.4 Ten Screening Criteria most Frequently Rated by VCs in China 
  Number % 
1. The entrepreneur is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by 
the project. 
25 73.5
2. The entrepreneur is capable of sustained intense effort.  23 67.6
3. The entrepreneur is honest enough.  22 64.7
4. The target market enjoys a significant growth rate. 20 58.8
5. The entrepreneur is able to evaluate and react to risk well. 13 38.2
6. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within 5-10 
years. 
11 32.4
7. The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance. 10 29.4
8. The market size is scalable.  9 26.5
9. The product is proprietary or can otherwise be protected. 6 17.6
10. Local public policy is friendly to SMEs and venture industry.  4 11.8
 
Table 7.5 VCs’ Requirements on Venture Team Composition of in China  
RESPONSES  NUMBER  PERCENTAGE 
One person with relevant experience essential  2 5.9% 
Team with similar experience essential 3 8.8% 
Balanced team essential 20 58.8% 
None essential 9 26.5% 
 
This study separately looks at the distribution of criteria that are commonly 
rated as essential by LPVCFs and LCVCFs. As shown in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7, 
the results demonstrate that LPVCFs are more demanding, since the frequency of 
the criteria rated as essential by LPVCFs is higher. The total score of the essential 
criteria for the 19 LPVCFs is 94; averagely, five criteria are considered as 
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essential for each LPVCF. However, the total score of the essential criteria for 15 
LCVCFs is 51, so the average number of essential criteria for LCVCFs is far less 
than 4.  
For LPVCFs, the top ten factors frequently considered as essential are the 
same as those recognized by the overall sample, although the sequence differs. 
Over 84.2 per cent of LPVCFs state that they would deny the project if the 
targeted market did not enjoy high growth rate that shows the importance of the 
market in the view of venture capitalists in China. At the same time, the financial 
return requirement is among the top five criteria. The other three criteria are 
related to the entrepreneur characteristics.   
As for LCVCFs, whether the local public policies are friendly to venture 
capital investment and entrepreneurship is not among the top ten criteria. 
However, whether the location of the project may provide enough human 
resources is considered as essential more frequently. At the same time, four 
criteria related to entrepreneur’s characteristics rank among the top five. The 
growth rate of the market is ranked fifth among the top ten criteria. 
This comparison again confirms that LPVCFs are much more profit-driven 
than LCVCFs. They are passionate about the huge market potential in China; 
about half see financial returns as the very essential screening criteria. However, 
for LCVCFs, concerns with financial returns rank last in the top ten screening 
criteria. Only 2 of 15 LCVCFs would reject the project if the predicted return is 
less than 10 times the investment in 5 to 10 years. In addition, LPVCFs show more 
concerns about the weak regulatory institutions in China and are more sensitive to 
public policies than LCVCFs. On the other hand, LCVCFs are more sensitive to 
the supply of human resources than their colleagues in LPVCFs. One 
interpretation for this result is that LCVCFs that are mainly backed by local 
governments or large corporations that retain strategic considerations when they 
undertake venture financing.  
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Table 7.6 Ten Criteria Frequently Rated as Essential by LPVCFs in China 
  Number Percentage  
1. The target market enjoys a significant growth rate. 16 84.2% 
2. The entrepreneur is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by 
the project. 
15 78.9% 
3. The entrepreneur is honest enough.  15 78.9% 
4. is capable of sustained intense effort.  14 73.7% 
5. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within 5-10 
years. 
9 47.4% 
6. The entrepreneur is able to evaluate and react to risk well. 8 42.1% 
7. The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance. 6 31.6% 
8. The market size is scalable.  5 26.3% 
9. The product is proprietary or can otherwise be protected. 3 15.8% 
10. Local public policy is friendly to SMEs and venture industry.  3 15.8% 
 
 
Table 7.7 Ten Criteria Frequently Rated as Essential by LCVCFs in China  
 Number  Percentage 
1. The entrepreneur is familiar with the market targeted by the project. 10 66.67% 
2. The entrepreneur is capable of sustained intense effort.  9 60% 
3. The entrepreneur is honest enough.  7 46.67% 
4. The entrepreneur is able to evaluate and react to risk well. 5 33.33% 
5. The target market enjoys a significant growth rate. 4 26.67% 
5. The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance. 4 26.67% 
5. The market size is scalable.  4 26.67% 
8. The product is proprietary or can otherwise be protected. 3 20% 
9. It is easy to access needed human resources in the location.  3 20% 




7.6 Factor Analysis  
Factor analysis is conducted to explore the general pattern of VCs’ 
concerns during project screening in China. The researcher tries to find out what 
posteriori factors emerge and how far the factors match the priori categories 
chosen for the examination with the factor analysis. Because many criteria are not 
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considered important, only criteria with a mean score over 3.0 are included in the 
analysis. Overall, 11 screening criteria are examined.  
As discussed in earlier sections, the ex-ante project screening is considered 
an important mechanism used by venture capitalists to control uncertainty and 
risks that are associated with financing young and R&D-oriented companies. 
These factors are therefore classified into categories with the theme of risk control. 
The method of interpretation is similar to Tyebjee and Bruno (1981) and 
MacMillan et al. (1985).  
Table 7.8 presents the result of the factor analysis.  In total, four factors are 
extracted from the factor analysis using a cut-off of 0.5. The cut off point of 0.5 is 
chosen that is similar to that of the existing literature (MacMillan et, al., 1985) in 
order to make this study comparable. 
As shown in Table 7.8, factor 1 is mainly associated with moral hazard 
issues of the entrepreneur.  An entrepreneur who is honest and able to exert 
sustainable efforts is relatively insulated from opportunistic activities.  
Factor 2 shows the concern from venture capitalists about the management 
risks of the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs with rich social networks and those who 
have shown leadership in the past are more likely avoid management failure.  
Factor 3 reports a concern for risk of loss. Projects that enjoy a scalable 
and high growth market and have the potential to produce more than 10 times 
payback within 5 to 10 years reduce the probability of losing the total investment. 
Factor 4 reflects a concern for market uncertainty. This criterion stands out 
from other market and product characteristics and remains a single item factor in 
this analysis. It suggests that venture capitalists in China heavily emphasize 
demonstrated market acceptance. No matter how large the market and how high 
the growth rate, if the project does not show demonstrated market acceptance, then 
it may fail due to uncertainty.  
In general, the result of the factor analysis is consistent with the findings 
from the unstructured interviews and the priori categories chosen for the 
questionnaire survey in the semi-structured interviews. It confirms that moral 
hazard issues are emphasized most by venture capitalists in China. VCs in China 
also see social networks as a considerably important element that may affect 
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overall management. The result echoes the findings from the unstructured 
interviews, which suggest that the weak regulatory and normative institutions are 
the major reasons for the strong emphasis on integrity and social networks of the 
entrepreneur (see 7.3). Venture capitalists rely more on the self-discipline and 
social networks of the entrepreneur when the legal system is underdeveloped in 
China.  In this sense, Guanxi provides a complement to the contract law (Luo, 
2002; Johnston, 1997). Moreover, the market is seen as one of the most attractive 
aspects Venture capitalists are most sensitive to the uncertainty of the market, 
suggesting that the dynamics of the market may affect heavily venture capitalists’ 
investment decisions.  
The results of this factor analysis share both commonalities and differences 
from what has been found in the United States. Similar to their peers in the United 
States, venture capitalists in China also consider management risk, risk of loss, and 
market uncertainty as important risk factors. However, differing from the findings 
of Tybjee and Bruno (1981) and MacMillan et al. (1985), the present study does 
not find a clear pattern on venture capitalists’ concerns with competitive risk and 
bail out risk.  
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Table 7.8 Factor Analysis of VCs’ Project Screening Criteria in China 
The screening criteria employed by VCs in China                      Factor 
  1 2 3 4 
The entrepreneur is capable of sustained intense effort 0.71 0.09 0.07 -0.08 
The entrepreneur is honest enough.  0.95 -0.23 0.13 -0.03 
The entrepreneur has rich social network.  0.21 0.85 0.09 0.20 
The entrepreneur is thoroughly familiar with the 
market targeted by the project. 
0.38 -0.09 -0.13 .084 
The entrepreneur is thoroughly familiar with the 
market targeted by the project. 
0.36 0.28 -0.55 -0.10 
The entrepreneur has demonstrated leadership ability in 
past. 
-0.13 0.55 -0.01 -0.18 
The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance. -0.01 -0.10 -0.05 .955 
The target market enjoys a significant growth rate. 0.07 0.02 0.50 -0.14 
The market size is scalable. -.138 0.13 0.58 -0.03 
I require a return equal to at least 10 times my 
investment within 5-10 years. 
0.25 0.15 0.55 0.12 
It is easy to access needed human resources in the 
location. 
-0.12 0.43 0.07 -0.07 
% of variance  16.72 13.40 10.84 9.35 
 
7.7 Conclusion and Implications 
Combining the unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews with 
37 venture capitalists from 34 VCFs, this study provides an exploratory analysis 
on VCs’ project screening criteria in China. VCs in China display both similarities 
and differences in project screening criteria with their peers in the United States. 
However, the analysis suggests that institutions, especially regulatory institutions, 
have a strong impact on VCs’ project screening strategy in China.  
Primarily, VCs in China share many commonalities with their peers in the 
United States and other developed countries in project screening criteria. All 
criteria that are recognized by VCs in the United States are also identified by VCs 
in China. In addition, VCs in China also consider the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur as the most important factor in their ex-ante project screening that is 
the same to the US practice. Moreover, similar to their counterparts in the United 
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Sates, VCs in China consider the market aspects of the products and services as 
critically important.  
However, the analysis shows that the project screening criteria employed 
by VCs in China indeed unique in some aspects due to the institutional 
environments and arrangements in China. Above all, VCs in China are more 
demanding than their peers in the United Sates and other developed countries in 
project screening under the weak regulatory institutions. Most of the additional 
screening criteria are taken as compensations or complementary conditions to 
reduce the problems of weak regulatory institutions. For example, besides the 
commonly recognized screening criteria in the West, VCs in China place great 
emphasis on the honesty and social networks of the entrepreneur. These concerns 
about the honesty and social networks of the entrepreneur confirm the influence of 
the institutions. Venture capitalists have to rely on the self-discipline of the 
entrepreneur to overcome the lack of legal protection for institutional financiers 
and the weak law enforcement. Moreover, Guanxi may work as a complement to 
the contract law or serve as a kind of a surrogate market system due to ill-defined 
property rights, economic roles, and a restricted flow of information (Johnston, 
1997). 
Additionally, VCs in China pay much more attention to the geographical 
location of the projects due to the concerns about the public policies of local 
governments and the supply of human resources in different areas. This indicates 
that the decentralization of China’s governance and the great regional diversity in 
China have significant impacts on VCs’ investment activities.   
Furthermore, this study also suggests that the macroeconomic environment 
is seen as a major concern by venture capitalists in China. VCs in China pay more 
attention to the market aspects of the projects in ex-ante screening than their peers 
in the United States and other countries. In particular, the market size and the 
market acceptance of the products are especially emphasized that suggests that the 
large market is the particularly seen as an attraction for VCs to invest in China.  
Finally, consistent with the findings in the previous chapter, venture 
capitalists’ choices in screening criteria are associated with the governance 
structure of the VCFs. This chapter provides evidence that LPVCFs, which are 
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more risk-taking, are also more demanding in project screening than LCVCFs, 
which are more risk-moderate. Moreover, LPVCFs are more profit-driven by 
nature and are much more sensitive to the market growth rate and financial returns 
of the projects in project screening than LCVCFs. Additionally, LPVCFs which 
are all foreign VCFs, care more about the regulatory institutions than LCVCFs in 
China. These observations suggest that the regulatory institutions affect the 
corporate governance of the VCFs in China and in turn influence VCs’ investment 
screening strategy of in China. The result can be explained by the incentive 
schemes provided by different types of VCFs. 
Perhaps the most important contribution of this study is that it provides the 
first analysis focusing on VCs’ project screening criteria in China. It combines 
both qualitative and quantitative data to make it comparable to the existing 
literature without losing China’s unique elements. This study also contributes to 
the existing literature on institution by improving understanding of how 
institutions impact the ex-ante screening activities of VCs in China.  
By providing stylized facts on what VCs see as attractive factors and 
disadvantages in investment in China, this study may also have implications to 
policy-making. As discussed, most of the institutional impacts are mainly related 
to the legal system and public policies. It therefore provides an opportunity for 
policymakers to adjust the existing regulations accordingly if they want to promote 
venture capital industry. Finally, this study may also be helpful for practitioners. 
For entrepreneurs, who are seeking for venture capital investment, this study may 
provides sufficient knowledge on what VCs normally concern the most in project 
screening in China. They may therefore draft the business proposal accordingly 
with the emphasis on the key points. As for venture capitalists in this market or, 
those who wish to enter into this market, this study offers information on how their 
potential competitors view China’s venture capital market and the risks and 
advantages related to this market.  
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Chapter 8 Venture Capitalists’ Ex-post Monitoring and Stage 
Financing Strategies in China  
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines venture capitalists’ stage financing to explore VCs’ 
ex-post monitoring activities in China through the lens of stage financing 
arrangements. It examine the relationship between the characteristics of the 
venture capital back projects and VCs’ ex-post monitoring activities; and, the 
relationship between the corporate governance structure of VCFs and VCs’ ex-
post monitoring efforts. By comparing the stage financing arrangements in China 
with those in the US, and, the stage financing activities employed by different 
groups of VCFs in China,  this study tries to determine whether  and how 
institutions impact VCs’ stage financing. Questions like how venture capitalists 
structure stage financing and the major reasons and motives for them to make 
these arrangements in China are addressed.  
Stage financing is deployed widely by venture capitalists. It has been 
recognized as one of the most effective ways to deal with agency problems in 
venture financing. By staging capital infusion, venture capitalists monitor and 
evaluate projects periodically and provide funds in instalments according to 
project performance. In this way, they retain the option to abandon the venture if 
the pre-set milestones are not achieved or the venture shows any negative signals.  
Theorists suggest that venture capitalists mitigate uncertainties and risks 
derived from information asymmetries and lack of collateral by staging the capital 
infusion, because the refinance decision is made with more information revealed 
and more human capital transferred into physical assets (Neher, 1999; Wang, 
2002). In addition, the threat of abandoning the venture also eases agency 
problems and provides incentives to entrepreneurs to exert more effort in order to 
meet goals and deter entrepreneurs of bad projects from seeking capital (Cornelli 
and Yosha, 2002; Huang and Xu, 1998).  
Even though the impact of stage financing has been discussed extensively 
by theorists, the topic has received little empirical investigation except for 
Salhman (1990), Gompers (1995) and Kaplan and Per Stromberg (2003, 2004). 
Based on the US data, the authors show the relationship between the stage 
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financing arrangements and the severity of agency costs and other external risks 
associated with the venture capital backed companies. The findings are consistent 
with most theories of stage financing, which indicate that stage financing allows 
venture capitalists to gather information, monitor the progress of their portfolio 
companies, and keep the option to abandon the bad projects.  
Two major limitations are associated with the current studies. First, the 
existing literature solely focuses on agency issues of venture capital backed 
companies and the structure of stage financing. None of these studies examine 
how incentive schemes provided by venture capital funds impact stage financing 
arrangements. Second, the empirical evidence is based on examinations in the US 
market, where institutional environments for business activities are among the best 
and the governance structures are more homogeneous (e.g. over 80 per cent of 
venture capital institutions in the United States are structured as limited 
partnerships). Stage financing outside the US under other institutions are not well 
documented. 
This chapter explores how institutions impact venture capitalists’ 
investment behaviour in China. The existing literature suggests that venture 
capitalists assess potential agency problems and external risks to decide whether to 
stage capital infusion and how frequently to monitor the progress of their 
portfolios. Therefore, more agency problems and transaction costs should lead to 
shorter financing, more financing rounds, and smaller investment.  Transaction 
cost economics suggests that different incentive schemes provided by venture 
capital funds may also influence venture capitalists’ investment activities. A 
relatively independent governance structure with a more pay-for-performance 
incentive scheme may provide more incentives for frequent ex-post monitoring 
activities, i.e. shorter financing duration and more financing rounds.  However, a 
more hierarchical organizational structure with a more fixed payment incentive 
scheme may lead to less exertion of venture capitalists’ efforts in staging the 
capital infusion. 
The analysis of 436 venture capital backed companies in China confirms 
the predictions derived from the in-depth interviews, agency theory, and 
transaction cost economics. In addition to the agency problems and uncertainties 
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associated with the venture capital backed deals, the incentive schemes provided 
by venture capital funds also impact the choice and structure of stage financing in 
China.  
The results show that VCFs under limited partnership employ stage 
financing much more frequently and show clear regularities in their stage 
financing arrangements. However, VCFs under the limited company structure 
rarely employ stage financing. Moreover, they do not show visible regularities in 
the choice and structure of stage financing in their investment. This illustrates the 
double-sided moral hazard problem that the incentive schemes provided by 
venture capital funds are important to encourage venture capitalists to exert efforts 
in venture financing (Cassammata, 2003; Repullo and Suarez, 2004). 
Moreover, this study shows that stage financing strategy deployed by 
VCFs under limited partnership in China is closely related to agency problems and 
transaction uncertainties. The more the serious the expected agency problems, the 
more intensive stage financing that is used. Financing duration between stages is 
negatively and significantly correlated with R&D intensity but positively and 
significantly correlated with the age of the company backed by venture capitalists. 
Moreover, a higher ratio of intangible assets and R&D spending in new product 
development leads to more rounds of funding. Furthermore, venture capitalists’ 
stage financing is closely related to the performance of portfolio companies. 
Companies that have gone public received significantly more rounds of venture 
funding and total venture capital than those that are privately held. This result 
implies the positive impact of stage financing on terminating bad projects and 
reducing agency costs. It is also interesting to note that the VCFs structured as 
limited partnerships in China have similar stage financing behaviours to their 
counterparts in the US (Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003); 
however, VCFs structured as limited companies in China are substantially 
different in stage financing from either the VCFs under limited partnerships in 
China or those in the United States. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the qualitative 
findings on venture capitalists’ stage financing in China from the fieldwork. 
Section 3 clarifies the research questions for the quantitative analysis based on the 
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exploratory findings from the interviews and the existing literature. Section 4 
describes the data and provides descriptive statistics of the quantitative data. 
Section 5 demonstrates the findings from quantitative analysis and discussion. The 
chapter concludes in Section 6.  
8.2 Exploratory Findings on VCs’ Stage Financing in China  
8.2.1 Stage Financing and Monitoring Costs  
All the VCs interviewed considered stage financing as an important way to 
control uncertainties and risks. Normally, there are two types of stage financing, 
i.e. ex-ante stage financing and ex-post stage financing arrangements. In an ex-
ante stage financing deal, VCs design a contingent contract with entrepreneurs for 
follow-up financing rounds upon financial or non-financial milestones. Sometimes, 
however, some venture financings are not explicitly staged ex-ante; rather, they 
are implicitly staged ex-post (Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003). Both ex-ante and 
ex-post staging arrangements were emphasized by VCs in the unstructured 
interviews.  
The semi-structured interviews provide further evidence for the findings 
from unstructured interviews with the answers from VCs on their actual 
investment activities in China. As shown in Table 8.1, 27 of 34 VCFs once used 
ex-ante staging contracts in their investment in China. More than 94 per cent of the 
venture capitalists interviewed stated that they would like to consider ex-post 
staging if the portfolio company does well and have great potential.  
However, VCFs under different governance structure have different 
choices in stage financing. As shown Table 8.1, VCFs under limited partnership 
make ex-ante staging arrangements much more often than VCFs structured as 
limited companies. Over 89 per cent of the LPVCFs once employed ex-ante stage 
financing in China compared to a 66 per cent of LCVCFs. Additionally, over 49 
per cent of the LPVCF backed deals were designed with ex-ante staging contracts 
whereas less than 18 percent of LCVCF backed deals were designed with a 
contingent contracts on further financing rounds. But interestingly, there is not 
much difference between these two types of VCFs in their views on ex-post stage 
financing. 
Table 8.1Choice of Stage Financing by the 34 VCFs in China  
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 ALL VCFS (#) LPVCFS (#) LCVCFS (#) 
Q1:  Whether you have ever invested the capital by instalments?  
Yes  74.47% (26)  89.47%  (17) 66.67% (10) 
No 23.53% (8) 11.53% (2)  33.33% (5) 
Q2: What is the ratio of the ex-ante staging arrangements in your investments in 
China?  
 35.21%  49.16%  17.55%  
Q3: Would you consider funding next rounds if you see great potentials from the 
company? 
Yes  94.11% (32) 94.74%(18) 93.33%(14)  
No 5.89%(2) 5.26%(1) 6.67%(1) 
 
In addition, the interviews with VCs show that, similar to their counterparts 
in the United States, VCs in China make many efforts on management of their 
portfolio companies. As shown in Table 8.2, over 73 per cent VCs normally check 
the financial report of their portfolio companies monthly. In addition, over 44 per 
cent VCs visit or talk to entrepreneurs or management teams for more than three 
times a week.  
Moreover, the interviews show that VCs make even more efforts to 
communicate with entrepreneurs and evaluate the performance of portfolio 
companies before deciding to make further investments. In general, over 73 per 
cent VCs would visit or talk to the entrepreneurs or management teams of their 
portfolio companies for more than three time a week before a decision for the next 
round of financing that the ratio is substantially increased than usual. This finding 
is consistent with the findings in the United States (Salhman, 1990). The extra 
efforts are also echoed by the conversation with VCs. As one FVC said, ‘Yes, it 
[decision-making for next round of financing] costs a lot of time and money, we 
have to meet them [entrepreneur and management team] many times, audit the 
financial information, investigate the market and so on. And, we also need to set 
meetings with other partners of the fund to have their opinions…it’s really 
consuming, but worthwhile of course...’ (Info: VCF18).  
More interestingly, the interviews also show the ex-post efforts made by 
VCs from different types of venture capital firms are different. VCs from limited 
partnerships normally communicate with management teams much more 
frequently than VCs from limited companies in general and before refinancing. As 
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shown, over 94 per cent VCFs under limited partnership require portfolio 
companies to provide financial reports monthly compared to less than 47 per cent 
LCVCFs. At the same time, over 63 per cent VCs from limited partnership visit or 
talk to the entrepreneurs at least once a week compared to 20 per cent VCs from 
limited companies. Consistently, over 94 per cent VCs from limited partnership 
communicate with their investees for more than three times a week before the 
decision for the next round financing compared to less than 47 per cent VCs from 
limited companies.  
Table 8.2 VCs’ Management of the Portfolio Companies 
 ALL VCFS (#) LPVCFS (#) LCVCFS (#) 
Q4:  How often you talk to/visit the entrepreneurs/management teams? 
More than three times a week 44.11% (15) 63.16% (12) 20% (3) 
Once a week  47.06% (16) 36.84% (7) 60% (9) 
Once two weeks  8.83% (3)  20% (3) 
Q5: How often you need the portfolio company to provide their financial reports? 
Monthly  73.53% (25) 94.74% (18) 46.67% (7) 
Seasonally 14.71% (5)  33.33% (5) 
Randomly 11.76% (4) 5.26% (1) 20% (3) 
Q6: How often you talk to/visit the entrepreneurs/management teams in the two 
months before you make the refinancing decision? 
More than three times a week 73.53% (25) 94.74% (18) 46.67% (7) 
Once a week  26.47% (9) 5.26% (1)  53.33% (8)  
 
Overall, the interviews show that, similar to the US practice, stage 
financing is also widely employed by venture capitalists in China. At the same 
time, like their counterparts in the United States, VCs in China suggest that extra 
efforts are needed for stage financing arrangements. However, according to the 
interviews, LPVCFs and LCVCFs differ from each other stage financing 
arrangements. LPVCFs stage the capital infusion much more frequently in than 
LPVCFs in reality. In addition, the efforts exerted by LPVCFs for ex-post 
monitoring are more than those made by LPVCFs in general and, before the 
decision for next financing rounds in particular.  
8.2.2 Major Reasons for Staging Capital Infusion in China  
8.2.2.1. Termination of bad projects  
When being asked why they pay extra costs to arrange stage financing, 
nearly all venture capitalists specify terminating unsuccessful projects on time as 
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the primary reason. Investing in young and usually high-technology companies 
without collateral, venture capitalists face severe agency problems as well as 
external risks and uncertainties. Therefore, they see the option of abandoning an 
unsuccessful venture as a critical way to protect their own interests. As one FVC 
stated, ‘No, we don’t put all the needed capital upfront. As you know, we don’t 
require collateral, so, if there is anything goes wrong, we normally lose all. But, 
no one can guarantee hundred percentages in business, so many uncertainties, 
market, people, products, competitions and industrial policies, etc. So, we must 
avoid the loss as much as possible…’ (Info: VCF2) 
Although venture capitalists do not always arrange explicit ex-ante staging 
contracts, they try to arrange ex-post staging arrangements to avoid large amount 
of loss. As one DVC suggested, ‘We usually don’t sign staging contracts. We may 
consider further funding if they do well, but we never promise. Actually, we 
normally invest moderate amount of funds first and the decision on next round 
financing depends on their performance.’ (Info VCF20).  
Venture capitalists also emphasize that investing in instalments is 
especially critical in China, where investor protection is still weak, law 
enforcement is problematic, and entrepreneurs are inexperienced. One FVC 
describes giving up a project due to a change of industrial policies in digital media 
in China: ‘We were lucky in that case. It was a sounded project, and the company 
has begun to make profits before we joined in. They needed more funds to expand 
the market. But, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television released a 
regulation on restricting the coverage of digital media afterwards that 
substantially influenced the business of the company. So, we had to withdraw the 
next instalment.  We would have lost at least 8 million dollars. But we only paid $1 
million for the first instalment. So, we did not lose too much anyway…’ (Info: 
VCF33). The importance of terminating bad projects is further echoed by another 
FVC: ‘In this circle, choosing a smart project is more like luck, but knowing when 
and how to stop a bad project is always wisdom’  (Info: VCF16).  
The semi-structured interviews confirm the findings of the unstructured 
interviews that terminating bad projects is an important reason for venture 
capitalist to stage capital infusion. In many cases, pre-set milestones are not 
226  
achieved. As shown in Table 8.3, only one venture capitalist said that all of their 
portfolio companies had achieved their pre-set milestones. Overall, the average 
ratio of the companies that have satisfied the performance milestones is only 31.38 
per cent. The average ratio of the companies that fulfilled the milestones backed 
by LPVCFs was five per cent higher than those backed by the LCVCFs. The 
results show that even though VCs put forth many efforts into ex-ante screening 
and due diligence, the uncertainties and risks are difficult to predict and to avoid. 
Therefore, an efficient mechanism for terminating unsuccessful projects seems to 
be more very important.  
Table 8.3 The Average Ratio of Companies that can Achieve the Milestones    
Q8: WHAT IS THE AVERAGE RATIO OF PORTFOLIO COMPANIES THAT CAN 
ACHIEVE THE MILESTONES? 
 ALL LPVCFs LCVCFs 
portfolio companies that can achieve milestones  31.03% 33.26% 28.20% 
 
Being asked what kind of decisions they have made when the performance 
milestones were not achieved, all the 27 responded VCFs stated that they once 
terminated the funding as shown in Table 8.4. At the same time, over 81 per cent 
VCFs once chose to provide future funding under the conditions that were set in 
the original contingent contracts. In most cases, these conditions included 
increasing venture capitalists’ control rights, increasing venture capitalists’ share, 
or reducing the management team’s option. Only 11.54 per cent VCFs once 
provided the exact amount of further funding as stated in the original contract.  
Again, there were differences between LPVCFs and LCVCFs. Over 94 
LPVCFs once enforced the contingent contracts, while only 55.56 per cent 
LCVCFs took the same actions. In addition, less than 5.56 per cent LPVCFs once 
provided additional funding compared to 33.33 per cent LCVCFs.  
Overall, the interviews show that in most cases, the portfolio companies 
are not able to achieve the pre-set milestones. The interviews show that, similar to 
their counterparts in the United States, VCs in China also consider stage financing 
as an important way to terminate bad projects. However, the results demonstrate 
that LPVCFs and LCVCFs are different in the way to deal with the unsatisfied 
projects:  LPVCFs normally undertake tougher punishments for the unsatisfied 
projects than LCVCFs do.  If the stage financing indeed helps VCs to terminate 
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bad projects, it is expected that companies with better performance should gain 
more financing rounds and overall investment.  
Table 8.4VCs’ Solutions when the Milestones are not Achieved  
Q10: HAVE YOU EVER MADE THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS IF THE 
MILESTONES ARE NOT ACHIEVED?  
 All  (#) LPVCFs (#) LCVCFs(#) 
Terminating further funding  100%(27) 100% (18) 100% (9) 
Providing the funding under the conditions 
of contingent contract  
81.48% 
(22) 
94.44%(17) 55.56% (5) 
Postpone the decisions on further funding 22.22% (6) 15.79% (3) 33.33%(3) 
Providing further funding as stated in 
original contract 
11.54% (4) 5.56% (1) 33.33% (3)  
Looking for new investors for the company  18.52%(5) 15.79% (3) 25% (2) 
Providing bank loan warrantee for the 
company  
7.41% (2) 0 (0) 25% (2) 
8.2.2.2 Reduction of agency problems  
The second major reason for venture capitalists to employ stage financing 
is to solve potential agency problems due to information asymmetries. In some 
cases, entrepreneurs try to hide negative information and continue the projects. As 
a DVC pointed out, ‘He [entrepreneur] has quit a nice job and paid almost all 
savings and time to the new business. So, he may try every best to continue [the 
project] even [though] he knows there are problems with the projects. But, we 
don’t know. So we have to limit the investment size at [an] earlier stage and set up 
some hard measures to evaluate [their performance].’ (Info: VCF4).  
Moreover, conflicts of interest between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs are more complicated in venture capital investment, which is mainly 
focused on financing young high-technology companies. Entrepreneurs’ private 
interests, like investing in more risky projects to satisfy their own research 
interests or build up their personal reputation in research at the price of 
shareholders interests, are major concerns of venture capitalists. As a FVC 
mentioned, ‘They are passionate on what they do. In fact, that is what attracts me. 
But sometimes they go too far. They are crazy about their own ideas in 
technological improvement. If you don’t force them to face harder financial 
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constraints, they may invest infinitely in the technological details and turn the 
company into a real lab at the end of the day’ (Info: VCF19). Acknowledging the 
potential issues, most venture capitalists suggest that this kind of problem is hard 
to verify on time. One FVC further elaborated: ‘what even more serious is you 
don’t realize the dangers, so don’t they [entrepreneurs]. Sometimes you get 
excited with their ideas too. A thorough re-evaluation is a nice chance to cool both 
us down. As a rule, we have to discuss with other partners before the payment of 
next round. It helps a lot.’ (Info: VCF12). The findings are consistent with most of 
the existing literature on control theory, which suggests the option to withdraw 
future funding is critical for investors who invest in projects with a higher level of 
risk and greater uncertainties (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Bolton and Scharfstein, 
1990).  
Furthermore, venture capitalists in China also recognize the signalling and 
screening effects of staging contracts. Almost all venture capitalists expressed that 
pre-set milestones help them gain information about the potential of projects and 
screen out uncertain candidates. If the entrepreneur hesitates with stage financing, 
venture capitalists normally reconsider the deal. As one FVC said, ‘Well, I receive 
over 200 business plans per year. If you look at the business plans, it seems that 
over half of the young guys will be Bill Gates. But, when we talk about stage 
financing, some become much more conservative…So, you get some sense about 
the real value while negotiating milestones and punishment terms.’ (Info: VCF23). 
A DVC further addressed: ‘if they themselves are not confident in the milestones, 
how could we believe they can run [the company] well?’ (Info: VCF4).  
According to the interviews, venture capitalists in China consider stage 
financing as an important way to reduce potential agency problems due to the 
severe informational asymmetries in venture financing.  The initial findings from 
the interviews are consistent with most of the existing theoretical literature on 
stage financing and empirical evidence from the United States. However, a more 
objective analysis based on a larger sample is needed to facilitate the reliability 
and validity of the findings in from the in-depth interviews.  
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8.3 Hypotheses for the Quantitative Analysis 
As stated in the earlier section, consistent with the existing literature, the 
interviews reveal that venture capitalists indeed consider stage financing as an 
important mechanism in their investments in China. The results suggest that 
agency problems should be associated with the stage financing arrangements in 
China. If there is no agency problem, venture capitalists give entrepreneurs as 
much capital as they need upfront, and stage financing is not necessary. 
Alternatively, if stage finance is not used as a mechanism to mitigate agency 
problems and uncertainties in China, then no relationship between stage finance 
and investment performance is observed. 
The interviews also show that VCFs in China are divided by governance 
structure. The two different types of VCFs in China differ in terms of 
compensation schemes, decision-making process, and authorization systems, 
which may have great bearings in stage financing. The questions raised here are 
whether VCFs behave differently in stage financing and whether VCFs under 
limited partnership, which are all foreign VCFs, behave similarly to their counter 
parts in the United States; whereas LCVCFs under limited company structure, 
among which the majority are DVCFs, behave differently from VCFs under 
limited partnership in China and VCFs in the United States. In particular, this 
study explores whether stage financing is associated with agency problems and 
uncertainties and whether it is correlated with the performance of VC-backed 
companies. 
 To summarize, the following hypotheses are made: everything else being 
equal the more severe the agency problem is the more rounds of stage financing 
will be; better performed venture capital backed companies should be associated 
with more rounds of stage financing and with larger size of total venture 
investment; companies backed by LPVCFs may involve in more stage financing 
arrangements; and, the stage financing arrangements of LPVCFs and the 
performance of companies backed by LPVCFs are more sensitive to agency 
problems.  
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Poisson regression is used to estimate the number of financing rounds, 
since the variable is ordinal and non-negative.  Focusing on the number of rounds 
of stages, the regression model is specified as follows: 
 
Log(yi )= α + δIPOi + γMAi + β′ Xi + φLPVCFi + εi,   (1) 
where i is the index for the i-th VC-backed firm; y is the number of financing 
rounds; α is a constant; dummy variable IPO equals one if the company went 
public, which implies a successful investment; dummy variable MA equals one if 
the company was acquired, which also implies a successful outcome; X is a vector 
of variables measuring agency costs and uncertainties (at the industry level) 
associated with firm i; dummy variable LPVCF equals one if the company was 
backed by a VCF under limited partnership structure; and εit is a random error.  
Similarly, focusing on the size of total venture investments, the regression 
model is stated as:  
zi = α + δIPOi + γMAi + β′ Xi + φLPVCFi + εi,    (2) 
where zi is the size of total venture investments to company i; and all other 
variables are the same as model (1). 
The following hypotheses are tested: Coefficients δ and γ should be 
positive and significantly larger than zero, i.e. more successful companies receive 
more rounds of stage financing and more total funds; coefficient β should be 
significantly different from zero, i.e. stage financing strategy is affected by the 
degree of uncertainty and the seriousness of agency problems; coefficient φ should 
be significantly different from zero, i.e. VCFs under different structure use stage 
financing differently.   
In next step, the relation between agency problems and the intensity of 
stage financing (hereafter abbreviated as stage intensity) are examined in China. 
The duration between financing rounds measures the stage intensity. Stage 
financing requires extra effort and costs from venture capitalists. At the same time, 
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venture capital does not require collateral. Therefore, the capital invested may be 
completely sunk if the project fails. If venture capitalists take stage financing as an 
important means to control agency costs in China, they may have to balance the 
tradeoffs between the benefits and costs of stage financing intensity. It is thus 
expected that venture capitalists may shorten the duration between financing 
rounds and reduce the size of investment per financing round for companies that 
are associated with more severe agency problems. The development stage at the 
time of investment, age, R&D intensity, and intangibility of assets of the venture 
capital backed companies are included in this examination as measurements of 
agency costs. It is expected that the stage intensity is associated with corporate 
structure. 
Liquidity constraints of the venture capital market are included in the 
examination. As financial intermediaries, VCFs may face liquidity constraints, and 
the shortage of capital may influence their refinancing activities in stage financing. 
In this sense, more capital raised in the previous year may induce more frequent 
and larger venture capital investment (Petersen and Rajan, 1995).  
A survival analysis model, Cox regression, is used to estimate the duration 
between financing rounds, because the duration data is right-censored, i.e., the 
duration data can only be observed if the next financing rounds occurs; thus, the 
survival analysis focuses on the distribution of hazard rate to estimate the duration 
model. Cox Regression 44 is a semi-parametric survival analysis model that does 
not assume any particular distribution of survival time data. As such, Cox 
Regression is considered more robust than general parametric survival analysis 
                                                 
44 Cox proportional-hazards regression model is a broadly applicable and the most widely used method of survival analysis. 
Cox (1972) proposed a semi-parametric proportional hazards model that can be used to model survival data without pre-
specifying the distribution of the baseline hazard. This method is widely used and has been shown to be both robust and 
powerful. There are also some parametric proportional hazard models that assume that the survival times follow a given 
distribution. Under the correct baseline hazard distribution, parametric models are more powerful than the equivalent 
nonparametric or semi-parametric methods. However, when the true underlying distribution of the baseline hazard is 
unknown, Cox proportional hazards regression remains the method of choice for most simple survival analyses (Anderson, 
2006). Moreno et al. (2005) compare the Weibull and Cox proportional hazards models to a more conventional QTL-
mapping method that ignores the nature of the survival data and found that semi-parametric proportional hazards models 




models and can examine multiple factors and the association between those factors 
and survival time data. The duration regression model is addressed as follows:  
  
Log hi(t) = δEarlyi + γMiddlei +  β′ Xi + χAgei+ η Cashi+ ϕ Capi +φLPVCFi + εi,    (3) 
 
where i represents a venture capital backed deal; t is the time between financing 
rounds counted in year for deal i; hi(t) is the hazard rate for deal i being financed 
for t years; dummy variable Early equals one if the company was in its early 
development stage when deal i occurred; dummy variable Middle equals one if the 
company was in its middle development stage when deal i happened; X is a vector 
of variables measuring agency costs and uncertainties (at the industry level) 
associated with deal i; Age is a variable measuring company specific agency 
problems and uncertainties associated with deal i; Cash is a variable measuring 
liquidity constraints of venture capital market in the year when deal i happened; 
Cap is the investment size of deal i; dummy variable LPVCF equals one if the 
company was backed by a VCF under limited partnership structure; and εit is a 
random error. The coefficients in regression (3) are estimated via maximum 
likelihood estimators. These coefficients estimate the probability that the firm 
receives financing in a particular month given the values of the independent 
variables.  
Focusing on the size of venture investment per financing round, the 
regression model can be expressed as:  
 
Capi= α+ δEarlyi + γMiddlei + β′ Xi + χAgei+ η Cashi +φLPVCFi + εi,      (4) 
 
where Cap is the size of the venture investment involved in deal i and all other 
variables are the same as in model (3). 
The following hypotheses are tested: Coefficients δ, γ and β  should be 
negative and significant, while coefficient χ should be positive and significant, 
indicating that venture capitalists increase the stage intensity and reduce 
investment size per financing round for projects associated with more severe 
agency problems and uncertainties; η should be negative and significant in 
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regression (3) and positive and significant in regression (4), illustrating that 
venture capitalists shorten the financing duration and invest more per financing 
round when the liquidity constraints are reduced; and coefficient φ should be 
significantly different from zero to show that VCFs use stage financing differently.   
As expected, the VCFs under the two governance structures behave 
differently, so their stage financing strategies are discussed separately. The 
corporate structure and the compensation schemes provided by LPVCFs in China 
are similar to those of VCFs in the US under the same governance structure, but 
LCVCFs in China differ substantially. Differences are also shown in their stage 
financing arrangements. According to the interviews, LPVCFs arrange stage 
financing more frequently LCVCFs do in China. In addition, the LPVCFs 
terminate projects with negative signals more often. The qualitative findings 
suggest that LPVCFs exert more effort in ex-post monitoring activities, which is 
consistent with organizational theories. Researchers argue that more decentralized 
organizations provide stronger incentives for exploiting profit opportunities and 
actors are quick to adapt to changing circumstances as information is revealed 
through market prices (Milgrom and Robert, 1992; Holmstrom, 1992; Shleifer, 
1985). Compared with decentralized structures, however, centralized organizations 
provide managers with weaker incentives to maximize profits and normally incur 
additional bureaucratic costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). In the case of venture 
capital in China, VCFs under limited partnership provide high-powered incentives 
associated with unlimited liability, whereas VCFs under the limited company 
structure provide lower-powered incentives associated with limited liability to 
their investment professionals.  
If the qualitative findings can be generalized and the arguments concerning 
governance structure and incentives represent reality in China, then venture 
capitalists from LPVCFs should be more sensitive to agency problems and should 
exert more effort to improve profits in venture investments. In the case of stage 
financing, if stage financing is indeed an effective way to reduce agency costs and 
uncertainties in China, it is expected that the relationship among stage financing, 
performance, and agency costs should be more visible with LPVCF backed 
companies than that with LCVCF backed companies in China. 
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The following questions are addressed. First, for FVCFs under the same 
corporate governance structure (i.e. limited partnership), as their counterparts in 
the US, a natural experiment is conducted to investigate whether their location of 
operation makes a difference in their stage financing strategy. Second, for VCFs 
under different corporate governance structures, another natural experiment is 
conducted to explore whether different corporate structures cause VCFs to behave 
differently in stage financing. So, the same regression analyses as in the previous 
chapter are executed, excluding the dummy variable on corporate governance, for 
the two different groups of VCFs.  
8.4 Quantitative Analysis Data 
8.4.1 Data Sources 
A sample of 436 VC backed companies was randomly selected from a 
database of 640 companies. All of these companies received venture capital 
investment between 1990 and 2006, and their first round of financing occurred 
prior to January 2005. The database was composed with two sub-datasets: the 
Venture Economics Database 45  and a hand-collected database based on the 
interviews and archive analysis.46  
The two sub-datasets provide detailed investment information concerning 
venture capital backed companies. Each sub-dataset includes the name of the 
company; industry (in four digits); establishment data; current public status (e.g. 
public, private or acquired); total amount of venture investment gained; number of 
rounds of venture financing; dates of each venture financing round; amount of 
venture financing in each round; stage of the company at the time of each venture 
financing round; date of IPO, if relevant; name of the venture capital investors per 
round; and the nation of each investor.  
                                                 
45 This database contains information on over 200,000 private equity investments (one whole financing round consists of 
several single investments) and is widely recognized as a leading source of venture capital investment data. Currently, it has 
gathered investment information on over 530 venture capital deals in China. Moreover, this dataset has been used widely in 
previous venture capital research (e.g. Bygrave, 1989; Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 1999a; Kortum 
and Lerner, 2000).  
46 The hand-collected data were mainly gathered from our interviews with VCs conducted from 2004 to 2006 and from the 
websites of VCFs.  
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Information on development stage and public status of the companies 
outside of the Venture Economics’ Database was mainly gathered from the 
interviews, mass media, and the websites of the companies if available. Unlike 
news on issuing IPO, however, sometimes news on Merger and Acquisition (M & 
A) is not open to the public; thus, data on M&A might be underestimated. 
Furthermore, companies without information on IPO or M&A are considered 
privately held. The number of privately held companies may be overestimated, 
since it is possible that some companies have been bankrupted or merged and 
acquired, although their websites are still running; this could not be distinguished 
due to lack of accurate information. Therefore, the companies’ current public 
status is classified into three categories rather than four as in Gompers’ (1995) 
study.  
The intangible asset to total asset ratio is important information in the 
analysis. However, the financial data of venture capital backed companies are not 
available. It is thus assumed that for any given industry and any given year, the 
average ratio for venture capital back companies is the same as that the national 
average (Gompers, 1995). The national average ratio for each industry in every 
year is calculated from the Chinese industrial firm census data. A similar 
assumption is made for the R&D spending to value added ratio and the R&D 
spending in new products developments to value added ratio, which were obtained 
from China’s High-Tech Industry Statistics.47 The data were matched by year and 
industry to each company and each round of financing as in Gompers’ (1995) 
study.  
 Aggregate data on venture capital industry in China were collected from 
the China Venture Capital Yearbook 2003, published by China National 
Democratic Construction Press, and the Annual Report on Venture Capital In 
China (2002–2006) published by Zero2IPO Co., Ltd. The data include aggregate 
information on total venture capital funds under management, new capital funds 
raised, and the amount of venture capital invested in each year.  
                                                 
47 The data were on an aggregate level that only information technology, semi-conductor, electronic, medical care and 
biotech could be collected. This might influence the results, although most of our samples are in these industries. 
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8.4.2 Definition and Measurement of Variables 
8.4.2.1 Dependent Variables: Ex-post monitoring activities and financing size 
1. Intensity of VCs’ stage financing: Intensity of venture capitalists’ stage 
financing activities is measured by the duration between financing rounds 
(Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003; 2004). In this study, intensity 
is measured by time in years from funding date to the next funding dates for the 
venture capital backed deals. The shorter duration between funding rounds 
indicates a more intensive stage financing arrangement. Venture capitalists must 
exert extra effort in stage financing, therefore, the more frequently that venture 
capitalists make refinancing decisions, the more monitoring efforts that are exerted.   
2. Volume of VCs’ stage financing efforts: The efforts exerted by venture 
capitalists to monitor a company in stage financing are measured by the total 
number of financing rounds gained by the company. They must re-evaluate 
portfolio companies periodically and terminate unsuccessful projects. If 
monitoring activities work in this way, then a company with better performance 
should be associated with more financing rounds.  
3. Risk of loss: Risk of loss is measured by the investment size per financing 
round. Since collateral is usually not required in venture capital investment, capital 
can be completely lost if the project fails. Thus, the larger the size of investment 
per financing round, the greater the risk of loss for the investment is.  
4. The value of information revealed: The size of total investment in stage 
financing is taken as a measurement of the value of the information. Researchers 
suggest that a positive relationship between a well-performing company and the 
level of investment should not be obvious, unless the venture capital firm uses 
information during stage financing (Gompers, 1995; Conelli and Yosha, 2003). In 
this sense, the greater the amount of the total investment involved in a successful 
VC-backed company during stage financing, the higher the value of the 
information.  
8.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
1. Agency problems associated with venture capital backed companies 
a. Liquidation value of assets: Liquidation value of assets is measured by the 
portion of intangible assets that the company possesses (Williamson 1988). A 
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larger portion of intangible assets indicates higher expected agency costs. The 
industry average ratio of intangible assets to total assets is taken as a proxy of the 
liquidation value of the company.  
b. Asset specificity: Asset specificity is measured by the intensity of R&D 
(Riordan and Williamson 1985; Shleifer and Vishny 1992). Less asset specificity 
decreases expected agency costs. Industry average ratio of R&D spending to value 
added and the ratio of R&D spending in new product developments to value added 
are taken in this study as proxies for the R&D intensity.  
c. History of the company: The history of the company is measured by the age of 
the company at the time of venture financing.  A company that has a longer history 
is able to provide more information to investors, so venture capitalists can better 
judge their prospects. Agency costs and information problems should be lower for 
these firms (Gompers, 1995).  
d. Development stage of the company: The development stage is self-reported by 
the company at the time of venture financing. Normally, development stage is 
categorized into early stages (seed/start-up, first stage), expansion stages 
(expansion stage, second stage) and late stages (third stage, bridge, 
Buyout/acquisition, other late stages). Companies that are at early stages of 
development, such as the seed and start-up phases, provide less information to 
potential investors and encounter considerable management, market, and 
technological uncertainty (Gompers, 1995; Ruhnka and Young, 1987) that may 
cause more agency problems and other external risks. Therefore, expected agency 
costs and external risks should be reduced as firms move toward later stages.  
2. Performance of VC-backed companies: Performance is measured by the 
outcomes of the venture capital backed companies, i.e. public status of the 
companies by March 2006. The status of the companies is classified into three 
categories: IPO, acquired, or privately held.48 Studies show that divestments via 
IPO bring the highest returns to venture capitalists. Venture capitalists’ that exit 
through the M&A of their portfolio companies show the second best returns 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999a). Therefore, even though the measure is imprecise, 
                                                 
48 Unlike Gompers (1995), this study does not consider bankruptcy as one of the categories, since there is almost no source 
to find out bankruptcy information in China.  
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the classification may give some indication of investment performance, as 
Gompers (1995) suggests.49 Thus, companies that have issued IPO or have been 
acquired are considered more successful.  
3. Governance structure of VCFs: Since accurate information on the governance 
structure of VCFs is not available, governance structure is proxied by the origin of 
the venture capital firm. FVCFs are proxied as VCFs under limited partnership, 
while DVCFs are proxied as VCFs under the limited company structure. VCFs 
under limited partnership, which is a more decentralized structure, should provide 
stronger incentives to venture capitalists. However, VCFs organized under the 
limited company structure, which is more hierarchical, provide weaker incentives 
(Williamson, 1981; Holmstrom, 1992).  
4. Liquidity constraints of VCFs: The liquidity constraints of VCFs are measured 
by the amount of newly raised funds in the previous year (Gompers, 1995). 
According to free cash flow theory, the capital inflow may also impact the 
financiers’ behaviour. More inflow of capital may lead to free cash flow problems 
that induce overinvestment (Jensen, 1986). Thus, more newly raised funds may 
lead to larger and more frequent investments.  
8.4.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Sampled Data 
8.4.3.1 Time series of the sample 
Table 8.5 summarizes information on the time and amount of the total 
venture capital financing for the 436 companies. The 436 companies received 594 
individual rounds of venture capital financing, which represents over one fourth of 
all venture capital investment in China during the period.50  
It shows that the industry was modest in size in the early years and there 
were less than 10 venture capital deals before 1996. 1999 and 2000 saw a sharp 
                                                 
49 This study shares the same concerns with Gompers (1995) on how well the data may reflect the performance of the 
companies, since that it is unknown how well the companies do after each round of financing and if there are any other 
funding sources of the companies.  
 
50 According to the Annual Report on Venture Capital in China published by Zero2IPO, about 2200 venture capital deals 
closed in China by the end of 2005.  
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increase in venture capital financing with the issuance of Announcement No.151 
and the Internet boom in China. In 1999, 63 deals closed; in 2000, 134 deals 
closed. In 2001, the number of venture financing deals dropped dramatically to 64 
after the crash of the Dot Com Bubble. It remained steady until 2004, when the 
number of annual venture capital deals increased again to over 100. Overall, the 
sample data is consistent with the aggregate data on China’s venture capital 
industry during this period.  
                                                 
51 Announcement No.1 refers to the Proposal on Developing China’s VC Industry presented at the Ninth Conference of the 
NPC in 1998. It was proposed to encourage large corporations to invest in venture capital funds. It attracted serious 
attention from policy makers and became Announcement No.1. A series of policies followed to promote the venture capital 
industry. The policies further clarified the legitimacy of corporate venture capital institutions. China’s venture capital 
industry saw rapid development.  
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Table 8.5 Time Series of the Sample 
This sample consists of 436 randomly selected companies backed by venture capital institutions 
that received their first venture capital investment prior to Jan, 2005. The table shows the number 
of rounds, the number of new companies in each year in the sample, the number of companies 
known amount of investment, the sum and average amount of investment each year.  
 








( $000)  
Average 
Investment Per 
Round ( $000) 
No. of new 
firms financed 
1990 1 1 248 248.00 1
1991 1 1 141 141.00 1
1992 3 3 577 192.33 3
1993 4 3 16992 5664.00 4
1994 6 5 39910 7982.00 6
1995 9 4 136621 34155.25 9
1996 16 16 52612 3288.25 8
1997 20 18 97009 5389.39 13
1998 14 9 23188 2576.44 9
1999 63 45 283865.2 6308.12 48
2000 134 82 577563.3 7043.45 107
2001 64 32 1413994 44187.32 46
2002 60 43 1077616 25060.83 46
2003 63 45 1143539 25411.98 47
2004 105 79 1145308 14497.57 88
2005 27 17 333210.9 19600.64 0
2006 4 3 24500 8166.67 0
Total 594 436 6366895 15682.01 436
 
8.4.3.2 Distribution by industry, investment stage, outcome and investor  
Table 8.6 reports the distribution of the sampled investments across various 
industries by the financing rounds invested in each year. The results provide a 
clear picture on the transition of venture capital investment from traditional 
business to high-technology companies in China.  
Before the late 1990s, traditional businesses such as financial services, 
manufacturing, and consumer-related industries, attracted the majority of venture 
capital financing in China. This situation changed dramatically in 1999 with a 
sharp increase of investment in high-technology industries. Internet, computer, 
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communication, and semi-conductor companies have became more attractive with 
the global booming of IT industries and the great emphasis of China’s government 
on the construction of an information infrastructure and communication system in 
the late 1990s. The percentage of venture capital invested in high technology firms 
has not fallen below 70 per cent of annual investments since 1999 in China.  
Overall, venture capital investment focuses on high-technology industry 
companies. The average industry ratio of R&D spending to value added in this 
sample is 5.44 per cent. The average of R&D spending to value added for all 
manufacturing industry is 2.45 per cent in China from 2000 to 2005. R&D-
oriented companies are associated with more server information problems and 
higher rate of failure, which may require more expertise and effort from venture 
capitalists in monitoring and evaluating. The increasing number of venture 
investments in the high-technology industry suggests that venture capitalists in 
China concentrate on industries that need to be monitored and re-evaluated more 
often.  
Panel 2 of Table 8.6 presents investment distribution by stage. The table 
shows a relative decline of investment in late-stage projects and an increase of 
investment in early-stage projects. This trend reflects the growing weight of 
private sectors in China since the mid-1990s. Before 1995, the majority of the 
economy in China was either state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or township-village 
enterprises (TVEs) that were later-stage companies. A growing number of newly-
established companies were established in the second half of the 1990s, when the 
private sectors were recognized legally. In addition, this trend is consistent with 
the distribution of the investment across industries: most of the high-technology 
companies are newly established, especially those in the information technology 
and communication sectors. The changes in distribution of the investment across 
industries and stage show the growing confidence of venture capitalists in China’s 
market, but more effort is needed to deal with risks and uncertainties associated 
with the projects.  
Panel 3 of Table 8.6 demonstrates the distribution of investments made by 
different types of investors in this sample. It clearly shows strong interest from 
FVCFs, which are mainly organized under limited partnership, in China’s venture 
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capital market. Overall, 64.1 per cent of the total deals were backed by FVCFs; 
35.9 per cent by DVCFs. 
There is a bias in the sample: the number of projects backed by FVCFs 
before 1999 might be overestimated. However, the bias does not really influence 
this analysis, since the overall proportion of venture investment deals before 1999 
is very small for the overall sample.  The bias is consistent with the interviews 
with venture capitalists. Interviews show that FVCFs disclose more investment 
information to the public, since they must be more transparent in order to raise 
funds from international markets. However, domestic VCFs were mainly funded 
by the government or government-tied organizations before 1999 and faced less 
pressure for fundraising. The situation changed gradually since 1998, when more 
large corporations were encouraged to invest in venture capital institutions. 
DVCFs also began to compete for funds, although the pressure might not be the 
same.  
The distribution suggests that an insightful exploration on the differences 
in investment behaviour between FVCFs and DVCFs is important, given the two 
different types of VCFs operate under different organizational structure and the 
incentive schemes.  
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 Table 8.6 Distribution of Venture Capital Backed Deals by Industry and Stage (Unit: %) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Panel 1: Distribution of Investment across Industries (%) 
Internet Specific               5.00 14.29 34.92 35.07 10.94 6.67 11.11 18.10 25.93 25.00 
Computer Software 100.00                 14.29 16.42 18.75 28.33 15.87 6.67 14.81   
Computer Hardware               5.00   3.17 5.22 3.13 8.33 6.35 4.76 3.70 25.00 
Computer Others                   1.59 3.73 4.69 1.67 1.59 0.95     
Communication           11.11       9.52 11.94 15.63 20.00 25.40 25.71 11.11   
IC/Electronics         16.67   12.50   7.14 1.59 2.99 10.94 10.00 9.52 16.19 18.52 25.00 
Medical/Healthcare     66.67   16.67   25.00 15.00 7.14 6.35 5.22 14.06   1.59       
Bio-technology     33.33               2.24 6.25 1.67   0.95     
Business Service                     1.49 1.56 6.67 6.35 4.76 7.41   
Industrial/Energy   100.0   25.00 16.67 11.11   5.00   9.52 6.72     3.17 2.86     
Financial Service       25.00 16.67 11.11 12.50 5.00     2.24 3.13 3.33 3.17 2.86     
Consumer Related       50.00 16.67 33.33 25.00 35.00 50.00 12.70 2.24 4.69 10.00 11.11 12.38 14.81 25.00 
Arg/Forestr/Fishery               10.00 7.14 1.59 2.99   1.67   0.95     
Others               5.00 7.14 4.76   1.56     0.95 3.70   
New Material/Energy                     1.49 3.13     0.95     
Transportation           11.11 6.25 5.00         1.67 1.59       
Construction             12.50 5.00       1.56   1.59 0.95     
Manufacturing         16.67 22.22 6.25 5.00 7.14         1.59       
Panel: 2 Distribution of Investment by Stage (%) 
Others               5.00 7.14 4.76   1.56     0.95 3.70   
Early Stage 100.00 100.00 33.33 50.00 50.00 22.22 37.50 25.00 28.57 50.00 55.91 61.29 53.45 47.62 48.54 29.63 25.00 
Late Stage     66.67 50.00 50.00 77.78 62.50 75.00 71.43 50.00 44.09 38.71 46.55 52.38 51.46 70.37 75.00 
Panel 3: Distribution of Investment by Different VCFs (%) 
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Investor: FVCFs       75.0 83.3 100.0 100.0 94.7 92.3 56.1 40.3 49.2 70.0 80.7 75.3 76.0 100.0 
Investor: DVCFs 100.0 100.0 100.0 25.0 16.7     5.3 7.7 43.8 59.7 50.8   30 19.3 24.7       24.0   
 
 
Table 8.7 shows the distribution of outcomes for companies that received 
venture capital financing. The venture capital backed companies might go IPOs, 
undergo a merger or acquisition, or remain private as of 31 December 2004. Overall, 
the outcomes of venture capital backed companies China substantially differ from 
what was found by Gompers (1995) in the United States. First, only 11.86 per cent of 
the entire sample went IPO in China, whereas over 22.5 per cent of firms went IPO in 
the United States. Furthermore, over 80 per cent of the sampled companies are still 
privately held52 in China, while the percentage of companies being privately held or 
bankrupted was 53.7 per cent in the United States. This implies the underdevelopment 
of capital markets and M&A markets in China.  
In information technology, financial service, and consumer-related businesses, 
the proportion of the sampled companies that go public are higher than those in other 
industries. No companies go IPOs in the healthcare, bio-technology, construction, 
transportation, and manufacturing industries. These results imply that the return of 
venture capital investment is higher in information technology, consumer-related 
businesses and financial service and lower in healthcare, bio-tech, construction and 
manufacturing.  
Table 8.7 also shows that about 15 per cent of FVC-backed companies have 
gone IPOs. However, the percentage for companies backed by other VCFs (including 
DVCFs and joint VCFs) is only 7.22 per cent. The same trend is seen in companies 
that have merged or have been acquired. The result empirically evidences the long-
debated problems with exit channels of venture capital investment for DVCFs due to 
the underdeveloped capital market in China; it also raises the question of whether 
FVCFs indeed have more efficient monitoring and evaluating mechanisms to reduce 
risks and agency costs, which leads to a better rate of return.  
 
                                                 
52 The number of privately held companies may be overestimated, since some companies have been bankrupted merged, or 
acquired. However, these companies could not be distinguished due to lack of accurate information. I therefore classify all 
companies that have not gone IPO and have undergone M&A as privately held companies.   
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Table 8.7 Outcomes of the 436 Companies Backed by VC Investment 
 
The number of companies that are privately held or merged/acquired and those that have issued IPO as 
of March, 2006 is stated in the table. The first column shows the number and percentage of companies 
that are privately held in each industry, the second column are the number and percentage of the 
companies that have issued IPO in each industry, and, the third demonstrates those that were merged or 
acquired.  
 
 Panel 1: Outcomes for 436 venture capital backed companies by industry  
 Privately Held  Went Public Acquired 
 Number Row % Number Row % Number Row % 
Internet Specific 60 78.95 10 13.16 6 7.89 
Computer Software 54 81.82 8 12.12 4 6.06 
Computer Hardware 20 100         
Computer Others 10 100         
Communication 64 86.49 7 9.46 3 4.05 
IC/Electronics 28 84.85 5 15.15     
Medical/Healthcare 21 100         
Bio-technology 9 100         
Business Service 6 54.55 2 18.18 3 27.27 
Industrial/Energy 20 90.91 2 9.09     
Financial Service 11 73.33 4 26.67     
Consumer Related 27 65.85 12 29.27 2 4.88 
Arg/Forestr/Fishery 5 83.33 1 16.67     
New Material/Energy 4 100         
Transportation 3 75     1 25 
Construction 6 100         
Manufacturing 5 83.33     1 16.67 
Others 5 83.33     1 16.67 
Total  358 83.33 51 11.86 21 4.88 
Panel 2: Outcomes for 436 venture capital backed companies by different types of investors  
Investor: FVCFs 200 78.12% 38 14.84% 18 7.03% 
Investor: DVCFs 164 91.11% 13 7.22% 3 1.67% 
Total  364 83.49% 51 11.70% 21 4.82% 
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 8.4.3.3 Funding Statistics  
Funding statistics by industry, outcome, and type of investor are presented in 
Tables 8.8 through 8.10. The average total financing received, the number of funding 
rounds, and the age of the companies at first funding are shown by industry, outcome, 
and the type of their investors. Unlike Gompers’ (1995) findings, this study does not 
show any clear difference between high-technology industries and low-tech industries 
in most of the funding information. However, the pattern of the funding data is 
considerably different for companies with different outcomes. Furthermore, the 
descriptive statistics also show variability between FVCF-backed companies and 
companies backed by DVCFs.  
The sampled data do not show visible differences in the average number of 
financing rounds and the average total amount of investment between high-
technology companies and low-technology companies in China. This is different from 
the US practice documented by Gompers (1995) in which high-technology companies 
gain more funding than low-technology companies. This result is consistent with the 
interviews: the major risk concern of most venture capitalists is not the technological 
aspect of the projects, but the market and business model, particularly among foreign 
venture capitalists.   
Furthermore, the sample shows that the average age of high-technology 
companies at the time of the first round of venture funding is less than that of low-
tech companies in China. This finding also differs from Gompers’ (1995) study, 
which does not find a clear pattern based on the data in the United States. In this 
sample, companies in information, communication, semi-conductor, healthcare and 
biotechnology industries are less than 3 years old, while companies in traditional 
industries such as transportation, construction, and financial service, are more than 4 
years old at the time of first venture funding. The finding is consistent with most of 
the R&D financing literature, which suggests high-technology companies encounter 
more financial constraints for external investment after incorporation (Hall, 2002).  
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Regarding the funding structure of the venture capital backed companies by 
outcome, the findings share considerable similarity with the United States. The total 
amount of investment and number of financing rounds are greater for companies that 
have gone IPO than companies that are still privately held. This is consistent with 
Gompers’ (1995) findings. This result shows that stage financing is correlated with 
better performance of investment. Using stage financing, venture capitalists can make 
better decisions on whether to offer more capital in the next round based on the 
information revealed.  
There are also differences in funding patterns between companies backed by 
FVCFs and those backed by DVCFs. From the descriptive statistics, FVCF backed 
companies receive more total investments than DVCF backed companies. Primarily, 
the average amount of capital gained is $27.3 million for FVCF backed companies 
and $ 5.9 million for DVCF backed companies.  This phenomenon also occurs in 
companies that have gone IPO. The result indicates that FVCs may need to exert more 
effort in monitoring activities to reduce risks, given their large amount of investment 
in each company compared with DVCs. This is evidenced by the statistics on total 
financing rounds of the venture capital backed companies. As shown in Table A1.4, 
the average number of financing rounds is 1.44 for FVCF backed companies and 1.20 
for DVCF backed companies. FVCF backed companies that have gone IPO gain an 
average of 1.95 rounds of venture financing, while DVC-backed companies gain only 
1.23 rounds.  
Moreover, DVCF backed companies are younger than FVCF backed 
companies in general and for companies that have been merged and being privately 
held in particular. Among companies that have gone IPO, FVCF backed companies 
are substantially younger than DVCF backed companies. Because younger companies 
may face more risks and uncertainties, DVCF backed companies are expected to have 
more frequent monitoring activities from venture capitalists. However, the data on the 
total number of financing rounds as shown in Table A1.4 does not support this. The 
result again shows that DVCFs may be more reluctant to employ stage financing than 
FVCFs.  
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An interesting observation from the statistics is that the average number of 
financing rounds and the amount of total venture investments for DVCF backed 
companies that have undergone M&A are larger than FVCF backed companies. The 
results imply lack of exit channels for DVCFs in China due to the underdeveloped 
capital market.   
Table 8.8 The Number of Financing Rounds for the Sampled 436 Companies 
                    Panel 1: Total Number of Rounds of Investment by Industry 
 All Companies  Privately Held Went IPO Acquired  
Industry  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Internet Specific 1.49 1 1.33 1 2.20 2 2.00 2
Computer Software 1.22 1 1.20 1 1.25 1 1.50 1
Computer Hardware 1.40 1 1.40 1     
Computer Others 1.20 1 1.20 1     
Communication 1.19 1 1.17 1 1.43 1 1.00 1
IC/Electronics 1.45 1 1.36 1 2.00 1   
Medical/Healthcare 1.45 1 1.48 1     
Bio-technology 1.11 1 1.11 1     
Business Service 1.45 1 1.00 1 2.50 3 1.67 1
Industrial/Energy 1.14 1 1.00 1 2.50 3   
Financial Service 1.27 1 1.18 1 1.50 1   
Consumer Related 1.71 1 1.63 1 1.75 2 2.50 3
Arg/Forestry/Fishery 1.67 1 1.80 1 1.00 1   
New Material/Energy 1.25 1 1.25 1   2.00 2
Transportation 1.25 1 1.00 1     
Construction 1.00 1 1.00 1     
Manufacturing 1.17 1 1.20 1   1.00 1
Others 1.17 1 1.20 1   1.00 1
Panel 2: Number of Rounds of Investment Backed by Different VCFs 
 All Companies  Privately Held Went IPO Acquired  
VCFs  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Investor: FVCFs 1.44 1 1.34 1 1.95 1 1.50 1 
Investor: DVCFs 1.22 1 1.20 1 1.23 1 2.67 3 
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Table 8.9  Age of the Companies at the First Round of Venture Financing  
Panel 1: Age of the Company at the First Round of VC Investment by Industry 
 All Companies  Privately Held Went IPO Acquired  
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Internet Specific 1.63 1 1.71 1 2.10 2 0.67 1
Computer Software 3.45 3 2.95 2 6.75 8 1.25 1
Computer Hardware 1.44 0 1.44 0     
Computer Others 1.20 0 1.20 0     
Communication 2.38 2 2.21 2 3.50 3 2.00 2
IC/Electronics 3.10 2 2.40 2 5.20 5   
Medical/Healthcare 2.63 1 2.80 1     
Bio-technology 2.00 1 2.00 1     
Business Service 2.33 1 1.00 1 0.50 0.5 5.33 7
Industrial/Energy 10.10 1 5.75 0 27.50 28   
Financial Service 4.82 5 3.00 2 8.00 8   
Consumer Related 3.05 2 2.85 2 4.75 5 1.00 1
Arg/Forestry/Fishery 2.67 0 2.67 0 . .   
New 
Material/Energy 
1.75 0 1.75 0     
Transportation 4.00 4 4.00 4   . . 
Construction 4.00 3 4.00 3     
Manufacturing 4.00 4 8.00 8   0.00 0
Others 8.00 8 12.00 12   4.00 4
Panel 2: The Age of the Companies at the First Round of Investment Backed by Different VCFs  
VCFs Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Investor: FVCFs 3.34 2 3.09              2 4.84            3 2.06            2
Investor: DVCFs 2.27 1 1.80 1 8.22           8 0.67 0
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Table 8.10 Total Investment Received by the Sampled 436 Companies 
Panel 1: Total Investment received per Company by Industry 
 All Companies  Privately Held Went Public Acquired  
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Internet Specific 19092.29 6290 9395.105 5000 73206.12 40000 15217.98 14000
Computer Software 6131.809 3685 6255.276 3670 4738.6 3700 8733.33 9200
Computer Hardware 19369.34 4700 19369.34 4700     
Computer Others 1281.75 78.5 1281.75 78.5     
Communication 24563.46 3000 11111.54 2450 126833.3 9000 2800 2800
IC/Electronics 82205.2 7725.05 16649.1 6998 357540.8 24315.2   
Medical/Healthcare 3962.242 3300 3962.242 3300     
Bio-technology 5831 1084.5 5831 1084.5     
Business Service 22503.43 4000 1318.5 619 56125 56125 40000 40000
Industrial/Energy 8198.688 288.5 7165.667 266 23694 23694   
Financial Service 24004.5 9500 13008.38 9500 45996.75 16193.5   
Consumer Related 11972.16 7464 9876.227 7464 17229 6750 14000 14000
Arg/Forestry/Fishery 18583.5 13817 24211.33 25164 1700 1700   
New Material/Energy 1850 1850 1850 1850     
Transportation 2369.333 920 3094 3094   920 920
Construction 7267 3453.5 7267 3453.5     
Manufacturing 7258.25 3510.5 7345 23   6998 6998
Others 20030 12000 24675 14094.5   1450 1450
Panel 2: Total Investment received per Company by Different VCFs  
VCFs Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Investor: FVCFs 27309.57 6500.10 12163.85 5800 109076.22 23694 11982.15 6998 
Investor: DVCFs 5912.07 1756 5272.33 1000 11400.00 3385 9830 9200 
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Table 8.11 Industry, Outcomes and Investors of the 436 Companies 
Panel 1: Number of Companies by Industry  
 Full  Privately Held  Went Public Acquired 
Internet Specific 76 60 10 6
Computer Software 66 54 8 4
Computer Hardware 20 20     
Computer Others 20 10     
Communication 74 64 7 3
IC/Electronics 33 28 5   
Medical/Healthcare 21 21     
Bio-technology 9 9     
Business Service 11 6 2 3
Industrial/Energy 22 20 2   
Financial Service 15 11 4   
Consumer Related 41 27 12 2
Arg/Forestry/Fishery 6 5 1   
New Material/Energy 4 4     
Transportation 4 3   1
Construction 6 6     
Manufacturing 6 5   1
Others 6 5   1
Panel 2: Number of Firms Known Current Public Status backed by Different VCFs   
 All Companies Active Investment Went Public Acquired
Investor: FVCFs 236 200 38 18
Investor: DVCFs 200 164 13 3
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8.5 Quantitative Findings and Analysis  
8.5.1 Total Number of Financing Rounds and Financial Size  
Table 8.12 reports the regression results on the relation between the 
performance of the venture capital backed companies and venture capitalists’ stage 
financing arrangements. Panel A is the Poisson regression on the total number of 
financing rounds. Panel B is the OLS regression on total amount of investment 
received by the venture capital backed company. Overall, the regression results 
confirm that the financing stage intensities, measured by the number of financing 
stages and the total amount of investments, are associated with the performance of the 
venture investment in China. As shown from the Poisson regression results in Panel 
A,53 companies that have gone public received significantly more venture financing 
rounds than those that are remain private. Additionally, companies that have been 
acquired or merged also gained more venture financing rounds than those that remain 
private, although the power and significance are not as strong as with companies that 
went public. The same pattern is seen in the relationship between the outcomes of 
venture capital backed companies and the amount of total investment, as shown in 
Panel B.  
The results imply that, consistent with most of the existing literature, stage 
financing helps VCFs to terminate bad projects with the information revealed over 
time in China. When VCFs see potential from portfolio companies to issue IPO or to 
be sold to other buyers during re-evaluation for next financing round, they may 
choose to continue the investment; otherwise, they may withdraw future investments.  
To a large extent, this finding is similar to results in the US venture capital 
market (Gompers, 1995). However, a major difference is that stage intensities for 
Chinese companies that are acquired and those that are privately held are statistically 
the same. A plausible explanation of this difference is that M&A is an important 
alternative channel for venture capital divestment in China where the capital markets 
are still underdeveloped. This is particularly true for DVCFs that have fewer choices 
                                                 
53 This study uses Poisson regression to estimate the number of financing rounds, since the variable is ordinal and non-negative.   
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for divestment. Even FVCFs may face similar problems. For example, the 
shareholders in international capital markets may have less confidence in China’s 
political or legal environments or less knowledge of Chinese business models.  
Measuring agency cost by asset intangibility (companies with more intangible 
assets may have more severe agency problems) by R&D spending (R&D projects 
involve more agency problems than other investments), Panel A shows that asset 
intangibility is significantly and positively correlated with the total number of 
financing rounds. Moreover, the size and the significance of the effects of asset 
intangibility substantially increase when the measure of R&D spending in new 
product development is included in the regression. The correlation test shows that 
asset intangibility is closely related with R&D spending in new product development 
in China. Companies in industries that spend more on new product development have 
more intangible assets; as a result; these companies encounter more severe agency 
problems. Thus, venture capitalists tighten their monitoring activities by periodically 
staging capital infusion. Similarly, as shown in Panel B, industries with more 
intangible assets receive more total investment through the greater number of 
financing rounds, although the effects are not statistically significant. However, R&D 
intensity does not seem impact the total amount of financing or the number of venture 
financing rounds. Overall, the findings in China are similar to the US practice 
discovered by Gompers (1995), which also confirms that intangibility is the most 
important industry factor explaining total venture financing and the number of venture 
financing rounds.  
Concerning the impact of governance structures of VCFs on stage intensity, 
Table 8.12 confirms the hypothesis that VCFs with different corporate structures use 
stage financing differently. As shown in Panel A, companies backed by LPVCFs gain 
more financing rounds than companies backed by LCVCFs, although the effects are 
weakened when agency costs and uncertain factors are included. However, the 
regression also demonstrates that VCFs’ governance structures improve the effects of 
agency costs substantially. The correlation analysis shows that LPVCFs invest more 
in industries with higher R&D intensity and a higher ratio of intangible assets.  This 
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may shed light on why LPVCFs use more stage financing than LCVCFs. At the same 
time, the total investment size gained by companies backed by LPVCFs is much 
larger than those backed by LCVCFs. As a matter of fact, VCF governance structure 
is the most important factor among all variables in determining the size of total 
investment in China. The result shows that LPVCFs invest more capital in companies 
associated with more risks and uncertainties in China. Accordingly, they arrange more 
stage financing deals in order to reduce the potential risks and uncertainties. 
As discussed in the previous section, most US venture capital firms are 
structured as limited partnerships. Therefore, investment activities of the LPVCFs 
under China’s institutional environment may differ from their counterparts in the 
United States. Given this study is an examination on investment activities of VCFs 
under different governance structures within China, other institutional environments 
are controlled to identify how institutions impact business behaviour in China.  
Table 8.13 reports the regression results of stage intensity for companies 
backed by LPVCFs. Table 8.14 reports the regression results for companies backed by 
LCVCFs. The analysis demonstrates that LPVCFs behave similarly to their 
counterparts in the United States, whereas LCVCFs behave differently. As illustrated 
in Table 8.13, for the companies backed by LPVCFs, performance is closely related to 
the number of financing rounds and total investment. Companies that have gone IPO 
received substantially more venture financing rounds and more total investment. The 
industry ratio of intangibility is also related to the number of financing rounds, 
although the effects are not significant statistically.  
In contrast, for companies backed by LCVCFs, companies that have gone IPO 
received substantially fewer financing rounds than those that remain private (Table 
8.14). However, companies that have been acquired experienced more intensive stage 
financing. Companies with more intangible assets gain more total investments, but the 
number of financing rounds does not increase accordingly. This result implies that 
VCFs under the limited company structure did not deploy stage intensity to respond to 
agency costs. That is, VCFs behave differently depending on their corporate 
governance structure.  
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Table 8.12 Regressions for the Number of Financing Rounds and Total Investment of 
the Venture Capital Backed Companies  
 
The sample is 436 randomly selected venture capital backed companies in China prior Jan 2005. 
Estimates are from Poisson regression for Panel A and OLS regression for Panel B (t-statistics for the 
regression coefficients are in parentheses.). The dependent variable is the number of total financing 
rounds in Panel A and logarithm of the amount of total funding revived by the company in thousands in 
constant 2000 US Dollar in Panel B. Independent variables include a dummy variable that equal 1 if the 
company completed an initial public offering, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company was 
acquired, and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company was backed by LPVCFs. Age of the 
company refers to the age of the company at the first venture financing round that is calculated by year. 
Intangibility of assets is measured by the average ratio of intangible assets to total assets for the firms 
in the company’s industry. R&D intensity is proxied by the average industry ratio of R&D spending to 
value added or R&D spending in new products development to value added.  
 
Panel A Regression for the Number of Financing Rounds  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE NUMBER OF FINANCING  ROUNDS RECEIVED BY ALL 
VC-BACKED COMPANIES  
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(1.55) 
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Ratio of R&D 
spending in new 
products development 
to value added 
  0.030 
(0.96) 




Investor-LPVCFs    0.126 
(2.07) 




Pseudo R square 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.01 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
Chi-square 15.03 10.97 12.52 25.62 11.00 16.49 12.95 17.37 
Log pseudo likelihood -
423.89 
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Panel B Regression for the Total Investment  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOGARITHM OF TOTAL VENTURE FINANCING RECEIVED 
Independent 
variables 



















































Ratio of intangible 
assets to total assets  
0.148 
(1.37) 
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  0.012 
(0.22) 
 
Ratio of R&D 








  0.033 
(0.60) 






R-Square 0.096 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.089 0.247 0.355 0.359 
F-Statistics 8.473 7.029 6.723 5.265 5.398 33.209 19.777 19.572 
 
 
Table 8.13 Regressions for the Number of Financing Rounds and Total Investment for 
Companies Backed by LPVCFs 
 
The sample is composed by 256 companies backed by LPVCFs in China prior Jan 2005. Estimates are 
from Poisson regression for Panel A and OLS regression for Panel B (t-statistics for the regression 
coefficients are in parentheses.). The dependent variable is the number of total financing rounds in 
Panel A and logarithm of the amount of total funding revived by the company in thousands in constant 
2000 US Dollar in Panel B. Independent variables include a dummy variable that equal 1 if the 
company completed an initial public offering, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company was 
acquired. Age of the company refers to the age of the company at the first venture financing round that 
is calculated by year. Intangibility of assets is measured by the average ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets for the firms in the company’s industry. R&D intensity is proxied by the average industry ratio 
of R&D spending to value added or R&D spending in new products development to value added.  
 
Panel A Regression for the Number of Financing Rounds  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NUMBER OF FINANCING  ROUNDS  
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(0.87) 











Ratio of R&D spending in 
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Pseudo R square 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.017 
Log pseudo likelihood -234.850 -220.650 -214.324 -220.622 -214.227 
Panel B Regression for Total Venture Financing  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOGARITHM OF TOTAL VENTURE FINANCING  































Ratio of intangible assets 
to total assets  
0.053 
(0.443) 











Ratio of R&D spending in 
new products development 
to value added 




R-Square 0.133 0.139 0.138 0.141 0.138 
F-Statistics 7.697 7.472 7.327 5.678 5.547 
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Table 8.14 Regressions for the Number of Financing Rounds and Total Investment for 
Companies Backed by LCVCFs 
 
The sample is composed by 180 companies backed by LCVCFs in China prior Jan 2005. Estimates are 
from Poisson regression for Panel A and OLS regression for Panel B (t-statistics for the regression 
coefficients are in parentheses.). The dependent variable is the number of total financing rounds in 
Panel A and logarithm of the amount of total funding revived by the company in thousands in constant 
2000 US Dollar in Panel B. Independent variables include a dummy variable that equal 1 if the 
company completed an initial public offering, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company was 
acquired. Age of the company refers to the age of the company at the first venture financing round that 
is calculated by year. Intangibility of assets is measured by the average ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets for the firms in the company’s industry. R&D intensity is proxied by the average industry ratio 
of R&D spending to value added or R&D spending in new products development to value added.  
 
Panel A Regression for the Number of Financing Rounds  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE NUMBER OF FINANCING  ROUNDS RECEIVED  
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0.043 
(1.06) 











Ratio of R&D spending in 
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Pseudo R square 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.0129 
Log pseudo likelihood -185.099 -168.752 -164.766 -168.734 -164.66 
Panel B Regression for Total Venture Financing  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOGARITHM OF TOTAL VENTURE FINANCING RECEIVED 
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0.305 
(1.892) 












Ratio of R&D spending in 
new products development to 
value added 




R-Square 0.092 0.074 0.049 0.074 0.105 
F-Statistics 2.75 2.012 1.244 1.502 2.092 
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8.5.2 Duration and the Size of Investment per Financing Round in China  
Stage duration and investment size per financing round are also measured for 
stage financing. Given that entrepreneurs usually have few tangible assets to be used 
as collateral, a VC investment may be sunk if a project does not go well. VCFs should 
therefore adjust the frequency of financing stages. The empirical literature shows that 
venture capitalists shorten the duration and reduce the size of investment per round for 
projects with higher risks in the US in order to mitigate the risks of loss (Gompers, 
1995; Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003; 2004). This section investigates how VCFs 
structure their stage financing in China and whether VCFs under different corporate 
governance structures behave differently in terms of stage financing.  
Table 8.15 summarizes the average duration, amount of venture capital 
funding, and the number of deals by development stage of the companies at the time 
of venture financing, and the type of VCFs in China. 54   Overall, only 29 stage 
financing deals occurred with early-stage projects. The majority of the stage financing 
deals occurred during the expansion stage. More information on performance is 
revealed with the development of the companies. The results imply that venture 
capitalists try to re-evaluate the performance of their portfolio companies at the 
expansion stage based on additional information received. Table 8.15 shows that the 
financing duration for early-stage deals is shorter than that for later stage deals. For 
companies at later stages, more information is revealed to VCFs, and the amount of 
tangible assets increases. Therefore, late-stage companies may be associated with 
fewer agency problems and uncertainty. Hence, venture capitalists may be willing to 
invest more capital per round and reduce staging frequency.  
 
                                                 
54 The analysis in this study classifies each financing stage according to the company’s stage of development at the time of 
financing as reported by the VentureEconomics’ database or the disclosures from VCFs. The information is self-reported by 
venture capital firms. There are no clear divisions between the definitions of each stage, so divisions should be seen as relative 
measures rather than absolute measures (Gompers, 1995).  
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Table 8.15 The Duration and Investment Size per Financing Rounds   
 Duration of Financing Round Average Investment Per Round ( $000) 
 Mean Median Valid N Mean Median Valid N 
Seed/Start-up 1.000 1 7 4631.160 1086.00 57 
Early Stage .864 1 22 19126.621 3062.50 84 
Expansion 1.375 1 96 11291.617 5047.50 216 
Later Stage 2.214 2 14 48307.115 15282.00 20 
LBO/Acquisition 2.750 2 4 75066.455 6600.00 11 
Other Stage 1.273 1 11 15283.571 1650.00 14 
 
Table 8.16 reports the regression results for determinants of stage duration and 
investment size per financing round for all 436 companies in this sample. Panel A 
shows the results of the Cox regressions for funding duration, that is, the time in years 
from one venture financing round to the next. Panel B shows the results of the OLS 
regressions for funding size per investment. Two dummy variables are included in the 
regression to capture the development stages of venture capital backed companies: 
early (dummy variable equals one if the company is in the early stage at time of 
financing) and middle (dummy equals to one if the company is in the middle stage). 
The development stage of the companies is reported by VCFs. Another dummy 
variable is included in the regression to capture the VCF’s corporate structure: 
LPVCF, which equals one if the company is backed by a VCF under limited 
partnership. Agency costs, company factors, and venture capital market liquidity 
factors are also included.  
The results in Table 8.16 suggest that stage duration decreases with greater 
R&D intensity. Both R&D intensity variables are negatively and significantly 
correlated to financing duration in China. Higher R&D intensity is usually associated 
with more uncertainties and more severe agency problems. Thus, venture capitalists 
must shorten each stage to increase stage intensity in order to monitor progress. This 
finding is consistent with theory and with the US data (Gompers, 1995). The 
intangibility of assets is negatively and significantly associated with stage duration 
when VCF’s governance structure and the ratio of R&D spending in new product 
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development are included in the regression.  Otherwise, intangibility of assets has no 
statistically significant relationship with stage duration. 
Agency costs are included in regressions 4 and 5. The R&D intensity variables 
remain negatively and significantly correlated to financing duration. In addition, the 
size and significance level for the effects of R&D spending on new product 
development to value added substantially increase when assets intangibility is 
included. The effects of intangibility of assets greatly improve when R&D spending 
on new product development is added to the regression. Given that the ratio of R&D 
spending on new product development is significantly correlated to asset intangibility, 
industries that invest more in R&D for new product development are more likely to 
have a higher ratio of intangible assets and thus higher agency costs. The overall 
impact of agency costs on venture capitalists’ stage financing is similar to the findings 
of Gompers (1995).  
Furthermore, the age of the companies at the time of venture financing is 
significantly and positively related to financing duration in China. The financing 
duration for younger companies is substantially shorter for older companies. Younger 
companies normally have little information about their track records and face more 
internal and external uncertainties. Hence, venture capitalists finance them with more 
intensive stages. Similarly, companies at early stages are associated with shorter 
financing duration.  
Panel B reports the regression for the size of investment per financing round. 
The development stage is significantly and negatively correlated with the size of 
investment per financing round. Early and middle stage companies gain substantially 
less capital per round than those in later stages. Projects in earlier stages are more 
uncertain. Therefore, venture capitalists are more cautious in the size of the 
investment per round. This result is consistent with the findings from the United 
States (Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Per Stromberg, 2003; 2004). However, this study 
also finds that there is no significant relationship between the age of companies and 
the investment size per funding round in China.  That is because some early stage 
projects are carried out by more mature companies in China.  However, the results in 
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Panel B of Table 8.16 indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between agency costs and the size of each round of investment.55  
Examining the impact of liquidity constrains of VCFs on their stage intensity, 
the results in Table 8.9 show that the duration between financing rounds is 
significantly and negatively associated with the inflow of capital, whereas the pattern 
for investment size per round is opposite. The result is similar to the findings from the 
United States (Gompers, 1995). This indicates that stage financing is associated with 
harder budget constraints of the VCFs (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Huang and Xu, 
1998). It may also indicate that control over free cash flow provides incentives to 
venture capitalists to invest more carefully (Jensen, 1986).  
In this sample, 70 of 256 companies backed by LPVCFs were financed with 
stage financing, compared to only 26 of 186 companies backed by LCVCFs. 
Moreover, we have financing duration data for 54 LPVCF backed companies and 10 
LCVCF backed companies. Given the small sample size of the stage duration data 
from LCVCFs, no statistic relationship between financing duration and governance 
structure was found. 
The regression in Panel B of Table 8.16 shows that the investment size per 
financing round of the companies backed by LPVCFs is substantially larger than 
those backed by LCVCFs in China. This implies that the examination actually shows 
the regularity of financing duration of LPVCF backed companies solely.  
Table 8.17 reports the investment size of the companies backed by LPVCFs, 
while Table 8.18 demonstrates the investment size of companies backed by LCVCFs. 
The results in Table 8.17 show that the pattern of the investment size per round gained 
by LPVCF backed companies is similar to the discoveries from the United States. 
Companies at both early and middle stages gained substantially less capital per round 
than later stage companies. Age is significantly and positively associated with the size 
of investment. The significance and power of the effects of both company specific 
                                                 
55 A plausible explanation is that China lacks protection for intellectual property rights that discourage high-tech companies to 
file patents. At the same time, the accounting standards for the calculation of intangible assets in China are different from that in 
Western countries. 
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factors increases. An interesting phenomenon shown in Panel A is the significantly 
negative relationship between intangibility of assets and the investment size per round 
of the companies backed by LPVCFs. Another interesting finding is that the effect of 
capital inflow on the size of investment substantially decreases for LPVCFs. The 
result is mirrored by Table 8.18, which shows that the effect of capital inflow for 
LCVCFs substantially increases when the firms are examined separately. However, 
Table 8.18 shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between agency 
costs or development stage to investment size for companies backed by LCVCFs.  
These results indicate that VCFs under different corporate governance structures are 
completely different in dealing with agency costs and uncertainties.  
- 266 - 
Table 8.16 Regressions for the Duration and Investment Size per Round  
 
The sample is 594 funding rounds for 436 venture capital backed companies for the period 1990 to 
2006. Panel A is the maximum likelihood estimates for Cox regression survival models (P-value for 
coefficients are in parentheses.). Panel B is estimates for OLS regression (t-statistics for coefficients are 
in parentheses.).  The dependent variable for Panel A is the time in years from funding date to the next 
funding dates.  The dependent variable for Panel B is logarithm of the round’s funding amount in 
thousands of 2000 US Dollars. Independent variables include a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
funding round is at either early development stage (i.e. seed, start-up, early, first, or other early stages) 
and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the funding rounds is at middle stage (expansion stage, second 
stage, and other expansion stage), and, a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the company was backed 
by LPVCFs. Liquidity in the venture capital industry is controlled using new fund raised in previous 
year in millions in constant 2000 US dollars. Intangibility of assets is measured by the average ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets for the firms in the company’s industry. R&D intensity is proxied by the 
average industry ratio of R&D spending to value added or R&D spending in new products development 
to value added.  
 
Panel A   Regression for Duration of Funding per Round  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DURATION BETWEEN FINANCING ROUNDS 
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Capital raised in previous 













Logarithm of the amount 














Age of the company at 













Ratio of intangible assets 
to total assets  
-0.067 
(0.25) 





Ratio of R&D spending 






Ratio of R&D spending 
in new products 
development to value 
added 





Investor--LPVCFs      0.325 
(0.803) 
Chi-square 26.825 26.127 24.971 27.499 27.52 16.926 
-2 Log Likelihood 404.382 405.080 307.022 403.708 304.473 607.379 
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Panel B Regression for Funding Size per Financing Round   
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:    LOGARITHM OF AMOUNT OF FUNDING PER ROUND                    
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-0.023 
(-0.51) 
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  0.030 
(0.82) 
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  0.069 
(1.27) 






R-Square 0.144 0.152 0.159 0.164 0.157 0.166 0.206 0.182 
F-Statistics 6.66 7.581 6.72 6.42 5.67 10.409 7.155 6.970 
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Table 8.17 Regressions for the Investment Size per Round for Companies Backed by 
LPVCFs  
 
The sample is 381 funding rounds for 256 LPVCF backed companies for the period 1990 to 2006. It 
reports the estimates for OLS regression (t-statistics for coefficients are in parentheses.).  The 
dependent is logarithm of the round’s funding amount in thousands of 2000 US Dollars. Independent 
variables include a dummy variable that equals 1 if the funding round is at either early development 
stage (i.e. seed, start-up, early, first, or other early stages) and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
funding rounds is at middle stage (expansion stage, second stage, and other expansion stage). Liquidity 
in the venture capital industry is controlled using new fund raised in previous year in millions in 
constant 2000 US dollars. Intangibility of assets is measured by the average ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets for the firms in the company’s industry. R&D intensity is proxied by the average industry 
ratio of R&D spending to value added or R&D spending in new products development to value added.  
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R-Square 0.183 0.144 0.188 0.155 0.160 




 - 269 -                                                              
Table 8.18 Regressions for Investment Size per Round for Companies Backed by 
LCVCFs  
 
The sample is 231 funding rounds for 180 LPVCF backed companies for the period 1990 to 2006. It 
reports the estimates for OLS regression (t-statistics for coefficients are in parentheses.).  The 
dependent is logarithm of the round’s funding amount in thousands of 2000 US Dollars. Independent 
variables include a dummy variable that equals 1 if the funding round is at either early development 
stage (i.e. seed, start-up, early, first, or other early stages) and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
funding rounds is at middle stage (expansion stage, second stage, and other expansion stage). Liquidity 
in the venture capital industry is controlled using new fund raised in previous year in millions in 
constant 2000 US dollars. Intangibility of assets is measured by the average ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets for the firms in the company’s industry. R&D intensity is proxied by the average industry 
ratio of R&D spending to value added or R&D spending in new products development to value added.  
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:    LOGARITHM OF AMOUNT OF FUNDING PER ROUND                    
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R-Square 0.186 0.200 0.067 0.183 0.052 
F-Statistics 3.518 3.697 1.93 3.021 1.462 
  
Overall, the regression examinations confirm the predictions raised in the 
previous section. However, it should be noted that the R-squares for the Poisson 
regressions and the OLS regressions on the size of the investment per financing round 
are relatively low. The R-square values for the Poisson regressions range from 0.007 
to 0.017. The R-square values for the OLS regressions on the size of the investment 
per financing round range from 0.052 to 0.20. Although it is suggested that the R-
squares value for the Poisson regressions are normally lower than in the OLS 
regressions, the low R-square values indicates that other factors may better explain the 
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total number of financing rounds. However, the lack of data has long been a common 
concern in studies on venture capital investment, and it is difficult for researchers to 
test other possibilities. Low R-square values have also been reported by Gompers 
(1995) that range from 0.007 to 0.02 for the regression for the total number of 
financing rounds of the venture capital backed companies in the United States. The 
regressions show that the corporate governance structure of the VCFs is associated 
with the stage financing arrangements in China. Additionally, the stage financing 
arrangements are correlated with agency problems and the performance of venture 
capital investment only when the VCF structured as a limited partnership.  
8.5.3 Alternative Explanations 
While the results from the above sections are consistent with the predictions 
that institutions have impacts on VCs’ stage financing strategy in China, alternative 
explanations may explain the results.  
Above all, similar to the discussion in Chapter 6, it might be argued that VCs’ 
different stage financing strategy is the result of the distinctions between domestic and 
foreign VCFs rather than the differences between VCFs under the two different 
governance structures since the governance structure is proxied by the origin of the 
VCFs. In addition, the existing literature indeed reports that the business behaviours 
of players in domestic and foreign companies are different in many aspects. However, 
the interviews with VCs show that the corporate governance of VCFs has more power 
than the origin of VCFs in predicting VCs’ stage financing strategy in China.  
As there are three foreign VCFs structured as limited companies among the 
interview samples, it provides a good opportunity for looking into the insights of this 
issue. In order to gain more insights and clearer ideas on how the governance structure 
of venture capital firms affects VCs’ investment activities, Table 8.19 compares the 
findings from the semi-structured interviews with FVCs from limited partnerships and 
limited companies, and, domestic limited companies separately.  
It shows that both the subjective views from VCs in these three foreign limited 
companies and their stage financing arrangements in reality are more similar with 
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those of the domestic venture capital firms, which are also structured as limited 
companies, but substantially different from those of their foreign peers under limited 
partnership. For example, as shown in Table 8.19, similar to domestic VCFs, these 
three foreign limited companies arrange ex-ante stage financing contracts much less 
frequently than the other 19 foreign VCFs under limited partnership. Additionally, as 
shown in Table 8.20, these three foreign VCFs structured as limited companies also 
share more similarities in the management of portfolio companies with the domestic 
limited companies than with the foreign VCFs under limited partnership. That is, 
these three foreign VCFs that structured as limited companies communicate and visit 
their portfolio companies much less frequently than the other 19 foreign VCFs which 
are structured as limited partnerships. Similar regularities are also seen in the 
punishment of the unsatisfied projects by the different types of VCFs.  
Table 8.19 Stage Financing Activities of Foreign LPVCFs, Foreign LCVCFs and DVCFs 
 FVCFS DVCFS 
 LPVCFs (#) LCVCFs (#) LCVCFs (#) 
Q1:  Whether you have ever invested the capital by instalments?  
Yes  89.47%  (17) 66.67% (2)  66.67% (8) 
No 11.53% (2)  33.33% (1) 33.33% (4) 
Q2: What is the ratio of the ex-ante staging arrangements in your investment in 
China?  
 49.16% 13.97%  18.45%  
Q3: Would you consider funding next rounds if you see great potentials from the 
company? 
Yes  94.74%(18) 100% (3) 91.67%(11)  
No 5.26%(1) 0 (0) 8.34%(1) 
 
Table 8.20 Management of Portfolios of Foreign LPVCFs, Foreign LCVCFs and DVCFs  
 FVCFS DVCFS 
 LPVCFs (#) LCVCFs (#) LCVCFs (#) 
Q4:  How often you talk to/visit the entrepreneurs/management teams? 
More than three times a week 63.16% (12) 0 (0) 20% (3) 
Once a week  36.84% (7) 100% (3) 60% (7) 
Once two weeks    20% (2) 
Q5: How often you need the portfolio company to provide their financial reports? 
Monthly  94.74% (18)  46.67% (7) 
Seasonally  66.67% (2) 33.33% (3) 
Randomly 5.26% (1) 33.33% (1) 20% (2) 
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Q6: How often you talk to/visit the entrepreneurs/management teams in the two 
months before you make the refinancing decision? 
More than three times a week 94.74% (18) 66.67% (2) 46.67% (5) 
Once a week  5.26% (1)  33.33% (1)  53.33% (7)  
 
In general, although the sample of the three foreign limited companies is small 
in number, the interviews with VCs confirm that confirms that the regularities of 
VCs’ stage financing strategy is more alongside with the line of the governance 
structure of the VCF rather than if the VCF is foreign or domestic. Combining both 
the interview analysis and statistical examinations, this study suggests that VCFs 
under different governance structure vary from each other in ownership structure, 
compensation schemes, decision-making process, information flow and budget 
constraints ect. (refer Chapter 5 for details). These distinctions in governance of VCFs 
in turn affect how the professional investors manage and monitor the portfolio 
companies ex-post in general and, stage financing strategy in particular.  
Another alternative explanation is related to the interpretation on the positive 
relationship seen between the performance of the venture capital backed company and 
the number of venture financing rounds and the total investment. It might be argued 
that the positive relationship does not necessarily mean that better performed 
companies attract further rounds of venture capital investment whereas the bad 
projects are terminated by VCs; rather, it might be other way around, i.e. the better 
performance is driven by more rounds of financing and total investment.  If there are 
no information asymmetry problems and uncertainty, the above assumption might 
make sense. With perfect information, the agency problems are much more easily to 
control: VCs are able to distinguish whether the project is a good one and decide 
whether to continue the investment. In this case, sufficient capital may indeed lead to 
better performance. However, it is well documented that venture capital is associated 
with very serious information asymmetry problems and uncertainty. In addition, as 
reported in earlier sections, VCs stated that they take terminating bad projects as the 
most important reason for staging the capital infusion. It therefore confirms the 
statistical examinations that suggest better performed companies normally induce 
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further rounds of investment in stage financing whereas investments in bad projects 
are withdrawn by VCs.  
In summary, while the alternative explanations might explain some of the 
results, the interviews suggest that the incentives provided to the investment 
professionals by VCFs under different governance structure indeed have impacts on 
VCs’ stage financing strategy in China. The results from the econometric analysis in 
this study are therefore consistent with the interviews with VCs and, the predictions 
derived from firm theory. 
8.6 Conclusion and Implications  
Combining field interviews, archive analysis, hand-collected data, and 
systematic econometric analysis, this study provides a first exploratory analysis on 
how institutions affect VCFs’ stage financing in China. The findings are summarized 
as follows. First, Chinese legal restrictions affect the corporate structure of VCFs in 
China. Second, the corporate structure of VCFs affects venture capitalists’ stage 
financing strategies; only VCFs under the limited partnership structure deploy stage 
financing regularly. Third, when stage financing is deployed regularly, it is used to 
mitigate agency problems as in the United States. 
Confirming the interview impressions, econometric evidence suggests that 
VCFs under limited partnership make more stage financing arrangements than VCFs 
under the limited company structure. More interestingly, the systematic evidence 
suggests that intensity of stage financing increases when agency costs are higher, if 
the investment is made by VCFs under limited partnership. For example, companies 
with higher R&D intensity or younger companies in their early development stage 
lead to shorter durations of financing stages. That is, similar to their counterparts in 
the United States, VCFs under limited partnership in China employ stage financing as 
a means to control potential agency problems. Additionally, stage financing 
arrangements are closely correlated with the performance of the companies backed by 
LPVCFs. Better-performed companies normally gain larger number of financing 
rounds and more capital. That is, similar to their counter parts in the US, VCFs under 
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limited partnership in China employ stage financing as a means to control potential 
agency problems and uncertainties.  
By contrast, however, the evidence also indicates that for Chinese VCFs 
structured as limited companies, there is no relationship between agency problems 
and stage financing strategy. These two groups of contrasting evidences suggest that 
venture capitalists’ stage financing strategies depend on the corporate governance of 
VCFs.  
This study not only contributes to the existing literature on venture capital 
investment and R&D financing, but also contributes to the literature on institutions. 
Above all, this study provides empirical evidence on VCs’ stage financing strategy in 
China, which enriches the existing research on stage financing in venture capital 
investment. In addition, to my knowledge, this discovery on the impacts of corporate 
structure on stage financing is the first of this kind not only for studies on China’s 
venture investment but also in the general literature of venture capital. At the same 
time, this research also addresses some general issues on institutions. The impact of 
institutions on investment activities has attracted extensive interests in the literature. 
Cross-country study is a major approach used in the literature. However, this 
approach has been challenged due to the endogeneity problems associated with the 
approach.  By investigating different corporate structures in the same country and in 
the same industry, a specific mechanism is identified through which institutions exert 
impacts. This study thus contributes to the literature with a ‘natural experiment’ 
approach to study impacts of institutions.  
Finally, this study may also have implications to policymaking and business 
practice. The Chinese government has made many efforts on promoting venture 
capital investment. This empirical assessment on how public policies affect VCs’ 
investment activities in China may help policymakers to adjust the regulations 
accordingly. For example, this study suggests that the regulative restrictions on 
corporate governance may limit the capability of domestic VCFs to provide enough 
incentives to their investment professionals. Consequently, domestic VCs are 
discouraged being responsible enough in ex-post project monitoring, which is 
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suggested to be ultimately important mechanism in venture financing. This empirical 
evidence may therefore remind the government reconsidering the related regulations 
in order to build a friendlier environment for venture capital investment. Regarding 
the business practice, for entrepreneurs who have gained or are seeking for venture 
capital investment, this empirical assessment confirm that VCs not only provide 
capital, but also actively involve in management and governance of the portfolio 
companies. Under this governance framework, ultimately, the capital is contingent to 
the performance of the projects. Recognizing this side of venture financing is very 
important for entrepreneurs, especially entrepreneurs in China, who are not very much 
familiar with this innovative financing instrument. Finally, this study also provides 
venture capitalists a general picture on how their competitors or potential 
collaborators operate under the institutions in China. Moreover, by empirically 
identifying the relationship between governance of venture capital funds and VCs’ ex-
post monitoring incentives, this research may provide practitioners useful information 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion and Implications  
9.1 Summary of this Study  
This thesis explores the institutions of venture capital investment and the 
impacts of these institutions on venture capitalists’ investment strategies in China. It 
documents and analyses the institutional environments and arrangements related to 
venture capital investment in China together with an analysis on the development of 
China’s venture capital industry firstly. This study then examines whether these 
institutions affect VCs’ investment strategies in China; and, if the answer is yes, how 
these institutions impact VCs’ investment in China. The impacts of institutions on 
VCs’ investment activities are examined through three aspects: i.e. VCs’ investment 
preferences in terms of the technology and development stage of their portfolio 
companies, VCs’ ex-ante project screening criteria and VCs’ stage financing 
strategies. 
Both intensive field research and econometric analysis were employed by the 
researcher to achieve these research objectives.  Over 50 unstructured and semi-
structured interviews with venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, researchers, and 
government officials were conducted in China. From the interviews with government 
officials and secondary document analysis, detailed information on institutional 
trajectory related to venture capital industry was obtained. The interviews with 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs provided first hand information on the 
governance of venture capital firms and venture capitalists’ investment strategies in 
China. Specific research questions for quantitative examinations were then derived 
from the analysis on these interviews and secondary documents, and, the 
understanding in the existing literature.   
Detailed investment information on over 800 venture capital backed 
companies, which were backed by over 160 VCFs, was gathered to test the 
assumptions. Secondary document analysis, interviews, and commercial databases 
were the major sources for these quantitative data.  The data cover about one third of 
all venture capital backed deals in China. Combining both qualitative and quantitative 
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approaches, this study provides insightful and systematic information on the 
institutions of the venture capital investment in China, the operation and governance 
of the venture capital firms and the investment strategies of the venture capitalists. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, the data are unique in studies on China’s venture 
capital investment. 
This study reveals that institutional environments and arrangements for 
venture capital investment in China differ from those in developed countries. Under 
the unique institutions, venture capitalists in China share both similarities and 
differences with their peers in the US and other western countries in terms of the 
investment preferences, ex-ante project screening criteria, ex-post monitoring, and 
stage financing activities. At the same time, venture capitalists behave differently in 
their investment in China depending on the governance structure of the venture capital 
firms. The research questions, research methods and the major findings of the major 
analysis chapters, i.e. Chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8 are summarized in Table 9.1.  
9.1.1 Institutions of the Venture Capital Industry in China  
The study shows that China has weak regulatory institutions. Protection of 
property rights is considered critical for finance and entrepreneurship and, 
consequently, venture capital investment (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). However, 
the protection of property rights is weak in China. Chinese Company Law did not 
allow limited partnership as an organizational structure until June 2007. Furthermore, 
convertible security and preferred security were not allowed until 2005. The Chinese 
capital control regime implies that foreign institutional investors are not allowed to 
raise funds in China unless they register as qualified foreign investment institutions. 
However, the threshold of these requirements is too high for most FVCFs. It is also 
well-documented that China’s stock market is underdeveloped; the protection of 
intellectual property rights remains weak; the role of government is unclear; and law 
enforcement is not efficient.  
Normative institutions and cognitive institutions are also different in China. 
The lack of professional business intermediations, the non-standard accounting and 
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auditing system, and the shortage of professionals in banking and finance with market 
economy experience are among the most visible issues in normative institutions in 
China. As for cognitive aspects, Chinese society heavily emphasizes networking 
(Guanxi), face value (Mianzi), and trust (Chengxin).  
Institutions, especially legal restrictions, have strong implications on the 
corporate governance and operation of venture capital firms in China. Above all, the 
corporate structures of the VCFs operating in China are divided into two distinct 
groups. This structural divide is closely associated with different regulatory 
requirements imposed on foreign venture capital firms and domestic venture capital 
funds. Concerning corporate structure, almost all DVCFs are structured as limited 
companies in China, whereas most FVCFs are structured as limited partnerships. In 
China, most DVCFs are established as state-owned subsidiaries or spin-offs of large 
corporations or prestigious universities; FVCFs in China normally incorporate 
overseas and raise funds from international markets to avoid restrictions on corporate 
governance and fundraising. Fund sources for most FVCFs are therefore similar to 
those in the United States (i.e. pension funds, insurance funds, university 
endowments, large corporations, and wealthy individuals).  
Incentive schemes provided by the different types of VCFs to their investment 
professionals, the information flow and decision-making process, and the degree of 
budget constraints of the two types of VCFs also differ. According to the interviews, 
under the control of their parent companies or higher-level supervisional 
organizations, VCFs structured as limited companies are typically organized 
hierarchically. Investment professionals take limited liability with lower incentives. In 
contrast, the governance and the decision-making process are much more independent 
in VCFs under limited partnerships. The investment professionals take unlimited 
liability with high-powered incentives. In addition, the VCFs under limited 
partnerships face harder budget constraints than VCFs structured as limited 
companies. 
In general, according to the interviews, the operation and governance of 
LPVCFs in China are similar to that of the United States, which are well-documented 
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in the existing literature. As for LCVCFs, the governance and operation are 
considerably different.  
9.1.2 VCs’ Investment Strategies in China  
This study further explores VCs’ investment strategies and the interaction 
between VCs’ investment strategies and the unique institutions in China by comparing 
VCs’ investment activities in China with those in the United States and other western 
countries, and, among the different groups of VCFs within China. VCs’ investment 
preferences, ex-ante project screening and ex-post monitoring activities are discussed 
respectively.  
First, VCs’ investment preferences are analyzed. Examining venture 
capitalists’ investment preferences in development stages and R&D intensity, the 
results show that, similar to the practice in the United States, venture capital 
investment supports R&D-oriented companies in China. Over 70 per cent venture 
capital deals are in the high-technology industry. About 90 per cent venture capital 
deals were at in the early or expansion stages at the time of financing by venture 
capital investment.  However, the investment preferences of VCFs are different within 
China. The statistical analysis of 628 venture capital investment deals made by 86 
VCFs shows that the distinctions on the corporate governance structure is the major 
factor contributing to the difference in venture capitalists’ investment preferences in 
China.  VCFs under limited partnership invest more in younger companies and 
companies with higher R&D intensity than VCFs structured as limited companies. In 
addition, VCFs, which invest more in early-staged projects, pay more attention to the 
proprietary of the products in China. Moreover, similar to the US practice, the 
business background of the VCF impacts venture capitalists’ investment choices in 
China. For example, VCFs from California and Massachusetts are more interested in 
early-staged projects in China. However, the analysis shows that that resource 
constraints and cost considerations, which are among the most evidenced factors that 
affect venture capitalists’ investment preferences in the United States, do not seem to 
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matter in venture capitalists’ investment choices in development stage and industry of 
their portfolio companies in China.  
Second, this study further explores how VCs control the potential agency 
problems and uncertainty involved in venture capital investment after the assessments 
of VCs’ investment preferences. VCs’ ex-ante project screening and ex-post 
monitoring activities in China are examined with the focus on the project screening 
criteria and stage financing arrangements respectively.  
Combining the unstructured and semi-structured interviews with the 37 
venture capitalists from 34 VCFs, this study identifies 38 different project screening 
criteria used by venture capitalists in China. Seven categories of project screening 
criteria are classified: entrepreneur’s personality; entrepreneur’s experience; 
management team; characteristics of the product/service; characteristics of the market; 
geographical aspects; and financial considerations. The exploration shows that 
venture capitalists in China share many similarities with their peers in the United 
States and other western countries in terms of project screening criteria. Primarily, all 
the screening criteria, which are recognized by VCs in the US, are also considered as 
major concerns VCs in China. Moreover, similar to their counterparts in the United 
States and other developed countries, VCs in China also consider the characteristics of 
the entrepreneur as the utmost important factor that impacts their ex-ante project 
screening. However, the analysis reports that VCs in China are more demanding than 
their peers in developed countries and impose more screening criteria. Besides the six 
categories of screening criteria identified by VCs in the United States, VCs in China 
add one more category of consideration in project screening, i.e. the geographical 
factors. In particular, VCs in China pay more attention to whether the local public 
policies and regulations are friendly to venture financing and entrepreneurship, and, 
whether the supply of human capital is sufficient. Moreover, VCs in China also add 
some other extra screening criteria in China such as the entrepreneur’s honesty, social 
network, overseas working and educational experience, and the size of the targeted 
market etc. Finally, comparing the project screening criteria employed by VCs within 
China, this study shows that the corporate governance structure of VCFs has strong 
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impact on VCs’ project screening. LPVCFs, which are more risk-taking by investing 
more in younger and more R&D intensive companies, are more demanding in project 
screening than LCVCFs. Thirteen screening criteria are considered as important 
factors for project screening by LPVCFs whereas only nine for LCVCFs. In addition, 
LPVCFs seem to be more profit-driven by giving more weights to the market and 
financial aspects of the projects than LCVCFs. Moreover, LPVCFs are more 
concerned with the institutional factors such as the regulation of the local 
governments and the supply of human capital etc. than LCVCFs. By contrast, 
LCVCFs pay more attention to the technological factors of the projects than LPVCFs.  
Furthermore, examining venture capitalists ex-post monitoring activities in 
China through the lens of stage financing arrangements, this study finds that VCs’ ex-
post monitoring strategy depends a lot on the corporate governance structure of the 
VCF. VCFs under limited partnership make much more stage financing arrangements 
than VCFs structured as limited companies. More importantly, the stage financing 
arrangements are associated the agency costs and uncertainty only for the deals 
backed by LPVCFs. For example, LPVCFs evaluate the companies with higher R&D 
intensity of companies at earlier stages more frequently by shortening the duration 
between financing rounds. In addition, the performance of the companies backed by 
LPVCFs is significantly and positively associated with a larger number of total 
financing rounds and financing size. All the above mentioned observations with VCFs 
under limited partnership are similar to the discoveries in the United States, where the 
limited partnership is a dominant organizational form for venture capital firms. By 
contrast, however, this study shows LCVCFs seldom stage the capital infusion in 
China. Moreover, for these Chinese VCFs structured as limited companies, there is no 
relationship between agency problems and VCs’ stage financing strategy. These two 
groups of contrasting evidences on VCs’ stage financing strategies suggest that VCs’ 
the corporate governance structure of VCFs has significant impacts on VCs’ ex-post 
monitoring activities in China. 
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Table 9.1 Summary of the Major Analysis Chapters  
 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter7 Chapter8  
Title  Development of Venture 
Capital Investment and 
Institutions in China  
Venture Capitalists’ Investment 
Preferences in China 
Venture Capitalists’ 
Project Screening 
Strategies in China 
Venture Capitalists’ Ex-post 
Monitoring and Stage Financing 
Strategies in China 
Questions 1. How is venture capital 
investment developed in 
China? 
2. What are the major 
institutional elements 
related to venture capital 
investment in China?  
3. What are the institutions 
potentially imply to venture 
capital investment in 
China?  
1. What are VCs’ investment 
preferences in China in stage and 
technology?  
2. Whether and how do 
institutions impact on VCs’ 
investment preferences in China?  
 
1. What are the major 
ex-ante project 
screening criteria 
employed by VCs? 
2. Whether and how do 
institutions affect VCs’ 
project screening 
criteria in China? 
1. How do institutions affect 
VCs’ stage financing activities?  
2. Does the agency problems 
between VCs and entrepreneurs 
affect VCs’ stage financing 
arrangements?  
3. Does the agency relationship 
between VCs and the ultimate 
fund investors have impacts on 





1. Portfolio methodology  
2. Agency theory   
 
1. Theory of 
information asymmetry 
2. New institutional  
economics  
1. Theory of information 
asymmetry  
2.  Agency theory 
Research 
design  
Combination of qualitative 
and quantitative empirical 
approaches  







Combination of qualitative and 
quantitative empirical approaches 
Samples 1.Two government officers  
2.Two researchers  
3.Four entrepreneurs  
4.37 VCs from 34 VCFs  
1. 37 VCs from 34 VCFs;  
2. Four entrepreneurs;  
3. 628 venture financing deals 
made by 86 VCFs 
1. 37 VCs from 34 
VCFs;  
2. Four entrepreneurs;  
 
1. 37 VCs from 34 VCFs;  
2. Four entrepreneurs;  




1. Interview descriptions;   
2. Secondary document 
analysis  
1.Interview descriptions;  
2. Descriptive quantitative 
analysis;  
3. OLS regressions 
 
1. Interview 
descriptions;   
2. Descriptive 
quantitative analysis;  
3. Factor analysis  
1. Interview descriptions;   
2. Descriptive quantitative 
analysis;  
3. Cox regressions; OLS 
regressions; Poisson regressions.  





2. Secondary documents 
1. Interviews 
2. ‘VentureEconomics’  
3. Secondary documents 
4. ‘Survey for Large and 
Medium sized Industrial 






2. ‘VentureEconomics’  
3. Secondary documents 
4. ‘Survey for Large and Medium 




1. The development of 
China’s venture capital 
industry is path-dependent.  
2. Legal and financing 
institutions are extremely 
weak in China.  
3. VCFs are divided into 
groups in organizational 
structure due to the legal 
restrictions. LPVCFs are 
more decentralized in 
management and providing 
higher-powered incentives 
to investment professionals 
like their peers in the US. 
LCVCFs are more 
centralized and providing 
lower-powered incentives.  
 
1. Venture capital is 
concentrated in early-staged and 
R&D intensive companies in 
China that is similar to the US 
practice. 
2. VCFs are different in 
investment preferences in stage 
and technology of portfolio 
companies. 
3. Regulatory institutions have 
visible impacts on VC’s 
investment focuses. The impacts 
are more alongside with the line 
of the corporate governance 
structure of VCFs. LCVCFs are 
more risk moderate than 
LPVCFs by investing more in 
older companies with lower 
technological intensity. 
 
1. Similar to the US 
practice, the human 
capital, market, 
product, and financial 
elements of the projects 
are also emphasize by 
VCs in China.  
 2. The institutions 
indeed have impacts on 
ex-ante screening. That 
is, VCs are more 
demanding in project 
screening in China 
under the weak 
regulatory institutions  
3. LPVCFs are more 
demanding in project 
screening than 
LCVCFs and paying 
more attention to the 
institutional, financial 
and human capital 
elements than 
LCVCFs. LCVCFs pay 
more attention to the 
technology aspects.  
1. Institutions, especially the rules 
on corporate governance, have 
significant impacts on VCs’ ex-
post monitoring activities in 
China.  
2. The stage financing activities 
of LPVCFs in China are similar 
to those in the US. They stage 
capital infusion frequently.  In 
addition, the impacts of the 
agency issues between VCs and 
entrepreneurs and the 
performance of the projects on 
stage financing are only seen with 
the projects backed by LPVCFs.  
3.  LCVCFs seldom stage capital 
infusion. In addition, there is no 
visible regularity associated with 
their stage financing 
arrangements.  
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9.2 Discussions 
The empirical discoveries summarized in the earlier section suggest that 
institutions and agency perspectives have strong impacts on venture capital 
investment in China. In general, these findings are consistent with the existing 
literature on new institutional economics and venture capital investment. However, 
different from the most widely the impacts of regulatory institutions on venture 
capital investment are not alongside with the line of protection of property rights; 
rather, the rules on corporate governance have stronger power in explaining VCs’ 
investment in China. In addition, expanding the existing literature on venture capital 
investment, this study empirically confirms that the ‘double-sided’ agency problems 
are important in understanding venture financing.  
9.2.1 The Impact of Institutions on VCs’ Investment Activities in China  
Primarily, this study shows that the regulatory institutional environments 
contribute to the differences in the corporate governance of VCFs. As discussed, 
VCFs in China are divided into two distinctive groups in term of the organizational 
structure. This divide is caused by the legal restrictions on corporate governance and 
restrictive regulations on registration as a QFII in China. New institutional economics 
argues that that business behaviour is affected by institutional arrangements, i.e. the 
agreements made by specific individuals to govern their own relationships 
(Williamson, 1979; Milgrom and Robert, 1992). In particular, firms under different 
governance structure provide different incentives to the business actors, and in turn 
affect individuals’ business behaviours and performance. It suggests that under a more 
decentralized and market structure framework, transactions take place through a more 
market-oriented system. Market prices provide actors strong incentives for exploiting 
profit opportunities and quickly adapting to changing circumstances. By contrast, 
under a more centralized and hierarchical structure, in which trading parties are under 
unified ownership and control, the firms offer managers weaker incentives to 
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maximize profits and thus incur additional bureaucratic costs (Williamson, 1986; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
Confirming the above arguments of new institutional economics, this study 
indeed finds that the organizational structure substantially affects the governance and 
operation of a firm. For instance, the compensation schemes, decision-making process, 
and information flow and budget constraints of the VCFs under difference 
organizational structure are visibly different in China. That is, VCFs under limited 
partnership is more decentralized in governance, providing higher-powered incentives 
to their investment professionals. By contrast, VCFs structured as limited companies, 
which are more centralized organizations, provide lower-powered incentives to their 
investment professionals.  
More importantly, the discoveries of this study provide further evidence that 
the corporate governance structure of VCFs have strong power in explaining VCs’ 
investment strategies in China. That is, VCFs under different governance structure 
behave differently in investment in China. Overall, the findings suggest that VCFs 
under limited partnership encourage the investment professionals to take higher risks 
for higher returns exert more efforts in mitigating the potential agency problems and 
uncertainty both ex-ante and ex-post than the VCFs structured as limited companies in 
China. For instance, VCFs under a limited partnership are more risk-taking than those 
under a more hierarchical structure by investing more in younger and more R&D-
oriented companies. Also, the VCFs under limited partnership are more demanding in 
their project screening and more involved in ex-post monitoring activities, such as 
stage financing in China. It is also very interesting to notice that, the investment 
strategies of VCFs under limited partnership in China share visible commonalities 
with those of the United States, where the limited partnership is the dominant 
organizational form for venture capital firms. These discoveries again confirm the 
predictions of on new institutional economics that the different incentives provided by 
different organizations may substantially influence on the way of the business actors 
exerting efforts and reacting to risks.  
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Besides, this study indicates that some other regulatory institutions also 
contribute to VCs’ investment activities in China. Above all, it suggests that the 
overall weak legal and financial systems in China have visible impacts on VCs’ ex-
ante project screening. As the interviews show that VCs in China identified more 
project screening criteria in China. Most of the extra criteria are those related to the 
concerns of the lack of protection of contracts and weak enforcement of laws.  For 
instance, besides the commonly recognized screening criteria in the West, VCs in 
China place great emphasis on the honesty and social networks of the entrepreneur. 
According to the interviews, VCs try to take the self-discipline of the entrepreneur to 
overcome the lack of legal protection for institutional financiers and the weak law 
enforcement. Moreover this study confirms the arguments of Johnston (1997) by 
suggesting that the social networks of the entrepreneur works as a complement to the 
contract law or serve as a kind of a surrogate market system due to ill-defined 
property rights, economic roles, and a restricted flow of information.  
Additionally, VCs in China pay much more attention to the geographical 
location of the projects due to the concerns about the public policies of local 
governments and the supply of human resources in different areas. This finding 
confirms that existing literature that suggest the decentralization of China’s 
governance and the great regional diversity in China have significant impacts on 
individuals’ business behaviours and regional development (Gerald, Qian and Xu, 
2006).  
At the same time, the positive relationship between VCs’ investment in early-
staged projects and the proprietary of products indicates that the protection on 
intellectual property rights may also affect VCs’ investment preferences. This finding 
is consistent with the existing literature that emphasizing the impact of protection of 
intellectual property rights on R&D financing.  
Furthermore, this study also suggests that the macroeconomic environment is 
seen as a major concern by venture capitalists in China. For instance, VCs in China 
pay more attention to the market aspects of the projects in ex-ante screening than their 
peers in the United States and other countries. In particular, the market size and the 
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market acceptance of the products are especially emphasized that suggests that the 
large market is the particularly seen as an attraction for VCs to invest in China.  
It is interesting to notice that while the regulatory institutions are shown as 
important factors that explain venture capital investment in China, the empirical 
evidence from this study show that normative and cognitive institutions do not seem 
to have visible impacts on VCs’ investment preferences, ex-ante project screening and 
stage financing in China. The social culture of China has been widely believed to have 
influential impacts on individuals’ business behaviours in this country. In particular, 
the Confucianism, which places high value on social networks (Guanxi), social capital 
(Face--Mianzi), and trust among are emphasized a lot by researchers friends (Ford, 
1997; Graham and Lam, 2003). However, these arguments do not seem to have strong 
predicting power in understanding VCs’ investment activities in China. There are 
some potential explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, the concept of venture 
capital investment is newly transferred from the United States to China. As a matter of 
fact, almost all nations try to duplicate the ‘Silicon Valley Model’. The local culture 
may therefore not as much interwoven with venture capital financing as in other 
traditional business. Secondly, according to the interviews, the majority of VCs and 
the entrepreneurs for venture capital targeted projects are young and highly educated. 
In particular, over 80 per cent VCs and about 50 per cent entrepreneurs once studied 
and worked in the United States and other western countries. They have been exposed 
to standard western education and involved much in western world; the impact of 
traditional culture might be diluted during the process. Thirdly, venture capitalists, as 
private equity investors, are specialized financial professionals that they are trained to 
be more rational in decision-making. This element may also weaken the impacts of 
social culture on venture financing.  
In general, this study supports the arguments of new institutional economics, 
which suggest institutions have strong impacts on individuals’ business behaviours 
and performance. With an insightful empirical analysis on venture capital investment 
in China, this study suggests that regulatory institutions, especially the regulations on 
corporate governance and the restrictive rules on foreign institutional investors have 
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significant impacts on the governance structure of VCFs. The corporate governance 
structure of VCFs in turn affects VCs’ investment activities in China. That is, VCFs 
under limited partnership behave similarly to those under the same governance 
structure in the United States, whereas VCFs under the limited company structure 
behave differently from either the VCFs under limited partnership in China or their 
peers in the United States. This study therefore implicitly implies that institutions 
impact venture capitalists’ investment strategies mainly through the channel of the 
corporate governance structure of VCFs in China.  
9.2.2 The Impact of Agency Problems on Venture Capital Investment  
Consistent with the existing literature on venture capital investment, this study 
suggests that agency theory also has strong power to explain venture capital 
investment in China like the practice in the United States.  
The agency perspective is generally considered as the most important theory to 
understand the mechanisms of venture capital investment in the existing literature. In 
general, there are two sets of agency relationships involved, i.e. the relationship 
between the venture capitalist and the ultimate investors of venture capital funds and, 
the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. It is well 
documented that venture capital investment encounters severe information 
asymmetric problems and high level of uncertainty that determine the agency 
problems are more serious than traditional institutional investment means. As 
discussed, venture capital investment is highly specialised that the ultimate investors 
of the venture capital funds are not able to fully observe how many efforts the venture 
capitalist exerts and how well the funds are managed whilst the venture capitalist has 
much more and better information. At the same time, there are also severe information 
asymmetries between venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs they back. That is, it is 
very hard for venture capitalists to fully observe and verify the efforts made by the 
entrepreneurs and the performance of the projects. Due to the serious and complicated 
agency problems involved in venture financing, most of the existing literature focuses 
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on the mechanisms employed in venture capital investment to deal with these agency 
problems.  
This study shows that both sets of agency issues may affect VCs’ investment 
activities. In particular, the argument of the ‘double-sided’ agency issues is especially 
helpful in interpreting the distinctions in investment strategies between VCFs under 
different corporate governance structures. As discussed in the foregoing text, the 
incentives provided to investment professionals by different VCFs are diverse. At the 
same tine, the risk-taking capability, the efforts exerted in project screening and ex-
post monitoring activities and the sensitivity to profits of the investment professionals 
are distinctive depending on the corporate governance structure of the VCFs. These 
evidences show that besides the agency issues between the entrepreneurs and VCs, the 
agency issues between VCs and the ultimate investors of the venture funds also have 
strong impacts on VCs’ investment activities. It confirms that how the ultimate fund 
investors provide incentives to VCs directly affect the how VCs govern the 
investments in the growing entrepreneurial firms.  
In addition, the empirical evidence in this study suggests that the agency 
perspective is very helpful in understanding the commonalities of VCs’ investment 
strategies in China with those in the United States and other Western countries. This 
study finds that consistent with the existing literature, VCs not only provide capital to 
entrepreneurs, but also exert many efforts in ex-ante evaluation and ex-post 
monitoring activities in China to control potential agency costs (Gompers and Lerner, 
1999). For example, similar to their peers in the United States, VCs in China examine 
many aspects of a proposal before further evaluation. More interestingly, the 
screening criteria employed by venture capitalists in China, both foreign and domestic, 
share many similarities to those used in the United States. Moreover, similar to the US 
practice, for sectors where agency problems are more sever, stage financing is used 
more frequently. These findings indicate the concerns for agency problems associated 
with the potential portfolio companies indeed affect venture capitalists’ investment 
activities in China that is consistent with the previous literature.  
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In summary, the empirical investigations report that venture capitalists in 
China display both similarities and differences in their investment behaviours 
compared to their peers in the United States. It suggests that institutions, especially 
regulatory institutions indeed affect venture capital investment in China. First, 
regulatory institutions restrict the corporate governance structures of venture capital 
firms. The corporate governance structure further influences venture capitalists’ 
investment activities. It therefore implicitly suggests that institutions impact venture 
capitalists’ investment preferences mainly through the channel of the corporate 
governance structure of VCFs. In addition, this study suggest that the agency 
perspective is also capable to explain venture capital investment in China that is 
consistent with the majority existing literature on venture capital investment based on 
the observations in Western countries.  
Overall, this study contributes to the existing literature on venture capital 
investment and R&D financing, and, to the literature on institutions. Above all, this 
study provides empirical evidence on institutions of venture capital investment and 
VCs’ investment strategies in China based on a large number of samples and in-depth 
explorations. It provides a thorough assessment on VCs’ investment focuses, project 
screening and ex-post monitoring activities in China that is useful for further 
comparative research. In addition, to the researcher’s knowledge, this discovery on 
the impacts of corporate structure on stage financing is the first of this kind not only 
for studies on China’s venture investment but also in the general literature of venture 
capital. It is thus among the first empirical studies addressing the interaction between 
the two sets of agency relationship in venture financing. Although the ‘double-sided’ 
agency problems have been identified and emphasized by many researchers, the 
existing literature is mainly focused on the agency issues between VCs and 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, the few studies, which addressed the agency issues between 
VCs and the ultimate fund investors, seldom pay attention to how the ‘VC-fund 
investor’ relationship may affect the governance of ‘VC-entrepreneur’ relationship. 
This study therefore fills up this knowledge gap by providing an analysis on the 
interaction between these two sets of agency relationships.  
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Moreover, this research also addresses some general issues on institutions. As 
stated, the role of institutions playing on investment activities has long been debating.  
Cross-country studies are a major approach used in the existing empirical literature on 
institutions. However, this approach has been challenged due to the endogeneity 
problems since many cross country factors could not be controlled. By investigating 
investment activities of VCFs under different corporate structures within one country 
and one industry, this study tries to identify the specific mechanism through which 
institutions exert influence. This study thus contributes to the existing literature with 
an implicit ‘natural experiment’ approach to study the impact of institutions.  
9.2.3 Limitations of this Study 
Although the research results of this study has explored venture capital 
investment in China and provided a comprehensive understanding on the interaction 
between institutions and venture financing in China that enriched the existing 
literature on both institutions and venture capital investment, the constraints of this 
study should not be ignored.  
Primarily, although the ‘triangulation’ method, which combines both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, used in this study allows the researcher to 
improve and secure the reliability and validity of this study, the data collected are 
potentially liable to biased results. The samples of the interviews, which were selected 
by convenience and snowball sampling methods, might be challenged for its lack 
capability to represent the population. This weakness is especially seen with the 
investigation on VCs’ project screening criteria, which is mainly based on interviews. 
The sampling issues also exist with the quantitative data. As stated, the researcher 
combines two subsets of data from different sources, i.e. one is from the commercial 
database, and the other one is gathered by the researcher from secondary document. 
For the data collected from secondary document by the researcher, the samples were 
again mainly chosen by accessibility rather than pre-set systematic sampling strategies 
due to the difficulties to gain sufficient data. At the same time, the compatibility of 
these two subsets of database might also by challenged though the researcher have 
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made many efforts to duplicate the data collection methods of the commercial 
database during the secondary document analysis to make sure the two datasets are 
more compatible. Moreover, there are potential researcher biases in this study. The 
researcher once worked in a venture capital backed company that might lead to more 
researcher reflexivity due to the personal involvements of the researcher with the 
research subjects. Besides, given the time constraints and the difficulties in accessing 
to the research subjects, some issues could not be discussed thoroughly.  Extending 
the empirical base to include more samples with more strategic sampling methods 
would allow greater confidence in the research results and allow more generalised 
results.  
In addition, while the analysis of this study has substantially improved our 
understandings in venture capital in China, the explanations for the research results 
might be challenged. As stated, the major finding of this study is the impact of 
corporate governance structure of VCFs on venture capitalists’ investment activities. 
However, since the accurate data on the organizational structure of VCFs are not 
available, this study takes the origin of the VCF (i.e. whether the VCF is a domestic 
one or a foreign one) as a proxy for the corporate governance structure. This might be 
questioned whether the differences in VCs’ investment activities between groups is 
due to the distinction of VCFs’ corporate governance structure or the differences 
between foreign and domestic firms. Although the interviews with the practitioners 
suggest that the corporate governance structure of VCFs seem to be more relevant, a 
further investigation with accurate information on VCFs’ corporate governance 
structure would allow deeper and more convincing understanding in this issue. Some 
other issues related to the explanations and the validity of the variables also exist in 
this study.  
Moreover, associated with the concerns on the variables and explanations for 
the analysis, the quantitative analysis shows that some of the R-square values for the 
regressions analyses are relatively low that may suggest other factors may better 
explain the dependent variables. However, due to the lack of data in private equity 
investment, it is almost impossible for researchers to test other possibilities. Low R-
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square values are thus commonly seen in studies on venture capital investment. For 
example, the R-square values of the regression examinations of Mayer et al. (2005) 
and Gompers (1995), which investigate VCs’ investment preferences and stage 
financing arrangements respectively, are even lower than the R-square values in this 
study. Due to the data constraints and the aims to make this study comparable with the 
existing research, it is beyond the researchers’ attempt and capability to identify other 
factors in this study. However, the regressions show that the R-square values 
substantially increase when the variable on corporate governance structure of the VCF 
is included into the examinations in both the examination on VCs’ investment 
preferences and stage financing activities. The results therefore confirm the major 
findings of this study that suggests the corporate governance structure of VCFs has 
important impacts on VCs’ investment strategies.  
9.2.4 Further Research  
The study on venture capital investment is still immature, both theoretically 
and empirically. More research, especially empirical analysis, is called for in order to 
advance our understanding of venture capital investment and the relationship between 
venture financing and entrepreneurship and institutions.  
The first possible research direction is to extend the empirical investigations 
on venture capital investment in China. As discussed, there is very little knowledge on 
China’s venture capital investment although China’s venture capital market is among 
the most active ones in the world, and, anecdotally, many new high-technology 
companies were backed by venture capital investment in this country. More studies on 
the economic impacts of venture capital investment on China’s innovation and 
entrepreneurship, the impact of venture financing on the performance of the venture 
capital backed companies, the mechanisms used in venture capital investment in 
China including the investment contracts, the syndicated investment, and the ex-post 
supporting and monitoring activities etc. are all important topics for further research.  
The second potential research direction is to compare venture capital 
investment with other traditional financing instruments in order to gain more 
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understanding in the mechanisms of venture capital investment. It has been long 
suggested that venture capital investment is different from traditional institutional 
investors in many ways. However, what makes venture financing so unique; why 
other institutional investors are not able to support the projects, which are associated 
with more uncertainty and higher profits, like venture capital firms are the 
fundamental issues for understanding in the underlying of mechanisms of venture 
financing.  It therefore suggests comparative examinations on the governance and 
investment activities between venture capital institutions and other financial 
institutions.  
The third research direction is to further examine the interactions between 
mechanisms used in venture financing.  As documented in the existing literature, 
many mechanisms are used in venture financing. However, most of the previous study 
examines the mechanisms separately that may fail to capture the major mechanisms of 
venture financing. For example, this study shows there is close relationship between 
the governance of VCFs and VCs’ governance on their portfolio companies. In 
addition, it also finds that the risk-taking degree of the VCFs is also related to VCs’ 
ex-ante project screening and ex-post monitoring activities. It would be of value to 
both academic research and business practice if further research could systematically 
examined the interwoven relationships between the ex-ante evaluations, contracting, 
stage financing and syndicated investment etc.  
The fourth research question centres on exploring how institutions matter 
venture financing and entrepreneurship. It is normally accepted by researchers that 
institutions have impacts on business behaviours. However, how the institutions work, 
what institutions contribute to what kind of business behaviours have been debated. 
This study finds that the impact of institutions on venture financing in China is mainly 
alongside the line with the rules on corporate governance that is different from the 
existing literature emphasizing the impact of property rights. It therefore calls for 
further examinations focusing on identifying the specific institutional elements on 
venture financing and entrepreneurship under different circumstance to gain deeper 
understanding in institutions.  
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9.3 Implications for Policymaking and Business Practice  
As one of the first empirical explorations on venture capital investment in 
China, this empirical study not only contributes to the existing literature, but also has 
implications to policymaking and business practice.   
In recent years, China has made many efforts to encourage venture capital 
investment with the expectation to stimulate entrepreneurship, especially R&D 
entrepreneurship activities. However, without a solid empirical analysis, it is hard to 
assess how institutional changes work in reality. This study therefore provides 
policymakers useful information on how these institutions interact with venture 
capital investment practice based on empirical examinations. Consequently, it 
provides alternative suggestions on policymaking. In general, this study suggests that 
although venture capital investment has been developed rapidly in recent years, the 
weak regulatory institutions might restrict further development of venture capital in 
China.  
Above all, it suggests that the policymakers should improve the rules on 
corporate governance. As stated, the regulative restrictions on organizational structure 
in China restrict the choices of domestic VCFs in corporate governance and, 
consequently limit the incentives these VCFs may provide to their investment 
professionals. Associated with these limitations, the domestic VCFs, which are all 
structured as limited companies, are less capable in supporting young and R&D 
intensive companies than those VCFs under limited partnership. In addition, VCFs 
structured as limited companies discourage VCs taking responsibilities in ex-ante 
project screening and ex-post monitoring activities, which are believed as important 
mechanisms in venture capital financing. These empirical evidences therefore suggest 
that the policymakers should encourage certain types of VCFs under different 
circumstances by adjusting the regulatory institutions. As discussed, the limited 
partnership as an organizational form has just been legally recognized in China since 
June, 2007. This institutional change may increase the flexibility for the both the 
domestic and foreign VCFs in the choice of governance and incentive schemes 
employed in China.  
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Furthermore, this study suggests the government improving the regulatory 
restrictions on foreign institutional investors. As discussed, foreign venture capital 
investment has become the major contributors to China’s venture capital market. In 
addition, China is becoming the most favorite destination for foreign venture funds 
that more foreign funds are entering into this Market. However, the interviews with 
practitioners and the analysis on the existing government policies show that foreign 
investors are encountered many obstacles operating in China including the rigid 
requirements for registering as a QFII in China, the restrictions on fundraising for 
foreign investors, the non-convertibility of RMB, etc. These restrictions might 
discourage the inflow of foreign venture investment in China.  
Moreover, this study suggests that the government should improve the 
protection for intellectual property rights. As discussed, the Chinese government has 
promoted venture capital program for years in order to stimulate investments in newly 
established companies and high-technology companies. This study shows VCFs, 
which invest more in early-staged companies pay more attention to the proprietary of 
the products. It therefore advises that the government should build up a better 
institutional environment to protect the intellectual property rights and encourage 
more investments in younger companies.  
There are also some other policymaking implications proposed by this study. 
For example, it suggests that the government strengthening law enforcement to 
protect the contracting parties of venture capital investment. In addition, the local 
governments should improve higher education and professional training to improve 
the human capital supply for young growing enterprise in order to attract more 
venture capital funds. Moreover, the governments, both the central and local ones, 
should try to provide a more stable and apparent regulatory environment that the 
investment activities are protected by a consistent legal and financial system.   
Finally, this study also has implications to business practitioner, i.e. the three 
groups of players in venture capital investment. Primarily, by providing detailed 
information on the institutions related to venture capital investment in China, this 
study might help all the business players gain general knowledge on the business 
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environment in China. Both those who are operating in this market, and, those who 
wish to enter into this market, may gain thoughrough understanding in what potential 
institutional issues they may encounter; what opportunities and threats are associated 
with this market, and how they may  overcome the potential institutional restrictions.   
In addition, the insightful examinations on VCs’ investment activities in China 
also provide helpful information to the business practitioners. Venture capitalists, may 
learn what kind of projects are attractive to their potential and competitors or 
collaborators; what their potential competitors and collaborators see as risks and 
advantages related to this market; and, how they organize the ex-post monitoring 
activities etc from this empirical study. This information may help VCs to locate their 
own market positions, recognize the potential weakness and strengths they have 
compared to their competitors, and, figure out who might be their potential 
collaborators in this market.  This study also has implications to the ultimate investors 
of venture capital funds. With the empirical evidence on the governance of the 
venture capital funds and its impacts on VCs’ investment activities and investment 
performance, this study provides the investors of venture capital funds some helpful 
information on how to structure the relationship between VCs and themselves and, 
consequently reduce the potential agency costs.  
Moreover, this study also contributes to the business practice of entrepreneurs. 
Venture capital investment is still very new in China. The interviews with 
entrepreneurs and VCs show that the founders of start-up companies are seriously 
lack of knowledge on venture capital investment. This study may therefore provide 
these entrepreneurs empirical knowledge and direct evidence on what venture capital 
investment by nature is and how venture capital investment operates in China. The 
entrepreneurs may gain useful information on what kind of VCFs may have interests 
in their projects from the analysis on VCs’ investment preferences. In addition, the 
analyses on ex-ante project screening provide detailed information on the key issues 
VCs are concerned. It therefore reminds the entrepreneurs what points should be 
addressed with more attention in the project proposal. More importantly, the analysis 
on stage financing suggests the entrepreneurs being aware that venture capital is not 
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just capital, it is associated with deep involvements and monitoring activities from 
VCs. And, the capital infusion is closely related to the performance of the projects.  It 
further suggests entrepreneurs seriously considering how far the project may go and 
how well the project will do before seeking for venture capital investment. In addition, 
it also reminds the entrepreneurs that they have to lose some control of their own 
companies for the capital they gain. 
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